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Abstract: In 1990s there has been a "boom" of extensive technology foresight 
studies based on the use of the Delphi method. This study examines critically e.g. 
national foresight studies made in Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Austria. The study suggests that the epistemic paradigm of the general theory of 
consistency (GTC), presented in the book, can provide working epistemic foun­
dations for futures studies and for technology foresight Delphi studies in special. 
Results of the national foresight exercises are examined with an epistemic utility 
model based on GTC. The epistemic utility is a modification of the traditionai 
utility concept of investment theory. New conceptual tools are used for the analy­
sis of the expertise and information policies of different expert groups in technol­
ogy Delphi studies. Empirical background of discussion are three technology 
Delphi studies made by the author. They concerned use of computer based in­
formation services of households, new biotechnology and the material technol­
ogy. Based on these studies a special interpretation of the Delphi method is pro­
vided: the Argument Delphi. 
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SUMMARY 
An important goal of this study is to analyse how expert knowledge eould be 
relevant for foresight on innovations (or generalizations) based on generic teeh­
nologies. A "generie teehnology" opens up a wide range of possibilities for fur­
ther innovations in many seetors of eeonomy (eompare Martin 1996, 1 ) .  
Another focus of the study i s  to suggest new episternie or philosophieal founda­
tions for futures studies. As Bell ( 1997 1, 166- 167) has remarked, epistemology 
has remained one of the least developed aspeets of futures studies: 
Despite a few efforts, sueh as those of de Jouvenel ( 1967), Helmer and 
Reseher ( 1960), Mitroff and Turoff ( 1975), Ogilvy ( 1992), Scheele 
( 1 975), Masini ( 198 1 , 1 982, 1993) and a few other futurists, epistemol­
ogy remains one of the least developed aspeets of futures studies. 
There is irony in this faet, since methodology - specific researeh tools 
and teehniques - to the contrary, is one of the most developed aspects 
of the field, and there are, of eourse, implieit epistemological assump­
tions and commitments that necessarily underlie every method. 
The eritique of Bell is direeted to the Delphi method, as well as at other methods. 
The Delphi method is probably the most often used method in teehnology fore­
sight studies made by futurists. 
The discussion in this study proeeeds from the general epistemie questions of 
futures studies to the speeifie problems of teehnology foresight Delphi studies. In 
the 1 990s, there has been a "boom" of extensive teehnology foresight studies 
based on the use of the Delphi method. My analysis is mueh based on the critieal 
exarnination of these studies and espeeially foresight studies made in Japan, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria (Delphi Report Austria 1 998, Cuhls 
1 998, Cuhls et a1. 1998, NISTEP 1997, Georghiou 1996, Elliott 1996, Cuhls et 
a1. 1996, Loveridge et a1. 1995, Cuhls and Kuwahara 1994, Grupp 1993, Grupp 
1 993b). 
The empirical baekground of diseussion eomprises three teehnology Delphi 
studies made by the author. Each of them used different methodology than the 
national studies. The studies eoneerned use of eomputer-based information serv-
ices of households (Kuusi 1 987, 1991b), new biotechnology (Kuusi 1 991)  and 
new material technology (1994). Before this study, the results of these Delphi 
studies have been available only in Finnish. 
My examination is mostly methodological. Different chapters of the book are 
focused on different methodological problems of Delphi studies. The chapters 
can be seen as rather independent essays, which are loosely interconnected. 
Chapter 1 is the most general one. It suggests an epistemic paradigm. 1 consider 
that the epistemic paradigm of the general theory of consistency (GTC), which 
was originally presented by Kuusi ( 1974), can provide working epistemic foun­
dations for futures studies in general and especially for technology foresight Del­
phi studies. Technological paradigms and their "developer communities" are the 
focus of Chapter 2. 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 provide starting points for Chapter 3. In Chapter 3 two 
main theoretical contributions 1 of this study are presented: the epistemic utility 
model and three basic types of reasonability of technology foresight studies: pre­
dictive, option and commitment reasonability. In Chapter 3, 1 also present basic 
features of the Argument Delphi, which might be the most important practical 
contribution of the study. 
The epistemic utility model, the three types of reasonability and the Argument 
Delphi are the background of Chapter 4, which discusses group communication 
aspects of the Delphi method. At the end of this chapter, 1 make methodological 
concIusions conceming the future use of the Delphi method in technology fore­
sight studies. Chapter 5 discusses the typical types of expertise and information 
policies of different expert groups in a technology Delphi (for example typical 
biases in judgments and arguments).  Chapter 6 looks at methodologically inter­
esting aspects of the Argument Delphi based on my experiences and on results of 
the three technology Delphi studies in which 1 have been the Delphi manager. 
Final conclusions are presented in the chapter seven. 
1 I of course consider that the general theory of consistency is also an important theoretical contribution. 
It is published for the first time in English in this dissertation. 
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1. EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 
ABOUT THE FUTURE 
1.1 The Oracle at Delphi and the Anticipatory Rationale 
The name of the Delphi method is a half-ironical reference to an ancient appreci­
ated "experts" on the future: the orac1es of Apollo at Delphi or Pythiae. The 
"divine madness" of the Pythia ( based perhaps on drugs) was evidently gener­
allyl recognised to be one kind of expertise about the future. "Divine madness" or 
plain talk to authorities, without taking into account the possible consequences of 
hard words, have been a distinctive sign of a believed prophet. Henri Troyat 
( 1984, 1 26-1 27) tells in his biography of Ivan the Terrible, the Tsar of Russia 
( 1547-1 584), how a prediction sayed Pskov from destruction. After cruel terror in 
Novgorod based on erroneous suspicions of conspiracy with Poland, Ivan and his 
army entered Pskov, the other "conspiracy" town Pihkova: 
Troyat tells that Ivan decided to visit in a cell of a monk, Nikolai, who saw vi­
sions. Ivan met a half-naked, thin, wild-Iooking, unshaved man with a necklace. 
The man gave hirn a piece of raw meat looking at hirn impudently and arrogantly. 
"1 am Christian",  the tsar said to hirn, "1 do not eat meat during the great Lent". 
The hermit answered firmly: "You do bad things: you eat human blood and meat, 
you do not forget not only the Lent but the God". He predicted to the tsar that he 
would be struck by lightning, if he would move even a hair of child in Pskov. At 
the same time black c10uds covered the sky. The tsar heard a distant c1ap of thun­
der. For safety's sake Ivan ordered his army to leave the town, because the God 
likes to express Himself through the mouths of simple (Mad of Christ). 
Was the monk an expert about the future? That is a tough epistemic question 
which 1 will discuss in chapter 3 .  If the defining feature of an expert about the 
future2 is that he or she is able to produce relevant arguments concerning the fu-
1 The "father of history" Herodotos refers in many connections in his book History to the answers of the 
oracle at Delphi. Actually he refers to many oracles. According to Herodotos (the Book 1, 47-49, Hero­
dotos 1907, 24-25) the king of Lydia, Kroisos, even tested the predictions of different oracles. He real­
ized that the oracle at Delphi was the best in "prediction reasonability". 
2 According to Jarvis ( 1990) an expert is a person, who based on the evaluation of the peer group and 
has some special know1edge or skills. An important feature in this definition is that the expertise is 
2 
ture, 1 consider that the monk was an expert in one specific sense: his viewpoints 
were important in terms predictive reasonability because he was capable of 
making arguments which had an impact on the realized future. Let us suppose 
that the monk would not have believed in his prediction if he had all the informa­
tion we now have. ln that case, on the basis of the option reasonability or com­
mitment reasonability the monk was not an expert. 
The idea that expertise about the future includes also influence on history was 
current already in the time of Pythia. Archaeological discoveries and historical 
investigations (e.g. Parker 1956, Cuhls and Kuwahara 1994,5) have made it clear 
that the oracle was not only intended to predict the future but to guide and direct 
the world's history at that time. 
The place name "Delphi" comes from the dolphin into which Apollo changed 
himself according to Greek mythology in order to hire the first orac1e priests, 
who were mariners. The mythology stresses the role of other types of experts 
behind the Pythia, namely the team of priests. The assi sting priests had, how­
ever, more specific (and as we now see more reliable) expertise, which was used 
both in everyday problems and in state questions. It is interesting that the first 
priests were assumed to be mariners. Mariners had perhaps the most extensive (or 
the best synthetic) knowledge about different cultures in that time. 
As the whims of a moment or irrational beliefs have often impact on even the 
most important decisions affecting the future, so is also the logic behind impor­
tant scientific discoveries often very complex. Irvine and Martin (1989, 1 3) con­
sider that there are certainly many who, while accepting the need for research 
foresight, nevertheless doubt whether such an endeavor is possible in practice. 
'Y ou cannot forecast science or technological innovations - they are too unpre­
dictable' is likely to be their reaction. The response to this objection by advocates 
of foresight is well summed up in Bright's rhetorical question: 'Does it make 
sense to commit a nation's research resources on the basis of total inexplicability 
and lack of an anticipatory rationale? . . .  Are we content to be "scientific" about 
everything but science itself? (Bright 1986, 1 and 12). 
The concept "anticipatory rationa1e" is more modest and feasible for the episte­
mology of expertise about the future than the concept "forecasting" . The exper­
tise in anticipation or foresight involves an explicit recognition that the choices 
made today (sometimes by anticipating experts) can shape or create the future, 
and· that there is often little point in deterministic predictions in spheres 
socially acknowledged (Remes 1 995). My idea is that acknowledgement of expertise about the future is 
based on three types of qualifications: true predictions or predictions having an impact on the realized 
future (prediction reasonability), options which are teasible from the point of view of some well­
informed actor (option reasonability) and a pian which is teasible and realistic tor a group of well­
informed actors, who take into account each other's actions (commitment reasonability). 
3 
(inc1uding teehnology) where social and political processes exercise a major in­
fluenee. 
The purpose of this first ehapter is to look for the epistemic foundations of 
"anticipatory rationale" .  What is the relationship between "truths as building 
blocks of the future" and different theories of truth? The chapter ends with a 
presentation of the basic elements of the general theory of eonsisteney (GTC) and 
a paradigm for future studies based on it. 1 hope that the future will show that this 
paradigm is an important contribution to the epistemology of "anticipatory ra­
tionale". 
1.2 Three Theories of Truth 
Niiniluoto (1987, 1 34) considered that traditionally, the most important theories 
of truth have been the eorrespondence theory, the eoherence theory and the vari­
ous versions of the pragmatist theory. 
According to the correspondence theory, truth is a relation between a belief and 
reality. In this aceount, the bearers of truth are considered the sentences, state­
ments, judgments, propositions, beliefs or ideas; they are true to the extent that 
they "correspond" to reality, the world or facts. A statement is a deseription of a 
"possible state of affairs".  It is true if the state of affairs is "actual" or exists in 
the "real world", that is, if it expresses a "faet"; otherwise it is false. 
The idea behind the correspondence theory is that there is a stable "real world". 
The purpose of scienee is to find the stable features of reality. According to 
Charles Peirce 
a (scientific) method should be found by which our beliefs may be 
deterrnined by nothing human, but by some external permaneney :.. by 
something upon which our thinking has no effect (Peirce, 1 93 1 -35, 
5.384) . 
Scientific method supposes: 
There are Real things, whose eharacters are entirely independent of 
our opinions about them; those Reals (realities) affeet our senses ae­
cording to regular laws, and, though our sensations are as different as 
are our relations to the objeets, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of 
perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly 
are; and any man, if he has sufficient experienee and he reasons 
enough about it, will be led to the one True conc1usion (Peirce, 193 1-
35, 5 .384). 
4 
The truths of scientifie eorrespondenee theory are objective in the following 
sense (Niiniluoto 1980,83): 
a) The truths eoneeming the features of an objeet are independent of the opinions 
of the researeher. 
b) Scientific knowledge arises in interaetion between a researeher and the objeet 
of study. 
e) Truths eannot be based on dogmas, beliefs, revelations, authorities or intui­
tions. In the final analysis, the souree and eriterion of knowledge is direet evi­
dence coneeming the objeet of study. 
d) There is a possibility to reaeh truthful knowledge about the objeet of study and 
a researeh eommunity ean beeome unanimous about the quality of the knowl­
edge. 
Aceording to Niiniluoto (1987, 135), the coherence theory c1aims that a judgment 
eannot "eorrespond" to any extralinguistie reality; truth has to be defined in terms 
of the relations that judgments bear to eaeh other. Thus, a judgment is true if it 
forms a coherent system with other judgements. Although some prominent mod­
em philosophers like Nicholas Reseher and Otto Neurath have defended the eo­
herence theory, Niiniluoto considered that eoherence, understood as some sort of 
consistency, is not an adequate definition of truth. 
In ordinary logie, the condition that a sentenee A is eompatible with a eonsistent 
set X of true sentenees, is not sufficient to guarantee the truth of A. Still, this 
eondition is neeessary for the truth A. Otherwise, one contradicts the rule of logic 
that X&A eannot be true at the same time as X& -A. Aeeording to Niiniluoto the 
compatibility is not enough for the truth, beeause it may happen that neither A 
nor -A. follows from X. 
A simple example conceming the truths of the future illustrates, what Niiniluoto 
means. Suppose that a researeher tried in 1982 to prediet how many mobile tele­
phones would be in use in Finland in 1995. One ean make' a list of truths, that 
explain the real number (about one million) and were already known in 1982: the 
NMT (Nordie Mobile Telephone) system was just started; first relevant appliea­
tions (or generalizations) of the digital teehnology were made; and Finns were 
driving more ears. It is at least in principle possible to make a long list of truths 
like those, from whieh one could infer the right predietion. The problem is that an 
evaluator ean never be sure that he or she has enough items in his or her list. For 
example based on!y/on the above three truths, one could rationally c1aim several 
figures for the numbers of mobile phones in Finland in 1995. 
The third theory of truth is pragmatism. According to Niiniluoto (1987, 136) 
pragrnatists think that it is not meaningful to speak of truth and reality as di­
voreed from human praetical and eognitive aetivities. The reality as sueh of the 
correspondenee theory is replaeed by reality for us (truth-as-known-by-us). Truth 
5 
is defined in terms of the results of human knowledge seeking: true means the 
same as "proved", "verified", "warranty assertive" , "successful", or "workable" 
in practice, the ideal limit of scientific inquiry. A present formulation of the pro­
gram is made by Jiirgen Habermas: the ideal consensus is reached in "free" or 
"undistorted" communication. 
Like correspondence theorists, many contemporary pragmatists have also been 
inspired by Charles Peirce. Peirce has characterised truth as the ideal limiting 
opinion of the scientific community. Richard Rorty has interpreted Peirce so that 
"we can make no sense of the notion that the view which can survive all objec­
tions might be false". The correspondence theorist Niiniluoto thinks that the 
phrase "all objections" must refer to situations where the scientific community 
has access to all true statements about the world. Without such access to at least 
some truths about reality, there is no guarantee that a community of investigators 
reaches the correct solution even to the simplest cognitive problems - whatever 
standards of discourse rationality we may impose on the communication between 
its members (Niiniluoto 1987, 137). 
1.3 Truths ahout the Future 
The possibilities of achieving objective knowledge concerning the future are lim­
ited, if we accept the criteria of objectivity given by Niiniluoto above. 
Truths concerning the future are often not independent of the opinions of the re­
searcher, because the researcher can still have an impact on the decisions which 
shape the future. A researcher cannot have a direct contact with the object of 
study in the future. The contact is based on the cues in the past. It is, however, 
good to notice that also many scientific objects in the past and in the present are 
only indirectly attainable. Many elementary partic1es of nuc1ear physics are 
"observable" only by using very complicated monitoring instruments and hap­
penings in the past are possible to construct only by using present cues. 
Norms, dogmas, beliefs, revelations, authorities and intuition have some role in 
the shaping future, because they affect decisions concerning the future. But in a 
similar way they are also important explanations of the past. It is seldom possible 
that a research community can become totally unanimous about the quality of the 
knowledge concerning a future object, because the future object is "unfinished". 
If the unfinished nature of the future or the role of beliefs in the process of its 
formation are considered to make the anticipation unscientific, then very many 
explanations of the past made by historians are unscientific. 
1 will start my search for a new kind of scientific epistemology of knowledge 
about the future with the profound discussion of Bertrand de Jouvenel (1967). 
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The analysis of de Jouvenel has provided an explicit or implicit epistemic back­
ground of many future researchers. 
The starting point of the analysis of de Jouvenel were the images formed in our 
minds. He considered, that it is natural to call images referring to the present or 
past "representations", for they "represent " facts, in however subjective manner. 
These representations can, however, also be fiction images of future. These fic­
tions are of major importance in our life. When we retain a fiction as something 
to be enacted, it serves as the source of systematic action. De Jouvenel (1967, 25-
30) presented four theses: 
1. Without representations, there would be no actions3, only reactions. Any be­
haviour which is not a necessary consequence of the external pressures acting on 
a man should be ealled an "action". Consider the ancient hero Mucius Sceavola, 
who deliberately held his right hand over live coals to let it be consumed. Time 
future is the domain able to reeeive as "possibilities" those representations which 
elsewhere would be "false". Man acts, not "because ... ," but "in order to ... " 
2. Sustained, systematic action aims at the validation of a representation pro­
jected into the future. De Jouvenel compared the projection of the image "over 
there" to the rock climber's flinging of a rope "up there"; in each ease, the 
throwing comes first and enables the actor to move toward the "hitching point." 
But there is a difference. The fixed point of the c1imber exists objeetively and 
provides physical aid, whereas a project exists only subjectively. 
3. Other things being equal, an assertion about the future must be weighed ac­
cording to the strength of the intention. An assertion about the future does not 
indicate a fact, but an intention. Intentions provide a convenient basis comparing 
the projects of different people. The intensity of intention, that is the mobilising 
of ones energy, is of great importance. 
4. A man who acts with sustained intention to carry out a project is a creator of 
future. Ego knows he has forees at his disposal, forces he can mobilise by eon­
scious effort to carry out a project. In this sense, the faet of my presenee in New 
York is the consequence of my imaging myself in New York. 
De Jouvenel (1967,35) considered that an individual who forms and pursues a 
project is generally inclined to postulate the stability of the universe. The uni­
verse is, however not generally stable. "Deformations of the social surface" are 
needed. How do these deformations arise? According to de Jouvenel it would be 
simpler to define when they do not arise. To the extent that the same repetitive 
3 A technical problem in the faIlawing discussians is the sex af actar. This is nat a problem af my native 
language Finnish, because we have a ward "hän" which represents bath "he" and "she". 1 will suppose 
that the learning being or the actor is "she". "She" is so the representative af the bath sexes, though 1 in 
the connections where the sex matters might use "she" ar "he". 1 think that it  is useful that developers af 
technologies who are recently mastly men remember the increasing role of wamen even in these matters. 
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pattems and mutual relations are maintained in the behaviour of different people, 
the social surface is stable. 
How can the future be an object of knowledge in the framework of de Jouvenel? 
According to de Jouvenel, we treat many aspects of the future as known, and if 
we did not we could never undertake any projects. The subjective certainties are 
the features of the future that one treats as known and does not question. This 
certainty may be faIsified by events, but a given person does not contemplate that 
things could be otherwise. There are different certainties (de Jouvenel 1967, 43): 
" . . .  the natural order is a datum, whereas the constitutional (for example the re­
current elections, my addition) order is a construct. The constitutionaI order is 
modifiable and can, moreover, coIIapse." ContractuaI assurances are a special 
form of constructs. De Jouvenel considered that a man of honour behaves in the 
way expected of hirn and as he has committed himself to do. 
For a given person, the future is divided into dominating and masterable parts (de 
JouveneI 1967,52). The masterable future is what a person can make other than it 
now presents itself. De Jouvenel stressed an important point: II in human affairs 
the future is often dominating as far as 1 am concemed, but is masterable by a 
more powerful agent, an agent from a different level" (for example the state, 
author's addition). 
As a conc1usion of his analysis, de Jouvenel (1967, 53-55) distinguished between 
primary, secondary and tertiary forecasts. He illustrated these predictions with 
the considerable increase of poIIution in Paris. The average inhabitant had be­
come quite conscious of this nuisance: he expected that it would get worse and 
this to hirn is a dominating future. This is a "primary forecast". It represents a 
first stage in our dealing with the future course of a phenomenon. If there is an 
authority with a capacity to change the development, the primary forecast serves 
to chaIIenge this authority: "This is our future, unless you take measures to 
amend it". 
The authority has a choice of measures differing in efficiency, which it takes 
more or less time to bring into operation and which car users and manufacturers 
will regard as more or less annoying. De Jouvenel asks us to imagine that the 
authority is provided by its experts with a set of curves, one of which represents 
the "primary forecast", while each other curve pictures a more or less amended 
course of the phenomenon expected after this or that corrective measure. The set 
of these curves constitute a fan of possible futures, of futuribles. The preparation 
of any of these curves is a "secondary forecast" . Hence, it is conditional on the 
taking of a certain definite action and is based on known or presumed causal re­
lationships. 
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The "tertiary forecast" is based on primary and secondary forecasts. Its author is 
aware of them and proposals subrnitted to the authority. Now he wants to 
"predict" what the course of pollution will in fact turn to be. This implies a 
"prediction" bearing upon the behaviour of the authority. According to de Jou­
venel (1967,55), it is immediately clear that this sort of forecast, which includes 
guesses concerning the choice and tirning of unique moves by a few individuals, 
is most hazardous. 
An intellectual undertaking or a research program based on the epistemology of 
de Jouvenel is commonly called "futuribles" (de Jouvenel 1967,18). The name 
was chosen according to de Jouvenel because it designates what seems to be the 
object of thought when the rnind is directed toward the future: our thought is un­
able to grasp with certainty the "futura", the things which will be; instead it con­
siders possible futures. De Jouvenel considers that a future state of affairs enters 
into the class of "futuribles" only if its mode of production from the present state 
of affairs is plausible and imaginable. The example of de Jouvenel was aviation. 
It was considered possible already in ancient times, but it became a futurible only 
when certain new facts made its development conceivable4. 
A kind of generalization of the ideas of de Jouvenel is the "strategic prospective" 
of Michel Godet (1994). According to Godet (1994, 36-37), the prospective ap­
proach accepts that there is a multiplicity of possible futures at any given time 
and that the actual future will be the outcome of the interplay between the various 
protagonists in a given situation and their respective intentions. How the future 
evolves is explained as much by human action as by the influence of causalities. 
Like de Jouvenel, Godet considered that the future is explained not only by the 
past but also by the image of the future imprinted upon the present. 
According to Godet (1994,105): 
The actors .. .  possess various degrees of freedom which they will be 
able to exercise, through strategic action, in order to arrive at the goals 
they have set themselves, and thus successfully carry out their project. 
From this, it follows that analysis of these actor's moves, confronting 
their plans, exarnining the balance of pawer between them (in terms af 
constraints and means of actian) is essential in order ta throw light an 
strategic issues and the key questions for the future (which are the 
outcames and consequences of foreseeable battles). 
The fdeas af de Jauvenel got a kind af practical interpretation in the actian theary 
af Godet. The definitions which he has given ta same basic cancepts af futures 
4 My concept "(perceived) interest" in the General theory of consistency (Appendix 1 )  has nearly the 
same meaning as "a futurible", which an actor tries to validate. An interest is bascd on the idea that its 
realization belongs to the capacity (and 01' course capability ) limits of the actor. 
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studies are interesting also from the point of view of technology foresight (Godet 
1994, 59): 
An event is an abstract entity whose only characteristic is to happen or 
not to happen. An event can be considered as a variable taking only 
one of two values, in general "1" if the event happens, and "0" if the 
event does not happen. 
Actors are those who play an important roIe in the system through 
variables which characterise their pIans and which they, to some ex­
tent, control. ExampIe: the consuming countries, the producing coun­
tries, the multinationals 
A strategy is a set of tactics (set of conditional decisions) determining 
each actor's acts relative to his pIan under every possible contingency. 
A conflict may result from the confrontation between opposing strate­
gies of the actors, and may take the form of an outbreak of tension 
between two trends (overcrowding and Iack of space, constrained time 
and free time). The outcome of these conflicts determines the evolu­
tion and the balance of power between actors or strengthens the 
weight of one trend or another. 
An invariant is a phenomenon assumed to be permanent up to the ho­
rizon studied. ExampIe: climatic phenomena. 
A Strong trend is a movement affecting a phenomenon in such a way 
that its development in time can be predicted. Example: urbanisation. 
A germ (or a weak signal, my addition): a factor of change hardIy per­
ceptibIe at present, but which will constitute a strong trend in the fu­
ture. Godet cited Pierre Masse (1965): "A sign which is slight in pres­
ent dimensions but huge in terms of its virtual consequences" 
Randomness: any event in the past or future of which we possess only 
partial information: we are incapable of verifying whether the event 
took or will take place. 
Irvine and Martin (1989,15) considered that essentially the Anglo-Saxon notion 
of (technology) foresight has a similar philosophical starting point as "la pro­
spective" of Godet. Whereas predictive forecasting implies a rather passive atti­
tude towards the future, foresight and "la prospective" involve a much more ac­
tive stance - reflecting a belief that the future is there to be created through the 
actions we choose to take today. Irvine and Martin consider that the concept of 
(technology) foresight and "la prospective" share several features: 
1. In both, the aim is not so much to predict the details and timing of specific de­
velopments as to outline the range of possible futures which stern from altema­
tive sets of assumptions about emerging trends and opportunities. 
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2. Besides enabling different possible futures to be explored, they provide a 
means of c1arifying the scope of current action and its implications for potential 
developments (often identified in alternative scenarios). 
3. Since the phenomena and activities subject to foresightlprospective analysis 
are invariably complex and interdependent, a holistic or systemic approach is 
essential, integrating and assessing the cross-impacts among all the constituent 
processes, conflicts and challenges. 
4. Different actors have their own, sometimes mutually irreconcilable needs, and 
these will be reflected in their alternative visions of desirable futures. Socio­
cultural, political and motivational factors are therefore often crucial parameters 
in foresight and failure to take them sufficiently into account can lead to the types 
of problems encountered in conventional forecasting. From this, it follows that 
the foresight or prospective process should be transparent to enable the underly­
ing assumptions, analytical framework and data inputs to be subject to external 
scrutiny. Such openness also prevents nonconformist views from being obscured 
conventional wisdom. 
5. Finally, both approaches recognise that the information available to make 
judgements about future prospects is invariably incomplete, frequently unquanti­
fiable and intrinsically uncertain. Consequently, a range of complementary ap­
proaches ideally needs to be employed bringing contrasting perspectives to bear 
on the foresight process. A method can be considered a good and useful one if it 
can improve coherence and stimulate imagination. 
One questionable conc1usion made by de Jouvenel from his epistemology is that 
foresight activities are not scientific. This point is expressed at least in two dif­
ferent connections in the book of de Jouvenel. Actually the reason why the word 
"conjecture" appears in the title of the book is precisely that it is opposed to the 
term "knowledge". De Jouvenel (1967,17) cited Jacques Bernoulli "with regard to 
things which are certain and indubitable, we speak of knowing or understanding; 
with regard to other things, of conjecturing, that is to say, opining". On the same 
page de Jouvenel comments on the term "futurology": 
This word would be very convenient for designating the whole of our 
forecasting activities ("futuribles" my addition) except that it would 
suggest that the results of these activities are scientific - which they 
are not, for .. . the future is not a domain of objects passively presented 
to our knowledge. 
A similar conc1usion was presented on the pages 127-128: 
.. Jorecasting will be brought into c10ser relationship with decision­
making. Forecasts can help us to make decisions whose necessity we 
are already aware of, and can suggest that decisions we have not pre-
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viously thought of will need to be faeed ... We treat forecasting as an 
art tied to practical needs. 
This (which I will attempt to show as unnecessary) idea of futurology as an un­
scientific art, has been accepted by many later authors.5 I think that the idea of 
futurology as art or as conjecturing has actually worked against the diffusion of 
the original ideas of de Jouvenel. If we could save futurology into the sphere of 
science, for example accepting the epistemology of the general theory of consis­
tency, it would be possible to make a distinction between "anticipatory rationale" 
and irrational anticipations. The lack of such a distinction has considerably hin­
dered the development of futurology. The word "futurology" has got a bad repu­
tation. Because of the bad reputation it has been commonly replaced by the new 
concepts "futures research" or "futures studies". 
Without the distinction between "anticipatory rationale" and irrational anticipa­
tions we cannot speak about real experts and non-experts on the future. It is in­
teresting that de Jouvenel also in passing speaks about the experts on the future 
(de JouveneI 1967,54). 
Wendell Bell (1997 1, 169-170) has considered that it is more reasonable to 
widen the scope of science than to accept the position of de Jouvenel. Bell con­
siders that art and the futures field distinctively involve intuition, creativity, 
imagination, insight, and spiritual understanding. Both involve a certain amount 
of subjectivity and invite originality, innovation, and invention. Both are syn­
thetic and humanising. The conc1usion that futurology is unscientific just because 
of above features impiies that science is portrayed as having contrasting features: 
it is mechanical, can be produced by any number of interchangeable persons, 
highly technical and rigorous, rational and dehumanising, standardised or too 
fragmented and analytic in perspective to represent reality in all its fullness. 
According to Bell, the problem is that the distinction between science and art 
based on the above features is false: both art and science are misrepresented in 
these characterisations. Firstly artists, like scientists, must learn to use their tools 
and to apply a set of principles in solving the technical problems they face. They 
must be concemed - objectively and rationally concemed - with line, colour, 
shape, size, texture and direction. They must exercise rigor and control. On the 
other hand, masterpieces of science require an extra something of intuition, crea­
tiveness, imagination or insightfulness, for example in the formulation of theo­
ries. Even beauty - a hallmark of art - may be used by scientists to choose one 
theory over another, other things being equal (and according to Bell sometimes 
even if they are not equal). 
5 E.g. Annele Eerola ( 1990 p. 1) has taken this type of position: "Forecasting is an arto A general scien­
tific basis for forecasting is lacking and the production of forecasts is largely based on common sense, 
experimental modelling and lately also empirical work." 
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According to Bell (1997 1, 171-173), there is, however, at least one distinction 
between art and science that remains and that bears on the nature of futures 
studies. Art can be - and often is - an illusion, a deliberate distortion of reality, 
perhaps even a negation of it. Art inc1udes expressiveness, especially of the inner 
mental states of the artist that may be fused with his or her perceptions of the 
outer world. According to Bell, the key point is this: artists, although they may 
create representations of reality or reveal a "higher truth", which give meaning 
and direction to life, are not obliged by their commitment to art to tell the truth. 
To the contrary, scientists are committed to tell the truth. According to Bell, the 
truth is the very heart of scientific enterprise. 1 consider, that truthfulness is the 
necessary condition for science. As 1 will discuss in more detail later 1 consider 
that truthfulness is, however, not the sufficient condition for science. Science has 
to be based on theories, that produce refutable propositions and means (or lan­
guages) for progress in the production of valid arguments. 
Though it is not possible to present empirical truths conceming the future, it is 
possible to find truthful arguments conceming the future. A possible scientific 
endeavour may be to increase the validity of future relevant arguments (compare 
"anticipatory rationale" mentioned in the beginning of the chapter). Though sci­
entists can tell few truths about the future, their obligation is to tell reasonable 
arguments conceming the future. AIso, de Jouvenel c1early accepts the endeavour 
of increasing reasonability in forecasting as the following citation shows (de Jou­
veneI 1967,277): 
We are forever making forecasts - with scanty data, no awareness of 
method, no· criticism and no co-operation. It is urgent that we make 
this natural and individual activity into a co-operative and organic en­
deavour, subject to greater exigencies of intellectual rigor. 
What does the reasonability of arguments mean? The objective bases of argu­
ments are one possible interpretation of reasonability are. Although one cannot 
observe the future object, one may make an agreement conceming the rules 
which determine the derivation of the future from the past data. Public and ex­
plicit rules (for example statistical rules) remove or hinder the effects of subjec­
tive elements in predictions for example the effects of dogmas and authorities. 
They connect past facts and possible future developments. 
Objectivity and neutrality are not, however as such the reason for the endeavour 
of reasonability. Nicholas Rescher (1995) has discussed the dimensions of ra­
tionality. Rescher uses the concept "rationality" to mean virtually the same as my 
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word "reasonability". 1 prefer the concept "reasonability" based for example on 
the following citation of the Webster's Encyc10paedic (1996, 1 107)6: 
REASONABLE, RATIONAL refer to the faculty of reasoning. RA­
TIONAL is the more technical or more abstract term, concemed al­
ways with pure reason. It is applied to statements which reflect or sat­
isfy highly logical thinking. REASONABLE has taken on more and 
more the pragmatic idea of simple common sense. 
Rescher introduces the concept "rationality" as follows ( Rescher 1995, 25-26): 
If 1 want a reason at aH, 1 must want a rational reason. If 1 care about 
reasons at all, 1 am already within the project of rationality . . .  Irration­
ality - wishful thinking and self-deception - may be convenient and 
even, in some degree, psychologicaHy conforming. But it is neither 
cognitively nor reflectively satisfactory. 
Rescher considers that the rationality (or in my terminology reasonability) may 
be cognitive, evaluative or pragmatic. In ignoring cognitive rationality we run an 
avoidable risk of accepting falsehoods, in ignoring evaluative rationality the risk 
is to endorse inferior items and in ignoring practical rationality the risk concems 
the failing to achieve appropriate ends. 
The validation of rationality consists in the consideration that its vio­
lation would compromise the successful pursuit of appropriate ends ... 
The process of validating reason pivots on there being (cognitively) 
sound reason to think that an (evaluatively) appropriate end of the en­
terprise will become less likely to be (practically) realized (Rescher 
1995, 26-27) 
Jörgen Habermas has a rather similar concept of rationality as Rescher 
(Habermas 1992, 1 5): 
In contexts of communicative action, we call someone rational not 
only if he is able to put forward an assertion and, when criticised, to 
provide grounds for it by pointing to appropriate evidence, but also if 
he is following an established norm and is able, when criticised, to 
justify his action by explicating the given situation in the light of le-
6 Airaksinen and Kaalikoski (1997, 329) have recently discussed the differences between the concepts 
"rationality" and "reasonability". They suggest that the action of a human being is considered to be ra­
tional if in a situation she or he makes a choice based on her preference order. Based on the analysis of 
Georg v. Wright (1963), they suggest a distinction between "only rational" and "reasonable". They con­
sider that reasonable is a broader concept than rational: rational behavior is based on a given preference 
order, reasonable behavior is also based on critical analysis of the motives behind preference orders. 1 
use the concept "reasonability" in a very similar sense as March and Simon (1958, 138) have used the 
concept "bounded rationality".  
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gitimate expectations. We even call someone rational if he makes 
known a desire or an intention, expresses a feeling or a mood, shares a 
secret, confesses a deed, etc., and is then able to reassure critics in re­
gard to revealed experience by drawing practical consequences from it 
and behaving consistently thereafter. 
According to Habermas arguments based on norms are rational (or reasonable), if 
the community which accepts the norms can shape the future object and behaves 
consistently. The explication of legitimate expectations can afford learning, 
which may change the decisions conceming the future (Habermas 1992, 18): 
In virtue of their criticizability, rational expressions also admit of im­
provement; we can correct failed attempts if we can successfully iden­
tify our mistakes. The concept of grounding is interwoven with that of 
learning. Argumentation plays an important role in learning processes 
as well. Thus we call a person rational who, in the cognitive­
instrumental sphere, expresses reasonable opinions and acts effi­
ciently; but this rationality remains accidental if it is not coupled with 
the ability to learn from mistakes, from the refutation of hypotheses 
and from the failure of interventions. 
How can we solve the dilemma of the objective and subjective determinants of 
future? Is there any way at the same time to accept an objective reality in the fu­
ture and the possibility that people or other beings can change the future with 
their decisions? Like Habermas, 1 consider that the answer to this question can be 
found in leaming processes 
1.4 Dual Description of the Reality in the General Theory of 
Consistency 
The general theory of consistency (GTC) gives an answer to the dilemma of ob­
jective and subjective determinants of the future (Kuusi 1974).7 The main postu­
lates of GTC and their motivations (as footnotes) are given in the Appendix 1 .  
7 Though different concepts and points o f  vicws are used i n  the OTC than i n  the epistemic thcory of de 
Jouvenel ( 1 967) many features of the theories are closely related. My eoncept of "interest" functions 
nearly in the same role as "project" in the theory of dc Jouvenel. De Jouvenel diseusses the role 01' crite­
ria of sameness in a way very similar way to mine in the case of the not-learning being. My eoncept 
"genuine learning being" has rather the same role as the " aetor" 01' de Jouvenel. Though the book 01' de 
Jouvenel contains no rel'erenees to learning, some examplcs used by him clearly refer to the role ol' 
learning. An important difference between theories eoneerns the role 01' consistency. Consistency and 
learning are not even mentioned in the index of the book ol' de Jouvenel . Beeause 1 highly appreciate the 
work of de Jouvenel and his ideas has been an important starting point for present practice in technology 
foresight, 1 often refer to his text in my short presentation on the OTe. 
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The answer of the GTC is based on a dual description of the reality using two 
types of beings: 1earning beings and not-1earning beings or beings, which are not 
able to leam. The not-Ieaming beings fonn the objective reality in Niiniluoto's 
sense. Because not-learning beings cannot change their behaviour, the truths con­
ceming them are the same now and in the future. Neither a researcher nor any 
other being can change their behaviour. The future is, however, partly indetermi­
nate because there are also leaming beings. Their behaviour dispositions may be 
different now and in the future. 
Different assumptions conceming the role of leaming and not-leaming beings in 
reality are possible. A philosophical realist or a correspondence theorist may try 
to interpret that the whole reality consists of not-leaming beings. Por example 
people consist of not-leaming atoms and at least in principle the behaviour of 
people should be possible to be interpreted as an interaction of these not-Ieaming 
beings. There is, however, at least one genuine leaming being: the Cartesian Ego 
( "Cogito ergo sum" - 1 exist, because 1 think or leam) (c.f. Kuusi 1974, 102). 
What kinds of truths do not change in the future? In natural sciences, the basic 
feature of a scientific discovery is that every scientist who repeats a scientific 
experiment, obtains the same results or makes the same discovery. This stability 
is connected with three groups of criteria of sameness: 
- the object of the experiment (for example a piece of iran) is the same as in the 
earlier experiment 
- the objeet of the experiment is in the same situation, where the discovery was 
made (for example the temperature of the piece of iron is the same) 
- the object is treated in the same way as in the earlier experiment. 
One can conc1ude that the stabile or invariant elements in scientific experiments 
are the criteria of sameness, which determine the behaviour of the object. There 
are, however, sometimes many possible graups of criteria of sameness which 
may produee the invarianee. Thomas Kuhn ( 1970, 192-194) has stressed the cru­
cial role of the criteria of sameness in the leaming of different paradigms. To a 
large extent, the eriteria of sameness of a paradigm are leamed trough shared ex­
emplars or experiments: 
. . .  when 1 speak of aequiring from exemplars the ability to reeognise a 
given situation as like some and unlike others, that one has seen before 
. .. 1 am c1aiming that the explication will not . . .  answer the question, 
"Similar with respect to what?" That question is a request for a rule, in 
this case, for the criteria by which particular situations are grouped 
into similarity sets, and 1 am arguing that the temptation to seek eri te­
ria (or at least a full set) should be resisted in this case ... 
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If two people stand at the same place and gaze in the same direetion . . .  
they reeeive c10sely similar stimuli . . .  But people do not see stimuli; 
our knowledge of them is highly theoretical and abstraet. Instead they 
have sensations, and we have no eompulsion to suppose that the sen­
sations of the two viewers are the same . . .  our world is populated in the 
first instanee not by stimuli but by the objeet of our sensations, and 
these need not be the same, individual to individual or group to 
group . . .  
One of the fundamental teehniques by which the members of a group, 
whether an entire eulture or a specialists' sub-eommunity within it, 
learn to see the same things when eonfronted with the same stimuli is 
by shown examples of situations that their predeeessors in the group 
have already learned to see as like eaeh other and as different from 
other sorts of situations. 
So aecording to Kuhn ( 1970) people learn common criteria of sameness through 
exemplars . But what is the connection between these criteria of sameness and the 
real objeets? One ean interpret that in addition to the experimenting scientist, 
the objeet (a not-learning being) also has the eriteria of sameness, whieh deter­
mine its behaviour and whieh it eannot ehange. 1nvariant eriteria of sameness do 
not require that some present visible property of the not-learning being remains 
invariant (eompare Nagel 1979, 149). On the other hand, it is useful to eonstitute 
the not-Iearning beings or the objeet of studies so that as many of the being's 
prominent features as possible remain invariant. Eino Kaila is a philosopher who 
has used the eoncept of "invariance"g in essentially the same way as 1 have. 1n a 
study originally published in German 1941 and in English in 1979, Kaila outlines 
the eoneept of "invarianee" in the following way (Kaila 1979, 150): 
We use the term 'invarianee' as a eolleetive name for any kind of 
similarity, sameness, uniformity, lawfulness, eonstancy, analogy, 
struetural identity (isomorphism). There is, then always a similarity -
in the broadest sense of the term - between different domains of expe­
rienee. But we cannot employ the term 'similarity' here, for it tends to 
lead the imagination on the wrong track insofar as, when speaking of 
'similarities', we primarily think of "lower-Ievel similarities", and less 
of eonceptual higher-Ievel similarities . . .  
And further (Kaila 1979 , 15 1 ): 
8 As was mentioned above Godet (1994) defines an invariant as a phenomenon assumed to be permanent 
up to the horizon studied. From the point af view of the GTC a phenomenon remains invariant (or is an 
invariant), because it is based on (at least transient) invariant criteria of sameness or invariances of 
relevant beings. 
1 7  
We shall show that "physico-scientific reality" (as to its content) con­
sists in nothing other than the system of higher invariances of the eve­
ryday physical world and thus (in the last analysis) 'immediate experi­
ence'. We shall demonstrate how this aim, this search for a representa­
tion of experience in which its invariance becomes maximal, deter­
mines the formation of concepts and theories in physics. 
Kaila connects his idea of invariance to the 'economy of thought' emphasised by 
the physicist Ernst Mach. According to Mach, science "may be regarded as a 
minimal problem, consisting of the most complete possible presentation of facts 
with the least possible expenditure of thought" (Mach 19 13). An highly important 
point which closely connects Kaila with my general theory of consistency is the 
following one (Kaila 1979, 154): 
If the task is only to represent a fixed and delimited stock of knowl­
edge, the two principles [Mach's principle of economy of thought and 
the principle of invariance] coincide; but even the attempt to discover 
the higher invariances possibly contained in this stock of knowledge 
leads, if it is successful, to generalizations and thus transgressions of 
this stock of knowledge. To this extent science is not a minimum 
problem but a maximum problem. It is not a 'parsimonious economy' 
but a bold adventure, not so much unperturbed enjoyment of the 'sta­
ble worldpicture' as a fight against perpetual shocks to which the theo­
retical mind exposes itself by its generalizations. 
Using the concepts of the general theory of consistency, Kaila is speaking about a 
kind of "translation problem".  We have a physical object with its behavioural 
language of "higher invariances" (criteria of sameness)9 and we have the observer 
with herlo  own language. A connection between these two languages is built 
upon observations or measurements. I I  The point of the translation is not only to 
explain as simply as possible the past measurements but to anticipate the future 
measurements (or generalizations) based as far as possible on true invariances (or 
real criteria of sameness). If the measurements or generalizations produce contra­
dictory results concerning the not-Iearning being, the observer has to change her 
9 According to Kaila 1979, 228: "The 'essence' of a thing consists of the invariances of this thing." 
10 As 1 already mentioned, 1 assume that the learning being or the actor is "she". "She" is 50 the repre­
sentative of the both sexes, though 1 in the connections where the sex matters might use "she" or "he". 
I I  A discussion concerning the nature of physical measurements has a central position in the reasoning 
of Kaila. He criticises Mach's conception of measurement according to which the assignment of numeri­
cal values in measurements is only a matter of convenience. According to Kaila  ( 1 979, 1 88) the conven­
tionalist theory of measurement is incapable of specifying where in physics the borderline runs between 
convention and experience. Only such a property can be measured with respect to which there exist 
lawful relationships of a definite kind (an invariance - my addition), where then the assignment of nu­
merical values is done in such a way that these lawful relationships find expressions in the relations of 
numerical values (Kaila 1979, 1 92). 
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translation. A new idea of the General theory eonsisteney is that if eontradietory 
measurements are made eoneerning a learning being, there are other options: the 
observed learning being ean ehange her eriteria of sameness. Aetually the meas­
urement ean have a role of "informing" the learning being. 
If a researeher sueeeeds in finding the right eriteria (the truth about them), he or 
she ean predict the behaviour of a not-Iearning objeet. The right predictions are a 
neeessary eondition to the equality of the eriteria of sameness between the re­
seareher and the objeet. It is not, however, a suffieient eondition, beeause the 
differenee in the eriteria of sameness may appear in a subsequent wrong predic­
tion eoneerning the behaviour of the objeet. De Jouvenel ( 1967, 85) deseribed the 
aetivity of a scientist (or of everybody) seeking the invariant eriteria of sameness 
of not-Iearning beings: 
Identical initial eonditions lead to identieal results. This is a funda­
mental postulate of our thought, and no doubt eorresponds to what 
used to be ealled an innate idea. Our ways of proeeeding depend on it: 
we reproduee the same initial eonditions when we wish to obtain the 
same result. All our eonfident predietions also depend on it: the result 
will be the same as before, beeause the initial eonditions are the same 
as before. But even in nature, and a fortiori in human affairs, the 
"same as before" is but an approximation, an impression of similarity, 
a subjeetive judgement. . .  the points of similarity that strike and eon­
vinee us are not neeessarily the ones that are relevant to the produetion 
of the expeeted result. . .  Or the similarities may be relevant, but a dif­
ferenee which in our eyes is insignificant may inhibit the result we 
have assumed. 
On the other hand, in the case of a learning being, a wrong prediction does not 
necessarily teli, that a researcher was earlier wrong concerning the criteria of 
sameness of the being. The learning being may have changed her criteria of 
sameness. The basic criterion for the change is an experience of contradiction 
or inconsistency: an ineonsisteney between results of an aetion and the interests 
of the being or an ineonsisteney between anticipated and aetual results of the ae­
tion. If the being has a suitable memory, it ean store these types of experienees in 
the form of ehanged eriteria of sameness. De Jouvenel ( 1967, 95) is again a good 
souree for illustrating my point, though he did not explicitly speak about learn­
ing: 
Let us eonsider . . .  the foreeasting of cigarette eonsumption in the 
United States. Before (the learning of! author' s addition) the eorrela­
tion between cigarette smoking and lung eaneer had been asserted by 
researehers, the foreeaster obviously eould not take into aeeount the 
future impaet of a (learned!) still-unknown assertion. . .  A new 
(learned !) eause has intervened. 
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Using the eoneepts of the GTC, the Ameriean people learned that the generally 
aeeepted eriterion of sameness that smoking is a harmless aetivity, did not work. 
They ehanged this eriterion of sameness and also their behaviour. 
It is interesting to eompare the epistemological standpoint of the GTC to the 
standpoint of Charles Peiree. As was earlier mentioned, Peiree proposed a scien­
tific method where beliefs should be determined by nothing human, but by some 
extemal permaneney (Peiree, 193 1-35, 5.384). Peiree begins this ehapter eon­
eeming the methods of fixing belief with a rhetoric question: 
. . .  why should we not attain the desired end, by taking as answer to a 
question any we may faney, and eonstantly reiterating it to ourselves, 
dwelling on all whieh may eonclude to that belief, and learning to tum 
with contempt and hatred from anything that might disturb it? This 
simple and direet method is really pursued by many men (Peiree, 
193 1-35, 5.377). 
The GTC does not reeommend this type of stubbomness to learning beings. We 
only have to accept the stubbomness of not-learning beings. In other words: we 
as learning beings have to change our minds because not-Iearning beings cannot 
do that. 
The following features define a learning being: 
- The being can change its behaviour as the result of its experiences. 
- The being has interests, which direct its behaviour. 
- The being has an active memory, where its experienees are stored. 
If any of these requirements is not met, the result is that the behaviour of the be­
ing is possible to predict without references to learning and the being can be clas­
sified as not-Iearning beings. A practical limit between the two types of beings 
could be the possibility to predict the behaviour of the being so that the being 
cannot nullify the prediction by changing its behaviour. 
It is of course also possible to find stable elements in the behaviour of learning 
beings. Because the learning can change these invariances - pattems of behav­
iour, traditions, expressed preferences, images of the future - 1 call them transient 
invariances in comparison with the (permanent) invariances of not-Iearning be­
ings. The concept of reliability is a common way to describe the stability of a 
transient invariance. 
The genuine interests of a learning being in a way resemble the permanently in­
variant criteria of sameness of not-Iearning beings. In the GTC, the genuine inter­
est of a being is characterised by the invariant positive direction ("more of that 
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aspired by the genuine interest is always better, if the fulfillment level of other 
genuine interests is given") (Kuusi 1974). A learning being does not typically 
know her genuine interests, but she learns to know them step by step through her 
experiences if she has a feasible and active memory. In principle, it is possible 
that an expert (for example a physician) knows better some genuine interests of a 
person than herself, though only the person (or some other learning being) has a 
direct access to her experiences of repentance or frustration. 
1.5 Capacity and Capability Limits 
Capacity and capability limits are concepts which characterise the possibilities of 
learning. Stafford Beer ( 1973) referred with the concept of capacity limit to the 
maximal production possibility of a single machine or of a production unit. By 
the concept of capability, he meant the real production possibilities of a produc­
tion unit, taking into account its connections to other parts of the production sys­
tem for example to suppliers and to marketing channels. 
The roots of the idea of the capacity and capability limits lay in the general re­
source view. According to it for example a firm is seen as a learning being using 
its resources. Raimo Inkiäinen ( 1994) saw that the roots of this view in business 
studies can be traced to Penrose ( 1959), who stated that "the firm is essentially a 
pool of resources the utilisation of which is organised in an administrative 
framework" . 
The concepts of the capacity and the capability have been tools in a major stream 
of strategic management research that tries to bridge the gap between organisa­
tional behaviour and competitive strategy (Inkiäinen 1994, 42, Barney 199 1 ) .  The 
two concepts have been used in different ways. Grant ( 199 1 )  differentiates be­
tween resources which are inputs in the production process, and capabilities 
which are teams of resources to perform a certain task. Teece & al ( 1 990) provide 
the following business-specific definition of a capability (lnkiäinen 1994, 44): 
. . .  a set of differentiated skills, complementary assets and routines that 
provide the basis for a firm's competitive capacities and sustainab1e 
advantage in a particular business. 
Many researchers have connected the concept of capabi1ity to the skills of a firm 
to combine resources. In some recent studies researches have not made a clear 
distinction between the capacities and capabilities . This has resulted in concep­
tual difficu1ties. Difficu1ties have been connected especially to the use of the 
concept "human capita1 resources" .  For examp1e Inkiäinen (1994), has applied 
the classification of Barney ( 199 1 )  of a firm's resources to physica1 capita1 re­
sources, human capita1 resources, and organisationa1 capita1 resources. 
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The definitions of Beer ( 1973) of the capacity and capability limits have been the 
starting points for the definition of these concepts in GTC. The capacity limits 
(and resources) characterise the capacity of an actor to perform certain actions (to 
use resources) whenever he chooses. What are the results of these actions and 
how a learning being is satisfied with these results depend on the capability limits 
of the being. These limits depend on interests, on the environment, where the 
being tries to promote its interests and on the abilities of the being to store ac­
tively experiences. An action theory based on these ideas is given by Kuusi and 
Keloharju ( 1985). Basic features of this action theory are described in Appendix 
1. The features are presented in a footnote of the postulate 4 of the GTC. 
Narrow capacity limits hinder a being changing its behaviour as the result of 
learning. The behaviour of a being may be predictable and unconnected with its 
interests, if the being cannot change its behaviour or if the future dominates - us­
ing the concepts of de Jouvenel. A disabled cannot save herself from a fire, be­
cause this is not within her capacity limits. In this situation the disabled behaves 
like a not-Iearning being. The example of de Jouvenel (1967,52) was: 
1 foresee that 1 will be soaked by rain, but 1 can contradict (or master) 
this prediction simply by putting on a raincoat. Here "it will rain" de­
scribes a dominating future over which 1 have no power. 
A simple thermostat is a being, which cannot change its capability limits or its 
limits of its consistent behaviour. This is the reason to classify it as a not-learning 
being, though it has an "interest" in keeping temperature within some limits and it 
has a capacity to start an action, that contributes to fulfillment of the target. A 
simple thermostat cannot change its criteria of sameness conceming the situa­
tions, because it cannot repent its behaviour and change its criteria of sameness. 
A computer, which is programmed to do some before determined tasks, is also a 
being, which cannot change its criteria of sameness. It is an example of a not­
learning being, which has a memory and action capacities but does not have in­
terests. A computer can change its criteria of sameness only if somebody 
changes its software to promote her interests. 
We can give an interpretatlon of the real capability limits using the concept of 
the rational behavior or the best possible behaviour. Real capability limits are 
boundaries of rational behaviour. Within the real capability limits are all rational 
choices based on perfect information . .  It is reasonable to suppose that within the 
real capability limits of an actor are typically more choices than only one. From 
the point of view of the actor these different altematives of rational behavior are 
similar in that sense that the actor has not to repent, if she chooses any of them. 
From the point of view of other actors the choices might, however, be very dif-
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ferent. This assumption has an interesting implication: The rational future is not 
determinate. There are many rational futures. 
The choices of actors are not based on real but on perceived capability limits. If 
real and perceived capability limits unite, an actor behaves rationally. This means 
that further learning could not change the behaviour of the actor. In reality it is 
only possible to infer that an actor is reasonable or rational in the limits of the 
actor's perceptions. 12 Nobody cannot know, whether an actor's choices are ra­
tional. 13  
Real capability limits refer to that concept of rationality, which Habermas 
vaguely says to "transcend spatio-temporal and social limitations" (Habermas 
1 995, 3 1 ). They are independent of the subjective evaluations of learning beings 
and are in this respect objective or "true" also in the meaning of Niiniluoto and 
Peirce. 
1.6 Cognitive Maps of Learning Beings 
A being capable of actions in the sense of de Jouvenel ( 1 967,26) is clearly a 
learning being. The concepts "the genuine learning being" and "the actor" are 
practically identical and 1 have used both of them. It is interesting that de Jou­
venel did not recognise the special learning capacity as the most important dis­
tinctive mark of the genuine actor. He did not see the epistemic importance of the 
fact that behind every relevant future image or project is a learning process which 
has started not at the birth of an individual, but actually in the form of DNA- or 
RNA-memories at the time when the evolutionary development of living organ­
isms began. 
People and intelligent animals are examples of genuine learning beings as are 
their organisations. In the future, an important group of learning beings will 
probably be neural computers, the behaviour of which is ruled by programmed 
interests and which can make action decisions independently. Even now it may 
be plausible to interpret the computers and even written documents to be organic 
parts of learning organisations. Analogously to not-learning beings, it is reason-
1 2  The rationality assumption belongs to the standard theory of economics. Actually this assumption does 
not suggest that people are in reality rational. The assumption suggests that 
'
if people behave rationally, 
their properties (e.g. preferences) should be those inferred e.g. from econometric mode\s. In reality they 
might be or might be no!. Like any actor also an economist can only look at perceived capability limits. 
The economist might consider that an actor behaves in a reasonable way, if the actor' s  perceived capa­
bility limits - related e.g. to the actor' s measured preferences - are those transient invariances inferred 
from econometric models. 
13 This type of knowledge contradicts the definition of the actor given in the postulate 5 of the GTC. It 
would be possible to predict the behavior of the actor without further learning related information. 
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able to eonstitute learning beings so that their interests, eapacities and eapabilities 
ean be diseerned. 
An advantage of the general theory of eonsisteney is that very eonerete interpre­
tations to its basic eoneepts ean be given. The eoneepts of the GTC are suitable 
to deseribe the physical learning proeesses in animal neural systems and the 
evolutionary learning of the biosphere as welI as learning proeesses of organisa­
tions. 
A basic interest in evolutionary learning is survival or replieation (e.g. Pantzar 
1 99 1 ). The relevant experienees are eolIeeted beside the neural networks to the 
DNA- or RNA-memories of organisms. 1t is important to realize that DNA or 
RNA moleeules are aetive memories of every living eelI. It is eommonly believed 
that these memories ean ehange only when two geneticalIy different organisms 
have a eommon deseendant. DNA-memories in single eelIs ean, however, ehange 
essentialIy for example when viruses eonneet themse1ves to DNA moleeules or 
when radiation ehanges the order of bases or nucleotides, resulting sometimes in 
uneontrolIed fission of eelIs ( the formation of eaneer eelIs). 
The ehanges in DNA moleeules as welI as in neural networks (for example 
deaths of nerve eelIs and new or stronger/weaker synaptic eonneetions) are nee­
essary but not sufficient eonditions for ehanges in the eriteria of sameness. An 
aetive memory requires both a passive registration (eoding) of experienees and an 
aetive (deeoding) meehanism for information retrieval. The ehanges in a fune­
tional memory are eonneeted to the unanticipated ehanges in the environment of 
an organism, which are relevant to the targets of the organism and result in the 
proper behaviour of the organism. 1n praetiee, eonerete memories (for example 
DNA-memories) often poorly eorrespond to the features of an ideal memory. 
A memory is a system of more or less intereonneeted parts. 1n some decisions, 
only very limited parts of the system are aetivated as in the ease of reflexes. 
Some other decisions are results of the aetivation of large parts of the system. We 
may interpret that behind every decision mental or cognitive maps (or a map) are 
stored in those areas of memory, whieh have been aetivated in decision making 
situations (eompare for example Laztlo et. al. 1 993 p. xii). Only those eriteria of 
sameness which belong to the used eognitive maps have impaets on the deeision. 
They are thought to be relevant in decision-making. 
Capability limits ean be interpreted to be properties of an ideal eognitive map 
including those eriteria of sameness whieh are relevant in a decision-making 
situation. The real eognitive maps are far from the ideal ones. They define the 
pereeived eapability limits and the deeisions of the learning beings are based on 
them. The results of the deeisions depend on the real eapacity limit of decision­
makers, though the decisions made are based on pereeived eapaeity Iimits. 
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Learning beings try to realize the choices belonging to their perceived capability 
limits, but are often incapable of realizing the anticipated results. 
The experiences of inconsistencies change the cognitive map of a learning being. 
Kuusi ( 1974) has described the changes with inversely unequivocal negations, 
which may have their counterparts in neural networks (for example negation in a 
binary dimension, negation concerning the relevance and negation concerning the 
antagonism; they are discussed briefly in Appendix 1) .  
1.7 Learning Organisations as Special Cases of Learning Beings 
Levitt and March ( 1988, 3 19-320) consider in their literature review that organ­
isational learning is routine-based, history dependent and target-oriented. Organi­
sations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history into routines. 
They can be seen as cognitive maps that guide behaviour. The generic term 
"routines" inc1udes the forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies and tech­
nologies around which organisations are constructed and through which they op­
erate. They also inc1ude the structure of beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, 
cultures and knowledge that elaborate the formal routines. Routines are inde­
pendent of the individual actors who execute them and are capable of surviving 
considerable turnover in individual actors. 
Routines are recorded in a collective memory that is often coherent but is some­
times jumbled, that often endures but is sometimes lost (Levi tt and March 1988). 
The collective memory has many concrete places: the brains of the persons in the 
organisation or persons communicating with it, written documents, computer files 
and even the layout of the office of the organisation. Routines change as a result 
of experience within a community of other learning organisations. These changes 
depend on interpretations of history, particularly on the evaluation of outcomes in 
terms of targets. 
Routines in the wide meaning of Levitt and March ( 1988) are the base of legiti­
mate expectations about the future in an organisation. U sing the terminology of 
Habermas ( 1984), making a decision based on organisation's routines is rational 
in that organisation. 1n the terminology of the GTC, a decision based on an or­
ganisation's routines is a solution which the organisation believes to be within its 
capability limits or a solution which the organisation does not expect to repent in 
the future. 
The independent role of an organisation as a learning being is stressed by the fact 
that what may be reasonable to the organisation may be irrational to its individual 
members. A form of organisational learning may even be the restrictions on the 
individual learning. According to Levinthai and March (1993,97), organisations 
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use two major mechanisms to facilitate learning from experience. The first is 
simplification. Learning processes (or routines) seek to simplify experience, to 
minimise interactions and restrict effects to the spatial and temporal neighbour­
hood of actions. The second mechanism is specialisation. Routines tend to focus 
attention and narrow competence. 
In technology foresight organisational learning and routines have a crucial role. 1 
will (in Chapter 3) call experts in organisational learning or in relevant routines 
"experts in processual arguments". 
1.8 The GTC Paradigm of Futures Studies 
1.8.1 Basic Orientation of Futures Studies 
Thomas Kuhn have presented four criteria for a science, which has proceeded 
from a pre-paradigmatic phase to a paradigmatic phase (Kuhn 1970b, 245-246) : 
1 .  The paradigm provides concrete predictions conceming some phenomena of 
nature which can c1early be proved to be right or wrong (an interpretation of the 
Karl Popper's demarcation criterion). 
2. The paradigm provides consistently successful predictions for a specific group 
of phenomena of nature. 
3 .  The methods of prediction have to be based on a theory, which gives a kind of 
metaphysical justification to predictions, which explains partial successes and 
suggests means to improve the predictions conceming both the accuracy of pre­
diction and the amount of predicted phenomena. 
4. The use of suggested methods should be a demanding and challenging job, 
which requires gifts and involvement. 
How can futures research obtain features of a paradigmatic science? Different 
researchers have suggested different features for the paradigm (or for the pre­
paradigm) of futures research. Most of futures researchers share the viewpoints 
of Wendell Bell and Theodore Gordon, which are in line with the epistemology 
of de Jouvenel ( 1967) and Godet ( 1994). Bell has suggested that the right orien­
tation to the futures research is 
An orientation toward conscious decision-making and social action 
aimed at adapting to or controlling the future (Bell 1987, Mannermaa 
1991 ). 
According to Theodore Gordon ( 1989), the paradigm of futures research sup­
poses that: 
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The future is not preordained and can be shaped by the actions of in­
dividuals, institutions and natural forces. This first paradigm suggests, 
that actions change the future. There is a future without action, and a 
different one with it. Thus futures research and predestination are, at 
least on the surface, antitheticaI. 
The implicit epistemic assumptions of most futurologists can be found in the sce­
narios made by them. The original definition of Herman Kahn and Anthony Wie­
ner ( 1967,6) of the concept of scenario was as follows: 
Scenarios are hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the 
purpose of focusing attention on causal processes and decision points. 
They answer two kinds of questions: ( 1 )  Precisely how might some 
hypothetical situation come about, step by step? and (2) What alter­
natives exist, for each actor, at each step, for preventing, diverting, or 
facilitating the process? 
The definition gives practical content to the statement of Gordon. There are sce­
narios without action, and different ones with it. 
Values and the GTC Paradigm of Future Studies 
An important aspect of the paradigm of futures studies concerns values. For ex­
ample Wendell Bell ( 1997) has focused the second volume of his Foundations 
of Futures studies to this problem. He discusses extensively the role of utopian 
writers (for example Thomas More, Daniel Defoe, Jean Jacques Rousseau and, 
Karl Marx), religious traditions and legal traditions based on "collective judge­
ments of groups"  in the formulation and interpretation of values . 
We may with standard methods of science produce transient invariances con­
cerning (Be1l 1997 voI. 1 ,  1 88 - 1 89): 
1. Present images of the future and expectations for the future that people hold, 
that is their conceptions of the possible. 
2. People's belief about the most likely future, that is their subjective probabilities 
concerning the chances of particular futures occurring. 
3. The goals, values and attitudes people hold; the preferences they use to evalu­
ate alternative images of the future, that is, peoples hopes and fears for the future. 
4. Present intentions to act. 
5. Obligations and commitments that people have to others. 
The problem is how to evaluate the rationality or reasonability of all presented 
images of future, goals, intentions and hopes . Will the transient invariances also 
last in the future or should they last? A "mainstream" idea of scientists concern-
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ing values has been that scientists cannot telI how things should be, but only how 
they are ("Hume's guillotine"). 
Many prominent future researchers have, however, considered that reasonable 
argumentation conceming values is possible. For exampIe Pentti MaIaska has 
seen vaIue rationality as an important feature of future research (Malaska 1993): 
Future research is a value rational science. It differs from normal sci­
ences in the way it handIes vaIues and vaIue judgements. They are not 
exc1uded from scientific treatment and they are not assumed to be 
general and common to all people. They are not assumed to be deter­
mined somewhere outside the topic of future research from where vaI­
ues are found in a way given. 
Roy Amara has specified the paradigmatic features of the future research in the 
following three theses (Amara 1981 ,  Mannermaa 1991 ): 
1 .  The future is unpredictable. From this follows, that conceptions of future 
should be based on the description of possible paths of development. "What is 
possible?" 
2. The future is not predetermined. From this follows, that the possible altema­
tives of future and paths to them have to be studied carefully: "What is prob­
able"? 
3. The choices have impacts on the future. From this follows that choices should 
be made between the altematives and the realization of the paths to the selected 
altematives should be studied: II What is desirable?" 
A similar type of definition was given by Bell ( 1997 I, 73): 
The purposes of future studies are to discover or invent, examine and 
evaluate, and propose possibIe, probable and preferable futures. 
Is it possible to rationally discuss future oriented values from the epistemic start­
ing points of the GTC? Let us start the discussion from the starting points pro­
posed by de Jouvenel (1967). He considered that ends and means are intercon­
nected in values having impacts on behaviour. Values are represented as images 
of the future, constructs (e.g. plans) or interests formed in our minds. These con­
structs "represent" facts in a subjective manner, however. 
The fact that values are based on both ends and means has important conse­
quences for the reasonable discussion about vaIues. Based mostly on the discus-
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sion of Keekok Lee ( 1985), Wendell Bell ( 1997 II, 82�98) formulates three pos� 
sible options for reasonable argumentation conceming values: 
� commitment�deductibility model, 
- means-ends model, 
- epistemic implication model. 
In the commitment�deductibility model, a lower-order moral assertion can be 
justified by a higher-order assertion, and the latter by others and so on. Thus 
there is deductibility through logical consistency. Ultimately the highest-order 
assertion, and thus the entire system of justification itself, rests on an act of faith 
or will. An assertion rests on "sincere commitment" to the highest�order princi� 
ple. 
The commitment deductibility model describes rather well many actual argu­
mentation processes conceming values. Many religions give first principles for 
human actions, which priests interpret. The systems of laws are also very much 
based on the same idea. Jurists and civil servants deduce from written laws the 
right actions from the point of view of "publie will" .  The present management 
decisions are evaluated in terms of their compatibility with the organisation's long 
range ethical commitments as expressed in its mission statement. More generally, 
common action of different actors for example a common developing process of a 
technology is typically based on commonly accepted rules. The success of com� 
mon projects is to a large extent based on the commitment of different actors to 
the "first principles" .  
The problem of the model i s  that it provides no way to rationally evaluate the 
relevancy of the first principles. Do they cover all relevant aspects of actions? Do 
they give right relevancy values to different actions? The second model discussed 
by Bell - the means-ends model - implies the same problem. 
Ilkka Niiniluoto is a sophisticated representative of the means-ends model. Niini­
luoto (1993) has sought a role for future research as a planning science. Niini­
luoto has defined design or planning as a systematic endeavour where precepts 
are sought to achieve given targets with optimal use of resources. The target of a 
pIan can be a material artifact (for example consumer commodity, machine, a 
work of art, or a building), a social organisation (for example a society or a po­
litical party) or an action (for example an action decision). 
Niiniluoto has suggested that the difference between planning sciences and de­
scriptive sciences is that the knowledge produced by planning sciences is not de­
scriptive but instrumentai, providing information conceming the connections 
between targets and means. The findings of planning sciences can be given in the 
form of technical norms or practical syllogisms (v.Wright 197 1) :  
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(N) If you want target A and you believe that you are in situation B,  
you have to do X 
UnIike unconditionaI norms (You have to do X !), technical norms are according 
to Niiniluoto sentences with truth values: Norm N is true, if the doing of X is a 
necessary condition of A in situation B. If X is only one possibility to promote A, 
the norm can be given in a weaker form "it is advantageous for you to do X". 
For example econometric planning models are typically based on empirically 
supported technical norms. The empirical estimations of re1ations between vari­
ables based on regression analysis of the past data are typically c1early distin­
guished from decision parameters in econometric planning models. The numeri­
cal values of decision parameters describe the values and targets of decision­
makers who use an econometric mode!. 
Although the seeking of true technical norms is a scientifically plausible activity, 
the idea that it is the only possible way to do scientific future research, greatly 
limits the scope of the scientific future research. In real planning activities, an 
expert can often predict a change of mind of a decision maker. A decision 
maker's old target values might contradict her new target values. This is an activ­
ity which de Jouvenel ( 1967, 55) called the making of tertiary forecasts. Is it 
really so that there is no possibility to look rationally at this type of expertise? 
The third model discussed by Bell ( 1997) is Keekok Lee's "Epistemic Implication 
Model". The idea in Lee's model (Lee 1985) is that her "epistemic implication" is 
based on contingent knowledge obtained under empirical conditions. Lee pIaces 
the knowledge squarely within Popper's fallibilism, which she applies to the 
grounds supporting value assertions and which she enriches by requiring criteria 
of reIevance. 
Lee's epistemic implication modeI does not argue that one can go from "is" to 
"ought"; it assumes that prescriptive statements contain or rest upon some de­
scriptive contents that can be tested, that is either faIsified or confirmed by SUf­
viving serious efforts to falsify them. Lee (1985, 105) points out that such logic 
has been around for some time in moraI phiIosophy. For exampIe, she shows that 
the Kantian dictum "ought" implies "can" is simiIar. You are not morally obli­
gated to do what you cannot do. Lee, however, goes further: she makes the de­
scriptive e1ements or grounds of any perspective statements subject to test. 
The idea is to subject the descriptive elements of value assertions to a series of 
criteria, inc1uding empirical testing. By implication we can reach a tentative 
judgement about the validity of vaIue assertions. She gives five criteria to be met 
in making such a test: 
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1 .  Serious Evidence 
The evidence required to support or falsify an assertion must not merely refer to 
the attitude of the speakers towards their assertion or their psychological state of 
mind regarding it. Thus, mere individual preferences, desires, or wants are not 
admitted as serious evidence. Instead, serious evidence requires that there is some 
public external features of the situation referred to in the assertion. It inc1udes 
only assertions that can be denied or confirmed by independent observers, by 
some kind of objective or intersubjective process. Lee's example is the assertion: 
People ought not to smoke tobacco. It is supported by the (serious) evidence: Be­
cause to do so increases their chances of dying of lung cancer. 
2. Referentially Relevant Evidence 
"Referentially relevant" means that the assertion and the reasons for it must be 
about the same thing. They must share a common term, that is, the subject term 
(Lee 1985, 87). To say that "this young woman fainted" as evidence for "this 
young women is ill" is referentially relevant. Both the evidence and the conc1u­
sion concern the young woman. The assertion "because 2+2 = 4" does not meet 
the criterion of referential relevance. The value assertion and the evidence have 
to deal, at the very least, with the same c1ass of objects, people or events. 
3. Causally Relevant Evidence 
The evidence cited to test a moral assertion must bear the assertion in some 
causal way like in the means-ends model. Human understanding of causal rela­
tionships in the world is, however, incompIete. Evidence might be referentially 
reIevant, but couId still fail the test of causal relevance. For example, to say 
"oxygen is colourless" as evidence for "oxygen is necessary for combustion" fails 
because there is no causal connection between the colour of oxygen and its com­
bustibility. 
4. Causal lndependence 
ReIevant serious evidence must be "causally independent" of the conc1usion (Lee 
1985, 99). The evidence is not acceptable if it is produced by the conc1usion it­
seIf, as in a seIf-fuIfilling prophecy. The evidence, in other words, must have oc­
curred earlier in time than the conc1usion and it must not have been a result of the 
conc1usion. This is for exampIe valid in the case of smoking and cancer. A con­
trary case of Bell is a white supremacist assertion in the period of pIantation slav­
ery in the Americas: "Africans ought to be treated as socially inferior" the evi­
dence being that "Africans in fact are socially inferior" . Let us grant that it is 
causally reIevant, that being socialIy inferior might be a cause of being treated as 
socially inferior, aIthough this is shaky and can be challenged. This evidence ac­
cording to Lee fails because the vaIue judgement contained in the originaI asser­
tion may have caused the evidence. The evidence is inadmissible in support of 
the assertion because it is not causally independent of it. 
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5 .  Empirical Test 
Finally, there is the requirement to put the evidence to an empirical test, to assess 
whether it is true or faIse. If the evidence meets the above four criteria, the evi­
dence, if true, would serve to support the assertion, while if false, would serve to 
refute it. For example the hypothesis that smoking causes lung cancer has sur­
vived many efforts to falsify it. 
From the perspective of the GTC Keekok Lee's mode1 is c1early the most inter­
esting of the three mode1s. In practice the modeI inc1udes the second model. The 
acceptance of a vaIue assertion is reIated to means of its realization or truthfuI 
technical norms. Like de Jouvenel ( 1967), Lee' s modeI considers vaIue state­
ments as interconnected networks of ends and means. The GTC aIso supposes 
that every prescriptive statement refers to the perceived capability limits or inter­
ests of Iearning beings or actors. The capability limits or the limits of "not re­
gretted behaviour" c1assify actions or pIans as feasibIe and not-feasible. The re­
alizing of an interest is an attempt to realize a feasibIe pIan or an "image" of the 
future. Like ethicaI statements in Lee's theory the concepts "capability limits" 
and "interests" inc1ude both descriptive and prescriptive dimensions. 14 The ends 
and means of interests are so interrelated that it is possible to evaluate the va­
lidity of every statement concerning real capability limits or genuine interests 
based on some descriptive dimensions. The four criteria of Lee can be used in the 
evaIuation of every statement conceming real capability limits or genuine inter­
ests of actors. 
The fourth criterion is especially interesting from the perspective of the GTC. It 
can be seen from the perspective of connections between capacity and capability 
limits. Let us once more look at the white supremacist assertion in the period of 
plantation slavery in the Americas: "Africans ought to be treated as socially infe­
rior" the evidence being that "Africans in fact are socially inferior" . The state­
ment "Africans in fact are socially inferior" refers to the present capacity limits of 
Africans. If these capacity limits cannot change (which is not true) this fact has 
implications conceming future capability limits (limits of not-regretted behav­
iour): Africans ought to be treated as socia1Iy inferior. The reasoning contradicts 
with one type of reasonability, which will be discussed Iater: option reasonabil­
ity. It does not take into account relevant possible options. 
14 The GTC also points to the similarity of ethical standards and invariances of not-learning beings. 
Ethical standards refer to suggestions concerning the real capability limits of learning beings or actors. 
We can give the following interpretation of a suggestion of ethical standards: if you fol!ow the basic 
ethical standards, you wil! not regret your choices. Because real capability limits are as invariant as the 
criteria of sameness of not-learning beings, this points to the similarity of ethical standards and invari­
ances of not-learning beings. Suggested ethical standards can be criticized like suggested invariances of 
not-Iearning beings. 
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Lee and Ben do not discuss a further evaIuation criterion which is evident from 
the point of view of the GTC. Ben discusses a form of this criterion when he dis­
cusses future-oriented vaIue statements (Bell 1997 II, 95-101). 
Bell considers that most prescriptive statements have at Ieast implicit future ori­
entation. In different ethicaI theories the future-orientation is more or Iess evi­
dent. This orientation is most evident for consequentionalists. For them, judge­
ments of the good on which peopIe base their decision to act rest upon anticipa­
tions. According to Ben (1997, 96) aIso contractarianist, utilitarianist and deon­
toIogicaI theories of ethics contain inherent futures orientation. Even a deontoIo­
gist, whose ethicaI judgements are based on duties, may add to an ethical judge­
ment a remark 'see that you don't do it again' for example in the correcting the 
behaviour of a child (Bell 1997 II, 98). 
The future orientation of prescriptive statements is based on the similarity of past 
and future situations. It is highly important to realize that this act of generaliza­
tion from the past to the future is not a simple or self-evident logical operation. It 
is based on the criteria of sameness of the actor. The criteria of sameness may 
change if the actor perceives that her criteria of sameness are contradictory. 
The epistemology of GTC is based on the idea that the first principles or moral 
ruIes are special types of criteria of sameness. Like other criteria of sameness of 
an actor, they are based on learning experiences . The learning experiences are not 
necessarily the learning experiences of the actor but mediated learning experi­
ences of others for example in the form of routines, traditions or religions. 
Though the criteria of sameness are often or even typically approved without pri­
vate experience, they are tested based on private actions and privately perceived 
contradictions. 
Though 1 highly appreciate the idea of intersubjective evidence concerning the 
reasonability of moral judgements proposed by Keekok Lee and Wendell Bell, 1 
consider that the reasonable evaluation of value judgements can also be based on 
a further evaluation criterion: the criterion of non-contradictory criteria of the 
sameness of an actor. 
Arguments of this type is very common in practical argumentation processes. For 
example in the discussion concerning abortion, the following argument is based 
.on that criterion: 
If abortion is allowed for economic reasons, why not accept abortion 
based on difficult hereditary diseases? 
The problem is, does abortion based on hereditary reasons belong to the similar­
ity group of abortions based on economic reasons. This depends on the ethical 
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paradigm of the actor. We are actually approaching the commitment deductibility 
model presented by Lee but without supposing explicit first principles. 
Presenting of a threat is a special kind of argument concerning the consistency of 
the criteria of sameness. The basic function of a threat is to suggest that a threat­
ened actor will regret an action if the actor performs the action. It is suggested 
that there will be a contradiction between the anticipated results of the action and 
the realized results. 
1.8.2 How do the Epistemic Starting Points of GTC Meet the 
Requirements of a Kuhnian Paradigm? 
How do the epistemic starting points of GTC fulfill Kuhn's conditions for a para­
digm presented above? Firstly, the GTC provides concrete predictions with truth 
values in different ways concerning the future behaviour of learning and not­
learning beings. One can make concrete predictions about the behaviour of not­
learning beings making assumptions about their invariant criteria of sameness. 
The falsification of these assumptions is possible. But how do we falsify the as­
sumptions concerning the criteria of sameness of learning beings or how to pre­
dict the changes of their criteria of sameness? Whenever a learning being has 
some criteria of sameness, she can have true or false hypotheses concerning 
them. The problem is the evidence, which could falsify a false hypothesis. 
The evidence has to concern the learning processes of the learning being. Learn­
ing processes are often non-deterministic. There are often many choices, within 
the capability limits (the limits of not-regretted behaviour) of learning being. This 
is another way to express the second point of Amara presented above. One can 
try empirically to form a conception about the capability limits: one may look at 
the choices made by the similar type of learning beings in similar situations. Any 
choice is relevant concerning the perceived capability limits but not concerning 
the real capability limits. The real capability limits are related on future repen­
tance of choices. Those choices, which the being has not regretted, might belong 
to real capability limits. We do not know, however, if some further experience of 
the actor will result in repentance. In the case of learning beings there is a con­
tinuos discrepancy between the behaviour based on imperfect knowledge and the 
ideal reasonable behaviour. 
Secondly, what may be the regularly successful predictions of the GTC para­
digm? In addition to the instrumentai predictions of the paradigm suggested by 
Niiniluoto, the paradigm might provide successful predictions about what a 
learning being or an actor cannot do, because the action is not within its capacity 
limits, and what it should not do, because the action does not belong to its capa­
bility limits (it will regret that type of behaviour, if it does it). 
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Thirdly, the general theory of consistency gives a metaphysical justification to 
predictions. In summary, futures research based on the GTC paradigm is re­
search on the capacity limits, capability limits and interests of actors and the 
study of possible futures based on this type of knowledge. In the case of a not­
learning being, the activity recommended by the paradigm is the seeking of in­
variant criteria of sameness. 
In the case of a learning beings, there is always a discrepancy between ideal and 
perceived capacity limits, capability limits and interests. The discrepancy de­
pends on cognitive maps based on the (concrete) memories of learning beings. 
The idea of the GTC is that a learning being continuously changes its cognitive 
map in response to experiences of inconsistency (for example unexpected 
events). 
The basic epistemic standpoint of the GTC is the coherence theory of truth. Ni­
iniluoto's basic critic of the coherence theory (" that a sentence A is compatible 
with a consistent set X of true sentences, is not sufficient to guarantee the truth of 
A" ) does not, however, apply to the GTC. In the GTC truth values do not depend 
on the relationships between sentences but on the relationships of sentences to 
the consistent behaviour of a study object (for example a not-Iearning being). In 
that sense it is a version of the correspondence theory. 
In the study of not-learning beings "the practical coherence hypothesis" is just the 
same, which de Jouvenel ( 1967,85) called our innate idea: identical initial condi­
tions lead to identical results. We expect from a not-learning being coherent be­
haviours in similar situations. If the hypothesis is falsified by inconsistent be­
haviour of a not-learning being we do not refute our "innate idea", but we con­
sider that we have made false presuppositions concerning the criteria of sameness 
of the not-Iearning being. 
The situation is much more complicated in the case of learning beings. As Char­
les Peirce in the above cited paragraph mentioned, some persons believe that they 
can make things true, if they behave as stubbornly as not-learning beings (Peirce, 
1 93 1 -35, 5 .377). But reasonable learning beings change their criteria of sameness 
based on new information and results of their actions. There is, however, a spe­
cial kind of coherence which directs the actions of learning beings. Their action 
has to be in coherence with their earlier experiences as these are stored in their 
memories. In principle, if another learning being could realize all experiences in 
the memory storage, she could anticipate the action possibilities. This is of course 
only a theoretical possibility and even contradicts the definition of the (genuine) 
learning being. 
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1.9 Basic Types of Expert Knowledge about Future 
One can find four possible types of expertise on the future based on the general 
theory of consistency (GTC). 
- the expertise on the invariant behaviour or invariant criteria of sameness of 
learning or not-Iearning beings' 
- the expertise on the capacity limits of learning beings 
- the expertise on the interests of learning beings 
- the expertise on the capability limits of learning beings. 
The basic types of futures-oriented expertise get different weights in different 
futures-oriented activities. 
The invariant behaviour of not-Iearning beings means a possibility to make de­
terministic predictions about the future behaviour of these beings. A weaker form 
of this type of prediction is a prediction based on the assumption that some 
learning beings behave as they used to behave. Let us refer to experts in these 
two types of knowledge with a common name: (traditionaI) scientists or experts 
on invariances. Natural sciences have tried to find not-learning beings and their 
empirically supported criteria of sameness ("natural laws") or invariant behav­
iours. On the other hand, behavioural sciences had tried to find (transient) invari­
ances of learning beings and their empirically supported criteria of sameness, 
learning possibilities (for example memories), capacity limits, interests and capa­
bility limits of behaviour. 
An important expert group on the future use of a generic technology comprises 
those actors, who have a large supply of relevant resources (wide capacity limits) 
and relevant interests (decisions concerning the generic technology belong to 
their capability limits). We may call this group decision-makers or the makers of 
futures. A difference between scientists and the developers of technologies in 
firms has been that the latter are more interested in ways to widen capacity limits 
to achieve different targets (to promote interests) than to find invariances. The 
capacity and capability limits of different actors are interconnected. The decision 
of a powerful decision-maker can move a choice of a less powerful decision 
maker beyond her capacity, or capability limits. A qualified decision-maker 
knows the limits of her power. Her power to shape futures depends on her exper­
tise on interests and decision routines of other relevant decision makers. No deci­
sion maker can change the genuine invariances. 
We might suppose that actors themselves are typically (with some exceptions) the 
best experts of their genuine interests and their present capacity limits, but often 
not of their capability limits or their future capacity limits. For example the ex­
perts, who know the relevant invariances well, often know better than people 
themselves, which types of resources satisfy the interests expressed by non-
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experts. These experts might be the best in the understanding of real capability 
limits. We may call this third main group of futures experts synthesizers. Synthe­
sizers are masters of relevance. Their ability to make good syntheses means that 
they are able to understand which invariances, capacities and decisions are most 
important, and they can anticipate the interplay of factors that shape futures .  
Figure 1 . 1. Three types of experts aboutfutures 
Scientists 
Decision-makers 
Synthesizers 
Types of expertise 
Knowledge on invariances: 
- permanent invariances: criteria of same­
ness of not-learning beings 
- transient invariances: habits, routines, 
equilibrium points of learning of actors 
Real and perceived capacity limits; per­
ceived interests and routines; real and per­
ceived capability limits 
Relevant invariances, relevant capacity lim­
its, relevant interests and relevant capability 
limits 
1 will illustrate the three basic types of expertise with a building process of busi­
ness scenarios. Typically, technology Delphi processes are related to scenario 
processes in firms. 
Tarja Meristö has defined a business scenario as a hypothetical view of the fu­
ture, which holistically and multidimensionally drafts a future action environment 
for an enterprise and describes a development path from the present to a future 
(Meristö 199 1 ,45). Meristö has c1assified the scenarios used in the strategic man­
agement of large corporations into mission scenarios, issue scenarios and action 
scenarios. The proposed phases of the scenario process describe rather well the 
scenario work in the ten big multinational corporations (Meristö 1991 ,  107-1 10). 
The purpose of mission scenarios is to help the top management to realize "who 
we are and where we are". What are the possible worlds for the whole corpora­
tion? 1n these scenarios possible business areas are discussed. Should the firm 
diversify or concentrate on some key areas? 
The idea of issue scenarios is to respond to the question "what are the possible 
worlds" .. 1ssue scenarios serve many units in a corporation and they are usually 
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made by planning staff at the corporation level, but also using the expertise of 
business units. The issue scenarios describe the environment of the corporation 
and they provide frames of reference for action scenarios. 
The action scenarios seek answers to questions such as "where can we go and 
how? where do we dedde to go?" Meristö and Pentti Malaska have developed a 
practical model for making action scenarios. It proceeds in eight phases and it 
uses mission scenarios and issue scenarios as inputs : 
1 .  The appointment of the working group and setting of its targets. The definition 
of the strategic task of the business unit. 
2. The c1arification of the basic beliefs of the business unit. 
3. The mapping of the possible changes (the "possible worlds"). 
4. The c1arification of threats and opportunities, strengths and weaknesses. 
5. The making of scenarios. 
6. The selection of final scenarios. 
7. The new definition of the strategic task of the business unit. 
8. The final evaluation of the working process. 
The crucial features of the action scenario approach of Meristö are as follows 
(Meristö 199 1 ,  vi): 
1 .  Those who are responsible for strategic decisions are also responsible for the 
action scenario approaches and the whole process to formulate and illustrate the 
scenarios. This ensures the commitment needed in decision-making and in action. 
2. The action scenario approach describes not only the alternatives of the future 
environment, but also inc1udes the strategy formulation based on those alterna­
tives. This creates flexibility for the strategies. 
3. The action scenario approach integrates futures studies with strategic planning 
and is independent of the planning process used by the company. 
What kind of interpretations can be given to the scenario process suggested by 
Meristö ( 199 1 )  using the three basic types of expertise? 
The main aim of the scenario process is the synthesis of different types of exper­
tise: expertise in permanent or transient invariances and the decision-making ex­
pertise. Meristö has crystallised the use of scenarios in a firm in the following 
way (Meristö 199 1 ,  23, Kite 1981) :  future research without connections to deci­
sion-making is a waste of time and other resources, but without futures research 
one cannot speak about freedom of decision-making, because the possible alter­
natives for action are not noticed and one has little freedom of choice. 
The synthetic process is c1early visible in the eight phases of action scenarios: 
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1 .  A preliminary synthesis (based on mission and issue scenarios) is presented in 
the form of the strategic task of the business unit. 
2. The most important concepts (criteria of sameness) and invariances are pre­
sented, on which the preliminary synthesis is based. 
3. The relevant future possibilities within the capacity limits of the organisation 
are discussed. 
4. The c1arification of capability limits based on perceived invariances ("threats 
and opportunities") and resources ("strengths and weaknesses").  
5 .  The preliminary futures within the capability limits of the organisation. 
6. The final futures within the capability limits of the organisation. 
7. The final synthesis in the form of the strategic task of the business unit. 
1n making different scenarios, different types of expertise are stressed. On the 
general level, it is reasonable to assume that in making mission scenarios the or­
der of importance of types of expertise is the expertise based on the use of re­
sources (or decision-making expertise), synthetic expertise and expertise in in­
variances. 1n the case of issue scenarios, the order may be expertise in invari­
ances, synthetic expertise and expertise based on the use of resources. 1n making 
action scenarios, the order may be synthetic expertise, expertise in invariances 
and expertise based on the use of resources. 
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2. TECHNOLOGICAL PARADIGMS AND THEIR 
DEVELOPER COMMUNITIES 
2.1 How to Define a Technology? 
Technological development is a special type of human learning. The use of a 
technology is not based just on things, it also encompasses skills and knowledge, 
and vice versa. This concems not only mental skills. A typewriter without a user 
who can type and read is a useless, heavy piece of materia!. It would not be a 
typewriter. A technology is a totality of skills and interconnected technical solu­
tions. A typewriter that has been deconstructed into hammers, springs, keys and 
bars is no longer a typewriter. And vice versa, it would not make sense to talk 
about the skill of typing without referring to the thing (Rip 1995, 1 8). 
The historian Charles Singer has given the following definition of technology: 
technology is how things are made and what things are made (Rip 1995, 1 8). 
Recognizing that a technology must work in a more or less routine-like way, in a 
more or less recognizable way, it is c1ear that technology does not only refer to 
"things" and "skills", but also to the way things and skills are part of the routines 
of organizations. 
There are three "poles" in technical learning processes (Techno-Economic Net­
works 199 1 ,  29), the interpretations of which in the GTC is given in parenthe­
ses1 : 
- the science pole (S) or production of "certified" knowledge and embodied skills 
(expertise in invariances), 
- the technology pole (T) or development of devices of varying complexity which 
enlist human and non-human resources to obtain anticipated results or targets on 
a routine basis ( the widening of capacity limits) and 
1 The three poles are represented by typical institutions. According to Callon (1992) (cf. Green et al. 
1998,6), the scientific pole consists of universities and public or private independent research centers; 
the technical pole consists of technical labs in firms, co-operative research centres and pilot plants and 
the market pole contains users, professionals and practitioners. 
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- the market pole (M) which structures and organizes demand or seeks relevant 
targets (interests, perceived and real capability limits). 
The technical leaming process can be better analysed if the intermediation activi­
ties S T and TM are also discussed : 
- the transfer pole ST is the interface between science and technology (the use of 
invariances in the widening of capacity limits) and 
- the development pole TM, which comprises activities in the areas between 
technology and the market (the widening of goal relevant capacity limits). 
ln some connections the third interface SM may also be relevant. It means that 
the science is used in analyzing market demand or relevant targets (the use of 
invariances connected with capability limits). 
T 
Technology 
Science 
S 
M 
Market 
From these starting points we can give a definition of a technology: 
A technology means a group of techniques and targets achieved or 
reasonably believed to be achievable with these techniques based for 
example on scientific invariances. A technology is based on similar 
targets or techniques. 
1 will use the concept "technology" more generally than the cop.cept "technique". 
The technology inc1udes both the target(s) and means to achieve the target(s). 
The technique refers only to some way to achieve target(s). This interpretation 
does not contradict the original use of the concepts "technology" and "technique" 
(Volti 1992, Autio 1995). The word "technology" is derived from the Greek 
words "techne" and "logos" .  The word techne can be interpreted as skill of hand 
or technique. The word logos means knowledge or science. Thus technology can 
be viewed as a knowledge of skills or techniques. It is reasonable to suppose that 
the knowledge of a technique also inc1udes the targets for which the technique 
can be used. 
It is actually unfeasible to study techniques and targets separately because as 
Bruno Latour (1993, 3) has stressed, the targets and the technologies to attain 
them are not independent. A technology is a sufficient but not a necessary condi-
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tion to attain a target. A technology gives to an actor a capacity to attain a target 
but the attainment does not necessarily be10ng to the capability limits of the ac­
tor: 
"Guns kill people" say those who try to control the free sale of guns. 
To which the National Rifle Association replies with another slogan 
"People kill people; not guns" . . .  
With a gun a new goal is  possible: 
Y ou simply wanted to hurt but now that you have the gun you want to 
kill . . .  You are a different person with the gun in your hand (Latour 
1993,5) 
The importance of the achieved targets of a technique and its efficiency vary. If a 
technique or products produced by it have positive net economic value we may 
refer, in analogy with Freeman (1982) to an innovation. Without a realized eco­
nomic value a new way of achieving a target is just an invention. Kimmo Kui­
tunen has defined technological innovation as a commercialized idea in any of 
the foIIowing dimensions: products, production processes or work organization at 
aII levels (Kuitunen 1993,22, Whipp and Clark 1986). Oslo Manual (OECD 
1997) has outlined guidelines for internationally compatible innovation surveys. 
According to this manual the minimum requirement for a technological product 
and process innovation (TTP) is that it is new for a firm. Thus, a firm can be an 
innovator if it only implements TTP' s developed elsewhere. In my conceptual 
framework different innovative implementations are different technology gener­
alizations. 
2.2 Generalizations Based on Special Technology Language or 
Technological Paradigm 
A key concept of this study is a promising technological language or a paradigm 
based on generic technologies. A generic technology functions well in many dif­
ferent types of products or production processes. Fusfe1d (1 978) illustrates this 
idea in the following way: 
When we talk about technologies, we tend to speak of specific tech­
niques and products - internai combustion engines, refrigeration, air 
conditioning, for example. But technology flows in and out of such 
products, and they do not provide the fundamental basis by which to 
measure technological change. The analysis must be on the level of 
generic technologies. A carburettor, for example, is an application of 
generic technology of vaporizing a liquid and mixing it with a gas. 
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The same technology applied in the paint industry might become an 
automatic paint sprayer or in the aerospace industry a jet backpack. 
Dussauge et al. (1992,106-108) describe generic technologies as follows: 
A technology is described as generic if - through combinations with 
other technologies - it is likely to lead to numerous different applica­
tions in diverse businesses. Unlike key technologies, generic technolo­
gies are not defined with reference to a particular business . . .  Generic 
technologies are often closely related to fundamental scientific knowl­
edge, precisely because they must hold the potential for generating a 
broad spectrum of applications. 
The development of a technology is a historical or an evolutionary process. A 
technology has a genealogical line. A generic technology can be seen as a group 
of analogous inventions or innovations which have the same origin or ancestor 
(basic invention). Nelson and Winter (1977) have used the analogous concept 
"generalized natural trajectory" to describe cumulative clusters of innovations. 
Like in the evolutionary process of living nature the technological development is 
an interaction of processes which generate variations (inventions and innova­
tions), transmit variations through time and space (learning and imitation) and 
restrict variations (selection as a result of competition and co-operation) (Pantzar 
1991). 
We might speak about special technological languages or technological para­
digms. The second concept has been used in the new macro economics of tech­
nological development. The traditionai "production function" viewpoint in eco­
nomics has supposed that technological change is a global phenomenon without a 
specific direction. The new "Kuhnian viewpoint" of technological change refutes 
these assumptions (Dosi 1982). Dosi draws an analogy with Kuhnian philosophy 
of science (Kuhn 1970 origo 1962) and assumes that "normal" technological 
change consists of relatively small improvements in bigger, revolutionary (and 
therefore "scarce") technological breakthroughs resulting in new technological 
paradigms. 
According to Dosi (1982,152) a technological paradigm "embodies strong pre­
scription on the directions of technical change to pursue and those to neglect" .  
Practitioners typically become committed to "their" paradigm, which defines both 
how they understand and how they carry out their work. A paradigm is like a 
world view which an enterprise cannot easily change. 
The macro economies of technological paradigms assumes that technological de­
velopment is not based on unconnected techniques from which an enterprise ra­
tionally selects the most profitable ones of any moment in time. The discoveries 
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are supposed to be grouped into technological paradigms based on different tech­
nological breakthroughs. Analogous concepts to technological paradigms have 
been "technological regimes" (Nelson and Winter 1 977), "technological guide­
posts" (SahaI 1981 ,  Rip 1 995) and "megatechnologies" (Kuusi 1 991 ). 
Dosi defined a technological paradigm as a "model and pattem of solution of se­
lected technological problems, based on selected principles from natural sciences 
and on selected material technologies" (Dosi 1 982, 152). Rene Kemp ( 1995) has 
defined a technological regime as 
the overall complex of scientific knowledge, engineering practices, 
production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and 
procedures, institutions and infrastructures which make up the totality 
of technology. 
The definition of a technological paradigm also links up Schumpeter' s innovation 
theory, in which an important innovation creates a bandwagon effect of smaller, 
incremental, follow-up innovations. Dosi ( 1982) uses a similar concept when he 
makes the distinction between technological paradigms and technological trajec­
tories. In his view, "normal" technological change (compare the Kuhnian term 
"normal" science) takes place along a direction set out by the discovery of an im­
portant general principle which provides the opportunity for application in a 
number of economic sectors. A technological trajectory is the development of a 
technology along the lines set out by the technological paradigm (Verspagen 
1992). 
An important dimension of a technological paradigm is its pervasiveness. Perez 
(1983) has introduced the term techno-economic paradigm to make a distinction 
between pervasive and non-pervasive technological paradigms. A techno­
economic paradigm describes the economic, institutional and technological inter­
linkages between sectors. A new technological paradigm will thus also imply a 
shift towards a new techno-economic paradigm if the technological principle (or 
the products associated with it) can be used throughout the economy, so that in­
stitutional and economic relations between alI economic agents are affected. 
Verspagen ( 1992) takes as examples of techno-economic paradigms steam power, 
electricity and iron/steel falI. Obvious current examples are revolutions in mi­
croelectronics and biotechnology. The takeoff of a techno-economic paradigm 
will require new investments and thus will imply the creative destruction of old 
capital in most sectors. The macroeconomic effects of less pervasive technologi­
cal paradigms are much smaller. The main effect is limited to one or a few sec­
tor(s) of the economy. 
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What determines the competitiveness of a paradigm? Freeman ( 199 1) makes a 
distinction between technological, economic and institutional factors in competi­
tiveness. Technological competitiveness relates both to production costs (process 
innovation) and quality (product innovation). According to Freeman, technologi­
cal competitiveness is increased by incremental innovations, which to a large ex­
tent take the form of learning effects. Due to their cumulative nature, the impact 
of incremental innovation and leaming effects differ over the lifetime of a tech­
nology. Freeman assumes that in the initial (laboratory) phase of the development 
of a technology, progress may be very slow. But after a certain period of intro­
duction, it is likely that incremental innovations and learning effects take place at 
increasing rates. In the later phases of the development of the paradigm decreas­
ing marginal returns to research efforts might set in and learning effects become 
smaller and smaller. 
Green et al. ( 1998) have made a distinction between techno-economic network 
(TEN) approach represented by Callon, Latour and others at the Ecole de Mines 
de Paris and the above discussed techno-economic paradigm approach (TEP). 
According to Callon ( 1992), "a techno-economic network is a co-ordinated set of 
heterogeneous actors . . .  who participate collectively in the conception, develop­
ment, production and distribution or diffusion of procedures for producing goods 
and services, some of which give rise to market transactions" .  According to 
Green et al. ( 1998,4-5), in a techno-economic network a variety of individuals 
with different interests are all able to realize their separate aims by the achieve­
ment of a common goal, with which all their interests become bound upo A bound 
between two actors in a techno-economic network is based on a translation. A 
translation defines the other, thus imputing it/himlher with certain interests, 
plans, desires and strategies. 
According to Green et al. (1998, 1 1 - 13) the TEP approach is a top-down ap­
proach. New (given) technological developments have to "fit" the appropriate 
social institutions for the TEP to take off. Green et al. consider that TEPs offer 
some understanding of how technological growth proceeds, but this approach 
does not explain how some technologies come to be se1ected in preference to 
others or how some succeed where others fail. As a down-top micro approach, 
the TEN approach provides these types 01' interpretations. The artifactl social sur­
rounds of an artifact are seen in a TEN as temporary and contingent. The scale 01' 
analysis is not predefined, but emerges within the analysis that starts from spe­
cific innovations. Translations do not have predetermined features. 
1 consider that the TEN approach has much in common with the approach 01' de 
Jouvenel discussed in the first chapter. Different actors have different pictures 
and strategies of the future (perceived interests and delegated subinterests in the 
conceptual framework of the GTC) which direct their behavior. These pictures or 
strategies are often not explicit. They can be inferred from e.g. instructions and 
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handbooks andl or in the unwritten, physical attributes of made artefacts 
(compare Green et al. 1998, 1 7) 
1 think that a general idea which connects both TEN and TEP is that there are 
common special technological future-oriented languages shared by those having 
the same technological paradigm or by those working together in a network. The 
"grammar" of TEP language has more definite elements than the "grammar" of 
the TEN language. Using the concepts of the general linguistics of de Saussure 
(1916) a TEP language is more based on "Lang" (general codes) and a TEN lan­
guage on "Parole" (special "speaches" of actors). 1 have hesitated if 1 should use 
the concept "special technology language" or "technological paradigm". 1 have 
decided to use the concept "technological paradigm", because 1 consider that the 
real long-term expertise conceming future technological development should be 
based on identification of definite elements of technological languages. 
1 consider that just the leaming processes based on definite (invariant) elements 
of a common technology generalization language provide a practical way to de­
fine a technological paradigm. 1 define a technological paradigm as a "shared 
generalization language " capable of producing important generalizations based 
on a cluster of linked technologies. Generalization language of a technological 
paradigm has its particular criteria of sameness connecting its different generic 
technologies and it is based on perceived (e.g. scientific) invariances. 
The role of a generic technology belonging to a technological paradigm can be 
illustrated by a biological analogy. Let us draw a parallel between a generic tech­
nology and a gene and between a successful product and a successful organism 
having the gene. As a gene with other genes, so a generic technology can func­
tion well only together with other generic technologies belonging to the same 
technological paradigm. A generalization language is a specific organization 
principle of generic technologies like a genome of a specie. A generic technology 
means that the "invention gene based on the generic technology" can function in 
many different types of technological paradigms or "genomes". If a product or 
production process, where the "invention gene" is applied, is successful, we may 
refer to an innovation. It is a new product or a production process based on some 
technological paradigm including the discussed generic technology. 
A promising technological paradigm can be described by a group 
[realized target(s), realized technique(s) to achieve target(s), promising new tar­
get(s), promising new technique(s) to achieve target(s)], 
where the already realized target(s) or technique(s) for achieving target(s) can be 
generalized to many or important potential target(s) or other technique(s) for 
achieving target(s). 
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Let us look more c10sely at "a generalization based on a technological paradigm". 
Technology generalizations are based on similarity between already realized gen­
eralizations and promising generalizations. The basic argument of a generaliza­
tion can be given as follows: 
Type 1 basic argument concerning a promising technology generalization: 
Premise 1 ,'  Technology generalization a 1 is realized. This means that a target is 
achieved with a technique belonging to technological paradigm A. 
Premise 2: Generalization al is similar in technological paradigm A to a not yet 
realized generalization a2. 
Conclusion: Generalization a2 is promising . 
A simpler formulation of the type 1 argument is 
A generalization a2 which is not yet realized is promising based on paradigm A 
because generalization a 1 is realized. 
Typically, the similarity between the two generalizations a2 and al is only par­
tial2. They are similar based e.g. on a common target or a common technique. A 
technology generalization can happen both in the direction of new targets and in 
the direction of new techniques. Similar targets from the point of view of a tech­
nique need not be similar from the point of views of the customers having those 
targets. The above example of Fusfeld (1 978) is illustrative: from the point of 
view of vaporizing a liquid and mixing it with a gas, applications in carburettors, 
in paint sprayers and in aerospace industry are similar. On the other hand, com­
mon targets might make technically very different techniques similar in technol­
ogy generalization enterprises. The target of the inserting of foreign DNA into 
isolated cells of animals or plants illustrates the case (Moses and Moses 1995, 
38). It is possible to meet the target using plasmids of bacteria, applying an 
electric current or by microinjection to inject a DNA solution directly into animal 
cells. 
It is often difficult to find realized specific generalizations similar to a new possi­
ble generalization because of the tacit or hidden knowledge. In these cases, it is 
often reasonable to give a general description of the realized generalizations of 
the technological paradigm and to connect the promise of a generalization to that 
general evidence. The general evidence defines a group of similar generalizations 
based on some technological paradigm. 
2 Many philosophers e.g. John-Stuart MilI, Peirce and many recent philosophers have tried to find ob­
jective measures for "argumentum a simile"(Niiniluoto 1987). My point is that the measures are always 
paradigm dependent. 
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Type 2 basic argument concerning promising technology generalization: 
A generalization is promising because it be10ngs to a promising simi­
larity group of generalizations based on a teehnologieal paradigm A.  
The similarity group is  promising because of the general evidence of 
theoretical considerations or because it inc1udes realized generaliza­
tions. 
U sing the concepts of GTC, a technology generalization can be defined to be 
promising if its realization is within the perceived capability limits of an actor 
("the group of actions, which the actor believes that he or she will not regret"). If 
the generalization is within the real capability limits of the actor, the actor does 
not regret its realization. The faet that a generalization is within real eapability 
limits of an aetor (or many actors) is a way to define a teehnological innovation. 
The generalization based on some technological paradigm is an innovation proc­
ess with a historical or time dimension. The innovation process starts if a gener­
alization seems to be reasonable for at least one actor with enough economic and 
other resources. It is commonly recognized that there are two basic types of inno­
vation processes: science push and demand pullo Irvine and Martin ( 1984) have 
depicted these two models of innovation in the following way: 
SCIENCE PUSH 
Curiosity- oriented research ----> Applied research ----> Experimental 
development ----> Innovation 
DEMAND PULL 
Market demand ----> Applied research----> Experimental development----> 
Innovation 
1 think that instead of "curiosity-oriented research" it is more reasonable to speak 
about "perceived promising technological possibiIities (related to promising ge­
neric technologies)". Instead of "market demand" we might more generally speak 
about "promising new targets", which are also related to some actor based para­
digm. From the viewpoint of an innovating organization the ongoing innovation 
process can be interpreted to be a "growth impulse" in its Bonsai tree or in its 
actor based paradigm. The starting impulse is situated in the top of the tree in a 
demand pull innovation process and in roots in a science push innovation proc­
esso In the case of a successful process the whole tree (generic technologies, skills 
and product branches ) should be in favour of the growth. 
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A practical way to conceptualize an innovation process is to describe its phases 
through the market position or the tumover of the products resulting from the 
process. It is reasonable to assume that the development is S-shaped (a form of a 
logistic curve). The reason for this form is that an application of a generic tech­
nology starts slowly and many impediments must initially be overcome. In the 
next phase the application advances rapidly for a period and then slows as the 
easy improvements have been "mined" (Rip 1995). An innovation process seldom 
leads to one product but to a series of products or innovations resembling each 
other. 
The concept "technology generalization" is used instead of the commonly used 
concept "technology diffusion" .  Pekka Ylä-Anttila and Synnöve Vuori ( 1992) 
have described this concept in the book "Mastering technology diffusion" as fol­
lows: 
The transfer of technology is seen as one form of diffusion. It is inten­
tional and active diffusion encompassing flows of technological know­
how and technical equipment from one country or area to another 
aimed to benefit both the supplier and recipient. Other forms of tech­
nology diffusions are spillovers, education, leaming or other forms of 
"natural diffusion". The diffusion may take place across borders or 
within economies, Le. it can be intemational or national. In general 
diffusion is viewed as a dynamic process over time during which the 
new techniques spread across the potential users once the innovation 
is adopted by the first individuals or firms. 
According to Stan Metcalfe ( 1998, 7), "It is diffusion which is the crucial process 
in ensuring the spread of innovations to an ever widening circle of economic ap­
plications" . A basic weakness in the concept "technology diffusion" is the at least 
implicit idea that the innovation adopted by the first individuals or firms does not 
change during its diffusion process. In practice, innovation changes or it is com­
plemented by other (incremental) innovations in many or sometimes even most of 
its new applications. The idea of "generalization" is that new applications change 
a generic technology. A successful flow of technological know-how and technical 
equipment from one country or area to another normally requires incremental 
innovations. The successful applications (or generalizations) of a generic tech­
nology in a new country mean e.g. that new targets are met by that technology. 
It is highly important to realize that the impacts of technological inventions (e.g. 
generalizations of generic technologies) also depend on generic ideas. De Jou­
venel ( 1967, 258-266) considered that in addition to technological foresight, we 
need the foresight of social carriers of ideas: that is to say, their diffusion, defor­
mations and applications. We may speak of socio-technological paradigms. These 
are clusters of generic technologies and generic ideas or social innovations. 
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Like generic technologies, generic social ideas diffuse through new generaliza­
tions. De Jouvenel ( 1967, 264-265) gave an interesting example of that. The 
American Dec1aration of Independence states that "We hold these truths to be 
self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator 
with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness" .  In the first phase this general idea was not generalized to concern 
slavery, at least in the minds of the slave owners who accepted it. This generali­
zation happened, as we know, slowly: it was not fully enacted in practice until 
nearly ninety years after the Dec1aration of Independence. 
If the acceptance of a scientific idea or of a technological invention demands ex­
tensive deformations in the cognitive maps of people, it is not easily approved. If 
a technological invention contradicts a social innovation which many accept to 
improve their understanding of their genuine interests, it is easily rejected. These 
problems have been highly relevant concerning the inventions/innovations made 
in genetics. De Jouvenel ( 1967, 262), who discussed the diffusion of the ideas of 
Darwin, also anticipated the present discussion: 
Take this example: in a country where, as in France, the state pays 
regular allowances to families with children, we would be deeply 
shocked by the suggestion that they should be denied to parents whose 
ancestors might have hereditary defects . . .  Neither the idea of natural 
selection nor the subsequent ideas of genetics has been received in the 
social field. The powerful surge of moral ideas has swept them aside. 
2.3 Technology Clusters or Application Paradigms of Actors 
The micro- or meso-leve1 counterpart of technological paradigm or of a special 
technological language is the technology c1uster of some actors. Dussauge et al. 
(1992) have defined a technology c1uster as a set of businesses sharing a common 
technological base. It consists of a number of applications, which relate the core 
technologies to products and markets. In contrast to a technological paradigm 
accepted by a whole community of actors, we might call the paradigm of a single 
actor an application paradigm. A technology c1uster or application paradigm can 
be described as a "bonsai-tree", a Japanese term used in applications made by 
Honda, Canon and NBC. 
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Figure 2. 1.  Schematic Picture of a Bonsai Tree 
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The roots of a miero level bonsai tree are generie teehnologies, the trunk the 
teehnologieal potential developed by the finn, the branehes the industries and 
businesses where the latter would be applied, and the fruits the produ�ts and 
produet/markets (Dussauge et al. 1992, 105). In a meso level bonsai tree, the 
roots are also generie teehnologies, the trunk the teehnologicaI potential devel­
oped by a developer eommunity (e.g. the Finnish bioteeh eommunity), the 
branehes the industries and businesses where the latter would be applied, and the 
fruits the produets and produet/markets. 
Two important elements mentioned already in the beginning of this ehapter are 
added to the originaI bonsai tree model of Dussauge et aI. ( 1992). They are 
promising targets and promising teehniques. Based on already realized targets 
(e.g. produets) and already reaIized teehniques and eompetencies, a bonsai tree 
(or a teehnological paradigm) grows towards promising new targets and promis­
ing new teehniques. 
The teehnology c1uster of generie teehnologies used by a finn deseribed by a 
bonsai tree reveals the special logic in the growth of teehnology generalization 
frrms, whereas the more eonventional miero approaeh based upon business units 
would interpret this growth as diversification moves3• The trunk represents the 
"eore eompetenee" of the finn - a teehnieal as well as industrial eapability. The 
trunk represents a eertain stability, whereas the roots eonsist of a set of ever­
ehanging elements of the teehnological paradigm of a finn, some of which are 
growing while others shrink and are abolished, the main objeetive being to eom­
bine elements in the best possible way in order to nourish a durable trunk 
(Dussauge et al. 1992, 109). 
Starting from the firm's produets and markets, strategic segmentation is implicitly 
based on the idea of "industry"; however, industry is only one way of eategoriz­
ing the finn's produets. This eoneept is totally irrelevant in the ease of finns 
growing in the teehnology-c1uster mode. Finns or developer eommunities which 
grow as teehnology c1usters do not eompete in one specifie industry, but in aII the 
industries where their teehnological potential ean provide them with an advan­
tage. A eompetitor which is faster in mastering and applying new generic teeh­
nologies thus represents a threat, entry into a given industry being a possible eon­
sequenee of sueh advantages (Dussauge et aI. 1992, 1 1 1 )  The teehnology-c1uster 
strategy implies shifting from a financial (alloeating resourees to businesses) and 
marketing (eoneentrating on market share, industry attraetiveness, ete.) logic, to a 
3 The Bonsai tree has analogous features with the "theme pictures" diseussed extensiveIy by Cuhls 
( 1998, 207- 287). They eoneerned e.g. the plaeement of solar eelis and rapid nuclear reaetors in the 
systems of targets. They represent poliey visions of the responsible eommunities in Japan (e.g. of MlTI). 
The method used by Cuhls seems to have many eommon features with the method, which l used in my 
study "A Coordinative Method for Social PoIiey Target Programmes" (Kuusi 1978). 
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capability4 logic (exploiting the firm's technological potential) based on research 
and development capabilities (Dussauge et al. 1992, 1 14). 
The capability logic is based to a large extent on network extemalities. If there 
are enough exploiters of a technological paradigm communicating with each 
other and forming a part of a larger communication network in a market or else­
where, it results in the increase of both incremental innovations and the number 
of users in the network. Due to specific historical circumstances, such as the ex­
istence of a competing technology or a specific institutional setting, a new para­
digm may not reach this "critical mass" of users in some well-established pro­
duction networks. This gives a chance for less well-established production net­
works of new or small firms. 
2.4 How to Identify Technological Paradigms? 
In practice the generalization of a generic technology with a new technique or a 
new target typically means a combination with the techniques or targets of other 
technologies. But how can we evaluate empirically which technologies might 
"co-operate" in generalization activities or might belong to the same technologi­
cal paradigms? 
Two methods have recently been used to analyse which technologies are c10se to 
each others. The first method is the content analysis of patent applications avail­
able through electronic databases. Like publications reflect the state-of-the-art of 
science, patents reflect the current inventive and innovative developments of 
modem technology (Engelsman and van Raan 1994, 3). 
The references to other patents and common scientific concepts used in patent 
applications are evidence which can be used to build links between technologies 
or to find the directions of technology generalizations. In practice, Engelsman 
and van Raan ( 1994) have built technology maps as follows: 
1 )  They used the patent data of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) and the European Patent Office (EPO) and aggregated the patent 
data into 28 fields of technology, following the work of Grupp and Schmoch 
( 1992). These fields are defined with the help of Intemational Patent Classifi­
cation (lPC) codes. They cover the entire domain of technology, and are dif-
4 Here the concept "capabil ity" is used in a different sense than in the GTC. There are, however, analo­
gaus features in the uses of the concept. "Capability logic" and "capabilities" refer skills and abilities of 
an actor. Analogously "capability l imits" in the GTC are related to learned action possibilities taking 
into account the capacity limits and interests of the actar. Both interpretations are possible based on the 
Webster's ( 1 996) definition of capability: "the ability ta undergo or be affected by a given treatment or 
action". 
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ferentiated to emphasize recent high-tech developments. Therefore "traditionai 
fields" (such as inorganic chemistry or building technology) tend to be larger 
in size (in terms of number of patents) than the more "modem" fields (such as 
genetics and electronics). 
2) For the priority year 1 987 they collected all indexed keywords in patent titles 
and patent abstracts for each of the 28 technology fields. Thus each field of 
technology is characterized by a specific set of keywords. 
3) The 28 key word sets form a total set of key words. For the 28 fields they 
counted - field by field - the number of patents characterized by each of the 
key words in the total set. Thus they constructed a matrix of key words versus 
technology fields. Matrix rows are indicated by parameter i, matrix columns 
by parameter j .  
4)  They correlated these wordprofiles (or matrix columns) and obtained a corre­
lation matrix (fields versus fields). The value in the cells (Cij) of this new "co­
field" matrix is the correlation measure between field i and field j based on 
their common wordprofile. 
5) The created co-field matrix gives us the relational strengths between all 28 
fields one with another, and this relational structure can be displayed in two­
dimensional space by multidimensional scaling. 
The different patenting practiees in different eountries are a problem in the patent 
analysis. In lapan, patents have been a way to proteet domestie market from for­
eign eompetitors. This patenting aetivity has been so extensive that in the world­
wide patent database 1987/1988 half of the number of patents were national pat­
ents from lavan (domestic and foreign patents, all patents with the first priority 
being lapanese). The map in figure 2.2 is based on patents 1 987/1988 excluding 
all national patents from lavan. 
The applied mapping teehnique (multidimensional sealing) in principle puts 
fields with strong resemblance in the defining sense c10se together. Sinee only 
two dimensions are used, this positioning is not always perfeet. To inc1ude the 
information on pair relations (field-field) as available in the eo-oeeurranee ma­
trix, a numerical value for these mutual relations was established, using a statisti­
eal index (Engelsman and van Raan 1994). These strengths are indicated by eon­
neeting lines, the thiekest line representing the strongest relation. 
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Figure 2.2. Co-classification map for EPO patents, database EPAT (1987/1988) 
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Another way to find interconnections between different generic technologies is to 
ask experts about technologies belonging together. This type of process was re­
alized in a technology foresight study accomplished by the Fraunhofer Institute 
for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI) in Germany (Grupp 1 993b). 1 call the 
method "critical technologies' nearness mapping method based on expert judg­
ments" or simply "critical technologies' mapping method" or CTM. 
Grupp ( 1994, 380) has criticised critical technology studies outside Germany 
concerning the degree to which they specify technologies. Some of them are re­
garded as critical though they are defined very loosely; they do not allow any 
detailed recommendations or decisions of the technology policy to be made. Ac­
cording to Grupp the list of technologies was specified in CTM from the outset in 
much greater detail than in the comparable foreign studies. For example subcon­
tractor agreements were made with institutes specialized in some topics. 
The experts of CTM ("Projektträger"5) made firstly lists of technological topics 
("technologische Themen") based on careful considerations concerning the pos­
sible technological areas (Grupp 1993b, 18-19). Beside negotiations among ex­
perts e.g. comparisons with studies made in the USA and in Japan were used. In a 
common meeting of experts a preliminary list of 103 technological topics was 
selected (Grupp 1994). The final list of 86 critical technologies (table 2. 1 .) was 
made combining some of the preliminary technological topics. 
Based on different kinds of c1uster analysis (Grupp 1993b, 26) an expert evalua­
tion was made concerning "distances" of the critical technologies. In the distance 
map only five possible distances between the 86 critical technologies were used. 
The evaluation horizon was the next 10 years (Grupp 1994, 382). The c10sest 
interconnection got the distance of 1 ,  the second c10sest distance got the distance 
of 2 and so on. If it was estimated that there was no connection between tech­
nologies they obtained a distance of 5. In reality this comparison of N techno­
logical topics produced an N-l dimensional space. The method of multidimen­
sional scaling was used, which transforms multidimensional distant data to two 
dimensional maps as in the case of patent analysis. This procedure produced the 
following interconnection map of different technological themes (figure 2.3, 
Grupp 1994). 
5 "Projektträger" are in Germany those evaluators who know applications and make financial decisions 
concerning applications in research programs. 
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Table 2. 1 List of critical technologies at the beginning of the 21"1 century 
Generic headings and topics Code Generic headings and topics Code 
AtlHNld rruzllrials. Telecommunications TEL 
High penonnance ceramics KER Broadband communications KOM 
High penonnance polymers POL Photonic digital tcchnology PHD 
High penonnance metals MET Advanced broadcasting (HDlV, DAB) HDT 
Gradient materials GRA Optical computing OPR 
Materials for energy conversion ENW Mimgstems � MST 
Organic magnetic rnaterials OMM Microaetuator technology MAK. 
Organic electric materials OME Signa1 processing in rnicrosystenu SVM 
Sunace and tilm technology ODT Microsensor technology MSE 
Sunace materials OBW Mounting and connecting techniques AVT 
Diamond layers and tiltns DIA SqfoPart mttl simuIaJitm 
Molecular surfaces MOO Software SOW 
N on-classical chemistry NCH Mode\ling and simulation SIM 
Meso-scale polymers MES Molecular modeUing MMO 
Organized supramolecu\ar systetns OSS Bio-inforrnatics BIN 
Clusters CLU Simulation of rnaterials WSI 
Adaptronics iillA Non-linear dynarnics NDY 
Multifunctional materials MFW Simulation in manufacturing SIF 
Lightweight construction LBW Cognitive systetns (AI) KIN 
Composite rnaterials VBW Fuzzy logics ULa 
Aerogels (solid foam) AEG Data network safety DSI 
Fullerenes FUL MD1ectd4t eltctronia MOE 
Materia! synthesis in standard shape MSG Bioe\ectronics BEL 
Implantation rnaterials IMP Biosensor tcchnology BSE 
Manufacturing of materials FVW Neurobiology NEB 
Narwl«lrrwl4tJ NAT Neuro-inforrnatics NEI 
Nanoelectronics NAE CelM4r 6i41«hM1ogy ZBT 
Single-e\ectron tunne\ling SET Molecu\ar biotechnology MBT 
Nano scale materials NAW Såence-based mediåne MED 
Manufacturlng in micro- and 
nanoscales FMN Catalysis and biocatalysls KAT 
MkrDll«trollics MEL Biological production systetns BPW 
Inforrnation Itorage INS Bionics BIK 
Signal processing SVA Biomimetic materials BMW 
Microelectronic materials MIW Biological hydrogen production BWS 
High speed electronics HGE Renewable resources (biomass and agents) NWW 
Plasma technology PIA Environmental biotechnology UMB 
Superconductivity SUL Plant breeding PFl 
High temperature electronics HTE ProJw:tWn mttl marurgemtnt mgin«ring 
Plwwniu PHO Management techniques MAN 
Opto-electronics OEL Mode\ling in manufacturing MPR 
Photonic materials PHW Control station technology LST 
Laser teclinology lAS Pi'oduction logistics PRL 
Flat display technology DIS Lean-resource production URP 
Luminous silicon LSI Behavioural biology VBH 
Ethics in science and technology ETH 
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Figure 2.3. A map 01 the structure 01 technological development at the 
beginning 01 the 21st century 
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58 
The content of the connections between fields in the patent analysis and the con­
tent of the connections produced by the CTM differ. The connections in the pat­
ent analyses are based on realized recent achievements. Connections of CTM 
refer to expert perception of possibilities in the near future. It is interesting that 
there are, however, considerable similarities between the maps of the two meth­
ods. Both maps include clusters of items grouped around new biotechnology, 
new communication technology and new engineering or material processing 
techniques. 
The three clusters mentioned are on the edges of the both maps. In the middle of 
the 1987/1988 patent map were electrical machinery, sensors and coating or 
crystal growing. In the middle of the map of the critical technologies' mapping 
method were organized supramolecular systems, micro-systems technology and 
nanotechnology. 
What is the relationship between technological paradigms and the maps produced 
by the above methods? Grupp ( 1993b, 26) made an interesting remark: 
"Technological development at the beginning of the 2 1st century is not any more 
divided (auftrennbar) from the point of view presented here. So different the sin­
gle lines of development might be, they finally all make impacts together (wirken 
alle zusammen)". Grupp's  conclusion leads to an interesting question: are the 
different present technological paradigms actually paradigms conceming the 
"whole picture" of the technological development? Are technology generaliza­
tions related to general paradigms? 
Personal or actor related technology application clusters or Bonsai trees provide 
an answer to the above question. It is reasonable to suppose that actors which 
have similar Bonsai trees can more easily communicate which each others. They 
typically have a "common language". As I have stressed earlier, just a common 
generalization language is the benchmark of a technological paradigm. Based on 
the results of the patent analysis and the critical technologies' mapping method, it 
is reasonable to suppose, that there are three comparatively separate technologi­
cal languages related to the options of the new biotechnology, of the new com­
munication technology; and of the engineering of new construction materials. 
There are, however, clear links between these technological languages related 
e.g. to the nanotechnology and coating or crystal growing techniques. 
The paradigmatic languages are not, however, related only to common tech­
niques. The basic "concepts" of paradigmatic languages are promising technol­
ogy generalizations based both on promising targets and promising techniques. 
The topics of national technology Delphi studies, which will be discussed later, 
are very interesting from this point of view of technology generalizations: they 
can typically be seen to be single technology generalizations. In a paper which 
Martin Meyer and the author have prepared (Kuusi et al. 1 999), we have illus-
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trated a technological paradigm with the figure 2.4. This picture illustrates better 
than a Bonsai tree the generalization aspect of a technological paradigm. 
Feasibility 
Horizon 
of 
Figure 2.4. 
Feasibility 
Horizon 
of Targets 
Incentives for further 
development of techniques 
The "language" of a technological paradigm 
Promising 
targets 
It seems to be reasonable to assume that patents indicate rather welI connections 
between techniques but less welI connections based on similar targets. There is a 
similar problem in the application of the CTM. ActualIy Engelsman and Raan 
( 1994) made a remark related to this matter. They considered that applied re­
search publications may reflect technological innovations in specific fields better 
than patents. 
Is it reasonable to suppose that there are common problems conceming new tech­
nology generalizations related to alI technological paradigms or actor based tech­
nology application clusters? This question is related to evaluation criteria of 
technologies. An important part of the discussed study Grupp ( 1993b, 1 57-2 1 1 )  
was an evaluation of technologies. AlI 86  critical technologies were evaluated 
based on 17  criteria. The evaluation criteria took clearly into account both the 
technique aspect (science push) and the target aspect (demand pulI). The used 
evaluation criteria were divided in science push re1ated ("Rahmenbedingungen") 
and in demand puH related ("Lösungsbeitrage"). 
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The science push related criteria concemed R&D infrastructure, risks in scientific 
development of techniques, human capital, costs of innovation activities, rele­
vance of scientific research for economic activities, national competitiveness, 
public support and intemational division of work. The demand pull related crite­
ria were scope of potential technical applications ("key technology" -aspect), 
scope of economic applications (value-addition in many industries), helping of 
the position of small and medium size enterprises (promoting of a good structure 
of economy), competitiveness in relation to other countries, position of Europe in 
production of applications, dependence between European countries, impacts on 
health, impacts on social aspects (e.g. on good working conditions) and environ­
mentai impacts. 
I will not continue in this connection the discussion about the evaluation criteria 
of technology generalization suggestions because it is the main topic of the next 
chapter. 1 mention only a basic problem related to expert evaluations based on 
above kinds of criteria. The evaluations provide subjective judgments ("proxy 
arguments") and seldom real informative arguments (with a real truth values) 
conceming potential technology generalizations. 
The problem is related to the fact that the recent technologies are so complicated 
that it is typically very difficult to give understandable factual arguments in a 
general discussion like Grupp (l993b). Old simple technologies typically com­
plemented or substituted basic human actions. It was possible to speak about re­
placement techniques (which allow to perform beyond the reach of the body), 
strengthening techniques (extending the performance of the body ); and facilita­
tion techniques (relieving the burden upon the body) (Rip 1 995). In technologi­
cally developed countries it, however, it only seldom happens that a new appli­
cation of a generic technology replaces a human function without the use of some 
earlier tool or technology. The technologies are substituting, complementing or 
quoting (often even plagiarizing) other technologies. 
Technological replacement of human potentials is, however, still very relevant, 
considering human information processing skills. Frederick Brooks (Rheingold 
199 1 ,  37) has made an interesting functional division of the uses of the new in­
formation technology into artificial intelligence (AI) and intelligence amplifica­
tion (lA): 
In the AI community, the objective is to replace the human mind by 
the machine and its program and data base. In the JA community, the 
objective is to build systems that amplify the human mind by provid­
ing it with computer-based auxiliaries that do the things that the mind 
has trouble doing. 
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The roles of AI and IA in  different connections depend on the strengths of com­
puters and of human beings. Brooks saw three areas, in which human minds are 
more powerful than computer algorithms: pattem recognition, evaluations and the 
overall sense of context. Computer scientists do not have good ways of approxi':' 
mating the pattem recognition power a one-week-old baby uses to recognize its 
mother's face. The three areas in which present computers are more effective in 
the processing of information than human beings are according to Brooks 
evaluations of computations, storing of massive amounts of data and remember­
ing things without forgetting. 
The forms of substitution or complementation between technologies are manifold 
and it is difficult to find a really useful general c1assification for these forms. 
Fusfeld ( 1 978) has, however, suggested a c1assification which seems to be rea­
sonable in many connections6 : 
1 .  Functional performance - an evaluation of the basic function that a device is 
supposed to perform. For example, the functional performance of a household 
refrigerator is to remove heat. 
2 .  Acquisition cost - in the example of the refrigerator, the price per cubic foot. 
3. Ease-of-use characteristics - the form of the user's interface with the device; in 
the example of the refrigerator, magnetic door latches and automatic defrosters 
contribute to the acceptance of the technology. 
4. Operating cost- in the case of the refrigerator, the number of kilowatt hours 
used per unit of service performed. 
5. Reliability - the question of how often the device or process normally requires 
service, how free it is from abnormal service requirements, and - ultimately -
what its expected useful lifetime iso 
6. Serviceability - the question of how long it takes and how expensive it is to 
restore a failed device to service. 
7. Compatibility - the way the device or product fits with other devices in the 
context of the larger system. 
Though it might be possible to compare single applications of technologies using 
above kinds of criteria, the comparison of technological paradigms or 
"technological languages" cannot be based on such kinds of simple criteria. Let 
us look c10sely at altemative paradigms around the generic heading 
"nanotechnology", which is in the middle of the map of Grupp ( 1993b). Accord­
ing to Grupp (l993b, 65): 
6 In the epistemic utility modeJ of technology generalizations which 1 will discuss in the third chapter 
the first, sixth and seventh criteria are connected mostly with impacts (1), the second, fourth and fifth 
criteria mostly with feasibility (F) and the third criterion with relevancy (R). It is important to notice that 
in case of a new technology option all properties of a technology are firstly non-validated suggestions 
(initiaJly low value of V). 
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The nanotechnology will have a key position in the technological de­
velopment of 1990s and in the first decades of 2 1 .  century. It makes 
possible the engineering in the level of atoms and molecules. This new 
basic technology can stimulate future innovation processes and new 
generations of technologies. It is based on the interaction of informa­
tion technology, polymer research, optics, biochemistry and medici ne 
and micromechanics. 
Although the developer community of nanotechnology is still very diffuse, the 
approaches of its members can be divided in followers of two basic paradigms, 
which could be called top-down and down-top paradigms or approaches (Kuusi 
1994, Bachman 1995). Looking at the present state of the art, they can also be 
called the near field probe systems approach and the protein chemistry approach 
(Meyer 1 996). 
In the first approach, microelectronics has a rather central position. It also has 
some common features with microsystems engineering (Grupp 1993, 90), one of 
the closest technological themes of nanotechnology in the German study. Micro­
systems engineering means top-down miniaturization to the micrometer scale. If 
the finest level of manipulation is one cubic micrometer, the "building blocks" 
still contain thousands of molecules. The top-down miniaturization might, how­
ever, contradict the forthcoming paradigm of the nanotechnology. According to 
one theoretician of nanotechnology, Eric Drexler ( 1995, 508), the methods of 
micro systems engineering "offer no obvious way to achieve the goals of mo­
lecular manufacturing". For Drexler the nanotechnology means essentially the 
same as the molecular nanotechnology, which he defines as follows (Drexler et 
al. 199 1 , 294): 
Through, inexpensive control of the structure of matter based on 
molecule-by-molecule control of products and by-products; the prod­
ucts and processes of molecular manufacturing, including molecular 
machinery. 
For this down-top paradigm of nanotechnology a very important step forward 
was a key innovation of biotechnology in the l980s: the polymerase chain reac­
tion. It routinised the multiplication of DNA. A challenge which stimulates the 
down-top developers of nanotechnology is the following possibility mentioned by 
Ted Kaehler: "There may be other polymers whose synthesis chemistry is easier 
than that of peptides, whose side groups take more volume and whose folding is 
more predictable" (Kaehler 1994 c.iJ. Meyer 1996). 
In summary, how to proceed in the practical identification of technological para­
digms? 1 consider that the earlier mentioned remark of Grupp ( 1993b, 26) is very 
important: recent technological paradigms are not related to one or few technolo-
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gies but they are different kinds of "whole pictures" of the technological devel­
opment. A promising way to identify technological paradigms might be firstly to 
construct total maps of generic technologies perceived by single experts. Rele­
vant descriptions of technological paradigms might be found by comparing these 
total maps of interconnected technologies. A reasonable hypothesis is, that the 
actor based total paradigms might focus on the new biotechnology, the new 
communication technology or the new engineering or material processing tech­
niques. The result might, however, be also paradigms with some other organising 
principles like the top-down and the down-top principles discussed above. 
2.5 Developer Communities as Sources of Expert Knowledge 
concerning Future Technology Generalizations 
The concept of a developer community of a technological paradigm is a key con­
cept of this study. It connects the theoretical and empirical considerations of the 
study. It has two main functions. Firstly, the developer community is the source 
of expert knowledge of a c1uster of generic technologies or c10sely linked actor 
based technological paradigms. Secondly, it is the main user of technology fore­
sight studies concerning the technological paradigm. 
Technology foresight based on expert knowledge is very much a "self-reflection 
activity" of a developer community. Technology foresight is based on a critical 
examination and an amplification of the competence which a developer commu­
nity already has. Typically, the successfulness of a technology foresight enter­
prise depends on the very same developer community from which the expert 
knowledge has been collected. If the developer community cannot utilize the re­
sults, a technology foresight study is often useless. The commitment of the de­
veloper community to the results of a technology foresight study is crucial (e.g. 
Georghiou 1996, 368). 
A developer community inc1udes not only producers, who use the new technol­
ogy, but also the buyers and users of their products. A good starting point for the 
analysis of developer communities are Michael Porter's famous "diamonds" of 
competitive advantage based on faetor conditions; demand conditions; related to 
supporting industries; and firm strategy, structure and rivalry (Porter 1990, 7 1 ): 
Firms gain competitive advantage where their home base allows and 
supports the most rapid accumulation of specialized assets and skills, 
sometimes due solely to greater commitment. Firms gain competitive 
advantage in industries when their home base affords better ongoing 
information and insight into product and process needs. Firms gain 
competitive advantage when the goals of owners, managers and em­
ployers support intense commitment and sustained investment. 
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The point of Porter can be given very simply: the competitive advantage is based 
on the committed and informed actions of different stakeholders in a developer 
community. 
A technology community may or may not have a clear structure of interaction 
and decision-making. It has an active or influential core, in which members have 
a dominant technological paradigm as their "world view" and a critical, passive 
or powerless periphery, in which members are often critical to the paradigm. To­
day, large multinational corporations (MNCs) are usually at the cores of devel­
oper communities. The structures of developer communities are greatly influ­
enced by the networks built by MNCs e.g. how they use subcontractors and 
which connections they have with customers, financial institutions, educators and 
public regulators. 
For example, the Nokia company accounted for some 20% of the total Finnish 
foreign exports in 1 998 was about 20% and most Finnish exports of telecommu­
nication equipments happened through the cluster led by Nokia. It is an interest­
ing question what should be the role of the experts of Nokia in the foresight 
studies of digital data technology in Finland when most of the production using 
this technology is directly or indirectly governed by Nokia. 
Seija Kulkki has published a study on knowledge creation in multinational corpo­
rations, which she calls "a realist, contextual and processual multiple-case study" 
(Kulkki 1 996, 95) of three Finnish companies including Nokia Telecommunica­
tions. It is obvious that the findings of Kulkki are highly relevant if one is inter­
ested in finding those persons who are most competent to evaluate the future ap­
plications of digital technology in Finland and even at the global level. 
It is, however, a mistake to believe that in general the present dominant decision­
makers of applications of a generic technology are the most valuable experts, es­
pecially in a public future technology study. Firstly, other persons may be better 
informants than the important decision-makers themselves concerning their real 
plans or their organizations' future decisions and actions as is more c10sely dis­
cussed in chapter 5. Secondly, dominant decision-makers are often so c10sely 
committed with the dominant technological paradigm that they do not easily ac­
cept even reasonable arguments if they are in contradiction with their paradigm. 
In general, if one likes to make realistic evaluations of the future possibilities of a 
generic technology, the scope of a developer community or a technology com­
munity should not be restricted even to those actively participating in innovation 
processes. Nelson ( 1 993) mentions firms, industrial research laboratories, re­
search universities, government laboratories, schooling institutions and financial 
institutions as major institutional actors of a technology community. 1 think that 
this list of institutions is too short. The regulative activities of civil servants and 
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civic organizations (politicaI parties, Greenpeace etc.) are often crucial. It is vitaI 
to notice that active eri ties of the technoIogy also belong to its developer commu­
nity. 
A good exampIe of a developer community which is defined broadly enough is 
given by Sirkku Kivisaari ( 1996). She described business reIationships of a tech­
nology generalizing firm in the health sector. Beside suppliers, distributors, cus­
tomers, medical research institutions and extemal sources of finance; she men­
tions policy makers, standard setting bodies and organized social actors. 
A practical way to define key representatives of a developer community was 
used in the UK Technology Foresight Programme (Georghiou 1996, 367). The 
idea was to use the community itself to identify those who should represent it in a 
Delphi study. The selection process was based on asking each respondent in a 
selected group to identify further individuals, who met the criteria of being good 
representatives of the community. Similar "snowball sampling" was also used in 
Finnish DeIphi studies by Kuusi ( 1987, 1991 , 1994). 
The relevant criteria for being a good representative of technology community 
are a problem in the "snowball sampling". In the British study, two main criteria 
govemed the seIection of the panellists: first that there should be sufficient ex­
pertise to answer the questions posed, and second that there shouId be a reason­
able balance of different types of experts (Georghiou 1996, 369). Given examples 
were balances between industry and academia and between regions. A difficult 
problem is how to find enough representatives of different technologicaI para­
digms when the representatives of different paradigms sometimes do not accept 
the representatives of rivaling paradigms as competent experts. More generally, 
the criticaI stakeholders do not easily win acceptance as experts from the other 
experts. 
The scope or the limits of a deveIoper community change continuousIy. A tech­
noIogy foresight study can broaden the group of peopIe who beIong to the com­
munity. It can also have an impact on the structure of the community. If a fore­
sight study results in a redefinition of the paradigm, some persons or institutions 
who were earlier in the periphery may move to the core of the community. 
The best experts of a generic technoIogy are typically active participants in a 
world-wide developer community. The world-wide developer community con­
sists further of nationaI deveIoper communities interacting with each other. In­
teraction networks of members of a developer community are partly intemational 
and partly national or even Iocal. Nelson ( 1993) proposes that just as the idea of 
national innovation systems has become widely accepted, technologicaI commu­
nities have become more intemational than ever before. 
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1 think that the successfulness of a technology foresight study depends foremost 
on the competence of the technology foresight study managers to handle the so­
cial dynamies of relevant developer communities. Such competence is needed in 
the selection of the expert panel and in optimising the communication process of 
the panel. Experts in basic research or in education, experts in realization organi­
zations of technology generalizations, experts in publie regulative organizations 
and other relevant stakeholders (e.g. political parties, consumer organizations, 
environmental organizations, trade unions) have very different kinds of motives 
for participation and in information transmission in technology foresight studies. 
The concept of the developer community is analogous to the concept of 
"scientific language community" used by the late Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 199 1 ). 
According to Kuhn, strong evidence (e.g. an argument concerning the future) for 
one community does not need to be evident for another. Like a language commu­
nity, a technology community has a core and a periphery. Actors in the periphery 
have to accept the lexicon of the community or the "rules of game" to have an 
influence on the behaviour of the community. On the other hand, those in the 
core are capable of changing the rules of the game, that is the acceptable argu­
ments conceming the future. 
2.6 Promising Generalizations as Leaps into the Unknown 
A basic difficulty of technology foresight is that every innovation process is a 
leap into the unknown. The considerations based on similarities of realized and 
promising generalizations and theoretical considerations of new links between 
some generic technologies provide only crude lines for anticipation of innovation 
processes. 
The management of uncertainty seems to be a key problem of a firm which tries 
to cope with an economic environment which continuously changes in response 
to new innovations. Eliansson ( 1996) has presented a general economic theory 
concerning "the experimentally organized economy",  which seems to describe the 
behaviour of firms in this type of economic environment. Eliansson ( 1996, 54-
57) considers that an experimentally organized economy forces the firm to be 
organized as "an experimental machine".  
First, technological competition constantly downgrades the economic value of the 
competence of knowledge capital in firms. The prime task of top level corporate 
management is to organize its human capital through recruitment, replacement 
and intemal education to steadily upgrade its competence base. Eliansson consid­
ers that the experience has shown that it is more difficult and takes more time to 
adjust obsolescent competence capital (embodied in people) to the requirements 
of new market situations than it is to change other assets on the balance sheet. 
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The reason is that it requires competence to change competence capital (or tech­
nological paradigm, author' s addition), and this was usually missing in the first 
place when a firm encounters major problems. Hence the solution is to change 
the key persons of the organization, those who make the top-Ievel decisions, no­
tably on recruitment and restaffing. 
Second, technological competition among a large number of firms in global mar­
kets, facing a virtually unlimited number of more or less well-defined investment 
opportunities (or technology generalization opportunities, my addition), pushes 
firm management to take action long before they confidently know what steps to 
take. Eliansson considers that the guiding management principle in the experi­
mentally organized economy is that if you have an idea that you consider good 
you had better realize it as a business very soon, because if it is good, a com­
petitor might otherwise do so before you, and beat you. Hence, it is risky for top­
level management to exhibit risk aversion. Firm management, therefore, faces 
two kinds of failure: 
- First order risk; of making a mistake by being too early, 
- Second order risk; of being beaten by a competitor for being too late. 
In the next chapter, 1 will discuss three types of reasonability continuing from the 
classical analysis of Herbert Simon (March and Simon 1958) - prediction reason­
ability, option reasonability and commitment reasonability - needed in an eco­
nomic environment which continuously changes based on new innovations. 1 will 
also present an epistemic utility model which connects the technology foresight 
to these types of reasonability. 
There are four basic types of uncertainties in a technology generalization process: 
- the aimed technique cannot meet the target; 
- there is some other technique, which is more efficient in achieving of the target; 
- the target is not good enough (e.g. economically, socially or environmentally); 
and 
- the technique is not acceptable (e.g. economically, socially or environmentally) 
AlI these types of problems can stop an innovation process. Often, however, after 
a search process a new feasible generalization based on the technological para­
digm is found. Sometimes, a radically new type of solution is found and it is rea­
sonable to speak about a new generic technology or sometimes even about a new 
technological paradigm. In the cases of very important targets or of large sunk 
investments, the search process may continue for a very long time, though it has 
reached rather meager results. For example, the innovation processes aiming at 
commercial nuclear fusion power have struggled for decades with the problem of 
how to keep the hydrogen long enough at a temperature of ten million degrees. 
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Reasonable technology foresight requires least a vague idea how to meet any dis­
cussed target. Irvine and Martin ( 1989, 17) have expressed a similar viewpoint 
conceming research foresight: 
Unpredictability is greatest in curiosity-oriented research, and it would 
be foolish in the extreme to pretend that it is possible in any reliable 
way to foresee the fundamental breakthroughs which periodically 
revolutionize our understanding of world, as well as opening up en­
tirely new technological possibilities over the longer term . . .  Our prin­
eipal concem, therefore, is with strategic research where the time­
scale for implementation of results in new products, processes or 
services is typically a decade (although it can be as little as five years 
in some areas and up to twenty or thirty in others). 
It might be reasonable to have a topic in a technology foresight study, which 
seem to be out of reach. Some panellist might have an idea, how to achieve the 
topic. An active search might result in a success. For example in the Second 
World War, Germany succeeded in the finding of a technique for produeing arti­
ficial rubber used in tires (Freeman 1982). 1 consider, however, that if at the end 
of a Delphi exercise there is no idea, how to meet a target, it is not very reason­
able to anticipate the attainment of the target. 
So, at least at the end of a foresight process any reasonable option should be 
based on technique-target relationships motivated by generic technologies or by a 
technological paradigm. This idea is the starting point of the episternic utility 
model, which will be presented in the next chapter. A technique may be only 
theoretically feasible based on the applied technological paradigm. But also in 
that case, it has to be a result of logical reasoning from some promising generic 
technology and supported by scientific laws or invariances of the technological 
paradigm. 
Pure basic research often finds means to targets earlier out of reach. It is, how­
ever, impossible to anticipate these findings. Recent inventions made in pure ba­
sic research may be, however, good starting points for the technology foresight. 
In practice, almost every decision to allocate considerable resources to an inno­
vation process airning to a target is based on some at least vague idea how the 
target can be met. A fundamental problem in technology foresight is, that this 
idea often belongs to tacit ar hidden knowledge. The problem of tacit or hidden 
knowledge is c10sely discussed in the following chapters . A key question of this 
study is, how to change tacit or hidden knowledge to the object of argumentation 
of experts making it explicit. 
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3. EPISTEMIC VALUE OF DELPHI ARGUMENTS AND 
TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT 
3.1 Different Interpretations of the Delphi Method 
According to Jay Gordon et al. ( 1993), the modem renaissance of futures re­
search began with the DeIphi technique at RAND, the Santa Monica, Califomia 
"think tank" in the early 1 960's. On the other hand, some researchers have denied 
the vaIue of the Delphi method nearly totally, at least in its traditional form. 1 will 
discuss the crushing critic of Sackman (1975) in the next paragraph. At the end of 
his long review artic1e, Fred Woudenberg (199 1 , 1 3 1) made the following conc1u­
sion: "The data discussed in the present artic1e leave no other possibility open 
than for a negative evaIuation of quantitative DeIphi. The main c1aim of Delphi -
to remove the negative effects of unstructured, direct interaction - cannot be sub­
stantiated. " 
At least in the area of technology foresight it is, however, difficult to deny the 
practical usefulness of Delphi studies. A Japanese study compared the methods 
used by Japanese research units in technology assessment (Grupp 1 993, 13 ,  
Cuhls and Kuwahara 1994,3). The study was made in 1989 and 247 participating 
research units, mostly working in industry, were asked to evaluate their methods 
of technology assessment. Figure 3 . 1  contains a summary of the results of the 
study. The vertical axis shows the number of enterprises, which have used the 
method. The horizontal axis describes the number of user firms, which evaluated 
that evaluated the method successful. 
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Fi/?ure 3. 1 .  Degree ofapplication oftechnologyforesight tools in Japan 
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The technology portfolio method and trend analysis were used most. These 
methods, however, did not rank very high in usefulness. Patent analysis received 
the highest value in usefulness. A limitation in patent analysis is its time horizon. 
It provides good information for only five years forward. Scenarios, Delphi and 
relevance tree methods ranked second in usefulness. 
Although the Delphi method has been used for already fifty years, the opinions 
about its relevant features differ greatly. More than twenty years ago, when Har­
old Linstone and Murray Turoff wrote an introduction to the extensive survey 
book "The Delphi Method",  the variety of applications of this method was very 
wide conceming both methods and contents (Linstone -Turoff 1975). The wide 
variety is pronounced in the very general description of the Delphi technique, 
which according to Linstone and Turoff can be taken as J.mderlying the contribu­
tions to their book: 
Delphi may be characterized as a method for structuring a group 
communication process so that the process is effective in allowing a 
group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem. 
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Group communication processes used to deal with complex problems have the 
following logical phases ( Linstone-Turoff 1975, 5). The first phase is character­
ized by exploration of the subject under discussion, wherein some persons con­
tribute additional information which they consider pertinent to the issue. The 
second phase involves the process of reaching an understanding of how the group 
views the issue. lf there is significant disagreement, then reasons for the differ­
ences are explored in the third phase to bring out the underlying reasons for the 
differences and possibly to evaluate them. The last phase, a final evaluation and 
conc1usions, is based on all previously gathered information. 
The characterization of the Delphi method given by Linstone and Turoff is very 
general. According to Gordon ( 1993, 4), anonymity and feedback represent the 
two irreducible elements of a Delphi study. Traditionally, a third feature has also 
been connected with the Delphi method: consensus seeking. Dalkey and Helmer 
gave the following objective to the Delphi method at the beginning of 1960's: II 
to obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of experts . . .  by a se­
ries of intensive questionnaires interspersed with controlled opinion feedback" 
(Linstone- Turoff 1975, 10) .  
Woudenberg (199 1 ,  133) gave three characteristics of Delphi as i t  was originally 
developed: 
- Anonymity. Participants, mostly experts, are approached by mml or computer 
- Iteration. There are several rounds. The first round can be inventory, in which 
participants are asked for events to be forecast or parameters to be estimated. ln 
subsequent rounds, participants are asked to give quantitative estimates about 
dates of future events or values of unknown parameters. The number of rounds is 
fixed in advance or determined according to a criterion of consensus in the group 
of participants or stability in individual judgments. 
- Feedback. The results of an eventual first inventory round are c1ustered and 
sent back to all participants. ln the first estimation round, participants give their 
quantitative estimates. Before the second and subsequent estimation rounds, the 
results of the whole group on the previous round are fed back in a statistical for­
mat (measure of central tendency plus variance) to all participants. On the second 
and subsequent estimation rounds, participants making judgments that deviate 
from the first-round group score according to a fixed criterion are asked to give 
arguments for their deviating estimates. Before the third and subsequent estima­
tion rounds, these arguments are, along with the statistical resuIts, fed back to all 
participants. 
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Rowe et al. ( 1991 ,  237) presented a very similar list of basic features of a Delphi 
procedure. The only difference was that they divided "feedback" into two items: 
"controlled feedback" and "statistical group response" . 
The basic features of the Delphi method have given grounds for different inter­
pretations of "the point" of the Delphi. Saaty and Boone (1990, ref. Lang 1996) 
have argued that there are four defensible ways of forecasting the future. One is 
by consensus, the second is by extrapolating on trends, the third is by historical 
analysis and analogy and the fourth is the systematic generation of altemative 
paths to the future. Delphi is considered the most prominent of the consensus 
methodologies (Jones 1980). 
Mike Metcalfe (1995, 79) has stressed the lack of group dynamics :  
The idea of the process traditionally known as the Delphi technique is 
to obtain a group forecast while keeping the group dynamics to a 
minimum. The physical, and thus psychological, distance between the 
members of the forecasting group is maximized . . .  The point of the ex­
ercise is to provide an egalitarian system of forecasting. 
Metcalfe sees the Delphi process as an altemative for a working group or a com­
mittee of experts. The common feature of an expert committee and a Delphi 
study is group communication between experts. But the essential difference is 
that a Delphi study it avoids, the group dynamics of a committee and especially 
their bad effects on innovativeness and objectivity. 
Turoff ( 1975, 86) have pointed to the problems associated with committees, 
which are especially urgent in the phase of seeking future altematives: 
- The domineering personality, or outspoken individual that takes over 
the committee process 
- The unwillingness of individuals to take a position on an issue before 
all the facts are in or before it is known which way the majority is 
headed 
- The difficulty of publicly contradicting individuals in higher posi­
tions 
- The unwillingness to abandon a position once it is publicly taken 
- The fear of bringing up an uncertain idea that might tum out to be 
idiotic and result in a loss of face. 
Similar reasons for anonymity were given by Hiltz and Turoff ( 1995): 
- Individuals should not have to commit themselves to initial expres­
sions of an idea that may not tum out to be suitable. 
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- If an idea tums out to be unsuitable, no one loses face from having 
been the individual to introduce it. 
- Persons of high status are reluctant to produce questionable ideas. 
- Committing one's name to a concept makes it harder to reject it or 
change one's mind about it. 
- Votes are more frequently changed when the identity of a given voter 
is not available to the group. 
- The consideration of an idea or concept may be biased by those who 
introduced it. 
- When ideas are introduced within a group where severe conflicts 
exist in either "interests" or "values", the consideration of an idea may 
be biased by knowing it is produced by someone with whom the indi­
vidual agrees or disagrees. 
- The high social status of an individual contributor may influence 
others in the group to accept the given concept or idea. 
- Conversely, lower status individuals may not introduce ideas, for 
fear that the idea will be rejected outright. 
An indication of the profound differences in interpretations of the Delphi method 
is that Millett and Honton ( 1991 )  even inc1uded the Delphi method in "group dy­
namics methods" .  In their short introduction of the Delphi as a consensus 
method, they even recommend contacts between paneHsts (Millett and Honton 
199 1 , 52): 
The Delphi managers put together a Hst of experts to complete the 
questionnaire. The experts do not have to be convened as a group, but 
they can if circumstances permit. 
3.2 The Critic of Sackman 
The basic difficulties of the traditionai Delphi method are widely discussed by 
Harold Sackman in his book Delphi Critique (Sackman 1975). The emphasis in 
the book was on scientific appraisal of the principles, method and practice of 
Delphi. Though Dalkey ( 1967), Gordon ( 1969), Helmer ( 1967) and Kaplan et al. 
( 1950) had given theoretical motivations for Delphi studies, Sackman considered 
that in 1975 there was virtually no serious scientific literature on Delphi based on 
evaluations of accomplished Delphi studies. 
The focus of his study was the scientific evaluation of about 150 Delphi studies 
conducted by the Rand Corporation and elsewhere before 1974. Based on his 
evaluation discussed below, Sackman ( 1975, 3-4) conc1udes that conventional 
Delphi is basically an unreliable and scientifically invalidated technique in prin­
ciple and probably in practice. Sackman considered that even variations of con-
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ventional Delphi should not be encouraged unless they explicitly attempt to meet 
the challenge of generally accepted standards of rigorous empirical experimenta­
tion in the social sciences at least so long as its principles, methods and funda­
mental applications can be experimentally established as scientifically tenable. 
Beside the evaluations of the Delphi studies already undertaken, the critique of 
Sackman is based on some assumptions concerning the method. Because my 
analysis is limited to knowledge about the future, 1 limit my discussion to the 
points which are relevant for that purpose: 
1) Sackman mentions four application objectives of the conventional Delphi, 
which are relevant for futures studies. The first is the forecasting of specified 
events. The second are qualitative evaluations (qualitative scales of agreement, 
preferences among alternatives). These applications inc1ude any type of quantita­
tive or qualitative rating scales and as such are coextensive with questionnaires 
broadly considered. The third objective is the consensus among the participants, 
which is sought through a controlled and rational exchange of opinions. The 
fourth objective mentioned by Sackman is educational: the Delphi study may 
help participants, Delphi managers, and the users to explore a problem more 
thoroughly. 
2) Conventional Delphi is primarily concerned with experts, but may also use 
other subject groups. 
3) Sackman considered that the main technical features of the method were ano­
nymity, feedback and iteration. 
The basic critique of accomplished Delphi studies was based on evaluative crite­
ria quoted from "Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests and Manu­
als" of the American Psychological Association (Sackman 1975, 1 1 ). These stan­
dards were based on the many critical studies concerning predictions of social 
events (e.g. Kaplan et al. 1 950). According to Sackman, the general conc1usion of 
the studies behind the standards was as follows (Sackman 1975, 1 2) :  
A questionnaire is  reliable and valid only to the extent that i t  is  ad­
ministrated under conditions that replicate the basic experimental 
controls under which it was originally designed, tested and validated. 
According to Sackman, Delphi iteration of questionnaires with feedback is a 
definite empirical experimental procedure with human subjects in its own right. 
Neglect of standard experimental guidelines may lead to uncontrolled variations 
in results and inability to define, replicate and validate method and findings. This 
neglect may be acceptable for an informal exploratory technique, but is unac­
ceptable for a rigorous social science experiment. 
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Based on the standards eonsidered essential by the Psyehologieal Association, 
Saekman made following eonclusions from the 150 Delphi studies (Saekman 
1975, 15-27). 1 give letter eodes to his arguments for further diseussion. 
Statistical significance of the evaluations 
A. The statistieal significance of a relationship is rarely reported in Delphi stud­
ies. A eonsensus among the panellists and the precision of the evaluations is not 
implied from standard error estimates. Analysis of the varianee of test scores is 
seldom made. 
B .  The doeumentation should report whether seores vary for groups differing in 
age, sex, amount of training, and other equally important variables. Saekman 
considered that the tacit De1phi assumption is that the pooled opinion of experts 
is better than that of any subgroup of experts. 
C. The number of independent judgments by experts is not reported. The re­
quirement eonceming independent judgments goes to the heart of Delphi iteration 
"with feedbaek". AlI rationalizations about reconsidering, ineorporating new in­
formation, and eonverging toward consensus eannot hide the faet that independ­
ent judgment is destroyed. 
Predictive validity 
D. Empirical validity is eommonly not tested. Panel opinion is reported with little 
or no subsequent effort to test results against actual and related events. The Del­
phi method typically measures very small sample attitudes toward future events 
at a given time. 
E. The average evaluation of the experts of the future is typically not better than 
in a simple projeetion. Sackman's example is eight independent expert foreeasts 
of the US gross national produet from 1953-63 (Zanowitz 1965). The average ob­
served absolute error for experts was $10 billion. Zamowitz found that simple 
arithmetie extrapolation of the inerease oeeurring in the previous years, yielded 
an average absolute error of $ 1 2  billion. 
Content validity 
F. Content validity is rarely evaluated. This validity requires that the doeumenta­
tion should clearly indicate, what universe is represented and how adequate the 
sampling iso The example of Saekman is a study of future eomputer developments 
(Parsons and Williams 1968). Saekman eonsidered that eontent validity prepara­
tion would eall for a systematic taxonomy of hardware, software, peripheral 
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equipment, communications and applications. The correspondence between final 
selected items and the specified area should be spelled OUt. 
G. The documentation had not indicated the are in accordance extent, to which 
interpretations matched hypotheses derived from the theory. The reasons, theo­
ries, and hypothetical constructs of expert panelists have been in Delphi studies 
covert, rather than overt. Panelists are asked for opinions, and the occasional ra­
tionale from panelists has been typically very brief, uneven, and often absent in 
final reports. 
The reliability of results 
H. Reports of reliability studies are not ordinarily expressed in terms of variances 
for error components or standard errors of measurement. Dalkey ( 1969) had 
made an initial attempt in this direction by indicating the inereasing reliability of 
medians with an increasing sample size of panelists. Dalkey had presented split­
half (odd-even) reliability for some results. The reported level of reliability had 
been marginal for useful questionnaires. 
1. Documentation should indicate to what extent scores are stable, that is, how 
nearly eonstant the scores are likely to be if the test is repeated after time has 
lapsed. No such replieations were reported in the Delphi studies analyzed by 
Sackman. 
The expertise and the representativeness of experts 
J. The study doeuments should deseribe the relevant professional experienee and 
qualifications of the experts. Delphi exercises guarantee the anonymity of indi­
vidual responses, which is typically interpreted so that seare information is re­
ported concerning the panelists. Some studies have listed the names of panellists 
and, in fewer eases, their professional affiliations. Sackman found no study list­
ing professional training and scaled experience levels qualifying each individual 
as possessing the skills required to meet an objeetive eriterion as an "expert" . 
K. Delphi studies typically do not report the key population characteristies of 
panellists, Such specification of "expert" sampling would perrnit more effeetive 
evaluation of the adequaey of the expert sample. For example, a long-range fore­
casting study might benefit from the inputs from relatively youthful panellists, 
10wer-c1ass or minority members, more women panellists or wider geographical 
distribution of panellists. 
L. Panellists dropout has been a well-known hazard of Delphi. The validity of 
sampling requires that probable selective factors and their presumed impaet on 
results should be stated. Saekman cited Bedforf ( 1972) who noted that dropouts 
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in a study on home communication services were less motivated to participate in 
the study and were more critical of the overall study and the utiIity of question­
naire items. 
M. Delphi practice dissociates itself from any systematic analysis of second­
string concurrent criteria (e.g. short-term interpretations of long-term trends). 
Panelists often disagree over what exists "today," and with rare exceptions, Del­
phi practitioners make no effort to present panelists with a precise report on 
"where we are". 
3.3 Answers to the Critique of Sackman 
In the recent national technology Delphi studies, large samples of experts have 
been used and the basic conventional criteria of statistical significance have been 
met much effectively than in the earlier studies. From the statistical point of 
view, the critique of the points A, B, D, H, 1 and L is not very relevant concem­
ing these studies. 
1, however, consider that Sackman ignores the special point of Delphi studies. 
Sackman' s critique was based largely on the comparison of the scientific criteria 
of opinion polls with Delphi studies. Actually, Sackman ( 1975, 3) suggested rig­
orous questionnaire techniques and scientific human experimentation procedures 
as preferable altematives to the conventional Delphi. 
There are, however, fundamental epistemic differences between opinion polls 
and Delphi studies, as 1 understand their roles. The basic difference can be stated 
as follows: The idea of opinion research is to find opinions ar behaviaral dispo­
sitians (transient invariances) af the persans studied or af the base group from 
which the study persans are sampied. The main idea of a Delphi study is to find 
relevant arguments concerning future developments. 
The above idea af the Delphi study is c1early visible especially in the Policy Del­
phi (Turaff 1975) and different later variants of it. 1 will later evaluate the Poli cy 
Delphi and present my own variant: the Argument Delphi. The above idea is 
c1early visible in a De1phi variant called the Qualitative Contralled Feedback 
(QCF) (Passig 1998, Press 1 983). This variant does not require that the panelists 
make camman judgments as groups. The QCF feedback is qualitative rather than 
quantitative, which means that statements explaining individual judgments rather 
than group response means and standard deviatians are pravided as feedback. 
These qualitative responses may contain infarmation, insights, perspectives and 
nuances not pravided in quantitative responses. The QCF daes not attempt ta 
achieve consensus. Althaugh the majarity or all af the participants may agree on 
one ar mare items, consensus is never suggested as the pracess gaal. 
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Based on the above main idea of the Delphi study, 1 will illustrate the difference 
between an opinion polI and a Delphi study with a possible future event dis­
cussed by Kuusi ( 1991 ): 
In 1999, the Jetuses oJ all pregnant women in Finland who give their consent will 
he examined Jor at least three hereditary diseases with new methods, either Jor a 
small remuneration or no remuneration at all. 
The topic suggests a generalization based on the new biotechnology. The prom­
ising target of the generalization is the prevention of hereditary diseases. The 
promising techniques may be based for example on genetic mapping and the po­
lymerase chain reaction. The methods are discussed in Appendix 3. It is now 
nearly sure, that that the topic will not realize in 1999. In 1996, in three cities 
gene examinations of three fatal or disabling hereditary diseases were made 
without remuneration to alI pregnant women who gave their consent. Though in 
the Finnish town of Kuopio, 90% of the women had give their consent to the ex­
aminations, they were stopped in 1997 for economic and partly ethical reasons. 
The main relevant findings made in the study by Kuusi ( 1991 )  conceming the 
topic will be presented below. 1 will later use the next arguments as illustrations 
in many connections. 
In 1989 - when the study conceming the impacts of new biotechnology was made 
- there were rather few people in Finland who realized the technical potentials of 
the new gene technology. There were very few who knew the latest highly rele­
vant generic technology, the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). When the Delphi 
study began, the Delphi managers did not notice the existence of the PCR. One 
panellist during the study provided crucial information about the prospects of this 
revolutionary new technology. 
In 1989, institutional safety regulation of gene technology was just beginning in 
Finland based especially on the principles launched by the European Union. 
Some panellists informed about the general safety principles proposed by EU. 
Publie discussion conceming values in genetic manipulation was in its initial 
stage in Finland. One panellist provided the Delphi manager with newsletters 
from critical consumer organizations in Europe and in the USA. Some panellists 
argued that the problem of hereditary diseases is more difficult in Finland than in 
many other countries. The Finnish population has many fatal or disabling he­
reditary diseases which the people of other nations do not have. 
Relevant information conceming the costs of gene diagnostics was received for 
example from a panellist working in a small firm specializing in restriction en­
zymes. Information conceming the funding of development projects for gene ex­
amination were obtained from panellists working as publie health authorities and 
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from a panelist working in TEKES (Technology Deve10pment Centre of Fin­
land). It the main public organisation for financing technological development in 
Finland. TEKES had launched a technology program in new biotechnology. 
The arguments were obtained both from the first round Delphi interviews, when 
the topic was not yet specified and as comments to the specified topic in the sec­
ond mail round of the Delphi study. The most important comments conceming 
PCR were actually obtained in the third Delphi round, where some specialists 
were asked to specify their general arguments. 
Let us suppose that an opinion poll was made in 1989 conceming the above topic 
based on the expertise which the Delphi managers had in the beginning of 1 989, 
and let us suppose that this study tried to take into account the scientific princi­
ples discussed by Sackman. 
The statistical significance and reliability require that the rather large (the mini­
mum is approximate1y 100; in author' s Delphi study 30 persons were on the 
panel) sample of panellists is selected from a rather large and rather homogenous 
universe or base group, from which it is possible to take another control sample. 
In Finland, the number of experts who used in 1989 most advanced techniques of 
the new biotechnology (e.g. the PCR) was extremely small. It may be, however, 
that the situation conceming the topic was actually analogous to the study of 
Bredford ( 1972) discussed by Sackman ( 1975,42). Bredford matched a group of 
twenty-five housewives against a group of twenty-six experts in "communi­
cations, consumer behavior, sociology and futurism generaIly" in a two- round 
Delphi study on "The Future Communications Services in the Home." Bredford 
found, using a long and extensively questionnaire, "remarkably few differences 
between the experts and the housewives on the panel" . 
Taking into account the crucial role of values conceming the realization of the 
topic, it is possible that a poll of mothers having small children might have been 
produced a more predictive valid (and statistically significant and reliable) 
evaluation conceming the topic than the evaluation of my panel of experts, most 
of whom belonged to the nuc1eus of the gene technology developer community. 
If the benchmark of a behavioral science is considered to be the discovery of 
transient invariances and predictions based on them, the poll of the mothers 
might have been more scientific than my study. If the scientific quality of a future 
study is based on the epistemology of the general theory of consistency, the 
situation is more complicated. From that point of view, the epistemic vaIue of 
transient invariances of actors is rather insignificant. The same concems even 
right predictions based on those invariances. Only permanent invariances of not­
learning beings are scientifically really interesting. Transient invariances are sci­
entifically interesting as far as they can be used for the identification of real ca-
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pacity limits, genuine interests and real capability limits of actors. The point is 
that the focus of scientific foresight is not to make outsider predictions based on 
prejudices of actors but to find what will happen in the future, if relevant actors 
act reasonably and use their learning capacity as far as possible. 
Let us look at the topic from this point of view. We may compare the results of 
my study and the hypothetical opinion polI. The comparison can be based on the 
relevant rational arguments, which my study produced in 1989- 1990 and which 
the hypothetical opinion polI might have produced conceming the discussed 
topic. In the table 3 . 1 .  I will list some relevant arguments (conceming the invari­
ances of unlearning beings and interests, capacity limits and capability limits of 
actors). 
As the list of above arguments shows it is reasonable to suppose that author' s 
study produced more rational arguments than the hypothetical opinion polI. 
Though author' s study did not provide a statistically significant, reliable and 
validated evaluation of the future realization of the topic, it provided many vali­
dated arguments affecting the topic. Evaluation of information values of different 
arguments is discussed in more detail in the next paragraph. 
If the main point of a Delphi study is to produce rational arguments concerning 
the future topics, and less to make judgments concerning future developments, 
the critical arguments A - E and H - 1 of Sackman are not very dangerous. In fact, 
as far as the finding of relevant arguments is concerned the number of panellists 
or the number of their answers is rather irrelevant. A case discussed by Sackman 
( 1975,22) is illustrative. In 1973, Arthur D. Little, Inc. made a Delphi study for 
health authorities to arrive at a consensus on the proper level of expo sure to as­
bestos fibers. The panellists were apparently members of the asbestos manufac­
turing community. Only one person on the panel was not a paid consultant of 
some segment of the asbestos industry or whose investigations into asbestos­
related disease had not been supported by the asbestos industry. It is dear that in 
this case the one dissident was in a special position in the production of ratjonal 
future arguments. It is, however, also important to realize that though this panel 
was c1early incapable of making any impartial judgments concerning norms for 
asbestos, even it was in principle capable of producing rational arguments con­
cerning future developments. 
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Table 3. 1. Arguments related to the topic: ln 1999, the fetuses of all pregnant 
women in Finland who give their consent will be examined for at least three he­
reditary diseases with new methods, either for a small remuneration or no remu­
neration at all. 
The notion "the results of the Delphi study are marked "D" and hypothetical results of the opinion re­
search "0". The certified fact" or "CF" is used in the case of an argument which is validated (in addition 
to any expert evaluation) through a trustworthy source, for example articIes in scientific journals. The 
arguments which are most favorable for the realization of the topic are on the top. The most unfavorable 
arguments are at the bottom. 
1 .  The problem of hereditary diseases is more difficult in Finland than in many 
other countries. In addition to the intemationally important hereditary diseases, 
the Finnish population has many fatal or disabling hereditary diseases which 
other nations do not have, CF (0). 
2. There are new powerful technologies e.g. gene sequencing technologies and 
PCR, which can be used in the diagnosis of hereditary diseases. The genetic 
codes of many difficult hereditary diseases were in known 1990, e.g. Ouchen 
muscular dystrophy and cystic fibrosis CF (0). 
3. If abortion is allowed for economic reasons why not study the reasons for 
abortion based on difficult hereditary diseases? An opinion of a panelist (0). 
4. The costs of the gene examination for three hereditary diseases in 1999 will 
not be much higher than those of the routine test for Oown' s  syndrome which 
was made to ten per cents of pregnant women in Finland in 1989. An evaluation 
of panelists working in relevant biotechnology firms or in publie sector biotech­
nology funding institutes (0). 
5. The European Union is preparing general (minimum) ethical guidelines for 
gene therapy. These guidelines prevent the ethically most questionable applica­
tions of gene therapy or diagnostics CF (0). 
6. From 20 panellists 75% did not think that the topic would be realized (0). 
7.  Many panelists considered that there are small technical obstacles to the reali­
zation of the topic. They considered, however, that the economic and especially 
cultural constraints will hinder its realization in 1 999 (0). 
8. According to a statistically significant and reliable opinion measurement in 
1990 8 1  % of the Finnish women with children under three years of age, thought 
that the topic would not be realized (0). 
9. 90% of the sample of mothers considered that cultural or ethical restrictions 
will be the main reasons for not realizing the topic (0). 
10. People should not tamper with the work of God. An opinion of a mother (0). 
1 1 .  There were movements of people in the EU area (especially in Germany) and 
in the US which have successfully opposed gene manipulation (0). 
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The argument M of Sackman is relevant only as far as the disagreement con­
ceming "where we are" is relevant conceming the finding of arguments with an 
impact on future developments. It is possible to express rational arguments con­
ceming the changes in the present situation without knowing the present situation 
exactly. On the other hand, especially in the processing of arguments, that did 
originally not have other sources of validation than the opinion of the panelists, 
the critical arguments F - G and J - L of Sackman are highly relevant. 
Content validity and the connections of the Delphi results with reliable theories 
(Sackman's points F and G) are related to the scientific or technological para­
digms discussed in the previous chapter. The content validity is closely related to 
the validation methods of technological paradigms. Because there is no entirely 
reliable way of determining the validity of suggestions conceming the future, ar­
guments which increase the content validity of these suggestions are essential. 
This conc1usion is the important starting point of the epistemic utility model dis­
cussed in the next paragraph. 
From the point of view of the production of rational arguments, the level of ex­
pertise is not the key property of the panel experts. The key property is the pan­
ellist's salience in the production of valid and relevant arguments. A top expert 
typically knows many more valid and relevant arguments than he expresses in a 
Delphi study and often important arguments are heard from less qualified but sa­
lient persons. They are often also "catalysts" who provoke relevant arguments 
from top experts. The critical arguments J - L of Sackman are dosely connected 
to the question of how to select a group of experts from the developer community 
of a discussed generic technology which in the Delphi communication process as 
a group is as efficient as possible in the production of arguments. 
Many examples of the bad use of Delphi method presented by Sackman con­
cemed social topics. A dear problem of national technology Delphi studies has 
been the expertise of the panelists in social matters. Because the panels have been 
selected mostly based on the expertise in technical matters, the panellists may 
have peculiar views conceming social matters. The problem is indicated by the 
fact that the demographic structures of the panels have been very biased. In the 
Sixth technology forecast survey of Japan the share of female panelists was 2% 
and the respondents under 30 years 1 %. (NISTEP 1997), in the United Kingdom 
study and in the last German study the shares were about 5% and about 1 %  
(Loveridge et al. 1995, Cuhls et a1. 1998). 
1 consider it essential to realize that any technology generalization has a social 
aspect ("relevancy aspect" in my later discussion) conceming which technical 
experts are seldom likely to be the best producers of rational arguments. A c1ear 
step forward in the above problem was made in the last German technology Del­
phi study. All panelists give their evaluations concerning nineteen social 
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"megatrends", e.g. "There will be warlike eonfliets between poor and rieh eoun­
tries" (Cuhls et al. 1998, Zusarnmenfassung, 1 3) .  A faetor analysis was made ' 
concerning their opinions. It is possible to compare how the evaluations of the 
panelists differ from the evaluations of other groups of people and how this influ­
ences technological views. 
It is interesting to compare my answer with the critiques of Sackman to that an­
swer which Cuhls ( 1998) gives to Sackman based on her experiences in Japanese 
and German national technology De1phi studies.  She has been a project coordi­
nator in the comparison of Delphi studies in Japan and Germany (Cuhls and Ku­
wahara 1994) and in the last German technology Delphi studies (Cuhls et al. 
1998, Cuhls et al. 1995). 
The total argumentation of Cuhls (1998) is not far from the idea that the focus of 
a Delphi study should be the production of rational arguments concerning the 
future. Cuhls considers (p.333) that it is very difficult to evaluate foresight in 
general and especially, how exact the predictions of a De1phi study are. She re­
fers to the results of Ono and Wedemayer ( 1994) and conc1udes that the Delphi 
predictions can be rather valid. In faet, the predictive validity of the results of 
Ono and Wademayer is rather questionable, as I will show in paragraph 3 . 1 0. The 
main arguments of Cuhls are, however, the following: 
1 .  Are there available any better sources of information for longrange forecasts 
than the knowledge of experts? 
2. It is important to look at self-destroying as well as se1f-fulfilling prophecies. 
Cuhls considers that one of the main tasks of the De1phi method is to hinder the 
realization of unimportant or undesirable happenings (or technology generaliza­
tions). Cuhls considers that a decision not to go further in a certain direction can 
also be a "success" (although then, the "prediction" is wrong). This is a conc1u­
sion which is c1early in line with my point of view. The role of Delphi experts is 
to make rational arguments concerning the future making possible more reason­
able decisions concerning future. Even the predictions of the experts can be seen 
as arguments. I will later call the predictions made by panelists as "proxy­
arguments" based on the tacit knowledge of experts. 
Cuhls' basic answer to Sackman's critique concerning information about panelists 
(point K above) is that the basic statistical data of the panelists (sex, age groups 
and professional activity) have been available in national Delphi studies without 
violating their anonymity. 
It is possible to use statistical background variables for the
' 
evaluation if the 
pooled opinion of experts is better than that of any subgroup of experts by 
counting correlation between background variables and answers to different top-
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ies. Cuhls, however, considers that it is possible to evaluate the validity of pre­
dictions only after 30 years or whenever it becomes clear that topics are realized 
or are not realized. 
Though Cuhls' conclusion is true conceming predictions, it is not, however, valid 
conceming the arguments on which the predietions of future events are based. 
Experts differ in their saliency and trustfulness in the production of both factual 
and "proxy" arguments. As 1 will in detail discuss in Chapter 5, it is vital to real­
ize the specifie role of a panelist in the developer community of a technologieal 
paradigm or in some fields of topies using the analogous concept of Cuhls. Be­
side roles in the developer community, psychologieal dimensions such as opti­
mism-pessimism are also important (compare Cuhls 1998,334) conceming the 
salience and trustfulness of arguments. 
Cuhls considers that the critique of Sackman conceming the vagueness of topies 
is justified to a certain extent. She considers that the unequivocality of topics 
should be stressed more. 1 consider, as in fact does Cuhls when she discusses the 
role of topics as general targets, that in an argumentation process conceming the 
topics, vague formulations have also advantages. They provoke factual arguments 
as explanations. 
A common feature of the most vehement crities of the Delphi method is that they 
have considered this method - or at least the traditionai Delphi method, on which 
most of their critique is focused - as a prediction method whieh even hinders the 
production of genuine arguments. Sackman ( 1975, 54) expressed it as follows: 
Delphi deliberately factors out face-to-face confrontation, and the ad­
versary process associated with it, as one of its prime philosophieal 
tenets justifying efficient consensus. Arguments are filtered, buffered 
and effectively neutralized in Delphi. A panelist can participate with­
out providing any justifieation for any of his opinions throughout the 
entire procedure. More conscientious panelists provide occasional 
brief commentaries. 
And further (p. 64): 
A fundamental epistemological confusion exists between Delphi 
method and Delphi results. Practitioners claim that the end result of a 
Delphi study is a series of expert forecasts of future events . . .  Delphi 
forecasts are opinions about such broad classes of events, not system­
atic, documented predictions of such events. 
Woudenberg (199 1 , 1 32) defined the starting points of his Delphi critique as fol­
lows: 
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Based on the above-mentioned literature reviews and expectations de­
rived from them, the different judgment methods can be put on a seale 
of inereasing aeeuraey. In this artic1e the expeeted high relative aeeu­
raey of Delphi is evaluated. 
Woudenberg evaluated the accuracy of the Delphi method by laboratory experi­
ments, in which practicalIy no factual arguments were presented. He did not find 
any systematic differences between the accuracy of different judgment methods: 
Delphi; staticized group ("usual opinion polI); unstruetured, direet interaction; 
and structured, direct interaction (e.g. "nominal group method"). The main con­
c1usion of Woudenberg ( 199 1 ,  39) was "that factors other than the specifie 
method used (capability of the group leader, motivation of the participants, qual­
ity of instructions, etc.) to a large extent determine the accuracy of an application 
of a judgment method". 
But did Woudenberg seek an answer to the wrong question? If the accuracy of 
predictions or evaluations is not the main criterion of a successful Delphi study, 
what should it be? That is the topic of the next paragraph. 
3.4 A ModeI for the Epistemic VaIue of Technology Foresight DeIphi 
Study Arguments 
Some technical features of the traditionai Delphi method have obscured the origi­
nai idea of the Delphi method. These technical features have in the hands of un­
critical practitioners, resulted in applications of the Delphi method which deserve 
the hard critique of Saekman (1975) and Woudenberg ( 1991) .  If the practitioners 
of the method had looked instead of mechanically following the technical rules 
more c10sely at the purpose for which the technical proeedures were constructed 
there would not be so many bad applications of the method. 
The original idea of the Delphi method was to make well-argued judgments. 
This is actually the same target, that most expert working groups or committees 
have. In this paragraph, 1 will discuss what implications can be made from this 
general idea for the success criteria of technology foresight with the Delphi 
methodology. In the next paragraph, 1 will evaluate the technical features and 
process stages of the method against the success criteria. 
A special point which 1 would like to emphasize strongly is that the Delphi 
method is not best at finding accurate judgments conceming future events but at 
revealing valid and relevant arguments for the judgments. What really happens in 
the future is typically not based only on valid arguments. The epistemic mistake 
which confuses rational arguments and judgments with actual happenings, has 
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very much confused the discussion about the Delphi method and hindered its de­
velopment. 
In this paragraph, 1 will present a model for evaluating epistemic value of tech­
nology Delphi argumentation. The model is based on a special interpretation of 
rational behavior. The background of the model is the epistemology of the gen­
eral theory of consistency (GTC) (originalIy Kuusi 1974) discussed in the first 
chapter. 1 will start, however, the discussion about the model with comparisons 
with the traditionai economic concept of rationality and the ideas of bounded ra­
tionality discussed by March and Simon ( 1958) and Eliansson ( 1996). 
3.4.1 Features of rational arguments 
The traditionai rational man of economics and statistical decision theory makes 
"optimal" choices in a highly specified and c1early defined environment (March 
and Simon 1958, 137-138): 
1 .  In front of the decision-maker is the whole set of alternatives, from which he 
will choose his action. 
2. To each alternative a set of consequences is attached - the events that will en­
sue if that particular alternative is chosen. The existing theories falI into three 
categories: a) Certainty: theories that assume the decision-maker has complete 
and accurate knowledge of the consequences that will folIow on each alternative. 
b) Risk: theories that assume accurate knowledge of a probability distribution of 
the consequences of each alternative. c) Uncertainty: theories that assume that 
the consequences of each alternative belong to some subset of alI possible conse­
quences, but that the decision maker cannot assign definite probabilities to the 
occurrence of particular consequences. 
3. At the outset, the decision-maker has a "utility function" or a "preference­
ordering" that ranks alI sets of consequences from the most preferred to the least 
preferred. 
4. The decision maker selects the alternative leading to the preferred set of con­
sequences. In the case of certainty, the choice is unambiguous. In the case of risk, 
rationality is usualIy defined as the choice of that alternative for which the ex­
pected utility is greatest. In the case of uncertainty, the definition of rationality 
becomes problematic. Possible strategies are e.g. maxmin or maxmax strategies. 
As March and Simon ( 1958, 138) remarked, there are difficulties with this model 
of rational man. Even if we accept the calculation with probabilities as rational, 
the model makes three exceedingly important demands upon the choice-making 
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mechanism. 1t assumes 1 )  that all the altematives of choice are "given" ;  2) that all 
the consequences attached to each altemative are known at least as probabilities 
3) that the rational man has a complete utility ordering for all possible sets of 
consequences. 
In what sense can we speak about rational choice if the above assumptions are 
not met or if only bounded rationality - using the concept of March and Simon -
is possible? My suggestion is that reasonable or bounded rational choices can be 
based on rational arguments. In order to make reasonable choices, rational ar­
guments are used to produce a special type of utility which I call "epistemic util­
ity" even in a situation where not all the alternatives, consequences and utilities 
connected with the consequences are not known. 
Behind my concept of epistemic utility is a kind of learning process. It is sup­
posed that a decision-maker first makes a "first guess" epistemic utility value of 
any relevant technology generalization option. The first guess is based on many 
types of arguments perceived by the decision maker. In the beginning of the 
learning process the arguments are very much part of his or her tacit knowledge. 
They concern the technical feasibility of the option, the impacts on "objective" 
targets, the relevancy of the impacts or consequences of realizing the option. The 
arguments can include objective probabilities, which the decision-maker knows, 
or they might be based on his or her subjective intuitive probabilities. 
The second main phase is an argumentation process transforms tacit arguments 
explicit. It results in the production of new arguments, which contribute to the 
epistemic utility of the evaluated option. The decision-makers - or independent 
observers - make also an evaluation of the validity or the rationality of arguments 
behind the epistemic utility evaluation. 
The final stage is the decision to continue or not to continue the realization of the 
technological option. This means a further allocation of resources to its realiza­
tion. An important aspect of this choice is the minimum acceptable level of va­
lidity of the option. In practical decision making the trade-off between the tradi­
tionai utility value of an option and the validity of the utility evaluation of the 
option is rather evident. It can be seen to be behind this minmax decision rule: 
consider the worst set of consequences that may follow from each alternative, 
then select the alternative whose "worst set of consequences" is preferred to the 
worst sets attached to other altematives. Let us suppose that A is the best altema­
tive based on the minmax rule. Let us suppose that there is another altemative B 
having a possible set of consequences which are in general clearly better than the 
possible consequences of A exempt the worst set of consequences (min A > min 
B). If the decision maker in this situation selects A she is ready to "sell validity 
paying an utility price".  Her decision is based on a valid argument "1 will get at 
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least min A" instead of an invalid but reasonable argument "It seems that I will 
get more with B" .  
The "epistemic utility" concept was firstly used by Carl G.  Hempel and Isaac 
Levi in the early 1960s (Niiniluoto 1987, 406). They suggested that acceptance of 
scientific hypotheses could be based upon the rule of maximizing "epistemic 
utilities" .  In contrast with various kinds of "practical" benefits, the epistemic 
utilities should reflect the cognitive aims of scientific inquiry. Levi has argued 
that the scientist' s task of "replacing doubt by belief' should aim at least to true 
belief, and could be "tempered by other desiderata such as simplicity, explana­
tory power, etc." These objectives of autonomous scientific inquiry are "quite 
distinct from those of economic, political, moral, etc. deliberation" (Levi 1967, 
Niiniluoto 1987, 410). 
From the point of view of the epistemology of the GTC a reasonable interpreta­
tion of Levi' s program is that the epistemic utility measures the distance between 
perceived and true criteria of sameness of a not-leaming being. The criteria of 
sameness of a not-leaming being are, however, always interpreted through a lan­
guage of some learning being (or of an actor). Because the development of Ian­
guages of learning beings are related to their interests, it is not possible to define 
the simplicity or explanatory power of a theory conceming invariant criteria of a 
not-Ieaming being without taking into account the interests of the leaming being. 
This means that we cannot build a relevant concept of epistemic utility without 
targetlactor related considerations. 
Though my concept of "epistemic utility" depends on economic and moral delib­
eration (the relevancy aspect), it has an important common feature with the origi­
naI idea of Levi. My model of epistemic utility (which I will present soonly) is 
based on the idea, that if an argument increases the validity of a specified option, 
the epistemic utility has to increase. The epistemic utility has to increase even in 
a case, in which the argument implies the deterioration of impact, feasibility or 
relevancy values of the option. We might suppose that the measure of validity of 
rational arguments might be based just on a kind of epistemic utility suggested by 
Levy and discussed by Niiniluoto ( 1987). 
It seems to be easy to accept a hypothesis, that a decision-maker prefers a tech­
nology generalization option with well validated consequences to the same tech­
nology generalization option with poorly validated consequences. This is, how­
ever, a stringent requirement, which is evidently not often met in actual behavior. 
If a validation process worsens the consequences of a technoIogy generalization 
option, decision makers are often very reluctant to accept the bad news. They 
might reject or try to forget evidently valid arguments in order to sustain their po­
sition as experts. They consider - often rightly - that the increase of epistemic 
utility is in contradiction with their interests (ar their traditianal expected utility) 
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and for example they wishfulIy hope that some new information would nuIIify 
the bad news or they try to hinder other actors to get the bad news. This is a main 
reason for the fact that the human decision making is seldom epistemic rationaI in 
a strict sense. 
In any case, for a rationaI decision-maker the Iow level of the validity of argu­
mentation is the reason for a search process for new relevant arguments. The dif­
ference between rational and irrational arguments can be based on their impacts 
on the epistemic utility. Any new rational argument improving the total validity 
of argumentation should have a positive impact on the epistemic utility of a fu­
ture generalization of technology. On the contrary, an approved irrational argu­
ment, which has a negative impact on the general validity of argumentation, 
should have a zero or worsening effect on the epistemic utility. 
The validity aspect of the epistemic rationality is a counterpart of the cognitive 
rationality of Resher ( 1995). He considered that rationality may be evaluative or 
pragmatic in addition to cognitive ("rejecting untruths or presenting truths"). In 
ignoring evaluative rationality the risk is to endorse inferior items (in GTC "to 
se1ect items which do not belong to capability limits") and in ignoring practical 
rationality the risk concems the failing to achieve appropriate ends (in GTC "the 
realization does not belong to capacity limits"). My point is that Resher' s three 
types of rationality (or reasonability) may be in contradiction with each others in 
the short runo My epistemic utility model suggests that in that situation the cog­
nitive reasonability should have the first priority because it is decisive in the long 
runo 
Epistemic rational arguments have some formal features. John Woods and 
Douglas Walton ( 1982) have suggested as a minimal requirement for a comment 
to be an argument that it should have the logical form of an argument. It has to be 
a set of propositions: one is calIed the conc1usion, the others premises. In practi­
cal argumentation, a problem is that some or sometimes even alI premises are im­
plicit. Rational argumentation requires that important implicit premises are made 
explicit if they are not evident without such an explication. 
Karl Popper has suggested another formal feature for rational argumentation. Ac­
cording to hirn, a minimum requirement for rational discussion conceming the 
empirical validity of an argument is that there is at least some condition of world 
which can refute the argument. This idea which is the comerstone of 'critical re­
alism' , seems also to be essential for evaluation of the rationality of value judg­
ments, as we already discussed in the first chapter. 
Habermas ( 1995, 15) connects rationality with the consistency like the GTC. Ac­
cording to hirn we may also calI someone rational if he or she makes known a de­
sire or an intention, expresses a feeling or a mood, shares a secret, confesses a 
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deed, etc., and is then able to reassure critics in regard to revealed experience by 
drawing practical consequences from it and behaving consistently thereafter. A 
problem in the standpoint of Habermas is the above mentioned rejection of evi­
dently valid arguments conceming invariances or the capacity or capability lim­
its of other actors. If "reassure critics" means rejecting validated evidence, we are 
no longer in the sphere of epistemic reasonable behavior though the behavior 
might be motivated from the point of view of traditionai utility based reasonabil­
ity. 
3.4.2 Evaluation criteria of the epistemic utility of technology 
generalization options 
In the next subparagraph, 1 will present a simple mathematical model for the 
evaluation of the epistemic utility of technology generalizations. In this paragraph 
1 will illustrate the evaluation criteria used based on the arguments presented in 
the study of Kuusi ( 1991) .  Let us once again look at the generalization of new 
biotechnology discussed above and by Kuusi ( 1991) :  
In 1999, the fetuses of all pregnant women in Finland who give their consent will 
be examined for at least three hereditary diseases with new methods, either for a 
small remuneration or no remuneration at all. 
What kinds of epistemic rational arguments can be found conceming this topic? 
The first group of arguments concems the concrete or objective targets,  the at­
tainment of which can be evaluated without disagreement. They define poten­
tially important impacts which the new methods or technology generalizations 
may have. My study produced e.g. the following argument belonging to this 
group (the numbers refer to the list on the paragraph 3.3.) :  
1 .  The problem of hereditary diseases is more difficult in Finland than 
in many other countries. In addition to the intemationally important 
hereditary diseases, the Finnish population has many fatal or disabling 
hereditary diseases which other nations do not have. 
If a technology results in the avoidance of a hereditary disease, we can suppose, 
that this impact can be noticed without disagreement. A second group of argu­
ments are focused on the feasibility of the techniques in achieving of impacts. 
Following arguments belonged to this group: 
2. There are new powerful technologies e.g. gene sequencing tech­
nologies and peR, which can be used in the diagnosis of hereditary 
diseases. The genetic codes of many difficult hereditary diseases were 
in known 1990, e.g. Duchen muscular dystrophy and cystic fibrosis. 
9 1  
4 .  The costs of the gene examination for three hereditary diseases in 
1999 will not be much higher than those of the routine test for Down' s 
syndrome which was made to ten per cents of pregnant women in 
Finland in 1989. 
What kinds of arguments have impacts on the validity of argumentation? 1 al­
ready discussed the problem of validity on a general levei above. The validity of 
a technology generalization proposal is related to the following question: is the 
suggested technique really able to produce the suggested impacts on suggested 
conditions (for example using the suggested resources)? The validation is based 
on a validation method. For example the validity of an opinion poll might require 
that the documentation should c1early indicate, what universe is represented and 
how adequate is the sampling. Though it might be possible to proceed in the de­
velopment of an objective or general validation method (e.g. based on the 
"epistemic utility" of Levi or Niiniluoto ( 1987» , proper validation methods de­
pend on the languages of actors. As 1 have discussed earlier, these paradigm­
based inductive or deductive inferences are actually generalizations based on 
criteria of sameness: 
The inductive inference : 
The validity of a generalization proposal a2 which is not yet realized 
increases because a similar generalization a 1 is realized. 
The deducti,ve inference: 
A generalization proposal is more valid because it belongs to a simi­
larity group of valid generalizations. 
For example in the Darwinian paradigm, the finding of a fossil (a1 ) which does 
not resemble the present species supports the assumption that there was once that 
type of species (a2). In the pre-Darwinian paradigm a1 is only a caprice of nature 
without further implications concerning a2. 
Let us suppose that somebody suggests that a technique can produce specified 
impacts in specified conditions and assesses the validity of the suggestion based 
on some validation method. The relevancy of the suggestion differs for different 
actors. 1 use this concept to describe all aspects of decision-making which depend 
on the "special mental map" of an actor. The actor may first have a different 
validation method for the suggestion. Second, actors assign different values to the 
impacts proposed (impacts are supposed to be perceived in the similar way by all 
actors). A person may e.g. consider that he has a minimal risk of taking respon­
sibility for a child with a hereditary disease. Different impacts are relevant to hirn 
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than to a person with a great risk of having such a child. Third, the proposed 
technology generalization may produce impacts which are not mentioned in the 
suggestion and which the actor considers to be relevant. The relevancy evalua­
tions might be systematic as in the European Union as was realized by an argu­
ment presented in Kuusi ( 1991) :  
5.  The European Union is preparing general (minimum) ethical guide­
lines for gene therapy. These guidelines prevent the ethically most 
questionable applications of gene therapy or diagnostics. 
Unlike the means-ends model discussed in the chapter 1, I consider that there 
might be rational arguments related to relevancy evaluations. There might be 
epistemic rational arguments conceming the reasonability of "mentai maps" of 
actors. Another possibility is to present true transient invariances conceming the 
relevancy evaluations of some actors. The first three arguments concern real or 
potential mental maps. The last argument refers to a (hypothetical) transient in­
variance: 
3 .  If abortion is allowed for economic reasons why not study the rea­
sons for abortion based on difficult hereditary diseases? 
7 .  Many panelists considered that there are small technical obstacles to 
the realization of the topic. They considered, however, that the eco­
nomic and especially cultural constraints will hinder its realization in 
1999. 
1 1 . There were movements of people in the EU area (especially in 
Germany) and in the US which have successfully opposed gene ma­
nipulation. 
8. According to a statistically significant and reliable opinion meas­
urement in 1990 8 1  % of the Finnish women with children under three 
years of age, thought that the topic would not be realized. 
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3.4.3 A model for an action-inducing epistemic utility of 
argumentation 
The idea behind the next model is a convenient situation in technology foresight 
studies .  A topic in a study suggests that specified impacts (i 1 ,iZ , . . .  in) are 
achieved now or later using some specific technique. Por example, somebody 
may suggest that different hereditary diseases in fetuses of pregnant women will 
be monitored in ZO 1 ° using a specific technique. My idea is to formalize the 
contributions of different arguments for rational evaluation of this kind of tech­
nology generalization suggestion. 
Let us suppose that we are making a study conceming the future technology gen­
eralizations based on a technological paradigm of new biotechnology. What is the 
value of a single argument in this kind of argumentation process? The value of 
the argument can be assessed according to its contribution to the totaI value of 
argumentation. 1 describe this total epistemic vaIue of an argument related to a 
technology generalization with "epistemic utility". The idea is that if the epis­
temic utility of a generalization increases, it is from the epistemic or cognitive 
point of view more reasonable to start a realization process of the technology 
generalization. We can describe the contribution of a single argument A to the 
totaI epistemic utility value Uik of a technology generalization i to an actor k as 
follows: 
UkiA - U'k( II .  p1 . y1 .  R1 'k Lk) - U'k( 10. pO. yO. RO'k Lk) - 1 l '  l '  l '  l '  1 l '  l '  l '  l '  
In the formula 
- lOi and I1i describe suggested (objective) impacts of the generalization i on 
proposed targets before and after the presentation of the argument A; 
- pOi and pI i are the suggested before and after feasibility values of used tech­
nique(s) of i used in the producing of the impacts; 
- yOi and y
l
i are values of validity of the generalization i before and after the 
presentation of the argument A (does the proposed techniques really produce the 
proposed impacts based on a suggested validation method); 
- ROik and R l ik are the before and after relevancy of the generalization i to the 
actor k; (inc1uding k' s evaluation of the suggested validation method) and 
- Lk is the minimum value of action inducing suggestion from the epistemic 
point of view for the actor k. Lk can be interpreted to be the opportunity cost of 
the most reasonable altemative technological option. 
It is assumed that all actors (or experts in a Delphi study) interpret in the same 
way the suggested impacts (1), the suggested feasibility (P) and the suggested va-
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lidity (V). This means that these values do not depend on the actor k. The possi­
ble doubts conceming e.g. unnoticed impacts or the correctness of the suggested 
validation method are visible in the actor dependent value of the relevancy (R). It 
is assumed that Lk does not depend on the discussed argument. In reality it 
might, however, have a contribution to the opportunity costs of the discussed op­
tion. 
What do we know about the function Uik(Ii ,Fi ,vi ,Rik , L0? The epistemic 
utility function Uik of the generalization i to the actor k is an increasing function 
of Ii ,Fi ,vi and Rik. Another property is that if Ii, Fi, Vi or Rik is zero, Uik is 
zero. If we consider that a change in epistemic utility has to be relevant for ac­
tion, Ii, Fi,Vi and Rik should have such high values that the starting of the reali-
zation process of the technology generalization i can be reasonable now or later. 
This minimum reasonability level is described by Lk. From the role of Lk, it fol-
lows that Uik is a decreasing function of Lk. A simple mathematical function 
which meets all above requirements is given below for Uik or for the total epis­
temic utility value of the generalization i to the actor k : 
Uik = Max( Ii Fi Vi Rik - Lk ,0) 
The "Max" means that Uik = ° if Ii Fi Vi Rik - Lk < 0. This is a reasonable as­
sumption, because knowledge conceming a technology generalization can never 
have a negative impact on the epistemic utility of a reasonable actor. The possible 
positive impacts are discussed below. In fact, the monitoring of irrelevant alter­
natives may have also negative effects because it may hinder the monitoring of 
relevant altematives. 
We obtain a more simple and perhaps in some connections more practical for­
mula for the total epistemic utility vaIue of an argument in a technology foresight 
study conceming a technology generalization if we look at the newness (or sur­
prise vaIue) of the argument to an actor. Using a newness indicator, the value of 
a argument A conceming a technoIogy generalization i to the actor k is 
UkiA = Max( Il i F1i VI i Rl ik - Lk, O)Nik = Max( Il i Fl i VI i Rl ik - Lk, 0) 
- Max( lOi FOi VOi ROik -Lk, 0) 
or if Max( Il i Fl i V I i R l ik - Lk, 0» 0 
Nik = 1 - Max( l0i FOi VOi ROik -Lk, O)/Max( l l i Fl i VI i Rl ik - Lk, 0) 
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where Nik is the newness of the argumentation concerning generalization i to the 
actor k. 
We can see from the formula that if the argumentation process does not improve 
the episternic utility or Max( Il i pI i yl i Rl ik - Lk, 0) = Max( lOi pOi y
Oi ROik 
-Lk, 0), the newness value is 0. 
As 1 mentioned above, the difference between traditionai econornic utility con­
cept and my episternic utility is based on the special role of validity. I define be­
low this special role only concerning reasonable technology generalization pro­
posals with defined 1, P, R and Y. In order to express my idea c1early, 1 have 
firstly to define five auxiliary concepts: reasonable technology generalization 
proposal from the episternic point of view, reasonable relevancy evaluation, c10se 
targetlimpact horizon, c10se technique horizon and tested preference values. 
I define a reasonable technology generalization proposal from the epistemic 
point of view in the following way: technique(s) is (are) suggested to produce 
specified impacts with a specified feasibility (e.g. the use of resources) and the 
level of validity of the suggestion is implicitly or explicitly evaluated based on a 
specified validation method. 
A reasonable relevancy evaluation of a reasonable technology generalization 
proposal is based on four basic reasons: 
- the proposed techniques may produce impacts which are not mentioned in the 
suggestion and which the actor considers to be relevant (targets inside a c10se 
targetlimpact horizon, see below); 
- there are c10se techniques not mentioned in the suggestion (techniques inside a 
cIose technique horizon, see below); 
- actors may have different validation methods concerning the relationships be­
tween discussed techniques and impacts(different validation paradigms); and 
- the preference values are tested (see below) related to the proposed and c10se 
impacts; 
With the close target/impact horizon and I refer to those targets/impacts which 
necessarily are related to the production of the suggested impacts using the sug­
gested techniques. E.g. a medicine rnight have negative side effects. The target 
horizon of a technological paradigm is typically very much wider than the c10se 
horizon. 
With the close technique horizon 1 refer to those complementary techniques 
needed beside the suggested techniques to produce discussed impacts. The tech­
nique horizon of a technological paradigm is typically very much wider than the 
close horizon. 
96 
With tested preference values 1 refer to the four criteria of Keekok Lee's epis­
temic implication model (Lee 1985) and my criterion of not-contradictory criteria 
of the sameness discussed in the first chapter. The preference values have been 
tested based on: 
- Serious refutable evidence 
- Referentially relevant evidence 
- Causally relevant evidence 
- Causal independence 
- Not-contradictory criteria of the sameness of an actor. 
Special Assumption concerning the Relationship between Indicators 0/ Im­
pacts, Feasibility, Validity and Relevancy: 
Let us assume that actors accept a common validation method. Let us sup­
pose also that we have a reasonable technology generalization proposal 
based on that validation method. In that case the relationships between indi­
cators of 1, F, R and V related to the proposal are defined so that every ar­
gument having a positive impact on V has also a positive impact on the total 
epistemic utility value of the technology generalization proposal. 
The assumption that actors should have a common validation method is restric­
tive. It means either that there is an "universal" validation method or actors have 
rather c10se scientific paradigms. The assumption is made in order to make the 
special assumption simple. More modest and perhaps more reasonable assump­
tion could be that validity has to increase in any used validation method. 
If the problem conceming the common validation method is not too serious, we 
might suppose that the measures of 1, F and R are in such a relationship with the 
measure of V that the net epistemic value of rational argumentation is positive 
also in the case, where a validity improving argument impairs the value of Ii x Fi 
x Ri . This means that the value of Vi has to rise at least as much as Ii x Fi x Ri 
decreases. 
I illustrate this relationship with a case which I will discuss more c10sely in the 
chapter 7. PKU is a hereditary disease which if left untreated leads to severe 
mental retardation. There is a fetus test which yields false positives. Let us sup­
pose that the wrong diagnosis happens in ten per cent of the cases (the feasibility 
is 0,9). Let us suppose that somebody suggests that the technique always gives 
the right diagnosis (the feasibility is 1 ,0). We have to deerease the validity of the 
argumentation by more than ten per cent, because it is evidently better to have the 
right feasibility vaIue. 
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Presently, the special assumption is more a kind of ideal than a specified crite­
rion. I already mentioned that the principle "bad news might be good epistemic 
news" is often a stumbling bIock of the epistemic reasonabIe argumentation. 
From the point of view of some other type of reasonability than the epistemic 
reasonability it is often reasonab1e to forget or hide bad news, which are good 
epistemic news. 
An argument, that impairs the epistemic utility or which has a negative newness 
value can be irrational or "semirational". It is possibIe that there are 
"semirationaI" arguments or "bad news" which have no impact on V but impair 
the value of I, F or R. A rational decision maker does not approve such a semira­
tional argument. The same of coarse concerns every argument impairing the 
vaIue of V. 
March and Simon ( 1958, 140) called an alternative satisfactory if ( 1 )  there exists 
a set of criteria that describes minimally satisfactory alternatives, and (2) the al­
ternative in question meets or exceeds all these criteria. My modeI suggests that 
the actor k, who likes to maximize the use of valid arguments in her decision­
making, starts a realization process of a technology generalization, if the gener­
alization proposal meets the criteria of a minimally satisfactory option. It has to 
be good enough in all relevant targets; in the feasibility of the suggested and 
c10se techniques to achieve the relevant targets; in the importance of the relevant 
targets; and especially in the validity of the arguments which connect the pro­
posed technique(s) and the relevant targets. 
According to March and Simon ( 1958, 1 4 1 )  in making choices that meet satisfac­
tory standards, the standards themselves are part of the definition of the situation. 
My standards I, F, V, R and L are "metastandards" which have different inter­
pretations in different situations. As March and Simon have stressed, in practice 
standards are raised whenever alternatives (good enough technology generaliza­
tions) proved easy to discover, and lowered whenever they were difficult to dis­
cover. In the case of my metastandards, this is possible by changing the value of 
Lk ·  
3.4.4 Epistemic utility and the general epistemic value 
My measure of epistemic utility is constructed for decision-making, which tries 
to maximize the use of valid arguments. An argument may have "general epis­
temic value" besides action-inducing value. An argument may expose a new vali­
dated invariant relationship between a target and a technique, but the target may 
be so unimportant that the use of the technique does not meet the minimum epis­
temic utility level for its use. In that case, the argument telling the validated in-
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variant relationship between the target and the technique produces no epistemic 
utility. 
We may consider that the "general epistemic value" (the epistemic utility dis­
cussed by Levi and Niiniluoto (1987), which is unrelated to economic utility) 
produced by the realization of a technology generalization is an impact in addi­
tion to other impacts of technology generalization options. We may also, how­
ever, assume that in the case of two technology generalizations which are equal 
in their epistemic utility, the "general epistemic value" indicated by the validity V 
decides their order. Especially if the argumentation is evaluated to have a zero 
value because of low R value, one can consider that the role of the "general 
epistemic value" is important. It often happens that the first products using a new 
technique are unimportant on the market. These products indicate, however, that 
the technique may be also feasible in the making of relevant products. 
3.5 An Operationalization of the Epistemic Utility: Microeconomic 
Interpretation of the Epistemic Utility Model 
The basic microeconomic theory (e.g. BaumoI 195 1 ,  Malinvaud 1985, Kreps 
1990) provides a simple interpretation for the elements of my epistemic utility 
model with the exception of one important e1ement. The standard theory does not 
discuss the problem of validity. The final decision concerning realization of a 
technology generalization is based on the expected future returns to the firm from 
investment in the generalization. In the realized projects the return of capital has 
to be higher than a limit value (in my mode1 L). The evaluation of the feasibility 
and impacts (in my model F and 1) of a technology generalization are based on 
the capacity limits using the concepts of the GTC (and not on capabilities, as in 
the citation below) (Kreps 1 990,234): 
The standard general modeI is set as usuaI in a world where there are 
K commodities. Some of these commodities may be inputs to the firm, 
some may be outputs of the firm, and some may be either inputs or 
outputs. Still others may have nothing at all to do with the firm. The 
firm's productive capabilities (capacity limits !) are modeled by a set of 
netput vectors in RK. The term "netput" is used as a generalization of 
input and output. For each commodity, we record the firm's production 
or usage of this commodity, using negative numbers for net inputs and 
positive numbers for net outputs. 
The capacity limits define the production possibility set or the technology set for 
the firm (Kreps 1990,234). Elements belonging to the capacity limits of the firm 
are called feasible production plans. If the realization of a production pIan is 
based on the generalization of the discussed technology, it is simply assumed that 
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the IxF vaIue of this teehnoIogy generalization g ean be deseribed by the pro­
duced and used netputs (ql , q2 , . . . .  qK ). E. g. if q l  describes the amount of 
produeed insulin (a positive netput or output) we may suppose that with the same 
negative netputs or inputs (e.g. labor foree) the generalization of the gene teeh­
noIogy produees a larger ql than possible with traditionai methods. 
"The impaet aspeet" in a produetion pIan eomprises the high levels of outputs 
produeed and the low leveIs of inputs used. The strietly objeetive measurement of 
the "the impaet aspeet" requires that it is not eonneeted with subjeetive eIements 
like prices. In praetice, a less dogmatie interpretation is, however, often reason­
abIe. From the point of view of a single produeer or eustomer, the market priees 
and market interest rates may be so "objective" that arguments conceming the 
relevancy eomponent can often be redueed to arguments conceming the personai 
relevancy evaluations of market prices, interest rates and amounts produced. The 
actor evaluates how relevantIy the anticipated market vaIue of a technoIogy gen­
eralization describes its future vaIue to her. 
The arguments reIated to the "the feasibility aspect" motivate the judgment that it 
is really possible with avaiIable resources (inputs) to produce the pIanned out­
puts. The question of validity, which is not diseussed in the standard miero­
economic anaIysis, eoncems the question of how sure we can be that a produc­
tion pIan can be realized with the proposed teehnology generalization. 
With the above reservations, the priees, the diseount ratio and interest rates in the 
standard microeconomie analysis ean be seen as indieators of the relevancy. 
Every netput has a price. The price which an aetor k is ready to pay for a netput i 
deseribes how reIevant this netput is for her. If the outputs are produced and in­
puts are used in a period 0, which is so short that the time preferenee or the dis­
eount faetor can be passed over, the proxy indicator of the total vaIue of a gener­
alization g is its monetary value Po =Ig FgRgr l:i Pikg qig where Pikg is 
the (relevancy) price of netput i for actor k in the production pIan g and qig 
the net amount of netput i produeed or used. An important point is, however, that 
l:i Pikg qig does not give the validity of evaIuation conceming the monetary 
vaIue Po. If we do not assume that we are complete1y informed we have to multi­
pIy Po with V g. 
According to the standard microeconomic theory, the rational firm seIects a pro­
duetion that maximizes its total diseounted profit subjeet to its teehnical con­
straint. It implies that marginal rates of substitution of netputs are equal respec­
tiveIy to the ratios of diseounted prices. In particular, the teehnical interest rates 
are equal to market interest rates (Malinvaud 1985, 274). Let D = lI(1+i) be the 
discount ratio, where i is the market interest rate, which is supposed to be the 
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same in all relevant periods. Let Po , . . .  , Pn describe The monetary values which 
are the highest possibIe with the use of technoIogy generalization g in the periods 
1 ,  . . .  ,n (i.e. marginal rates of substitution of netputs are equal respectiveIy to the 
ratios of discounted prices). The traditionai (econornic) utility vaIue of g is Po + 
DPl + . . . .  Dn Pn. An econornic proxy indicator of the episternic utility of g to the 
actor k is 
Ugk1(1g ,Fg ,V g ,Rgk , Lk) = Max« Po + DPl + . . . .  Dn Pn) V g - Lk , 0) 
where Lk is The rninimum leveI of the expected vaIue required for The realization 
of g, V g the validity of argumentation after the argumentation process, and Ugk1 
refers to the episternic utility after the argumentation process. The newness as­
pect of the technology generalization argumentation can be stated by comparing 
the value of Ugk1 with the sirnilar value before the argumentation UgkO. As in 
my formula the newness value can be stated in the following way: Ugk= Ugk1 -
UgkO . 
There are evidently many everyday technology generalizations in which the 
above proxy indicator of episternic utility or the "objective" cost-benefit analysis 
based on given technologies, market prices and market interest rates is reason­
able. This conceptual framework works rather well when the actor is a price taker 
and when the relevant outputs / inputs are evident. The risk conceming changes 
in future prices is described using the validity index V g' The basic assumption 
conceming the role of the validityl in the episternic utility is also econornically 
reasonable at least if an argument impairing the expected econornic utility of the 
generalization g provides the true future prices of the netputs. The proxy meas­
ure of episternic utility is reasonable e.g. in the following te�hnology generaliza­
tion decision: 
When a homeowner replaces his windows, will he use triple glazing? 
The narrow conditions of reasonability (or rationality) of the validity extended 
rnicroeconornic analysis do not function in the case of emerging technology gen­
eralizations because the set of possible netputs is not fixed. In the new technol­
ogy generalizations there is only a vague idea about relevant outputs / inputs and 
stabile price and cost information is lacking. 1n the present era of rapid techno­
logical change, this type of decision situation is more the rule than the exemption. 
I The epistemic utility is an increasing functian af validity af the argumentatian. 
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A recent comment of the two experts who had earlier used "objective" cost­
benefit analysis is illustrative (Linstone and Mitroff 1994,xx) : 
We still may wax nostalgic when we remind ourselves of the beauti­
ful, e1egant, and satisfying results achieved with the paradigms of sci­
ence and engineering with which we grew upo But we must now face 
complex systems where everything interacts with everything, where 
human and technical factors must both be fully appreciated and ethics 
means much more than logic and scientific rationality. 
1 disagree with the opinions of the above experts, if they consider that reasonable 
decision making based on rational arguments is also impossible. 1 consider that 
reasonability should be the central focus of technology foresight studies, but that 
the content of reasonability has to be greatly enlarged from the conception of the 
rationality of the standard microeconomic theory. The reasonabiIity must include 
considerations of the commitment of relevant actors which may seem to be irra­
tional from the point of view of the narrow concept of rationality as Linstone and 
Mitroff (1 994, xix) have remarked: 
For example, there may be good reasons to do things that appear not to 
be cost-effective. A company may undertake a research and develop­
ment program to keep its superb engineering team together, knowing 
that it cannot make a profit on the project. 
My model of the epistemic value of the argumentation concerning generalizations 
of technologies does not restrict the measurement of 1, F, V, R and L to the nar­
row concepts of the standard microeconomic theory though the microeconomic 
interpretation of my model is possible. The framework of the standard micro­
economic theory is in any case also useful for the analysis of complex technology 
generalizations because it provides a framework for further questions concerning 
the importance, feasibility, validity, relevancy and the minimum realization limit 
of a technology generalization. 
Further questions concerning the importance (I) of a technology generalization g 
are for example: 
1) What kinds and amounts of products or other outputs are possible based on g ?  
2) How is it possible to reduce the use of valuable inputs based on g or in more 
general terms how can g avoid the pitfalls of earlier technologies without creat­
ing new ones? 
3) If a production pian based on g is realized, are all the relevant "objective" 
netputs taken into account? 
4) On which indicators (e.g. on market prices and on market interest rates) can 
the "objective " evaluations ofthe expected market values ofnetputs be based? 
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Further questions conceming the feasibility (F) of a technology generalization g 
include: 
5) How is it technically possible to use g to produce some specijic outputs using 
some specijic inputs? 
6) Will the relevant technology generalization organizations have enough equip­
ment, skilled labor force, monetary resources and networks with important stake­
holders or other relevant netputs for a successful generalization g ?  
The following is a further question conceming the validity of a technology gener­
alization: 
7) How valid are the arguments on which the judgments concerning the above six 
questions are based? 
Further questions conceming the relevancy of a technology generalization g to an 
actor k include 
8) Are the "objective " market prices ofnetputs and market interest rates relevant 
or unbiased measures of the value of g to the actor k? 
9) Are there some relevant subjective netputs which the actor k connects to g but 
which are not noticed in the "objective " measures of the importance and feasibil­
ity of g?  Are there e.g. international, governmental, organizational or personai 
(e.g. ethical) restrictions for the production or for the use of some netputs or for 
the use of some techniques which can connect some inputs and outputs? 
10) Does the actor k accept the validity evaluations? 
A further question about how the realization limit Lk of a technology generaliza­
tion g is stated can be formulated as follows: 
11) What are reasonable technological choices taking into account other tech­
nological options. Which technology generalizations or production plans can at 
the same time belong to the capacity and the capability limits of k? How can 
plans, the realization decisions of which actor k will not have to regret, be cho­
sen? 
The last question builds an important final link to the concepts of the GTC. We 
may describe the rational argumentation process conceming a technology gener­
alization as a process, that moves from perceived capacity limits (production sets) 
towards real capability limits (to the realization of reasonable plans). 
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3.6 Basic Types of Factual Arguments Improving Epistemic Utility 
The traditional micro economic analysis is rather incapable to evaluate and an­
ticipate the impacts of innovations based on generic technologies, even if the va­
lidity aspect of arguments conceming futures is taken into account. I consider 
that the research tradition of technology foresight studies and especially technol­
ogy Delphi studies has been much more successful. A main purpose of my epis­
temic utility model is to give a framework for improving Delphi argumentation 
concerning promising technology generalizations. In this paragraph, I will sug­
gest a cIassification of rational arguments in a technology foresight Delphi study. 
1 .  Option suggesting arguments 
We already discussed the logical form of option suggesting arguments in the pre­
vious chapter. It is based on the idea, that an unrealized technology generaliza­
tion belongs to the same similarity group than an already realized generalization: 
- A generalization a2 which is not yet realized is promising based on 
the paradigm A because the generalization a 1 is realized or 
- A generalization is promising because it belongs to a promising 
similarity group of generalizations based on a technoIogical paradigm 
A. The similarity group is promising because of the general evidence 
of theoreticaI considerations or because it inc1udes realized generali­
zations. 
An option suggesting argument opens the discussion conceming the validity of an 
option. The "starting validity" of an option suggesting argument is based on the 
technical validity (1 and F) of the similar technology generalization and on the 
"epistemic power" of the similarity relation. If the similarity re1ationship is based 
on the ruIes of the paradigm and an actor accepts the paradigm, its starting valid­
ity for hirn is considerable. The person who suggests an option should also have 
some idea of the relevancy (R) of his suggestion. It is the starting point for further 
considerations about relevancy. 
2. Arguments concerning genuine invariances 
Improvement of the validity of an option proposal conceming impacts on targets 
(1 ) and feasibility of the technique (F) is based on arguments conceming genuine 
invariances. They expo se more or Iess validated invariances of the behavior of 
not-Iearning beings. We can e.g. exactly describe how DNA is multiplied in the 
poIymerase chain reaction (peR) and how the new technique can be used to find 
"DNA fingerprints".  A genuine invariance always improves the validity of future 
argumentation. If the argument is not well validated we have to evaluate how re-
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liable the source of the argument iso Another possibility that we try to find new 
evidence (for example make scientific experiments). 
3. Arguments concerning transient invariances 
Transient invariences tell about the stable elements of the behavior of actors or 
learning beings. The reliability is the often used measure of this stability. We 
may assume that actors will behave as they have behaved earlier or will change 
their behavior as they have changed it in the past (trends of behavior). We may 
assume that learning, at least on the aggregate or group level, does not signifi­
cantly change behavior. Arguments conceming transient invariances have an im­
pact, especially on the reliabiWy of relevancy (R) evaluations. For example the 
next type of argument might improve the reliability of relevancy evaluation: 
According to a statistically significant opinion measurement, x% of 
the sample of the Finnish women with children under 3 years of age 
considered that they do not need more information about possible he­
reditary diseases of their future babies. 
Often arguments conceming transient invariances are based both on the behavior 
of actors or leaming beings and on the implicit or explicit assumptions concem­
ing the behavior of not-leaming beings . We may e.g. have a "megatrend" which 
suggests that the use of the World Wide Web will increase by 30% annually. 
This trend is based on both the behavior of people and on the development of 
techniques used in the WWW. 
4. Arguments concerning reasons Jor relevancy evaluations 
It is important to realize that the reliability of a relevancy evaluation of some ac­
tors does not guarantee its validity. As we will see later, transient invariances 
might produce predictive reasonability (or validity) but not necessarily option or 
commitment reasonability. The arguments based on transient invariances assume 
that at least on the group or population level no leaming happens . The purpose of 
arguments conceming the reasons of relevancy evaluations is just the opposite: 
their purpose is to produce epistemic reasonable learning. As 1 discussed in the 
first chapter, rational leaming can be based on putting every aspect of the rele­
vancy evaluation to the test of 
- Serious refutable evidence 
- Referentially relevant evidence 
- Causally relevant evidence 
- Causal independence 
- Non-contradictory criteria of sameness of an actor. 
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5 .  Arguments conceming the capacity limits ofrelevant actors. 
Arguments concerning the capacity limits are important for the feasibility (F) of a 
technique: do the relevant actors have the resources needed to realize a technol­
ogy generalization option? Arguments conceming capacities to produce altema­
tive technological options are also important concerning the minimum level of the 
epistemic utility of realized technology generalizations (L). Relevant actors have 
only limited resources, which means that only a limited number of options can be 
realized. 
3.7 Process Arguments and Expert Judgments as Proxy Evidence 
We have so far discussed five basic types of factual arguments: options suggest­
ing, genuine-invariances-related, transient -invariances-related, relevancy -related 
and capacity-related arguments. We may also speak about two further basic types 
of arguments which 1 call proxy arguments: process arguments and arguments 
based on judgments of experts. The common feature of these two further types of 
arguments is that their connections with the epistemic utility of argumentation is 
indirect. Process arguments concem the feasible ways to produce arguments. Ex­
pert judgments are supposed to be based on tacit or hidden knowledge (factual 
arguments) of experts. 
6. Process proxy arguments 
As 1 remarked above, the starting points of my epistemic utility model are very 
c10se to the "bounded rationality" concept of March and Simon (1958).  It is pos­
sible to build further connections between concepts of March and Simon and my 
concepts. A rigidly used technology generalization can be seen as a special case 
of a "program" (March and Simon 1958, 141) :  
. . .  an environmental stimulus (e.g. some concrete targets, my addition) 
may evoke immediately from the organization a highly complex and 
organized set of responses (the use of a specified technique, my addi­
tion). Such a set of responses we call a performance program or sim­
ply a program . . .  Situations in which a relatively simple stimulus sets 
off an elaborate program of activity without any apparent intervaI of 
search, problem solving, or choice are not rare. 
The interpretation in my epistemic model is that the technology generalization 
connecting the concrete targets and the technique is without further considera­
tions accepted by the organization k to be higher in vaIue than Lk and realized. 
No argumentation process or search process - using the concepts of March and 
Simon - are started conceming e.g. validity or relevancy. No comparisons are 
made with other options which might have e.g. an impact on Lk. 
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A "routine realization of a technology generalization" or more simply routine use 
of a technique for some purpose can be seen as a special case of the 
"performance program" of March and Simon. An important feature of a routine 
realization is that the actor expects that it is not reasonable to produce new argu­
ments for comparing the routine and other (possibly unidentified) options taking 
into account the cost of a search process. Using the concepts of my model, a fur­
ther argumentation process is not expected to produce more enough epistemic 
utility. 
Another way to approach both the routine use of a technique and the routine use 
of decision rules can be based on the concepts ex ante and ex post rationality 
(Eliansson 1996, 88). Eliansson considered that to be rational requires that one is 
consistent in one's decisions and selects the best ex ante option (optimization), 
given the available information. This can be prevented by two things: 
- knowledge may be lacking, 
- the decision situation may be too complex. 
Both circumstances may make the ex post outcome differ from the ex ante 
evaluation. If an actor uses a technology generalization in a stable economic envi­
ronment she can often rationally - based on the past experience - consider that ex 
ante and ex post rationality of a routine realization do not differ. In a continu­
ously changing and complex economic environment, past experience cannot, 
however, guarantee the identity of ex ante and ex post rationality of a routine. 
Can a decision in a complex environment be rational? Let us assume that a search 
process can produce only poorly validated future technology generalization op­
tions. Can the final judgments conceming the realization be rational in that situa­
tion? According to Eliansson ( 1997, 88) rationality requires in a complex situa­
tion that ex post error correction is part of the ex ante decision. The weight given 
to that error correction in the ex ante decision determines the" decision maker's 
attitude to risks. 
According to Eliansson, the argumentation in a complex decision making situa­
tion has two special features: 
1 .  in the decision making, more complex information can be taken into account 
than can be presented or communicated (tacit knowledge), 
2. when complexity becomes too large, simplification is resorted. 
The simplification is needed for coordinated action. The choice of the decision­
making model, which Eliansson considers to he an important decision, is con­
nected with the fact that an organization cannot function properly without simpli-
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fying rules which the members of the organization realize. This is the reason for 
the use of the concept "reasonability" instead of "rationality" above. 
In complex decision making situations, process arguments conceming decision 
making rules can be decisive. Process arguments do not suggest the validity of a 
target-technique relationship or the relevancy of a technology generalization but 
they propose ways to evaluate it or to moni tor it in the future. They may suggest 
how to evaluate the validity of produced factuaI arguments and when to start a 
search process of arguments conceming new options or routine technology gen­
eralizations. They may propose necessary conditions for starting a realization 
process of an option (e.g. a realization project in a firm) or sufficient conditions 
for stopping an innovation process. Eliansson ( 1996) stressed the importance of 
the early identification of business mistakes in a complex business environment. 
Efficient central capacity to identify lower Ievel mistakes makes the organization 
less risk averse. 
In a technology Delphi study process, arguments concerning the monitoring of 
new factual arguments relevant for discussed topics or issues are an important 
way to reduce the risk of accepting an option too early or too late2• In a situation 
where the validity of argumentation conceming a technology generalization is 
low, process arguments may radically reduce the risk of allocating resources to 
invalid options. If a process argument provides a good way to avoid the bad con­
sequences of the choice of an invalid option, it has a similar role to an argument 
which improves the validity of argumentation. Hence it improves the epistemic 
utility of a technology generalization option. 
Eliansson ( 1996, 90) heavily stresses the role of process arguments. The process 
arguments frame and edit an economic environment. According to Eliansson, an 
optimization can be performed in a framed and edited environment; the latter is a 
trivial task compared with the first choice process. 
The framing and editing of an economic environment is based on traditions of 
organizations. The choice of the rules of an organization or its tradition is a path 
dependent learning process. As in the case of technological or scientific para­
digms, it is practically impossible to anticipate the specific forms of traditions in 
an organization because the number of possible choices of rules is virtually un­
limited. 
2 Like Cuhls ( 1998, 62-80) 1 like to see topics in technology Delphi studies as continuously changing 
and developing options ("Ziele" in Cuhls' terminology) in the networks of other more general or more 
specific options. As Cuhls has remarked (p.66): "Die Zielbildung ist ein zeitverbrauchender Prozess, 
kein punktueIler Akt". 
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Not all process arguments or traditions are, however, reasonable from the point 
of view of the epistemic utility. A tradition is not reasonable if it hinders the ac­
ceptance of validated arguments. A routine may e.g. systematically overlook 
some types of valid arguments because they do not belong to the "core compe­
tence area" of a firm. 
7. Expert judgments as arguments 
As Eliansson ( 1996) remarked, in complex decision making situations, more in­
formation can be taken into account than can be presented or communicated. The 
difficulty is that much of the relevant information is in the form of tacit or hidden 
knowledge. 
Following the guidelines of Nonaka ( 1994), Annele Eerola ( 1996, 193) has de­
scribed the problem of the knowledge as follows: 
.. . in most practical contexts knowledge that can be expressed in 
words and numbers only represents a small fragment of relevant 
knowledge: most people - among them highly educated experts - fre­
quently experience the problem of knowing more than they are able to 
telI. In the context of technology studies we can, in fact, speak about 
two different types of knowledge: explicit knowledge on emerging 
technologies that is transmittable in formal, systematic language and 
tacit knowledge on factors affecting technological development that is 
hard to formalize and communicate, because it is deeply rooted in ac­
tion, commitment and involvement in a specific context. In addition to 
the relatively concrete things, like contextual know-how, crafts and 
skills, even people's images of reality and visions of the future are in­
volved in their tacit knowledge. 
Collins ( 1994) has described the role of tacit knowledge in a technological inno­
vation process. In the late 1960s, many laboratories throughout the world were 
attempting to increase the power output of gas lasers by increasing their operating 
pressure. Early in 1970, a Canadian research laboratory ("Origin") announced the 
"Transversely Excited Atmospheric Pressure C02 laser" (TEA-laser). In 197 1 ,  
Collins studied seven British laboratories who had built or were building TEA 
lasers . Collins' main interest was to study the modes of transfer of real, usable 
knowledge among a set of scientists. 
Most British scientists first heard that the laser had been successfully operated 
from a small "note" in the New Scientist. The first article in the formal journals 
appeared six months later in Applied Physics Letters. This article provided more 
detail, but, as events proved, insufficient to enable anyone to build a TEA laser. 
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Some respondents of Collins stated that the early articles were more misleading 
than helpful. A member of "Origin" commented: 
What you publish in an article is always enough to show that you'Ye 
done it, but never enough to enable anyone else to do it. 
Skills were not transmitted through the medium of the written word. The labora­
tories studied actually learned to build working models of TEA lasers by contact 
with a source laboratory, either through personai visits and telephone calls or 
transfer of personnel. 
In this special case, there was no open intent to hide the findings because 
"Origin" was a public laboratory. This "scientific openness" was, however, a half 
truth. Tactics for maintaining secrecy were less forthright. One tactic was to an­
swer questions, but not actually volunteer information. As one informant put it: 
"let's say I've always told the truth, but not the whole truth".  Nearly every labo­
ratory expressed a preference for giving information only to those who had 
something to return. The importance of friendship relations explained in part the 
isolation of a Scottish laboratory from the othe.r: British laboratories. 
According to Eerola ( 1996, 193) we can see four different modes of knowledge 
conversion that are of interest when creating technology foresight: 1 )  explicit ar­
ticulation of tacit knowledge Cexternalization' in Nonaka's ( 1994) terms), 2) con­
version of explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge Cinternalization'), 3) conversion 
of existing tacit knowledge to new tacit knowledge (through 'socialization'), and 
4) reorganization of existing explicit knowledge to new explicit knowledge 
Ccombination'). 
When producing information on future technologies, the participants' ability and 
willingness to externalize their tacit knowledge can be a key factor in creating 
essentially new knowledge on important issues. According to Eerola, redundant 
information for concept development and successive rounds of dialogue in the 
atmosphere of mutual trust may be needed for this purpose. Creation of mutual 
trust can then be a challenging task, if it doesn't naturally grow from shared expe­
riences. In this respect, the starting point of 'private studies' within individual 
companies can be better than in other types of technology studies. 
As the case study of Collins (1994) also shows, it is reasonable to speak about 
"hidden knowledge" beside tacit knowledge Hidden knowledge can be explicit or 
tacit. An argumentation process concerning a technology generalization, e.g. a 
Delphi study, is a process in which potential arguments or judgments are based 
on tacit, hidden or explicit public information. The nine basic possibilities are 
given below. 
An argument for an 
expert knowing it before 
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The arguments after the argumentation process for 
an expert who did not know it before the process 
Tacit Hidden Explicit 
an argumentation process 
Tacit, does not A B C 
like to hide 
Likes to hide D E F 
1s ready and 
able to tell G H 1 
An expert judgment as an argument or as a producer of epistemic utility can be 
based on the idea that the experts have some evidence which they cannot express 
though they are ready to express it (case A), do not like to express it (cases D and 
E) or forget to express it (cases G and H). Though panelists - using the concepts 
of Nonaka - might in some way "internalize" or "socialize" the factual arguments 
or hints given by other panelists, they often cannot explicate to non-experts what 
they have learned. 1nternalization of the messages of unc1ear arguments is evi­
dently much easier for those repeatedly and interactively making use of similar 
tacit or hidden knowledge - e.g. for R&D experts or for professional planners -
than for outsiders. 
Though there are good reasons for the use of e;x.pert judgments based on tacit of 
hidden knowledge, there are, however, two difficult problems in judgments based 
on implicit arguments: 
1) how to be sure that judgments are made by real experts having relevant tacit or 
hidden knowledge and 
2) how to be sure that they do not hide their knowledge or use honestly their 
relevant tacit or hidden knowledge honestly in their judgments? 
The technology foresight studies are much based on the idea of expert judgments 
as arguments. The praxis of many technology foresight Delphi studies has been 
the production of "proxy evidence" based on expert evaluations (or judgments) 
without factual arguments. 
The production of proxy evidence has focused on "topics". A Japanese definition 
of "topic" was as follows ( IFTECH 1988,17) :  
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Topic refers to technological breakthroughs, events, or changes, each 
expected in the future of Japan, some of which may already have 
taken place outside of Japan. In the latter cases, this refers to domestic 
realization through the introduction of technology from aboard or in­
temational joint development. 
In the six national technology foresight studies made in Japan 1971-1997, the 
number of topics has increased from 644 to 1072 (NISTEP 1997l According to 
Kerstin Cuhls (1998), the topics in the Japanese Delphi studies are used more as 
options4 than as events. In fact, Cuhls, who has made comparisons with Japanese 
and German national technology Delphi studies, has interpreted topics ("Thesen" 
in German) as targets or sub-targets ("Ziele"), but she c1early speaks about a 
combination of targets and means5• According to Cuhls (1998,70): 
Because few govemmental target documents for research and devel­
opment or for the economic deve10pment are published (in Japan), a 
Delphi study as an overview of future developments is we1come. The 
topics represent a c1uster of long range, medium range and short range 
targets ("Ziele"l "The STA Delphi study is sometimes the only TF 
(technology foresight) result available to most firms. Therefore many 
firms are forced to rely on its result. More specifically, many firms 
choose one or two particular approach(es) among several altematives 
according to the result of the Delphi study. Similarly many firms set 
target dates of their projects according to it. In this way the STA Del­
phi study tends to unify the approaches of different firms and to syn­
chronize the target dates of the technologically related projects under 
the independent management" (Eto 1984) 
Another interpretation which is near to the idea of Cuhls is that topics are "mini­
scenarios" or visions believed or not believed by experts. This idea is very c1ear 
in the report of the last German national Delphi study, (Cuhls et al. 1998b, 9): 
"For these topic fields, altogether 1070 future visions were raised. In the topic 
3 The number of topics was higher in the 5th study: 1 149. 
4 In the framework of the GTC topics function very much as interests or as subinterests. 
5 Cuhls (1998,7 1) :  "Aber auch hier werden Ziele (" . . .  Technik A kann fiir X eingesetzt werden" ) auf­
gestellt". The same idea is also very dear in the figure 25-5 on the page 78. 
6 Cuhls ( 1998, 69) describes the role of targets on different levels in Japan as follows:"  the great targets 
are not ' " very concrete. They become concrete only with the time. The subtargets (or subsubtargets) are 
stiIl flexible, but aiready very specified. They are divided in special operational projects with exact plans. 
The plans are proved in these special projects . . .  " And later (p.74): Die Teilziele, die es in der For­
schung und Entwicklung zu erreichen gilt, werden allerdings sehr konkret vorgegeben (zeitlich, Kosten 
usw.) geplant und die Einhaltung strengtens iiberpriift. Wenn jedoch ein Teilziel nicht in der Zeit einge­
halten wird, kann und wird der Gesamtplan angepasst - und nicht wie in Deutschland often iiblich -
verworfen. 
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areas (Themenfeldem) have been made 1070 visions of the future in the form of 
topics (Thesis) . . .  " 
If we accept the idea that topics should be continuously developing options or 
mini-scenarios for the developing work we are very near the idea that topics 
should be promising technology generalization proposals. This interpretation is 
consistent with the following parameters set by the technology forecast commit­
tee for the last national Japanese study (NISTEP 1997, 2): 
- In principle, topics that have no technological elements and are con­
nected only to socioeconomic conditions should not be inc1uded in the 
survey. 
- Topics should inc1ude specific objective values and champion data 
wherever possible, and should present an image of specific use and 
application. 
Many topics of Japanese (and German) national Delphi studies have actually had 
the form of a technology generalization. A c1ear example is e. g. the following 
topic (IFTECH 1988, 92): 
Widespread use of ultrasonic, underwater holographic technology ca­
pable of application for probing underwater objects. 
Often however either only a promising target or only a promising generic tech­
nology have been mentioned in the definition text of a topic (IFTECH 1988, 84, 
44 ): 
Landing and retum of manned spacecraft from Mars. 
Practical use of semiconductor lasers emitting blue light. 
Though many topics do not inc1ude explicit suggestions conceming target (or im­
pact) - technique relationships, it is very reasonable to assume that "proxy argu­
ments" of national technology Delphi studies actually concem explicitly or im­
plicitly defined technology generalizations. It is possible to evaluate the "proxy 
evidence" from the point of view of the model of the epistemic utility, though all 
topics surely do not meet the requirements of "reasonable technology generaliza­
tion proposals from the epistemic point of view" defined above. 1 consider, that a 
topic in a national technology Delphi study has been something between an 
"issue,,7 and a reasonable technology generalization proposal with specific tech­
nique(s), specific impacts and an implicit validation method. 
7 1 wiJI discuss the role of issues in technology Delphi studies in the connection of my Argument Delphi 
in the paragraph 3. 10. 
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The fifth Japanese fifth national technology foresight Delphi study and the Del­
phi 1 of Germany, contain evident "proxy" measures of the variables of the epis­
temic utility model (Cuhls and Kuwahara 1994). The degree of the importance of 
each topic was measured with evaluations of Delphi panellists on a scale of high­
medium-low-unnecessary. This evaluation refers both to the impacts of the tech­
nology (1) and the relevancy (R). From the scale, it follows that there cannot be a 
topic which is evaluated to be undesirable and feasible, only unnecessary and 
feasible. This implies a questionable assumption that the realization of the topics 
is always a positive happening, though more or less important. 
In the Japanese- German study experts evaluated the realization of a topic based 
on the following constrainls. They were asked to choose a maximum of two from 
among eight choices (Cuhls and Kuwahara 1994, 40-41) :  
a) "Technical constraints" :  V arious technological factors which are difficult to 
resolve. 
b) "Institutional constraints" :  The restrictions placed by law and regulations or 
unimproved standards or requirements. 
c) "Cultural constraints" :  The sense of values of society, cultural and climatic 
factors or other similar factors. 
d) "Constraints in costs": The difficulty of redueing eosts for reinforcing market 
competitiveness or for opening up markets. 
e) "Constraints in funding" :  Insufficient funding. 
f) "Constraints in fostering or seeuring human resourees": Inadequate fostering or 
securing of human resources. 
Anticipated eost eonstraints ean be seen as a proxy measure of the feasibility (F). 
Proxy measures of feasibility were also perceived as technical, funding, human 
resources and R&D system constraints on topics. 
Two proxy measures of the validity (V) of an evaluation were used. The first was 
the degree of certainty of an expert conceming the realization time of a topic. It 
was measured with the high-medium-low scale. Another measure of the validity 
was the self-evaluation of the expertise, which was also measured with the high­
medium-low scale. 
The subjective evaluation of importance was also a proxy of expert evaluation of 
the relevancy. Other proxies of tlIe relevaney were institutional and eultural eon­
straints. Actually, the evaluation of relevancy was not clearly distinguished from 
the evaluations of impaets and feasibility. 
Both German and Japan have made new technology Delphi studies after their 
common study (Cuhls et a1. 1998, NISTEP 1997). Though some changes have 
happened in the proxy indicators, e.g. the relevancy aspect is more clearly distin­
guished in the last German study, the basic logic has not changed. Beside Japan 
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and Germany e.g. France, the United Kingdom, Korea and Austria have made 
technology foresight Delphi studies based on proxy arguments of experts (Heraud 
et al. 1999, Loveridge et al. 1995, Shin et al. 1999, Delphi Report Austria 1 ,  
1998). In these technology Delphi studies the proxy measures have in  general 
been rather similar to those used in the common Japanese and German study. The 
different targets of the studies have, however, had impacts on the proxy indica­
tors used. 1 will discuss the UK study (Loveridge et al. 1995) in more detail in 
paragraph 3 . 13 .  
1 interpret the basic logic of the common Japanese - German national Delphi 
study as follows. If some panellist considers that the product (the impacts x the 
feasibility x the validity x the relevancy) of a topic is high enough in some future 
year, he or she makes a judgment that the topic will be realized in that year. This 
means that the epistemic utility of the topic has to be for some actor(s) k, who 
can realize it, greater than the epistemic utilities of altemative choices (the epis­
temic utility of the topic is greater than the minimum value L08• 
1 think that the above interpretation is in accordance with the interpretation of e.g. 
Cuhls ( 1998) that topics represent reasonable targets. Another possible interpre­
tation is that Delphi panellists try to make true predictions conceming the reali­
zation times of topics. The predictions of future events could be based on the 
following logic. The realization time of a topic depends on the importance of the 
topic and the constraints on realization of the topic. The insecurity of the exact 
time of realization is measured by the certainty expressed conceming it and by 
the self-evaluated expertise. 
A hint that the focus in the technology Delphi studies has moved from the pre­
diction towards reasonable choices is that the insecurity measure of the exact 
time of realization was removed from the later German and Japanese Delphi 
studies (Cuhls et a1. 1995, NISTEP 1997, Cuhls et al. 1998). 
8 Let us assume that the discussed topic is a possible technology generalization g. The minimum re­
quirement for the realization of g is that the total value of Ig Fg V g Rgk - Lk has to he higher than 
zero for some relevant actor k, who can realize g. In that case, the realization of g helongs to the per­
ceived capability limits of k. An interpretation of the logic of the national Delphi studies mentioned is 
that g is supposed to he a real innovation. This means that a Delphi panellist considers that g helongs to 
real capability limits of actor k , which means that k will not regret the realization. 
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3.8 Predictive, Option and Commitment Reasonability 
3.8.1 A basic epistemic problem in technology foresight based on 
expert judgments 
What is the epistemic value of the "proxy" arguments based on expert evaluations 
or processual arguments discussed in the paragraph 3 .7 in comparison with fac­
tual arguments discussed in the paragraph 3 .6? I will discuss this question with a 
comparison of the epistemic values of a factual argument (A) given in my study 
(Kuusi 199 1 )  and a "proxy" argument (B) .They both motivate the same topic or 
technology generalization proposal b: 
The specifically Finnish hereditary diseases will be extensively diag­
nosed using methods of genetic engineering in Finland in 2005 
Let us first look at the factual argument: 
(A) The problem of hereditary diseases is more difficult in Finland 
than in many other countries. Besides the intemationally important he­
reditary diseases, the Finnish population has many fatal or disabling 
hereditary diseases which other nations do not have. New methods 
like the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) provide new opportunities 
for diagnoses. 
Let us suppose that the argument is new for the decision-maker k who makes a 
reaIization decision conceming b based on its epistemic utility. Because the ar­
gument is vaIid, it in any case has a positive net impact on the epistemic utility of 
b.  In addition to a positive validity effect the argument increases the vaIue of im­
pacts of b ( = the finding of the hereditary diseases of fetuses) or Ib, if Ib is e.g. 
measured by the avoided costs of babies with hereditary diseases. The argument 
mentions also a new efficient technique PCR resulting in a higher value of Fb. 
In this specific case the role of Rbk is, however, probably most important to the 
total value of the argumentation conceming generalization b. If the decision­
maker k gives - for ethical reasons not taken into account in the vaIue of Ib - as-
sign only a liWe vaIue to the produced impacts, he or she shows it through a Iow 
vaIue of Rbk . The resuIt is perhaps that the total value of IbFb VbRbk is below 
Lk. So the "realization value" of generalization b is 0 for k. 
What is the value of Rbk, if instead of the above well-validated factual argument 
we have the following similar argument, which could be the form it might take in 
a technology Delphi study: 
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(B) 60% of the experts, evaluating themselves high in expertise on the 
topic, considered that it will be true. 
Let us suppose that the implicit or tacit factual motivation of the argument (B) is 
just the same as in argument (A). If judge k believes in the real expertise of the 
experts used the value of argument (B) can, however, be higher than the value of 
argument (A). If k firrnly trusts on the experts she may even forget her ethical 
considerations and give a high value of Rbk. The total value of Ib x Fb x Vb x 
Rbk is now over Lk- Hence we see from the formula that the "realization vaIue" 
of generalization b is above 0, which means that k believes in the realization of 
generalization b. 
The point in the above comparison is that the conclusion based on the first argu­
ment is reasonable but the conclusion in the second case is not. The proxy argu­
ments describe wrongly the tacit knowledge or factual arguments behind the 
proxy arguments based on the fallacy called "argumentum ad hominem" ( Woods 
and Walton 1982). 
3.8.2 Three types of reasonability of argurnentation 
A realized technology generalization is often based on wrong premises. The main 
target of technology foresight studies is not to anticipate wrong decisions but to 
avoid them. What does this mean concerning the topic: 
In 1999, the fetuses of all pregnant women in Finland who give their 
consent will be examined for at least three hereditary diseases with 
new methods, either for a small remuneration or no remuneration at 
all. 
My expert panel made a judgment concerning it; 75% rejected it. As 1 already 
mentioned, a statistically significant opinion measurement of Finnish women 
with children under 3-year of age would have produced a more predictive valid 
resuIt. But what about the reasonability of the judgment? 
1 rnake a distinction between three types of the reasonability of a judgment: pre­
dictive reasonability, the reasonabiIity of options and commitment reasonabiIity. 
In predictive reasonability the focus of both arguments and judgments is in the 
anticipation of the - reasonable or not reasonable - actions of relevant actors, 
without trying to make an impact with arguments on the behavior of those actors. 
With the option reasonability, 1 refer to an argumentation process where every 
actor or every panelist in a Delphi study produces epistemic rational arguments or 
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compares different future options from his or her personai point of view or from 
the point of view of his or her organization. The arguments produced are evalu­
ated on the basis of the personai values of relevance or R and personaI values of 
newness or N. If the focus of a Delphi study is the reasonability of options, we 
obtain arguments and judgments which are important and valid at least for some 
actors represented on the panel. 
The idea in commitment reasonability is to build reasonable coalitions of actors 
for realizing future options. The arguments produced in an option reasonable ar­
gumentation process are evaluated from the viewpoints of different actors. It is 
realized that the evaluations of re1evant actors are more important than the 
evaluations of actors for which a future generalization of a technology is less im­
portant or which does not have relevant resources realizing the generalization. 
Let us assume that the Finnish government is so worried about the use of gene 
technology in the diagnosis of hereditary diseases that it appoints an expert com­
mittee. From the mandate of the committee, we may infer which type of reason­
ability the govemment expects from the experts. If the mandate is to evaluate 
how some other countries will diagnose fetuses in 2010, predictive reasonability 
is supposed. If the mandate is to make an extensive survey of the possibilities for 
diagnosis of fetuses in Finland in 2010, the focus is on option reasonability. If the 
mandate is to make a pIan for 2010 conceming future use of the diagnosis of he­
reditary diseases incIuding the roles of different organizations, the focus is  on 
commitment reasonability. 
An important point is that the epistemic value af an argumentation pracess (or a 
Delphi study) depends on the type af reasonability expected. I will illustrate this 
by comparing the argumentatian of the aUthor' s Delphi study with the hypotheti­
cal opinian research from the perspectives of different types of reasonability. Let 
us suppose that all arguments are equal in newness, which means that this dimen­
sion is not relevant ta the camparison. Let us use a simple quantification where 
the impacts of the technalogy generalization (1), the feasibility value of the tech­
niques (F), the validity value of argumentation connecting impacts and tech­
niques (V )and the relevance of argumentation (R) are all measured all on a scale 
of 0-5 . The assumed values in the follawing discussion are of caurse only for 
illustration. 
We may assume that the predictive reasonability value of an argument depends 
on the ability of the argument to describe the average attitude of Finnish peaple 
conceming the topic in 1 999. 
What is the cantribution af the Delphi study to the predictive reasonability? We 
may assume that in 1 999 an average af 50% af the Finnish people will know the 
arguments 1 ,3, 5 presented in the paragraph 3.3 .  If knowing people give on aver-
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age 2 points higher I-value to the topic than not-knowing, the total effect on the 1-
value is 1 .  We may also assume that 50% of people will know the arguments 2 
and 4 and if on average the F value of knowing people is also 2 points higher 
than of those not knowing, the totaI effect of arguments on F-vaIue of the topic is 
1. Let us suppose for simplicity that arguments have no effect on the average 
IeveI of the validity of argumentation V. Because of ethicaI considerations and 
because they are suspicious about the ethics of the experts, their average reIe­
vancy vaIue may be rather Iow, Iet us say 2. 
Let us suppose that the finaI decision of the realization of the topic in 1999 is 
based on a comparison of the epistemic vaIue IxFxVxR with the minimaI feasibIe 
realization vaIue L. Let us suppose that this minimaI vaIue is 25. 
We may assume that the resuIt of the hypotheticaI opinion research represents the 
present 1999 vaIue of Finnish peopIe of IxFxVxR. Let us suppose that it is 
2xl x3x2 = 12, which is c1earIy Iower than 25. The vaIue on which the realized 
"no" decision in 1999 is better informed. It is 3x2x3x2=24 which is sti1l Iower 
than 25. Therefore, the predictive reasonability of argumentation based on the 
present opinions is so high. 
It is important, however, that the epistemic utility value related to the predictive 
reasonability is always below the level of epistemic utility which can be pro­
duced by further option rational or commitment rational argumentation. In the 
above example, we might suppose that 75% of the citizens instead of 50% could 
know the arguments 1-5 as a resuIt of further argumentation. In that situation 
they would have made a more reasonable judgment conceming the discussed 
technology generalization: 3,5x2.5x3x2=28.5. This is higher than 25 and it makes 
the predictive reasonability of argumentation based on the present opinions inva­
lid. 
Though every future topic can be viewed from the perspectives of predictive rea­
sonability, option reasonability and commitment reasonability, different types of 
reasonability are relevant in different situations. The future topics can be divided 
into three types based on the motives of the anticipation: 
1) A topic is asked, which cannot be affected by the action of the panellists or the 
customers of the study. In this situation, predictive reasonability dominates. Pan­
ellists have to look at the future topic as outsiders . 
2) Panellists or their customers may have an impact on the anticipated future, but 
they are especially in Iack of reIevant decision altematives or reIevant future op­
tions. In this situation, the option reasonability dominates in the argumentation 
and in the making of judgments. 
3) Panellists or customers have an impact on the anticipated future and they know 
relevant future options well enough, but realization of the options depends on the 
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coordinated action of many decision makers. In this situation the commitment 
reasonability dominates in the argumentation. 
If the prediction reasonability is the main focus of a study, the accuracy of pre­
dictions can be seen as the main criterion of success. If the customers of the study 
have defined specific topics of prediction (will some specified events happen or 
will they not), the accuracy can even be seen as the sole success criterion. If the 
topics are, however, vaguely defined, the relevance of predictions is another main 
criterion beside accuracy. The predicted topic has to be important to the custom­
ers. In that case, there are two necessary conditions for the prediction reasonable 
epistemic value of a generalization b: 
(1) IbFb VbxRbA is over LA, where A is a group of actors whose ac­
tions are sufficient for the realization of b. A has to be committed to 
realize b.  
(2) b is rationally relevant for the group of customers of a prediction 
study 
In order to predict the realization of b, arguments conceming the real capacity 
limits and perceived capability limits of A are crucial while arguments concem­
ing the perceived capacity limits and real capability limits of A are not so impor­
tant. It is namely reasonable to assume that realized actions are based on per­
ceived interests (perceived capability limits) and on real resources. The discrep­
ancy between perceived and real capacity or capability limits may, however, also 
anticipate the possible impacts of learning on the behavior of actors. 
If the option reasonability is the main focus of a study, the main success criterion 
is the total epistemic value of the exposed new rational options (and arguments) 
to the relevant actors. Behind relevant options are often different ideas, para­
digms or, using the concepts of the GTC, different systems of criteria of same­
ness. Already de Jouvenel ( 1967,251- 259) stressed the role of finding relevant 
ideas by conducting foresight: 
Our different angles of vision bring out different facts. Our value­
judgment is not so much subsequent to our reading of the fact, as it is 
immanent in the ideas we use in reading the facts . . .  Whatever extemal 
use a science is put to, its inner life is characterized by the progress of 
ideas . . .  On the assumption that changes in society are the result of 
changes in ideas, we cannot forecast the former without forecasting 
the latter. . .  What 1 mean by the forecasting of ideas is forecasting their 
diffusion, deformations, and applications. 
If the option reasonability is the main focus of a study, there is one necessary 
condition for the epistemic value of arguments conceming a generalization b: 
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(3) IbFb VbxRbk is over Lk , where k is any reasonable actor, who is 
reasonably relevant for the realization of b from the point of view of 
the group of customers of the options seeking study. 
The final epistemic value of the argumentation depends on both its relevancy and 
on its newness. The concept "rational" inc1udes the idea that different types of 
arguments are relevant for predictive reasonability and for option reasonability. 
For predictive reasonability irrational arguments also are relevant if they have an 
impact on the future generalization b. Reasonability is required only in the rele­
vaticy evaluations of the study customers (the condition (2» . In an option reason­
able argumentation the focus is, using the concepts of OTe, on capability limits 
after the rational arguments (or a learning process) instead of perceived capability 
limits before the argumentation. If a technology generalization is within real ca­
pability limits of an actor, it is also within her real capacity limits. 
A problem in the option reasonability is the scope of the argumentation. An op­
tion reasonable argumentation or communication process can produce rational 
arguments but they may be biased to the interests of some actors. A result of the 
biases may be a discrepancy between the prediction reasonability and the option 
reasonability. The right predictions require the anticipation of the behavior of 
relevant actors. If the relevant options of key actors are not discussed, the option 
reasonable argumentation does not anticipate the future developments. That type 
of argumentation cannot even improve the reasonability of decision making of the 
customers of the study. Hence according to the condition (3) every argument is 
valuable which has epistemic value to an actor who is rationally relevant for the 
realization of b from the point of view of the group of customers of an options­
seeking study. 
Because every generalization of a technology is a leap into unknown - as was 
discussed in the previous chapter - an actor actually perceives a distribution of 
possible outcomes of a technology generalization enterprise. For different out­
comes different arguments are relevant. It is often useful to divide options seek­
ing studies in "minmax" -studies or "providing for bad alternatives (dystopies)" -
studies and "maxmax"-studies or "opportunities seeking"-studies using concepts 
from game theory (Luce et a1. 1957). The idea in a minmax-study or a risk­
averting-study is to find relevant options for a strategy which maximises the 
benefits in the worst futures. The idea in a maxmax-study is to find relevant op­
tions for a strategy which can produce - even with a risk of losses - maximal 
benefits. 
The main success criterion in a technology foresight study focused on commit­
ment reasonability is the total epistemic value of the relevant rational decision 
options to which relevant decision makers are ready to commit themselves. It is 
possibIe to give two necessary conditions for this type of epistemic vaIue: 
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(4) IbFb V bRbA is reasonably over LA, where A is the group of actors 
whose actions are decisive for the realization of b. 
(5) IbFb VbRbB is reasonabIy over LB, where B is the group of cus­
tomers of the commitment producing study. 
Like in the option reasonability, the finaI epistemic vaIue of the argumentation 
depends on both its reIevancy and on its newness. The fourth necessary condition 
is identical with the first necessary condition of prediction reasonability, except 
the form inc1udes the word "reasonably".  Like in the option rational argumenta­
tion, the focus is on capability limits after the argumentation (or a learning proc­
ess) instead of perceived (e.g. irrational) capability limits before the argumenta­
tion. The fifth condition says that the decision options concerning technology 
generalizations have to be reasonable for realization for the group of customers of 
the commitment-producing study. 
In practice, there is another way to define commitment reasonability. It is often 
so that the interests of the customers of the study concerning the generalizations 
differ from the interests of the actors whose actions are decisive for the realiza­
tion of generalizations. Let us suppose that we have a generalization suggestion 
which is reasonabIe from the point of view of the customers of the study but not 
from the point of view of some decisive actors. In this situation from the point of 
view of the special interests of the customers, it is reasonable at least in the short 
run that decisive actors do not behave rationally. Instead of (4) we get another 
condition (4'): 
(4') IbFb VbRbA is not necessarily reasonabIy higher than LA, where A is a 
group of actors whose actions are decisive for the realization of b. The group of 
customers of the study B is, however, abIe to inform (or to manipuIate) A so that 
A perceives IbFb VbRbA to be higher than LA 
In this case of customer oriented commitment reasonability or weak commitment 
reasonability, the focus is on the manipuIation of A. B can use the knowIedge 
concerning the perceived capability and capacity limits of A as well as the 
knowledge concerning the real capability and capacity limits of A for manipula­
tion of the actions of A. Using this knowledge and manipuIating the Iearning 
processes of A, the customers B can make A to commit themselves to actions 
which resuIt in the realization of b. The weak commitment reasonability means 
that though b is reasonabIe based on the epistemic utility from the point of view 
of B ,  it might not be reasonable from the point of view of A. 
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3.8.3 A classification of reasonable generic technologies 
1 have above discussed the reasonability of single technology generalizations. 
The prospects of a generic technology or of a technological paradigrn can be de­
scribed by its reasonable generalizations. Reasonable generalizations define alI 
reasonable irnpacts or targets and all reasonable techniques of a generic technol­
ogy. Any positive target or irnpact of a technology generalization includes also 
caused negative side-effects or impacts. 
AlI realized targets and techniques are predictive reasonable sirnply because they 
are realized. AlI of thern are, however, not necessarily option or commitrnent rea­
sonable. One can often expect that realized generalizations which are neither op­
tion nor commitrnent reasonable will in the future disappear. The realization of a 
generalization might, however, rnake it reasonable because of sunk investrnents. 
Technological paradigrns are bundles of reasonable generalizations and not bun­
dles of separate targets/irnpacts or techniques. A rough classification of techno­
logical paradigrns or generic technologies can be based on all realized and prorn­
ising targets or techniques. 
We might characterize realized achievernents of technological paradigrns with the 
folIowing types: 
A. One or a few realized targets with one or a few realized techniques .  
B .  One or a few realized targets with rnany realized techniques. 
C. Many realized targets with one or a few realized techniques. 
D. Many realized targets with rnany realized techniques. 
Based on promising techniques and targets the analogous classification is as fol­
lows: 
N. One or a few prornising targets with one or a few prornising techniques. 
B'. One or a few prornising targets with rnany promising techniques. 
C'. Many promising targets with one or a few promising techniques. 
D'. Many prornising targets with many promising techniques. 
Sorne generic technologies rnentioned by Grupp ( 1993b) can illustrate how the 
above types A -D can be used in the classification of generic technologies based 
on their recent applications and future opportunities. 
FulIerenes (or buckminster fulIerenes) are a good example of the case A. There 
are still only a few techniques to produce fullerenes and only few targets for their 
use. There are, however many possibilities to generalize the applications and 
techniques to handle these tiny carbon "footbalIs" .  It is very difficult to evaluate 
the future type of this generic technology. Will it be B ' ,C' ar D'? 
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Buckyballs that everybody wants to use and nobody knows what to do 
with 
The title is from a review artic1e in The Economist (August 23rd 
1 997). These molecules shaped like footballs (each one a near­
spherical framework of 60 carbon atoms arranged in pentagons and 
hexagons). They are so neat that they have long seemed destined for 
great things - as building blocks for strong, lightweight structures, per­
haps, or as molecular cages. These options can, perhaps, be realized 
with some new technique used to make fullerene polymers (e.g. 
Hirsch 1993). Perhaps fullerene polymers will open the way to 
fullerene superconductors (Travis 1993). 
There is a fundamental technical problem or opportunity in the use of 
nice buckyballs. They are so stable that enchaining them into chemical 
reactions is exceptionally difficult. This property may be both a prob­
lem and an advantage. Laura Dugan, Tom Lin and their eolleagues re­
ported in 1997 their success in using buckyballs to protect nerve eelIs 
from damage caused by molecular attackers known as free radicals. 
These molecules are so reactive that they can destroy a wide range of 
important biochemicals. On meeting a buckybalI, a free radical grabs 
at the bounty of e1ectrons smeared across the bucky's surface, but can­
not break it. The radical stays stuck to it like a leech. It is reasonable 
to assume that the technique-target connection realized by Dugan et al. 
is possible to generalize to many further uses. 
The recombinant DNA technology is a key generic technology of the new bio­
technology or cell-biotechnology as Grupp ( 1 993b, 1 1 8) calls it. This technology 
is an example of the case B and it is reasonable to suppose that the type will not 
change in the future (B'). The main target of this teehnology will probably always 
be the same: the transfer of effeetive genetie material from one organism to an­
other. 
The teehnology of Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) or DNA multiplication is 
now a dear example of C. The same technique can be used for many purposes. It 
is an interesting question whether there will be many techniques for multiplying 
DNA in the future. Is the future type of PCR D'? 
Digital teehnology is nowadays a good example of D. The number of different 
techniques and targets based on the idea "information sampling" of the digital 
technology is enormous. There is little sense to believe that this type of technol­
ogy will change (D'). 
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At the end of eighties Arthur D. Little developed a method for strategic technol­
ogy management (Irvine and Martin 1989, 94-95). A phase in his technology 
strategy building process was the looking after promising technologies for the 
strategy builder. Little classified technologies into four categories according to 
their potential impact on competitiveness: 
a) Base technologies (essential for a given product or process but widespread and 
easily accessed) 
b) Key technologies (which provide a commercial advantage through product or 
process differentiation and through improved economics) 
c) Pacing technologies (not yet widely applied but having the potential to alter 
the basis of competition in the sector and therefore of high research priority) 
d) Emerging technologies (often still at a basic stage and with uncertain pros­
pects, but with the promise of developing into pacing, and, perhaps subsequently, 
into key technologies). 
What are the connections between Little' s classification and my classification? It 
is reasonable to suppose that a technology which has the characterization BB', 
CC' or DD' for the actor and for its competitors is typically a base technology. If 
the economic profitability of present or possible future generalizations is higher 
for the strategy building enterprise than for competing firms, the generic technol­
ogy is a candidate for a key technology. If global characterizations of technolo­
gies are e.g. AB', AC', AD', BD' or CD', but there are few or no applications of 
these technologies in the use of the strategy builder or its competitors we may 
call them pacing technologies.  A technology in the global phase A with uncertain 
promises of important generalizations is a typical emerging technology. 
3.9 Delphi Variants Focused on Option Reasonability 
In this and the next paragraphs, 1 will evaluate the success criteria lised and the 
results of some technology Delphi variants from the point of view of different 
types of reasonability. Two general conclusions can be drawn from the analysis 
below. Firstly, much confusion has resulted from the fact that different require­
ments of different types of reasonability have not been realized. Secondly, few 
technology foresight Delphi studies have been made that actually focused on only 
one type of reasonability . All successful technology foresight Delphi studies have 
to some extent taken into account most of the success factors summarized by 
Cuhls ( 1998, 1 9-20) Cuhls' twelve success factors refer to all three types of rea­
sonability: 
1 )  to open new possibilities or options, which makes possible the pri­
ority setting and the evaluation of the results of the options and the 
possibilities of their realization; 
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2) to realize the impacts of the present technology poliey; 
3) to get early warnings; 
4) to realize new needs and new technical possibilities; 
5) to evaluate the consistency of a specified poliey; 
6) to give frameworks for planning and to have an impact on strategic 
planning; 
7) to launch new ideas; 
8) to restart interrupted developments to take up older ideas 
9) to focus selectively on economic, technological, social, ecological 
aspects and to make observations and to do further research on these 
aspects; 
10) to define the desirable and undesirable futures and the identifica­
tion of inevitable events and action needed related to those events; 
1 1) to make action proposals for the reaIization of desirable futures; 
12) to stimulate continuous discussion processes about the future. 
The success factors 2 and 3 are most closely connected with the prediction rea­
sonability; 1, 4, 7, 9 and 12 with the option reasonability; and 1 ,  5, 6, 8 and 1 1  
with the commitment reasonability. 
In this paragraph, 1 will discuss the Delphi variants which are focused mostly on 
option reasonability. It is most reasonable to start from these variants because 
some level of option reasonability can be seen as a necessary condition for other 
types of reasonability. In other words: it is impossible to produce other types of 
reasonability in a technology foresight (Delphi) study without an implicit or ex­
plicit option-reasonable stage. 
The Poli cy Delphi can be seen as the "mother" of many Delphi variants used es­
pecially for achievement of option reasonability (e.g. Turoff 1975). The idea of 
the Policy Delphi was introduced in 1969 for the first time and reported on in 
1 970 (Turoff 1975, 84). Instead of the consensus, it sought to generate the 
strongest possible opposing views on the potential resolutions of a major policy 
issue. Turoff introduced the Policy Delphi, because a policy issue is one, for 
which there are no experts, only informed advocates and referees. An expert may 
contribute a quantifiable or analytical estimation of some effect resulting from a 
particular resolution of a po'ticy issue, but it is unlikely that a dear-cut (to all 
concemed) resolution of a policy issue will result from such an analysis. 
Experts cannot do more than supply a factual basis for advocacy of policy issues. 
They must compete with the advocates of concemed interest groups within soci­
ety or an organization concemed with the issue. In practice, their role is often not 
only to give neutral factual arguments conceming the planning issue. Experts rep­
resent the interests of their interest groups. 
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The c1ear focus of the Policy Delphi is option reasonability. Policy Delphi is for 
the analysis of policy issues and not a mechanism for making final judgments 
such as predictions or cornmitment-reasonable policy recommendations. Its target 
is to persuade an informed group to present all possible options and supporting or 
rejecting evidence for them. It deals largely with statements, arguments, com­
ments and discussion. 
Turoff (1975, 87) suggested that a Policy Delphi differs from a traditionai Delphi 
in being able to serve any one or any combination of the following objectives: 
- To ensure that all possible options are on the table for consideration 
- To estimate the impact and consequences of any particular option 
- To examine and estimate the acceptability of any particular option 
The communication process of a Policy Delphi proposed by Turoff ( 1975) has 
six phases: 
1) Formulation of the issues. What is the issue that really should be under con­
sideration? 
The initial design must ensure that all the "obvious" questions and sub-issues 
have been included and that the respondent is being asked to supply the more 
subde aspects of the problem. With proper knowledge of the subject material, the 
design team can stimulate consideration of otherwise neglected issues by inter­
jecting comments for consideration by the group. 
2) Exposing options. Given the issue, what are the policy options available? 
There is a risk of swaying the respondent group towards one particular resolution 
of an issue. The special experts can sometimes be even less innovative than other 
experts because they are so inc1ined to ongoing development processes (Schrum 
1985). 
3) Determining initial positions on the issues? Which are the ones everyone al­
ready agrees upon and which are the unimportant ones to be discarded? Which 
are the ones exhibiting disagreement among the respondents? 
Turoff stressed the importance of inducing discussion. In the evaluation scales 
proposed by hirn there are no neutral answers (a 'No Judgment' answer, how­
ever, is always allowed for any question). The lack of a neutral point promotes a 
debate. One will usually find a significant number of items which are rated desir­
able and unfeasible or undesirable and feasible. The discussion among the re­
spondents about these items may lead to the generation of new options. 
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4) Exploring and obtaining the reasons for disagreements. What underlying as­
sumptions, views or facts are being used by the individuals to support their re­
spective positions? 
5) Evaluating the underlying reasons. How does the group view the separate ar­
guments used to defend various positions and how do they compare to one an­
other on a re1ative basis? 
6) Reevaluating the options. Reevaluation is based upon the views of the under­
lying "evidence" and the assessment of its relevance to each position taken. 
Turoff ( 1975, 88) considered that in principle the above process would require 
five rounds in a paper-and-pencil Delphi procedure. He considered that in prac­
tice, it has been possible to restrict the number of rounds to three by utilizing the 
following procedures: 
- The moni tor team devotes a considerable amount of time to carefully prefor­
mulating the obvious issues. 
- Sending the list with an initial range of options but allowing for the respondents 
to add to the lists. 
- Asking for positions on an item and underlying assumptions in the further 
rounds. 
Passig ( 1998) has presented a summary of the later Delphi variants with features 
similar to Policy Delphi. Decision Delphi adds new features to Policy Delphi. It 
does not deal with experts nor with lobbyist or advocates but with actual deci­
sion-makers. The panellists are recruited with regard to their actual position in 
the decision-making hierarchy (Ranch, 1979). In this procedure, anonymity is not 
fully implemented. The panelists' names are known from the beginning, but the 
responses are not identified with any one participant (quasi-anonymity). Another 
procedure based on quasi-anonymity is OSCAR (On-Site Conferencing and Re­
searching) (Harkins et al. 1983). OSCAR, like many other similar methods, pro­
vides the opportunity to conduct multiple information gathering rounds in face­
to-face settings such as workshops, while maintaining quasi-anonymity. 
The Qualitative Controlled Feedback (QCF) (Press 1983) can also be seen as a 
variant of the Policy Delphi as well as the Imen-Delphi exercise ("the ability to 
emerge is in me") (Passig 1998). The Imen-Delphi is according to Passig a pro­
cedure for eliciting and refining non-expert group opinions about their future. 
Firstly. a panel concemed with a common future issue is collected. The proce­
dure is based on the personal and group evaluations of the prepared summaries of 
previous forecasts and studies concerning the possible futures of the panelists. 
The procedure does not aim to predict events, but to generate an agreement for 
the purpose of developing a framework to realize the preferable and redefined 
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mission derived from it (Passig 1 998, 3 1 9) .  Hence, the procedure is explicitly 
not-focused on prediction reasonability. Beside option reasonability, the Imen­
Delphi is also focused on commitment reasonability. 
3.10 Argument Delphi 
1 will present in this paragraph the main features of a Delphi variant which can be 
seen as a variant of the Policy Delphi. Because it is focused on the production of 
relevant (factual) arguments, I call it the Argument Delphi (AD). The basic fea­
tures of the AD described below can be found from the Delphi studies in Kuusi 
( 199 1 )  and Kuusi ( 1994). 
In the Argument Delphi, the panellists are informed about the names of the other 
participants but the responses are given anonymously as in the Decision De1phi. 
The main purpose is to make the panellists to argue seriously as in the Qualitative 
Controlled Feedback procedure. Only Delphi managers have direct contacts with 
the panellists in the first round interviews, unlike in the OSCAR process. Like in 
the Imen -Delphi, prediction reasonability has only a limited role in the study. 
My applications of the Argument Delphi have mostly focused on option reason­
ability. As I will discuss more c10sely at the end of this paragraph, in my last 
study (Kuusi 1994) I gave an opportunity to panelists to select the type of reason­
ability on which they based their arguments concerning any specific issue. 
The Argument Delphi is based on a four level c1assification of statements. First 
we have topics. They are typically statements (e.g. future events) which experts 
evaluate. Topics have been typically evaluated in a very simple way: panelists 
have decided whether they approve or disapprove a topic. Topics are c1assified in 
issues inc1uding many topics .  The topics of an issue are at least in part mutually 
exc1usive. Issues are c1assified in issue areas. The idea of an issue area is that 
typically the same panellists are special experts (e.g. based on work experience) 
in an issue area. 
The role of issues, inc1uding mutually exc1usive topic statements, is to promote 
efficient argumentation processes. Van Emereen et al. ( 1 996,280-288) have pre­
sented a model for critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. 
It is an ideal model, specifying the various stages in the resolution process. It has 
. four stages: 
1 )  In the confrontation stage (or in the framework of the Argument Delphi in the 
choice of issues and topics) a difference of opinion presents itself through the 
opposition between a standpoint and nonacceptance of this standpoint. 
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2) In the opening stage, the protagonists and the antagonists in the dispute are 
identified. The protagonists undertake the obligation to defend the standpoint at 
issue, while the antagonists assume the obligation to respond critically to the 
standpoint and the protagonist's defense. In this stage, it is aIso certified that the 
protagonists and antagonists have sufficient common ground (shared background 
knowledge, vaIues, ruIes). According to van Eemeren et al. ( 1996,282), it onIy 
makes sense to undertake an attempt to eliminate a difference of opinion by 
means of argumentation if such a starting point can be established. 
3) In the argumentation stage, the party that acts as the protagonists methodically 
defends the standpoint at issue against criticaI responses of the antagonists. If the 
antagonist is not yet wholly convinced of all parts of the protagoriist's argumen­
tation, he or she elicits new argumentation from the protagonists, and so on. Ac­
cording to van Eemeren et al. ( 1996,282) there is no criticaI discussion if there is 
no argumentation or no critical appraisaI of this argumentation. 
4) In the concluding stage, the protagonists of a standpoint and the antagonists 
determine whether the protagonists' standpoint has been successfully defended 
against the critical responses of the antagonists. In the argumentative discourse, 
the concluding stage corresponds with the stage, in which the parties draw con­
clusions about the resuIt of the attempt to resolve a difference of opinion. Ac­
cording to van Eemeren et aI. ( 1996,282), the critical discussion has not led to a 
resolution of the difference of opinion if the parties do not agree on the outcome 
of the discussion. 
The phases of the realized Argument Delphi exercises are similar to those of the 
above ideal model. The argumentation process in the study conceming the future 
impacts of the new biotechnology made in 1989-1990 (Kuusi 199 1 )  has the 
stages discussed below. 
The preliminary stage of the Biotech Delphi study was based on the work of an 
advisory board and DeIphi managers. The advisory board included leading ex­
perts of the Finnish new biotechnology community. They were used for the 
preparation of the confrontation stage, though the ideas of the Argument Delphi 
were more tacit than explicit in the beginning of the Delphi process. The advisory 
board and Delphi managers define eleven preliminary issue areas of the new 
biotechnology. The study had three Delphi managers. One of the them does not 
belong to the Finnish developer community of the new biotechnology. Two oth­
ers were its active members and doctors of biosciences. 
The advisory board and the DeIphi managers selected most of the 28 panelists of 
the study. Some further panelists were seIected based on the first round inter­
views ("snowball sampling"). The panelists represented different points of view 
conceming the new biotechnology. They also had the basic expertise of the new 
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biotechnology. So the protagonists and antagonists of the argumentation process 
had a sufficient common ground for critical discussion. 
In the first round, every panelist was personally interviewed by the Delphi man­
agers. With a few exemptions, the interviews were made by the "outsider" of the 
biotech community (the author) together with an "insider". The interviews lasted 
3-5 hours. The interviews were used to define the issues and topics .  Beside this 
element of the confrontation stage, the first arguments of the argumentation stage 
were identified in the interviews. Experts were firstly asked to present promising 
Finnish products in the issue areas or the branches and their life-cyc1e stages in 
1999 and 2010. They were asked to give factual arguments for their judgments 
and the Delphi managers presented the anonymous arguments of other panelists 
to them. Lastly, panelists were asked to evaluate the life-cyc1e stages of the 
whole branches in Finland 1999 and 2010 and their economic and social signifi­
cance. 
The second stage of the study was a c1ear counterpart of the argumentation stage. 
A rather extensive report conceming the first stage was mailed to the panelists. In 
the report, the arguments presented were formulated into issues inc1uding speci­
fied suggestions conceming the future (topics) and to anonymous arguments for 
or against the topics of an issue. Most of the suggestions explicitly or implicitly 
concemed new biotechnology generalization proposals. The issues were divided 
in the eleven issue areas or branches. Eight +/- 1 special experts were nominated 
for every branch. They were asked to evaluate the topics, mostly using simple 
"will be true in 1999 or 2010" or "will not be true in 1999 or 2010" reactions. 
Based on the interviews, the Delphi managers presented suggestions conceming 
the reactions of the experts. The experts were asked both to correct the sugges­
tions and to give further comments on the topics and arguments. 
The total number of issues discussed in the second round was 49, in addition to 
the general evaluations conceming the developments of eleveri branches or issue 
areas. The total number of the topics was about three hundred. This means that 
the average number of topics in an issue was six. In reality, there were issues in­
cluding only one topic and others with ten or even more topics.  
The mailed report of the second stage included about 100 pages. It was divided in 
two parts for every single panelist. On average about 20 pages dealt with issues 
of his or her special expertise. The remaining about 80 pages dealt with the other 
issues. If the panelist so wished, he or she was also allowed to comment on the 
topics and arguments of other issues. Everybody was asked to correct their judg­
ments conceming the life cycle stages, economic significance and social signifi­
cance of all issue areas or branches in 1999 and 2010. As background informa­
tion, the distributions of the evaluations of the other panelists were anonymously 
presented. 
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Beside special experts, typically 2-3 other experts made judgments and comments 
on the topics. Hence on average about 10  or one third of the panel reacted to any 
single topic. The second round of the study alsö had features of the conclusion 
stage. If two experts who presented different opinions in the interview stage were 
ready to accept a common conclusion, we might consider an issue or a topic to be 
resolved. 
The argumentation and preparation of conclusions continued in the third stage. In 
the third stage of the study, a common seminar of panelists was arranged. The 
topics which produced disagreement were discussed based on the presentations 
of some panelists. Because a personai meeting destroyed the anonymity of the 
Delphi study, any changes of mind of the panelists were ignored in the final re­
port. The comments were, however, useful in the evaluation of results. In the fi­
naI stage, Delphi managers also asked those panelists who made major contribu­
tions to the study to comment on a preliminary version of the final report. 
When we describe a Delphi process with the four process stages of van Eemeren 
et al. ( 1 996) we are able to discern sufficient conditions for a reasonable resolu­
tion of the difference of opinions. The fact that protagonists and antagonists agree 
concerning a topic does not guarantee that the resolution is reasonable. Resolu­
tion is a necessary but not the sufficient condition for commitment reasonability 
because it may be based on the acceptance of irrational arguments. 
Actually, a main target of the modern argumentation theory represented e.g. by 
van Eemeren et al. (1996) has been to increase the reasonability of the argumen­
tation. The "Ten Commandments" of critical discussion introduced by van Ee­
meren and Grootendorst ( 1992, van Eemeren et a1. 1996, 283-284) apparently in­
clude their answer to that question: 
Rule ( 1 )  Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from 
casting doubt on standpoints. 
Rule (2) A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to defend it if asked by the 
other party to do so. 
Rule (3) A party's attack on a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has in­
deed been advanced by the other party. 
Rule (4) A party may defend a standpoint only by advancing argumentation re­
lating to that standpoint. 
Rule (5) A party may not disown a premise that has been left implicit by that 
party or falsely present something as a premise that has been left unexpressed by 
the other party. 
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Rule (6) A party may not falsely present a premise as an accepted starting point 
nor deny a premise representing an accepted starting point. 
Rule (7) A party may not regard a standpoint as conc1usively defended if the de­
fense does not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that 
is correctly applied. 
Rule (8) A party may only use arguments in its argumentation that are logically 
valid or capable of being validated by making explicit one or more unexpressed 
premises. 
Rule (9) A failed defense of a standpoint must result in the party that put forward 
the standpoint retracting it and a conc1usive defense of the standpoint must result 
in the other party retracting its doubt about the standpoint. 
Rule ( 1 0) A party must not use formulations that are insufficiently c1ear or con­
fusingly ambiguous and a party must interpret the other party's formulations as 
carefully and accurately as possible. 
1n general, 1 consider that the above ruIes with the qualifications discussed below 
and in the next chapters provide reasonable basic rules for the Argument Delphi. 
The implicit decision rule of the Argument Delphi is the model of the epistemic 
utility presented in the paragraph 3.4 The rules 1 - 10  are basically in line with 
the epistemic utility model. This modeI gives sufficient conditions for the resolu­
tion of opinion differences conceming the realization of technoIogy generaliza­
tions. 1ssues conceming technology generalization options refer to a specific type 
of question: should some actors start a realization process or make further in­
vestments in the realization of a technology generalization option X? The deci­
sion is based on the following rule: If the epistemic utility value IFVR of the op­
tion X is higher than the minimum limit vaIue L for an actor, the answer is af­
firmative. 
The first two rules of van Eemeren et al. concem the option reasonability of the 
argumentation. It is difficult to evaluate the validity or the reasonability of argu­
ments if they are not known or it they are onIy expertise based proxy arguments 
of the factuaI arguments. A difficulty was discussed at the beginning of the para­
graph 3.8 .  Rules ( 1 )  and (2) concem the option-suggesting arguments discussed 
in paragraph 3.5, which opens the discussion conceming the reasonability and 
especially the validity of an option. Rules ( 1 )  and (2) require that both the pro­
tagonists and the antagonists of an option make open their arguments conceming 
the "starting validity" of the option. It is based on originaI arguments conceming 
technicaI validity (1 and F) of e.g. the referred similar technoIogy generalization. 
The protagonists and the antagonists have aIso starting point arguments about the 
relevancy (R) of the option discussed. 
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Rules 3 - 8 try to ensure that the defense or the attack take place only by means 
of epistemic rational arguments. A difference of opinions cannot be truly resolved 
with rhetorical devices, if decisions are made based on the epistemic utility. Ar­
guments which violate rules 3 - 8 often impair the validity of the argumentation 
and so they impair also epistemic utilities of discussed technology generaliza­
tions. Arguments presented by protagonists or antagonists in the Argument Del­
phi process should have positive impacts on the epistemic utilities of discussed 
generalizations of technoIogies. 
The point given in rules (3) and (4) concerns the relevance of the arguments such 
as the second rule of Keekok Lee discussed in the first chapter. A difference of 
opinions cannot be resolved if the antagonist attacks and the protagonist defends 
different standpoints. According to van Eemeren et al. ( 1996,285), the ruIe (5) 
ensures that implicit elements within the protagonist's argumentation are also ex­
amined critically. A difference of opinions cannot be resolved, if a protagonist 
tries to withdraw from the obligation to defend an unexpressed premise. On the 
other hand, the rule (6) ensures that the starting points of the discussion are inter­
preted in a similar way. For the production of epistemic utility in the epistemic 
utility modeI, the ruIes are important because they are highly reIevant for the 
evaluation of the validity of the options discussed. 
Rule (7) is aimed at ensuring that the argumentation can lead to a reasonable 
resolution of a difference of opinions when a protagonist and an antagonist agree 
on a method of testing the soundness of arguments which are not part of the 
common starting point. The rule (8) concems directly the validity. According to 
van Eemeren et al. ( 1996, 285) the reasoning is valid if the defended standpoint 
follows logically from the premises used (compare the third rule of Keekok Lee). 
1 think that in practice, rules 7 and 8 are very difficult to meet in the discussions 
conceming future technology generalizations. Though there are arguments which 
all or at 1east nearly all experts can accept to be valid 1 think that instead of valid 
arguments it is reasonable to speak about more or less validated or rational argu­
ments. The different paradigms of experts often resuIt in different methods for 
testing the soundness of future options. 
Rule (9) is aimed at ensuring that a protagonist and an antagonist ascertain in a 
COITeet manner what the result of the discussion iso According to van Eemeren et 
al. ( 1996, 285-286) a difference of opinion is truly resolved onIy if the parties 
agree in the concluding stage whether or not the attempt at defense on the part of 
the protagonist has succeeded. In reality,. a technology Delphi argumentation 
process seldom resuIts in the final resoIution of an issue or a topic. Instead, it of­
ten results in a partial resolution of an issue, which can be described by the 
changes in the epistemic utility evaluations of experts. 
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Rule (10) is aimed at preventing misunderstandings. Problems in formulation and 
interpretations may arise at all stages of a discussion; they are not linked to any 
particular stage. In practice the differences in the paradigms of experts often re­
sult in misunderstandings. 
The real process of the Argument Delphi can be understood in the light of above 
rules, the Epistemic utility model and the social psychological and the action 
theoretical points of view which will be discussed in the next chapters. 
3.11 Fields, Issue Areas, Issues and Topics in Technology Delphi 
Studies 
In the beginning of the previous paragraph, 1 mentioned that the Argument Delphi 
operates on four levels. Topics, issues and areas of issues were already men­
tioned. It is reasonable to c1assify areas of issues into issue fields. The distinctive 
feature of an issue field is that typically the same panellists are general experts in 
an issue field just as the same panellists are special experts in an issue area. The 
general expertise of a issue field does not mean that the expert knows details of 
the issue areas of the issue field. It is enough that a general expert can evaluate 
the validity of arguments of special experts. 
1 illustrate the general expertise with an example. Let a special expert in the issue 
area "Applications of new biotechnology in the forest industry" present the fol­
lowing argument: "Some kinds of enzymes can be used in the production of pulp 
to separate lignin and cellulose". It is not needed that a general expert knows ex­
actly, how specific enzymes behave. It is enough that the general expert of the 
issue field "Biotechnology" knows that enzymes are typically big molecules and 
what are their catalytic functions in his or her own special issue area. It might be 
for example "Applications of new biotechnology in the production of medicines". 
An evident counterpart of an issue field in national technology foresight studies 
has been a field of expertise in which an expert panel is collected. The fields of 
the national Japanese - German technology Delphi studies were (Cuhls et al. 
1994, 16): 
1. Materials and processing 
2. Information and electronics 
3. Life science 
4. Space 
5 .  Partic1es 
6. Marine science and earth science 
7. Mineral and water resources 
8. Energy 
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9. Environment 
10. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
1 1 . Production 
12. Urbanization and construction 
13 .  Communications 
14. Transportation 
15.  Medical care and health 
16. Culture and life styles 
The above fields can be divided in science or technology push oriented and de­
mand or need puH oriented. The six frrst fields are clearly technology push ori­
ented and the fields 7 - 16  are more need puH oriented. My study Kuusi ( 1994) 
can be seen as a special study conceming the first field and the study Kuusi 
(199 1 )  as a special study conceming the third field. From the point of view of an 
option-seeking technology Delphi study, a practical definition of an issue field 
can be given using the technological bonsai tree discussed in the chapter 2. An 
issue field can be described by the aggregate bonsai tree of the experts working in 
that field. The aggregate bonsai tree includes those product branches and ge­
neric techniques which the experts in the field consider that their key competen­
cies can connectfor promising technology generalizations. 
If the research hypothesis of a technology foresight study conceming a field of 
expertise is given in the form of a hypothetical aggregate bonsai tree, an issue 
area obtains the foHowing interpretation: 
a) How to use generic technologies of a "technology push" oriented 
field (or of the "roots" of an aggregate bonsai tree) to realize in differ­
ent branches applications or products9; or 
b) How to solve different types of target related problems (of a prod­
uct "branch" of the aggregate bonsai tree) of a "demand puH" oriented 
field using aH kinds of technologies10? 
9 The issue areas of the study Kuusi ( 1991 )  were e.g. Applications of the new biotechnology in diagnos­
ties; Applications of the new biotechnology in the production of medicines; Applications of the new 
biotechnology in diagnostics; and Applications of the new biotechnology in forest industry. 
10 A "demand puH oriented bonsai-tree" can be interpreted to be "grown" around one application branch 
like the "Medical care and health" in the German - Japanese study. "Applications of the new biotechnol­
ogy in the production of medicines" could be an issue area in this field. Even issues and topics of this 
common issue area might be identical with a technology push oriented field "New biotechnology". When 
in a technology push oriented field the variety of considered application branches is great, in a demand 
puH oriented field the variety of considered generic technologies is great. 1 consider, however, that re­
cently important developer communities or "learning communities" are usually "technology or science 
push" oriented, because they have a common (scientific) paradigm. E.g. designers might, however, also 
have a common paradigm. 
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An issue describes a specific choice situation in an issue area. Topics can seen as 
alternative futures in a choice situationl J . 
In the national technology foresight studies the levels of issues and issue areas 
have been unc1ear. The c1assifications have had three levels. AlI studies have had 
the level of topics and the level of "science push" or "demand pulI" oriented 
fields l2• The content of a levei between these levels has varied. The topics have 
been c1assified e.g. into "sub-sectors" (Loveridge et al. 1995) or "divisions of 
topics" (NISTEP 1997). 
Is the interpretation reasonable that the c1asses between topics and fields are ar­
eas of issues? ActualIy the subc1asses have often not been real areas of issues fo­
cused on a special expertise area. In the last Japanese study the topics of the 
field Life Science were divided in "molecules", "eelIs" ,  "tissues and organs" , 
"individuals", "groups" (NISTEP 1997, 226-245).  This Japanese c1assification of 
Life Science topics has very weak connections with issues or issue areas. 
It seems that the sub-c1assification of "Life Sciences" of the German study is a 
compromise between very broad issues and issue areas. The field is divided into 
two main sub-fields: "Health" and "Life Processes". The c1asses in the sub-field 
Health are more like broad issues than issue areas (Delphi '98, 138- 163): 
"prevention" ,  "causes of diseases", "diagnostics", "therapy" , "health systems and 
services" , "ethics", "information techniques", though "diagnostics"  and "therapy" 
can also be seen as issue areas, as in the author' s study Kuusi ( 199 1) .  On the 
other hand, the division of the sub-field Life Processes was more like my division 
of issue areas: "genetics", "reproduction", "developmental biology" , "structural­
functional relationships",  "evolution" and "biotechnology" . 
The "Life Science" c1assification of the UK study (Loveridge et al. 1995, 338-
353) is mostly focused on issue areas e.g. "Advances in Diagnostics and Instru­
mentation" , "Advances in Therapeutics" ,  "Cancer", "Molecular 'and CelIular Sci­
ences",  "Neurosciences and Cognition" and "Informatics" are more like issue ar­
eas. 
I I  The number af tapics varied from abaut 40 ta abaut 1 10 in ane field e.g. in the camman Japanese and 
German study (Cuhls and Kuwahara 1994, 1 6). In the UK study the number af tapics in a field varied 
between 75 and 1 1 3 (Laveridge et al. 1995). When 1 campare this number af tapics with the number af 
issues in the authar's studies (Kuusi 1 99 1 ,  1994), the scape af tapics in natianal studies has in average 
been nearly the same as the scape af issues in  the authar' s study. Tapics af the natianal studies and is­
sues af the author' s studies seem ta have analagaus scapes. 
12 This name have been used in the English translatians af the Japanese studies (NISTEP 1997). The 
German name has been der "Themenfeld" (Cuhls et al. 1998). In the UK study the caunterparts af fields 
are "sectars" (Laveridge et al. 1995) 
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A possible original reason for the lack of  dear divisions based on topics, issues 
and issue areas seems to connected with the original idea of prediction reason­
ability. When the first national technology Delphi study was made in Japan in the 
beginning of 1970s, the "state of art" was to make long term predictions. Like the 
famous study of Gordon and Helmer ( 1964), which was called long-range fore­
casting study, most technology Delphi studies discussed by Sackman ( 1975) were 
used for the timing of events. WiIl an event be true or will it not be true in some 
future date? 
As was discussed above the topics in the Japanese Delphi studies are now in 
practice more than events options ("miniscenarios") or issues related to futures. 
Cuhls ( 1 998) who has made comparisons with Japanese and German national 
technology Delphi studies has even interpreted topics as sub-targets. The 
"transformation" of topics from possible future events to options or issues is re­
lated to the increasing use of proxy arguments related to the topics. A kind of 
"end" of this transformation is visible in the Austrian national foresight study 
(Delphi Report Austria 1 ,  1998). In this study it was not even asked the period of 
time, when a topic will realize. 
The Austrian study had a three-Ievel classification: "Themenbereichen " , 
"Fachgebiete" and "Thesen". The first class is the clear counterpart of the fields 
of issues (or fields of general expertise). "Fachgebiete" are counterparts of issue 
areas (or areas of special expertise). "Thesen" have features of issues13  or more 
specific technology generalization options (topics in my classification) 14. Their 
realization is evaluated based on some possible means ("Massnahmen") 
"Massnahmen" are more than "proxy arguments" they are standardized factual 
arguments. They suggest what government or some other actor might do in order 
to realize a topic using standard meansl5. Instead of factual arguments discussed 
in the paragraph 3.5. we have information concerning standard means and the 
importance evaluations of experts concerning these means. In a way a target hier­
archy based on topics is connected to a hierarchy of means. A similar idea was 
used in "a coordinative method for social policy target programs" in 1 970s 
(Kuusi 1 979). 
There is surely no single right way to make an Argument Delphi exercise. If one 
decides to use a large Delphi panel, the evaluation of standard arguments as in 
the Austrian exercise seems to be a reasonable choice. If one decides to work in-
13 E.g. "Neue Therapien (z.B. verbesserte Enzym-, Rezeptoren- und Mediatorenblocker) werden zur 
Bekämpfung altersspezifischer degenerativer Erkrankungen wie M. Alzheimer, Cardiopathien und Arte­
riorsklerose eingestzt" (Delphi Report Austria 1 ,  1998, 70) 
1 4  E.g. "Die Transplantation von organoidem Material (z.b. Implantation von doparninproduzierenden 
Zellen aus Foeten) wird zur Therapie des M. Parkinson eingesetz. "(Delphi Report Austria 1 ,  1998, 70) 
15 E.g. "Immunologische Forschung fördern"(Delphi Report Austria 1 ,  1998, 80) 
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tensively with a sma11 panel, the author' s studies (Kuusi 1991 and 1 994) seem to 
have reasonable features. 1 will next discuss some special features of the author' s 
studies in order to illustrate problems of practical Argument Delphi processes. 
A common praxis in the defining of topics in the national technology Delphi 
studies has been the use of work groups. E.g. in the Austrian study, the job was 
done by field panels of 14-23 members. 1 think that this is not an optimal proce­
dure for the option reasonability because, based on the lack of anonymity, it 
might result in conventional choices of topics. In the first rounds of author' s 
De1phi studies, issues and topics were produced based on the interview discus­
sions conceming issue areas. The defining of issues and topics was based for ex­
ample on the following question (Kuusi 1 994): 
What kinds of products will be made in 2010 using the basic generic 
technologies of the new material technology in the area of construc­
tion? 
The interviews made it easy to proceed to more subt1e aspects of issues or possi­
ble technology generalizations. It was also easy in an interview to stimulate con­
sideration of the otherwise neglected arguments by interjecting comments for 
consideration. "Stupid questions" were useful because the best experts in tech­
nologies are often not very innovative. They tend to continue existing develop­
ment processes (e.g. Schrum 1985). 
In my option-production focused study, finding of relevant issues and topics was 
a main task of the experts. It is vital that issues and topics are not too general or 
not too specific and that the conceptual frameworks of the panellists and the 
customers of the studies have been taken into account. Otherwise, the epistemic 
value of tlJ.e argumentation conceming a topic might be small. An example of a 
topic conceming the issue of the Diagnosis of Hereditary Diseases in the study 
Kuusi ( 199 1 )  is the many times discussed suggestion: 
In 1999, the fetuses of all pregnant women in Finland who give their 
consent will he examined for at least three hereditary diseases with 
new methods, either for a small remuneration or no remuneration at 
all. 
After the specification of the issue and its topics, the standpoints of the experts 
concerning each issue were asked. In the extensive Japanese and German Delphi 
studies, many types of standpoints were asked as was discussed above. As 1 
pointed out above, the different types of standpoints ("proxy arguments") have 
actually substituted factual arguments. 1 used to ask the panelists to take a stand­
point conceming a topic in a very simple way: does the expert accept or reject the 
development suggested by the topic? 
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In the study Kuusi ( 1994) the expert was, however, asked to make a further 
evaluation concerning the general point of view from which he or she looks at 
any specific issue. Hence, the experts selected whether they liked to look at the 
issue from the point of view of prediction, commitment or option reasonability 
One point of view (A, B, C or D) was suggested for every topic and an expert 
was allowed to change the proposed point of view. The points of view were as 
follows: 
A. The onlooker point of view. The possible developments are anticipated, put­
ting one' s own interests aside. The probable developments are sought. 
B. The point of view of the maker of the future. Future options are sought whose 
realization is reasonable. The focus is on the allocation of resources without tak­
ing too much or too little risk. 
C. The point of view of providing for bad alternatives or seeking minmax op­
tions. 
D. The point of view of finding good but insecure options or seeking maxmax 
options. 
Point of view A is clearly focused on prediction reasonability. This point of view 
was suggested if the actions of panelists or customers of the study were judged to 
have no or very little impact on the issue. This situation was assumed to prevail 
in most generalization processes of technologies where foreign actors dominated. 
Though the predictive reasonability was the suggested point of view in these is­
sues, accurate predictions were still not the main focus of interest. The "will 
happen - will not happen" decisions were requested more to provoke further ar­
guments and to make judgments based on the factual arguments presented. 
The suggested point of view was B if it was considered that the panelists or cus­
tomers of the study would have a considerable impact on it. In that case, the 
commitment reasonability is an important point of view, though the production of 
new arguments was also an important target in these cases. 
If the suggested point of view was C or D, it was considered, that it was impossi­
ble to make any final conclusions concerning the prospects of the topic with the 
present information. In this situation option reasonability clearly dominates in the 
argumentation and the making of judgments. 
The panelists did not have to accept the suggested point of view concerning a 
specific issue. 1 will later discuss how the panelists in reality reacted to the sug­
gested points of view. 
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3.12 Different Types of ReasonabiIity in a Prediction-Oriented Delphi 
Study 
A Delphi study was made in 1976 which anticipated 24 communication trends 
and 17 events in the State of Hawaii over a 30-year period. Ryota Ono and Dan J. 
Wedemayer ( 1994) evaluated the results of that study with a new study made in 
1992. The expressed purpose of the study of Ono and Wedemayer ( 1994, 29 1)  
was predictive validity: whether or not the 1976 forecasts for 1991 were accurate. 
Though the expressed main target of the study was predictive reasonability, other 
two types of reasonability were also clearly present in the studies. Option reason­
ability was sought in the 1976 study, as in many other prediction-oriented studies 
already before the expert panel was used. An option-reasonability-oriented phase 
was the selection of the potential items in the questionnaires. They were drawn 
from "various communication, social and psychological theories and frame­
works" (Ono and Wedemayer 1994, 291) .  The extensive list of events and trends 
was then subjected to the following two criteria for inc1usion in the study: 
Event questions :  
a) Is the event likely to occur within the next thirty year? 
b) Is the impact of the event significant to communication in the state of Hawaii? 
A selected event was e.g. "The establishment of the first video conference center 
in the state".  This can c1early seen to be a generalization proposal of the generic 
techniques of the new communication technology. 
Trend questions: 
c) Is there a strong likelihood that any of the discussed levels of a trend - the 
level of the need, the level of the supply or the right level (see below) - will devi­
ate from the anticipated level? 
d) Will there be a direct or indirect impact on communication in general if the 
deviation occurs? 
A selected trend was e.g. "Mobile communication: Ability to communicate with­
out being stationary" .  The definitions of different levels were given as follows: 
Need level or baseline communication needs: The level required for society to 
function without experiencing urgency, privation or destitution. It is neither the 
minimum nor utopian level; it is something between these extremes. 
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Supply level or available communication supply: The means, technology, and/or 
personnel availability at a particular time period to serve communication needs. 
Right level or strength of communication right: The intensity of that which is due 
anyone by just c1aim, legal guarantees, moral principles, etc. 
Two interpretations concerning the epistemic roles of the criteria a-d are possible. 
Perhaps the more plausible interpretation is that criteria a) and b) functioned in 
similar roles to my two necessary conditions of predictive reasonability. If an 
event is anticipated to happen, it presupposes an anticipation that relevant actors 
are successfully active or Ib x Fb xVb xRbA is over LA , where A is the group 
of actors whose actions are decisive for the realization of the generalization b. 
Criterion b) can be interpreted to be just a more concrete way to express my sec­
ond condition. 
Another interpretation is that the selected events and trends were interesting from 
the viewpoint of the Delphi managers or some decision makers. According to this 
interpretation, the option reasonability was still the main focus in the selection 
phase and the predictive reasonability was sought only in the next phase, where 
the expert panel was used. 
In the selection of trends for the 1 976 Delphi study, the main criterion was the 
evaluated invalidity of anticipation based (linearly?) on past developments (or 
using the concepts of the GTC on transient invariances). This selection criterion 
is at least vaguely connected with the anticipated surprise or the newness values 
of the expert evaluations. Assuming that this criterion is fulfilled c) and d) have 
similar possible interpretations to a) and b). 
The Delphi panel of the 1976 study was selected in the following way (Ono and 
Wedemayer 1 994, 291) .  1 will present the selection process of the panel in details 
because it is interesting for forthcoming discussion of the selection criteria of the 
expert panel: 
Initially, 500 communication specialists were identified by using Ha­
waii communication conference attendance lists and professional di­
rectories compiled during the previous three-to-five years. From these 
500 specialists, 70 experts were selected by a panel of four profes­
sional communication specialists, in terms of their notable experience, 
knowledge or special skill in the field of communication, and such 
balancing factors as island location, sex, race, technical, social and 
political orientation. Of the 70 experts, 60 respondents agreed to par­
ticipate in the study. These experts were matched into pairs on the ba­
sis of their responses to self-rating forms about their expertise in eco-
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nomics, politics, culture, psychology, technology and sociology, and 
then were randomly assigned to one of two Delphi panels. 
In the 1992 study, two panels were formed: the experts of the year 1976 panel 
("old pane!") and a new control panel ("new panel") .  The roles of the panels in 
the 1976 study and in the 1992 study were to make different types of predictions 
concerning the selected events and trends. The epistemic nature of the predictions 
of events was c1early predictive reasonability. The 1992 panels simply evaluated 
whether the events anticipated in 1976 to happen before 1991 had really hap­
pened. 
The reasonability of trend evaluatio�s sought also inc1udes, however, features of 
the commitment reasonability. One object of the prediction was the Policy Ur­
gency Index (PUI), which Ono and Wedemayer (1994, 293) used to indicate the 
urgency of policy formulation or planning vis-a-vis each individual trend. It was 
derived as follows: 
PUI = (Need level - Supply level) x Right level 
The 1976, the Delphi panelists were asked to evaluate every discussed trend on 
the three levels of the PUI-index for 1976, 1991 and 2006 . The evaluation scale 
of every variable was 0- 100 (from "none" to "absolute"). The values of the PUI­
indexes in the year 1976 study concerning the year 1991 were compared with the 
PUI-indexes, which were got from the repetition study. What was the type of 
epistemic reasonability of the PUI-indexes? 
The difference between need value and supply value describes an imbalance be­
tween demand and supply. A (probably too) simple explanation of the gap be­
tween demand and supply is that the price of the communication commodities 
described by the discussed trend is not on the right place to eliminate the differ­
ence between supply and demand. The problem evidently COI).cerns not only rea­
sonable pricing. The PUI-index concerns not only the gap between present de­
mand and present supply, but between some rational future demand and antici­
pated future supply. 
Only the anticipation of the Supply level can be seen as prediction-reasonable 
activity. The evaluation of the Need level and the Right level are based on com­
mitment reasonability. Let us use the concepts of the OTe. Panelists are not 
asked ta evaluate the future perceived capability limits (or real/ true demand in 
the future). By definition the Demand levels and the Right levels refer ta reason­
able "real" capability limits. They are reasanable equilibrium points af learning 
processes ar choices af "enlighten" citizens, as they were perceived by Delphi 
panellists . 
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My conc1usions give an interpretation of the results of Ono and Wedemayer. 
They compare the rankings of different indexes of the old panel in 1976 and 1992 
and the new panel in 1992. The statistical significances of the rank correlations 
between rank evaluations in 1976 and 1992 were (highest at the top) as follows:  
PUI-indexes of the old panel 1 976 vs. 1 992 (significant in p< 0.05 1evel ) 
Need-indexes of the old panel 1976 vs. 1992 (significant in p< 0.05 level ) 
PUI-indexes of the old paneI 1976 and the new panel 1992 (significant in p< 0.05 
level) 
Right value-indexes of the old panel 1976 vs. 1992 (significant in p< 0.05 level ) 
Need-indexes of the old panel 1976 and the new panel 1992 (significant in p< 
0.05 level) 
Right value-indexes of the old panel 1976 and the new panel 1992 (not signifi­
cant positive correIation) 
Supply-indexes of the old panel 1976 and the new panel 1992 (zero correlation) 
Supply-indexes of the old panel 1976 vs. 1992 (not significant negative correla­
tion) 
Old experts had not radically changed their minds in what are commitment rea­
sonable choices (Need indexes and Right value-indexes). On the other hand the 
predictive reasonable element of the PUI-index, the supply side, had not devel­
oped as they anticipated in 1976. This conc1usion is reinforced by the evaluation 
of the new panel. It was interesting that the opinions of the whole expert commu­
nity and not only of the old panelists had remained rather stabile conceming 
commitment-reasonable demand. 
The final conc1usion of Ono and Wedemeyer ( 1994,300) that the Delphi tech­
nique is a valid technique for long-range forecasting is very questionable as far as 
it was based on the rank correlation of the variables of the PUI-index. A better 
conc1usion is that the opinions of experts conceming the commitment reasonabil­
ity had remained rather stabile though supply conditions did not develop as an­
ticipated in the period 1976-199 1 .  This means that the prediction reasonability of 
the 1976 study was rather poor conceming the trends. The prediction reasonabil­
ity of the 1976 study conceming the events was, however, better. The predictions 
of five events out of n�ne events conceming 1991 were accurate, based on the 
evaluations made in 1992.· 
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3.13 Commitment-Oriented Delphi Study: the UK Program 
3.13.1 The objectives of the UK Program 
Commitment has been a very important objective of recent large technology fore­
sight Delphi studies. An example is a study made by the Intemational Standardi­
zation Organization in 1989. In this study, a total of 2744 replies were received 
from 40 countries (A Vision . . .  1990). Standardization needs the commitment of 
the worldwide developer communities of technologies. 
Commitment strategies of national or intemational developer communities of 
technologies vary. Cuhls ( 1998, 128- 130) made an interesting empirical conc1u­
sion conceming commitment strategies of the Japanese and German developer 
communities based on the common Delphi study of Japan and Germany in the 
beginning of 1990s. In average if Japanese experts evaluated that Japan was not 
in a good research position conceming a topic, they preferred intemational coop­
eration. No such a relationship is visible in the evaluations of German panellists, 
which also in general preferred intemational cooperation more than Japanese 
panellists. 
The development of national innovation systems needs the commitment of tech­
nology communities, e.g. for setting priority areas for national programs of tech­
nology development. The United Kingdoms Technology Foresight Program has 
stressed this point. 
Like the German Delphi studies discussed above and the study made by the In­
temational Standardization Organization, an important starting point of the UK 
Programme has been the Japanese studies. However, it was never intended that 
the use of Delphi in the UK would entail a further iteration of the Japanese ques­
tions. These were considered to reflect the agenda of Japanese industry and sci­
entists and would not necessarily correspond to the specific aims of the UK Pro­
gramme. The specific objectives of the UK Delphi study were (Loveridge et al. 
1995, 5) as follows: 
- to access the business and science and technology communities' views on future 
developments in markets and technologies; 
- to assist in achievement of commitment to results and consensus on develop­
ments; and 
- to inform the wider business and science and technology communities about the 
major issues being addressed in the Technology Foresight Programme and how 
their peers assess those issues. 
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The objectives emphasize the interactive approach. According to Loveridge et al. 
(1995, 5): "As well as the most obvious function of gathering opinions for the 
Panels, the Delphi survey also aimed to involve large numbers of experts who 
would otherwise be exc1uded, and hence to widen significantly the constancy of 
participants feelfng ownership of the results and a consequent commitment to 
their implementation". The program aimed to forge a new working partnership 
between scientists and industrialists best placed to assess emerging market op­
portunities and technological trends, and to inform decisions on the balance and 
direction of public1y funded science and technology (Georghiou 1996 p. 361). 
This commitment reasonability is very c1ear in a later definition of the three basic 
objectives of the Program (Science shaping . . . 1997, 1 ) :  
- i t  was intended to build a consensus on the various generic technologies which 
are likely to yield the greatest economic and social benefits to the UK in the long 
term; 
- it was designed to break down barriers between different parts of the UK and 
its institutions (between industry and academia; between the City and high-tech 
industry; between markets and technologies); 
- it was also meant to influence the funding patterns of public1y-funded research 
- through the Office of Science and Technology directly, via the Research Coun-
cils, via universities, via government departments, within industry and research 
and technology organizations. 
Based on the above three objectives, the UK Delphi was focused on commitment 
reasonability. The third objective given in the main report (Loveridge et al. 
1995), however, concerns option reasonability. The report motivates the third 
objective as follows: "Receipt of the questions gives the respondents early feed­
back on the topics deemed to be of interest by their peers on the Panels". This 
motivation is c1early given in the spirit of option reasonability. 
A more extensive typology of the objectives of this technology foresight study 
was given in another document (UK Technology . . .  1994, 23-24). The specific 
objectives were divided in two groups: 
The process was designed to 
1 .  Break down barriers and create contacts/ networks between academia and in­
dustry, between small and large companies, between sectors and so on. 
2. Help develop a consensus of future technological scenarios and their likeli­
hood and importance. 
3. Raise awareness among the science and technology community (both in the 
science base and industry) of the long-term potential of areas of technology and 
markets. 
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The process has also been characterized in terms of requiring delivery of "the five 
Cs" originally presented by Ben Martin (e.g. Martin 1996) which are: 
4. Communication 
5. Concentration on the longer term 
6. Co-ordination of the research plans of the relevant actors 
7. Consensus on the future directions and research priorities 
8. Commitment amongst those responsible for developing and translating re­
search results into benefits for society. 
The output/results can be used to: 
9. Identify particular generic technologies which are likely to be important to 
meeting societal goals over the next decade or so. 
10. Identify fields and targets regarded as important in the long-term (up to 30 
years). 
1 1 .  Set priorities within broad fields of technology (e.g. between IT or biotech­
nology). 
12. Set priorities between broad fields of science and technology (e.g. between 
biology and engineering) . 
13 .  Identify fields of "technological fusion" which may otherwise be overlooked 
because they fall across or between administrative or disciplinary boundaries. 
These objectives of the UK technology foresight study are related to the three 
possible types of reasonability of the Delphi studies. The objectives 2 and 8 are 
closely linked with the prediction reasonability. The objectives 3, 9, 10 and 13  
require the production of  new options based on generic technologies and are thus 
linked with option reasonability. The objectives 1 , 4, 5, 6, 7, 1 1  and 12 advance 
the coordinated actions of members of the technology community and require the 
commitment reasonability. 
The key commitment-oriented objective of the UK study was priority setting for 
technology policy. The criteria in the priority setting of technologies (or technol­
ogy generalizations) were divided further (Science Shaping . . . 1997, 3) :  
1 .  Potential economic and social benefits 
2. Opportunities for innovative science, engineering and technology 
3 .  The ability of the industrial and institutional base to capture economic and so­
cial benefits 
4. The ability of the science base to assume a leading position 
5 .  The cost of supporting science, engineering and technology 
6. The time required for the technology to mature. 
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3.13.2 The phases of the UK Program 
1 will next go through the phases of the UK program and evaluate them based on 
the framework given in this chapter. 
The UK Program was very much based on the work of Panels inc1uding about ten 
persons in fifteen areas. Normally chaired by a senior industrial manager, the 
membership of these Panels was designed to draw upon a broad range of exper­
tise (Loveridge et al. 1995,4). Following the Pre-Foresight phase, Pane1s gener­
ally began to meet in May 1 994. 
According to Loveridge et al. ( 1995,5) early emphasis was upon defining their 
scope and agendas, construction of scenarios and initial consultation on which 
issues should give consideration. The result of this activity was the identification 
of the areas of principal interest or the identification of the issue areas using my 
terminology. The identification of topics was assisted by a postal exercise tar­
geted at 50-80 experts per Panel. Known as the 'Trends, Markets and Technolo­
gies Questionnaire', this requested respondents to follow a 'logic chain', whereby 
they answered the following linked questions (Loveridge et al. 1995,8): 
(i) List four trends or issues and their driving causes, that you believe may influ­
ence the sector up to 2015 ;  
(ii) Identify possible new market opportunities arising from trends or issues and 
driving causes; 
(iii) Identify possib1e new products, processes or services to meet the needs of 
some of the market opportunities; and 
(iv) Identify technologies, breakthroughs, scientific advances or innovations 
needed to underpin products, processes or services.  
Typically, Panels found that the broader group of experts confirmed their own 
views rather than extending the agenda significantly. When compiling topics for 
the Delphi, there was normally a substantial surplus of candidate topics. Panels 
were given a maximum amount of freedom to formulate Delphi statements in 
their own way. Offered a suggested range of 50-80 topics, all the Panels tended 
to the maximum. 
This Hst of questions or the criteria i-iv c1early indicate that "topics" of the UK 
study have the features of both the issues and the topics in the four level classifi­
cation of the Argument Delphi. The criteria define a way to identify promising 
options. Using my conceptual framework, the results of this stage are option­
suggesting arguments. What is the relationship between the criteria i-iv and my 
criteria of promising options? 
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We might assume that trends or issues identified by experts (the criterion i) used 
not to be separate interesting developments. Their potential importance is based 
on technological paradigms realized by the experts. It was interesting that the 
Panels considered that the broader group of experts used to confirm their own 
views. Perhaps a reason was that the Panel experts evaluated the suggested op­
tions based on their own technological paradigms. 
The criteria ii-iv include the elements of my epistemic utility model. The crite­
rion (ii) describes the impacts (1) and their relevancy (R). The criterion (iii) de­
scribes the feasibility (F) of some techniques to produce impacts resulting in new 
products, processes andlor services. The criterion (iv) is focused on realized in­
variances. It is reasonable to conclude that its main function is to produce argu­
ments which increase the validity of the suggested 1, F or R of the options.  
The option identification stage resulted in topics or "Delphi statements" 
(Loveridge 1995,8). According to the report, "A Delphi statement must be a con­
cise expression of the event, achievements or other phenomenon upon which 
views are sought. " As in the Japanese studies, the following classification of the 
stages of innovation process was used: 
Elucidation: to scientifically and theoretically identify principles or phenomena; 
Development: to attain a specific technological goal or complete a prototype; 
Practical use: the first practical use of an innovative product or service; 
Widespread use: significant use: significant market penetration to a levei where a 
product or service is in common use. 
Half of the all topics concerned "widespread use" and only 2% were on 
"elucidation" in the UK study. In the fifth Japanese study, "widespread use" ac­
counted for 21 % and "elucidation" for 8%. This indicates the commitment­
reasonability orientation of the UK study. 
Selection of the panel of the main study was based on a co-nomination process, 
where "core panelists" suggested further experts. A problem of this process is the 
difficulty of identifying the challengers of the dominant paradigms. Further more, 
the experts on impacts (1), and the feasibility (F) of options are often not experts 
on the relevancy (R) of options. The main report of the UK study realizes the fact 
that the results of the co-nomination process might be biased: "To avoid exces­
sive homogeneity, referred to above, the database should, in future, record the 
age and gender of the individuals" (Loveridge et al. 1995, 539). 
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The topics were evaluated in the manner of the J apanese and German national 
De1phi studies focusing on the judgments (or "proxy" arguments) of pane1ists. 
The dimensions of the proxy arguments were similar to those used in the Japa­
nese and German studies (Loveridge 1995, 1 0- 12):  degree of expertise, degree of 
impact, period within which the eventldevelopment will have first occurred, ne­
cessity of collaboration, UK current position versus other countries and con­
straints on occurrence. 
There were, however, some interesting differences. Instead of the importance of a 
topic, the evaluation was focused on the degree of impact of the topic on wealth­
creation and on the degree of impact on quality of lifel6. Though this classifica­
tion, like "the importance", does not make a clear distinction between the impacts 
and their relevancy evaluations, it is clearly a better proxy of that distinction than 
the "importance" .  The market vaIue or the impact on weaIth creation can be seen 
as a proxy indicator of the "objectively perceivable" impacts (1). At least in some 
cases, it is possible to measure the market vaIue of a technology generalization 
proposal with relative objectivity, though all important objective impacts like 
measurabIe impacts on heaIth do not have market prices. On the other hand, the 
impact on the quality of life can be seen as a proxy indicator of the (subjective) 
relevance. 
The time scheduIes of the UK study were extremeIy demanding and not feasibIe 
for the factual argumentation of the panelists. The first round forms were dis­
patched by post in the beginning of September 1 994. Second round forms were 
dispatched by post in the beginning of November 1994. In each round, a com­
ments space was provided next to statement in which respondents were invited to 
ampIify their responses. A fundamentaI difference between the Argument DeIphi 
and the UK study was, that the very short interval between the two rounds made 
it unfeasibIe to feed a digest of these comments back into the UK second round 
survey (Loveridge 1 995, 12). Besides the short lag between the rounds, very little 
time was provided both for the preparation of the forms and the anaIysis of the 
results. 
3.13.3 Evaluation of the results of the UK study 
The participants of the UK DeIphi were asked to evaIuate the study. The re­
sponses of the panelists were summarized as follows (Science Shaping, 1 997, 
1 2):  
1 6  This distinction was used also in the German-Japanese Mini-Delphi (Cuhls et al. 1 995) and in later 
Japanese and German exercises (NISTEP 1997, Cuhls et al. 1998). 
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1 )  A majority believed Delphi to have been too complex, to have contained too 
many statements and variables, and to have offered too little time for the comple­
tion. 
2) Others felt that sufficient expertise was already present within Panels to carry 
out the program effectively, and that the wider consultation objectives of Delphi 
could have been achieved via workshops, or expert hearings. E.g. regional work­
shops received a much more positive response. 
3) Some saw the Delphi as a very cumbersome process producing very little new. 
4) The co-nomination process is not effective in identifying other than "obvious" 
names. Less formal nomination processes used in Japan worked better. 
5) More subgroups were favored. 
6) More cross-over in membership was favored. 
7) It was felt that small and medium size enterprises were a neglected sector. 
8) The survey was too close to the panel report deadlines so that the panels had 
no time to absorb results. 
The first and the last comments criticize the too hasty process, which made it dif­
ficult both for the panelists to produce relevant judgments and for the Panels to 
use them. This is especially apparent conceming factual arguments. Conceming 
comments 2 and 3, we might ask if it is really so that direct discussions in small 
working groups or in regional workshops could provide better opportunities for a 
national development program (for the commitment of expert communities) than 
the anonymous hearing of a large group of experts concerning many topics? Let 
us look at this question from the point of view of the characterization of com­
mitment reasonability. It is possible to evaluate the results conceming any topic b 
of the study based on the following two criteria: 
(4) IbFb VbRbA is reasonably over LA ' where A is the group of actors whose 
actions are decisive for the real.ization of b or (4') IbFb VbRbA is over LA (not 
necessarily reasonably), where A is a group of actors whose actions are decisive 
for the realization of b. It is possible for the group of customers of study B to 
make A commit themselves to actions which result in the realization of b.  
(5) IbFb VbRbB is reasonably over LB. where B is the group of customers of the 
commitment producing study 
1 5 1  
The next conc1usions are very preliminary and only try to show how the frame­
work of the epistemic utility model might be used. 
If only a small Panel of about 10 persons is used for judgments conceming 70 
relevant topics (or issues) in a field and especially if it is not possible to see the 
real factual arguments on which the judgments of the Panel are based, it is very 
difficult to decide whether a real commitment of whole developer communities 
have happened (compare also with the comments "more subgroups were favored" 
and "it was felt that small and medium-size enterprises were a neglected sector"). 
It is very likely that the Panel in some way tries to manipulate the whole devel­
oper community in the field (the use of (4') instead of (4» . 
On the other hand, the commitment reasonability might increase if the Panel or 
regional discussions produce new relevant rational arguments having an impact 
on IbFb VbRb of A or B .  The less obvious names might be especially good in 
this sense (compare the comment "less formal nomination process used in Japan 
worked better") .  
The UK study at least partly met its commitment objectives. It resulted e.g. in a 
useful classification of issue areas for the priority setting. The Steering Group of 
the UK technology foresight program grouped 1 5  sectors into (Science Shap­
ing . . .  1997, 3):  
- Sectors where the sectored driver was primarily new advances and investment 
in basic science, engineering and technology (chemicals, materials, defense and 
aerospace, health and life-sciences); 
- Sectors where the key driver will be the UK's ability to exploit foreseeable ad­
vances in science and technology and intemational access to products and serv­
ices ( information technology and electronics, communications, food and drink, 
financial services); 
- Sectors where key drivers are the political, social and regulatory environments 
(transport, energy, retailing and distribution, agriculture, natural resources and 
the environment) ; 
- Sectors where advances will be due primarily to investment in human resources 
- by developing new skills and deepening the understanding of business processes 
and consumer preferences, as much as by investment in relevant areas of science, 
engineering and technology (manufacturing, construction, leisure and learning). 
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4. SOCIAL INTERACTION IN THE DELPHI PROCESS 
AND THE VALIDITY AND RELEVANCE OF TECH­
NOLOGY FORESIGHT ARGUMENTATION 
4.1 Social Interaction in the Delphi Process and the Validity of Argu­
ments or Judgements of Experts 
All the basic features of the Delphi method are ways to influence the communi­
cation process between panellists or between panellists and Delphi managers: 
- Anonymity. The panellists do not know exactly who has produced an argu­
ment, though information may be available about some features of the producer 
of the argument. 
- Iteration. There are several rounds for verbal argumentation or for making 
quantitative or qualitative judgements. The purpose of the iterations is to give 
possibilities for panellists to change their minds. 
- Feedback. The anonyme judgements (quantitative or qualitative) of other pan­
ellists or further arguments are sent back to some or all panellists. 
In this chapter, 1 try to answer the following question: Production of the argu­
ments or judgements about the future is based on a social interaction process 
between Delphi panellists and Delphi managers. How can the interaction process 
increase or decrease the validity of arguments or judgements? 
Let us look at a basic situation faced by any panellist many times during a Delphi 
argumentation process. This is a situation in which a panellist has to evaluate 
alone an argument or a judgement presented by a Delphi manager or another pan­
ellist in the light of the other arguments and judgements presented by other pan­
ellists. Two forces have an impact on the panellist's evaluation: M or the possi-
. bly "expertise weighted" median or average answer of the panellists; and T or the 
"truthlike" or directly validated value which seems to be reasonable based on the 
arguments known by the panellist before the study and based on the information 
content of the arguments presented by the other panellists (Parente et. al. 1987, 
Rowe et al. 199 1 , 247). 
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The production of arguments which can be directly evaluated as true, for example 
based on the reliable statistics or other reliable observations is an obvious way to 
produce valid arguments in a Delphi study. Because of the tacit knowledge of ex­
perts it is, however, reasonable to use expert judgements as proxy evidence. 
Judgements can also be catalysts for finding relevant new valid factual arguments 
and connections between actors. 
The catalytic role of Delphi argumentation has received relatively little attention 
in the theoretical literature concerning the Delphi method, though its practical 
importance is now widely accepted. 1 Instead, a much discussed topic in the theo­
retical literature concerning the Delphi method has been: may the presentation of 
the average expert judgements or opinions improve the validity of argumentation 
of separate experts? 
A main result of empirical studies has been that the "expertise-weighted" median 
or average answer of the panellists (M) is a rather questionable basis for the va­
lidity of judgements. The logical interpretation of M is ad verecundiam or appeal 
to authority: something is true (conclusion), because experts consider so 
(prernise). Woods and Walton ( 1982, 86) considered that there are five necessary 
conditions for the plausibility of an appeal to authority. 
1) The authority must be interpreted correctly. 
2) The authority must actually have special competence in an area and not simply 
glamour, prestige or popularity. 
3) The judgement of the authority must actually be within the special field of 
competence. 
4) Direct evidence must be available in principle. 
5) A consensus technique is required for adjudicating disagreements among 
equally qualified authorities. 
A problem in the list is that the evaluation of the Delphi technique is at least 
partly in a vicious circle: Woods and Walton (1982) explicitly motivated the fifth 
condition by referring to the Delphi technique. As a motivation of the fourth con­
dition, an example was given where an expert falls well outside the range of con­
sensus of an expert pane!. Woods and Walton suggested that a dissident has to 
argument for his or her standpoint, like in traditionai Delphi studies. 
1 In a recent article of Ben Martin and Ron Johnson ( 1999, 44) describe this function as follows: 
"Technology foresight offers a means of "wiring up" and strengthening the connections within the na­
tional innovation system so that knowledge can flow more freely among the constituent actors, and the 
system as a whole can flow more freely among the constituent actors, and the system as a whole can be­
come more effective at learning and innovating .. Such learning requires a process for stimulating, nur­
turing, encouraging, and strengthening interactions between the actors so that the linkages between 
them become more permanent." 
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Amstrong (1985, 92) conc1udes the results of many "M-based " judgmental stud­
ies (Amstrong 1985, 93-96) as follows: 
Many studies have been done on the value of experts. Most have come 
from psychology and finance, but there is evidence also from eco­
nomics, medicine, sports and other areas. Expertise in the field of in­
terest has been measured in various ways (education, experience, 
reputation, previous success, self-identification). Accuracy has also 
been measured in many ways. With few exemptions, the results fall 
into the pattern illustrated in the figure (figure 4 . 1 ). Above the low 
1evel of expertise labelled El (which can be obtained quickly and eas-
ily), and expertise and accuracy are almost unrelated. 
Figure 4. 1 .  Relationship between expertise and accuracy inforecasting change 
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A typical study cited by Amstrong was a study where, 24 PhDs, 24 trainees in 
psychology and 24 naive subjects (undergraduates) listened to lO-minute inter­
views with each of three clients and then predicted how each c1ient would fill out 
three different personality inventories. There was no difference in accuracy be­
tween the PhDs and the trainees, and both were significantly more accurate than 
the naive subjects. 
Based on the present state of the art, one can hardly rely on the predictive valid­
ity of "M-based" expert judgements in technology foresight studies. 1 consider, 
however, that in the future, expert judgements may be an important source of 
valid information. The conc1usion of Amstrong is a typical example of a too 
straight-forward empirical conc1usion based on the lack of a real explanatory the­
ory. It is Iike the foIlowing conc1usion: 
156 
It is perceived in many studies that objects (compare the judges of fu­
ture developments !) fall at different velocities. The conc1usion is that 
the properties ( compare the expertise !) of objects do not have a sig­
nifieant impact on their velocities. 
We do not know if there is powerful theory about how to eliminate the biases of 
the past expertise-based judgements in the anticipation of future generalizations 
of technologies. Though it seems to be very diffieult (perhaps impossible) to find 
a relevant theory working in all situations, 1 consider that the epistemic starting 
points of the GTC and the epistemic utility model discussed in the previous 
chapter may be useful in this context. Let us suppose that we have found a rele­
vant theory. In that case, it is c1ear that an expert knowing the theory, the expert 
judgements and the needed background information concerning the experts re­
quired by the theory, would be a better expert about the future than an expert or a 
naive subject who does not know the theory and the relevant past evidence. 
Analogously, the astronomer who knows the relevant laws of nature and relevant 
properties of planets is obviously a better forecaster of the future behaviour of 
planets than an unqualified astronomer or a naive subject. 
A remarkable attempt to deviee a relevant general framework for the critieal ex­
amination of expert information is the "factor model" presented by Fjermestad, 
Hiltz and Turoff (Hiltz and Turoff 1995, 486-501) .  Though this model is c1early 
a remarkable achievement, it has a basic weakness: it is too complicated to be 
very useful. It is more a ioase collection of theoretical concepts from different 
sciences than a real compact theory. It is more a way to describe research prob-
1ems or a way to c1assify problems than a way to solve them. 
The concepts used in the "factor model" to evaluate the validity of argumentation 
originate from the history of philosophy: inuctive ("Lockean"), deductive 
("Leibnitzian"), relative ("Kantian"), negotiated ("pragmatie") and conflictual 
("Hegelian"). The concepts used to evaluate the complexity of prob1ems can be 
seen to be an application of the Kuhnian idea of paradigmatic and preparadig­
matie sciences: structured, semistructured, unstructured and wicked problems. 
Members of expert panels are characterized according to the conventional psy­
chological concepts: attitudes, values, power, self confidence, demographics, in­
terpersonal skills, initial quality. What happens during the interaction process of 
experts (during "the adaptation process") is also described using the conventional 
psychologieal concepts: level of effort of experts, emergent structure of commu­
nicating group, emergent leadership, diffusion of responsibility, deindividuation, 
pressure to consensus, co-ordination, co-operation and structuration. The 
"outcome factars" are measured in so many dimensions that it is really difficult to 
see the point of measurements : Efficiency measures, Decisian Cyc1es, Effective­
ness measures, Communications, Decision quality, Process quality, Innovatian, 
157 
Level of understanding, Imp1ementation, Consensus, Social re1ationships, Influ­
ence, Confidence, General satisfaction, Attitudes (pre/post), Usability measures. 
If somebody really describes a De1phi study in all the dimensions mentioned in 
the "faetor modeI" ,  they will have a 10t of work to do. 1 like to call the "faetor 
modeI" as a "PtoIemaic expert communication theory".  Like the Pto1emaic cos­
moIogy, it seems to describe the communication processes perhaps rightly but in 
a very complicated way. It does not fulfil a benchmark of a good theory. Good 
theory has to be as simpIe and "e1egant" as possib1e. 
I do not assert that 1 know a "KepIerian expert communication theory" .  However, 
I consider that we will not find an e1egant "Keplerian theory" ,  if we only look for 
new simpIe empiricaI resu1ts. Instead of "Lockean empirism" we need a rationaI­
istic structuration of the communication processes. Empirical evidence is reason­
abIe onIy as a test of a structurated mode1 or theory. I hope that my epistemic 
utility mode! and three types of reasonability are steps forward in this type of ra­
tionalistic structuration. 
In a DeIphi process the production of epistemic utility is based on a special kind 
of group communication. Social psychological experiments have uncovered some 
basic general features of group communication which are re!evant for the evalua­
tion of the validity of judgements resu1ting from group communication processes. 
Before this discussion it is, however, useful generally discuss about errors that 
might produce invalid judgements concerning the future. 
4.2 Sampling, Nonresponse and Response Errors 
A basic idea of the GTC and my epistemic utility mode! is that an actor realizes 
her "good enough" pIan (e.g. a techno10gy generalization option) if the actor does 
not have to change her reIevant criteria of sameness. This means that the realiza­
tion of the pIan beIongs to her perceived capability and real capacity limits. The 
judgements based on this kind of pIan might resu1t in stabile or reliable transient 
invariances. 
If it is reasonable to assume that 
- the Iearning of the actor does not change the relevant perceived capability lim­
its, which means that the pIan aIso belongs to the perceived capacity limits (the 
pIan remains invariant during the realization process); 
- the realization of the perceived pIan belongs to the real capacity limits of the 
actor or in other words: the actors have enough resources to realize his or her 
pIan; and 
- the actor tells her true pIan; 
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then the toId pIan gives the valid prediction about a topic or about a technology 
generalization, if the realization of the topic or the technology generalization be­
longs to the pIan. 
Many market studies have been based on the above kinds of assumptions result­
ing in good predictions.  The predictive reasonability based on opinion polls of 
consumers have been based on avoidance of three types of errors (compare Am­
strong 1985, 82): 
- sampling errors create problems in generalizing from the sample to the popu­
lation of all relevant consumers having the needed resources; 
- nonresponse errors create problems in generalizing from the respondents to the 
sample; 
- response errors create problems in generalizing from the response of an indi­
vidual respondent to his or her future behavior. 
Market studies take often into aecount the first two errors but do not carefully 
take into account the third error. An example given by Amstrong ( 1985,82) illus­
trates the errors. Assume that you must forecast the sales of automobiles in the 
United States. A sample is selected from that part of the US. population which 
has enough to buy a car. The members of the sample are asked whether they ex­
pect to purchase a car within the next six months. Sampling errors result if the 
sample is too small or if it was selected from a list that was not representative of 
the population of potential automobile buyers. Nonresponse errors occur if indi­
viduals in the sample cannot be located or if they refuse to answer. 
If the sample is large enough, it is often supposed that response errors of respon­
dents eliminate each others. E.g. somebody answers that he will buy a car and in 
reality will not buy. This error is eliminated by another respondent who answers 
that she will not buy a ear, but in reality will buy. If the potential buyers of cars 
have no systematic reasons to give misleading information, the disregard of the 
response errors is a reasonable choice. There are often, however, systematic re­
sponse errors in market studies. A typical systematic error is e.g. that respondents 
want to answer in a way that makes them look good. 
Two first types of errors are also relevant for technology Delphi studies in addi­
tion to marketing studies. In the case of car buyers it is relatively easy to identify 
the population of relevant eonsumers or decision-makers. But what is the popula­
tion of experts being able to realize a technology generalization? We have two 
basic problems in this identification task. Firstly we often do not know who is 
capable to realize a generalization described by a topic. Even actors, who in real­
ity will realize a technology generalization, are often incapable to anticipate their 
future success. This concerns especially topics having the form "when a generali­
zation X will realize for the first time". Secondly experts cannot typically alone 
realize a topic. Often an extensive coalition of actors is needed. In faet the reIe-
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vant population in foresight studies is - unlike in market studies - not based on 
the capacity of respondents to realize asked topics. Panellists in technology Del­
phi studies are typicalIy seIected based on their expertise in relevant arguments2, 
not so much based on their capacity to realize some topics. 
Unlike potential car buyers the panellists in a technoIogy De1phi study typically 
have made no plans concerning the realization of a topic. Typically panellists 
present different scenarios based on arguments. Few experts having relevant 
plans are usually not very eager to tell about their plans because they do not like 
inform their competitors. This sometimes results in a nonresponse error. The 
more likely error is, however, the response error. Let us assume that an expert has 
a pIan but he or she is not ready to inform other panellists. In the author' s studies 
(Kuusi 1991 and 1994) he or she often made some kind of response error but did 
not refuse to be a panellist. 
This and Iater chapters of this study are much focused on response errors of dif­
ferent kinds of panellists. An important conc1usion of my study is that response 
errors of experts are interreIated. When a first best expert makes a response error 
it often results in bandwagon response errors of second or third best experts. The 
anonymity of DeIphi studies can be an efficient way to avoid the bandwagon re­
sponse errors, but not always. 
In the beginning of this chapter I mentioned two forces, which have an impact on 
a Delphi panellist's evaluation: M or the possibly "expertise weighted" median or 
average answer of the panellists; and T or the "truthlike" or directly validated 
vaIue which seems to be reasonabIe based on the arguments known by a panellist 
before the study and based on the information content of presented arguments of 
other panellists. My discussion concerning response errors in technoIogy DeIphi 
studies is very much focused on these forces. 
In traditionai opinion polls respondents are assumed to give their opinions inde­
pendently, but in Delphi studies opinions of other experts or M has an impact. 
Though a Delphi panellist does not know whose responses result in M, it is for 
hirn or her a kind of representative of "pubIic opinion" concerning a topic. As 
Timur Kuran (1995) extensively discusses in his bo ok "Private Truths, Public 
Lies", people are inclined to give publicly opinions, which are somewhere be­
tween ones true (private) opinion and the pubIic opinion. 
2 For example in the UK study only 5% panellists c\assitied themselves "belonging to that community of 
people who currently dedicate themselves to the topic matter" (the expertise level 5) but 46% considered 
that they "know most of the arguments advanced for and against some of the issues surrounding it, and 
had read about it, and have formed some opinion about it" (at least the expertise level 3) (Loveridge et 
al. 1 995, 1 0- 1 1 ,  22). 
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Let us suppose that an expert changes his judgement on the second Delphi round 
based only on the value M. Let us suppose that the panellist approves now the 
median value of the first round. When does this decision increase the invalidity 
of the median value? We can image at least one extreme case, when this is the 
case. Let us suppose that half of the panellists make the same systematic response 
error in order to mislead other experts. If some other panellist accepts their opin­
ion he makes the same error. 
You might consider that the risk of bandwagon error is, however, not very great 
if an expert sees that the judgement of other experts is false based on his past 
knowledge. Actually social dynamies may produce very strange results in this 
type of situation as some basic empirical results of social psychology which will 
be discussed in the next paragraphs indicate. 
4.3 Some Relevant Social Psychological Discoveries concerning Group 
Communication 
A key prerequisite for any relevant theory concerning the validity of the expert 
judgements produced using the Delphi method is the profound understanding of 
the forces inhuman communication. Although group communication happens 
between learning actors, it is reasonable to assume that group communication 
could have at least some weakly invariant features. 1 agree with Rowe et al. 
( 199 1 , 249) in their statement that in improving the Delphi method, "first priority 
should be given over to more intense analysis of the mechanics of change in 
nominal ( not interacting) and interacting groups, which should subsequently al­
low us to develop stronger theoretical frameworks on which to construct tech­
niques for improving judgement and forecasting." 
1 think that in order to find really relevant invariances we first have to discuss 
group communication on a very general level. The general understanding of so­
cial influence in groups helps us to understand the specific problems of the Del­
phi method. 
Social influence in groups has been a well-studied topic in social psychology. 
Social influence on the general level refers to a change in the judgements, opin­
ions and attitudes of an individual as a result of being exposed to the judgements, 
opinions and attitudes of other individuals (de Montmollin 1977, Avermaet 1995, 
350). 
A question of social influence vital for the Delphi method concems conformity or 
majority influence. Do individuals change their opinions when they leam that the 
majority of the members of a group to which they belong holds a different opin­
ion? Do they perhaps only give in overtly and maintain their own conviction in 
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private (e.g. their own vision of the generalization possibilities of a technology), 
or does the majority influence really change people's minds? Under which condi­
tions do individuals manage to resist majority influence? 
The next relevant general problem concerns minority influence. Can a minority in 
a group bring about changes in the opinions of a majority? What characteristics 
should a minority have in order to produce an effect? 
Social influence has implications concerning group performance in comparison 
with the performance of individual members. The problem discussed by social 
psychologists in this context is highly relevant to our problems: how interper­
sonai processes may affect actual performance and could they keep a group be­
low its potential performance? 
A "paradigmatic" experiment concerning the group influence was made by Muza­
far Sherif ( 1935, Avermaet 1995, 35 1) .  He placed subjects alone or in groups of 
two or three in a comp1etely darkened room. At a distance of about 5 meters, a 
single and small stationary light was presented to them. In the absence of refer­
ence points, a stationary light appears to move rather erratically in all directions 
(autokinetic effect). Sherif asked his subjects to give an oral estimate of the ex­
tent of movement of the light, obviously without inforrning them of the autoki­
netic effect. Half of the subjects made their first 100 hundred judgements alone. 
On three subsequent days they went through three more sets of trials, but this 
time in groups of two or three. For the other half of the subjects, the procedure 
was reversed. They underwent the three group sessions first and ended with a 
session alone. 
Subjects who first made their judgements alone developed rather quickly a stan­
dard estimate (a personai norm) around which their judgements fluctuated. This 
personai norm was stable, but it varied highly between individuals .  In the group 
phases of the experiment, which brought together people with different perso nai 
norms, subjects' judgements converged towards a more or less common position 
- a group norm. With the reverse procedure this group norm developed in the first 
session and it persisted in the later session alone. 
Sheriffs famous experiment did not strictly speaking concern conforrnity or 
majority influence. To turn it into conforrnity study, Jacob and Campbell (1961)  
firstly replaced all the subjects but one by confederates who unanimously agreed 
with a particular judgement. After every 30 judgements, a confederate was re­
placed by a naive subject until the whole group was made up of naive subjects. 
Their results indicated that the majority had a significant effect on the subjects' 
judgements even after they had gradually been removed from the situation 
(Avermaet 1995, 352). 
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A special feature in the experiments above was that there was no right answers to 
the evaluation tasks. The situation was different in experiments conducted by 
Salomon Asch (Asch 1 95 1 ,  1 956, Avermaet 1 995 p. 352-354). In the experi­
mental condition the subjects, who were seated in a semicirc1e, were requested to 
give their judgements aloud, in the order in which they were seated, from posi­
tion 1 to position 7. ActualIy there was only one real subject, seated in position 6. 
AlI the others were confederates of the experimenter and, on each trial, they 
unanimously gave a predetermined answer. The answers concemed decisions, 
about which of the three comparison lines was equal in length to a standard line. 
On each trial one comparison line was in effect equal in length to a standard line, 
but the other two were different. AlI in all, the task was apparently very easy, as 
was shown by the fact that in a control group of 37 subjects who made their 
judgements in isolation, 35 people did not make a single error. 
In six "neutral" trials (the first two trials, and four other trials distributed over the 
remaining set) the confederates nominate the correct lines, which were equal in 
length to the standard lines . In the other 12  "critical" trials they unanimously 
agreed on an incorrect line. The results reveal the tremendous impact of an 
"obviously" incorrect but unanimous majority on the judgements of a lone sub­
ject. Out of Asch's 1 23 subjects only about 25% did not make a single error com­
pared with 95% in the control condition. 
Essentially, similar results have been obtained on numerous occasions, using dif­
ferent subject populations and different judgmental tasks. The Asch effect re­
flects not only a conformist attitude or a specific culture as most replications have 
shown (Doms and Van Avermat 1 982, Vlaander and Van Rooijen 1 985, Perrin 
and Spencer 1 980 for a negative finding). 
Asch's experiment has provided the groundwork for a rich tradition of theoretical 
speculations and empirical studies in social psychology with potential relevance 
to Delphi studies: 
1 )  The subject's perceived competence at the judgement task relative to others, as 
well as his self-confidence, reduces the amount of conformity (Mausner 1 954). 
2) Dittes and Kelley ( 1 956) observed more conformity in subjects of medium 
status than in high-status or low�status subjects. 
3) Di Vesta ( 1 959) showed that more conformity was obtained on later trials if 
the early trials contained many neutral trials. 
4) Asch ( 1 95 1 )  ran groups in which the size of the "majority" varied from one to 
1 6. One person had no effect, but two persons already produced 1 3  per cent er­
rors. With three confederates, the conformity effect reached its full strength with 
33 per cent errors. The addition of even more confederates did not lead to further 
increments in conformity. 
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5) Endler ( 1965) has shown that a direct reward for conforming responses leads 
to an increment in confonnity. 
6) Subjects who were infonned that groups would be compared, confonned more 
than subjects for whom accuracy of individual judgement was emphasized 
(Thibaut and Strickland 1956). 
7) Wilder ( 1977) showed that two independent groups of two people have more 
effect than four people who present their judgements as a group. 
8) If one discovers that others hold opinions more in the direction of the valued 
altemative, one will become more extreme in order to differentiate positively 
from others (Lamm and Myers 1978, Avennaet 1 995 368-372). 
The process discussed by Lamm and Myers ( 1978) can in special conditions lead 
to an extreme fonn of "groupthink" . There the decision process of a highly cohe­
sive group of similarly minded people becomes so overwhelmed by consensus 
seeking and "positive thinking" that their apprehension of reality is undermined. 
Janis and Mann ( 1977) have described a number of instances of political and 
military decision-making which provide dramatic illustrations of the utmost stu­
pidity shown by groups in spite of the superior "intelligence" of their members 
(e.g. The Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961).  
An important question for the Delphi studies concems the impact of minorities. 
When Asch gave the subject a supporter in the fonn of a confederate who an­
swered before the subject and who gave correct answers on all trials, the confor­
mity of the real subject dropped dramatically to a mere 5.5 percent from 33 per­
cent (Avennaet 1 995 p.356). In trying to find out whether the reduced conformity 
was caused by a break in the unanimity of the majority or by the fact that the 
subject now had a social supporter for his own private opinion, Asch added a 
condition, in which the confederate deviated from the majority but gave an even 
more incorrect answer than they did. The results showed that the extreme dis­
senter was nearly as efficient in reducing conformity as was the social supporter. 
Allen and Levine ( 1968, 1969) later showed that the conc1usion only holds with 
respect to unambiguous situations as in Asch's experiments. With opinion state­
ments only a genuine social supporter will lead to reduced conformity. 
The perceived expertise of the supporter had an important impact. In an "Asch 
experiment" by Allen and Levine ( 1971 )  a supporter was given to the subject, but 
in one of their two support conditions the social support was invalid. The 
"invalid" supporter, although giving correct answers, could possibly not be per­
ceived as a valid source of information because the subject knew that he had ex­
tremely poor vision (as was evident from a pre-experimental eye examination and 
from his eyeglasses with thick lenses). The results showed that although invalid 
social support is sufficient to reduce conformity significantly compared with an 
unanimous majority condition, the valid social supporter has much more impact. 
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An important question relevant for to Delphi studies concems the impact of mi­
norities. When Asch gave the subject a supporter in the form of a confederate 
who answered before the subject and who gave correct answers on all trials, the 
conformity of the real subject dropped dramatically to a mere 5.5 percent from 33 
percent (Avermaet 1995, 356). 
In trying to find out whether the reduced conforrnity was caused by a break in the 
unanimity of the majority or by the fact that the subject now had a social sup­
porter for his own private opinion, Asch added a condition in which the confed­
erate deviated from the majority but gave an even more incorrect answer than 
they did. The results showed that the extreme dissenter was nearly as efficient in 
reducing conforrnity as was the social supporter. An interesting question dis­
cussed in social psychology concems the possibilities of a minority to change the 
minds of the majority. The answer to this question is to be found in minority be­
havioural style (Avermaet 1995 p.360). A minority has to propose a c1ear posi­
tion on the issue at hand and hold firmly to it. The most important component of 
this behavioural style is the consistency with which the minority defends and ad­
vocates its position. 
Some further observations have complemented the above results: 
1 )  Consistent minorities are strongly disliked (Moscovici and Lage 1976). 
2) A consistent minority, which behaves in a very rigid, extreme or dogmatic 
manner, is less influential than an equally consistent minority whose negotiation 
style is more flexible (Mugny, 1982). 
3) If the minority appears to have something to gain from the position it takes, 
self-interest becomes a plausible altemative cause of their behaviour (Maass, 
Clark and Haberkom 1982). 
4) There is probably a privileged relationship between minorities and private 
change of mind on the one hand and majority and public change of mind on the 
other hand. Under conditions where minorities usually have to try to exert influ­
ence, they can at first expect just private change and only later public change 
(Moscovici and Personnaz 1980, Avermaet 1995 p.365-366). 
The key role of consistency has been demonstrated in many experiments. In what 
is essentially a reversed Asch experiment, Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux 
( 1969) had subjects participate in a study on colour perception in groups of six. 
Subjects first underwent a test for colour blindness. Upon passing this test they 
were then shown 36 slides, all c1early blue and differing only in intensity. Their 
task was simply to judge the colour of the slides by narning aloud a simple col­
our. Two of the subjects, seated in the first and second position or in the first and 
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fourth position, were actually confederates of the experimenter. 1n the consistent 
condition they answered "green" on all trials and in the inconsistent condition 
they answered "green" 24 times and "blue" 12 times. The experiment also con­
tained a control condition, for which the groups were made up of six naive sub­
jects. 
Out of 22 naive subjects, only one person gave two green responses in the control 
condition. In the inconsistent minority condition, the number of green responses 
was only slightly and insignificantly higher than in the control condition. 1n the 
consistent minority condition, 32% of naive subjects gave at least one green re­
sponse. There were two categories of groups: those in which nobody was influ­
enced, and those in which several people were influenced. A typical observation 
was that, in contrast to conformity studies, the minority effect only begins to 
show after a certain period (Nemeth, 1982). 
Why the social influence is so important in human learning? Kuran (1995, 162-
167) gives an explanation. He considers that free riding on the knowledge of oth­
ers is an essential vehicle for overcoming one's cognitive limitations. 1f others 
have investigated an issue in depth and their judgment can be trusted, one can 
dispense with the trouble of reflection by appropriating their apparent under­
standings. Kuran considers that we often rely the heuristic of social proof 
(Cialdini 1984): if a great many people think in a particular way, they must know 
something we ourselves do not. Even where we possess independent knowledge, 
the faet that our perceptions are shared assures us of their correetness. It is a rea­
sonable search rutine for learning (compare Loikkanen, 1996). 
Even in seholarship, where the authentication of ideas is supposed to be based 
solely on logic and evidence, appeals to social proof are common. Academic 
writers routinely cite great scholars to bolster the credibility of their assumptions 
and inferenees. Scientific or technological paradigms are partly adopted based on 
social proofs. Seholars draw support from the presumed agreements within their 
disciplines. Many aeademie writings are peppered with phrases like "the standard 
assumption" and "as is well known" (Kuran 1995, 165). 
It seems not be far from the truth to eonsider, that the traditionai Delphi method 
has in practice been based just on social proofs of experts, though in principle 
also faetual arguments are distributed during traditionai Delphi proeesses. 
Though the anonymity of experts helps to avoid at least partly the "fallaey of ar­
gumentum ad hominem,,3, the "fallacy of argument ad nauseam" is difficult to 
3 Kuran ( 1 995, 168- 169) gives a nice example of this fallacy. A visitor arrives in front of a Cubist 
painting signed "Picasso". "Phenomenal ! "  he exclaims, " it's creative, and the eolours are subtle". Sup­
pose we had replaced the signature on the painting "R. Barney" and placed it among works by unknown 
loeal artists. Our visitor might well have dismissed the otherwise identieal painting as unimaginative. 
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avoid in traditionaI Delphi studies. According to this fallacy many falsehoods 
have attained the status of truth through reiteration. Multiple exposures to a sin­
gle belief produce a social proof. If in a Delphi panel is a majority of like-minded 
experts, which do not represent the general opinion of alI experts, they produce a 
social proof of their opinion. 
Even the presentation of a topic is a kind of social proof. In an experiment cited 
by Kuran (1995, 166) a group of subjects were exposed to sixty plausible state­
ments, each either true or false (Hasher et al. 1977). Here ar! two examples: "In 
the U.S., divorced people outnumber those who are widowed" (which at the time 
of the experiment was false), and "In Malaya, if a man goes to jail for being 
drunk, his wife goes too" (which was true). After hearing the statements, the 
subjects were asked to rate the validity of each on a seven point scale. Two 
weeks later, and again two weeks after that, the subjects were exposed to addi­
tional sets of sixty statements, each of which inc1uded twenty from the original 
list. As with the first session, the subjects were asked to rate each statement for 
its validity. A comparison of the ratings from the three sessions shows that the 
subjects treated exposure as a criterion of validity. For the repeated statements, 
whether actualIy true or false, the mean rating was significantly higher in the 
second and third sessions than in the first. 
4.4 Does the Delphi Process Produce More Valid Judgements than 
Staticized or Nominal Groups: Empirical Results concerning the 
Predictive Reasonability 
The discussed invariances of group communication are helpful in analysing the 
results of some empirical studies which have tried directly to evaluate how in­
formation about the "expertise weighted median or average opinion" (M) may 
produce valid argumentation. A basic weakness in laboratory experiments, 
which have tried to evaluate the validity of the Delphi method directly, has been 
that they have focused on predictive reasonability. Actually, I have found no 
laboratory experiment which tried to evaluate the option reasonability or com­
mitment reasonability of the Delphi method. Hence the "valid judgement" in cited 
in the studies below usualIy means the "predictive valid judgement" .  
In many studies, the Delphi method or structured indirect interaction has been 
compared with an average of responses from the polI of experts ("staticized 
group", individuals working alone) or with results of unstructured, direct inter­
action in a group ("working group, committee"). The fourth possibility has been 
structured interaction with phases of direct interaction. Nominal group tech­
nique is perhaps the most widely known structured, direct interaction method 
(Woudenberg 1991 ,  1 32). Like many similar methods (e.g. the "futures work-
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shop" method often used in Finland), it includes phases of direct interaction and 
phases where panellists give evaluations anonymously or semi-anonymously. 
The experiments seem to focus on the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The average judgement of a communicating expert group is more 
valid than the average judgement of separately evaluating experts ( "staticized 
group"). 
Hypothesis 2: The Delphi method or structured indirect interaction produces 
more valid judgements than the unstructured or direct interaction of experts 
( "working group" or "nominal group "J. 
Hypothesis 3: The experts high in self-evaluated or peer-evaluated expertise 
produce more valid judgements than experts who have received low evaluations. 
The discussion conceming the first hypothesis began already in the 1 930s. 
Douglas MacGrecor undertook a study in 1936 and formulated what came to be 
known as the "MacGrecor effect". This refers to his finding that predictions made 
by a group of people are more likely to be right than predictions made by the 
same individuals working alone (Loye 1978 ref. Lang 1 996). 
The simple idea, that a group makes better predictions than its single members, is  
very questionable, as  many comparison studies of performances of staticized 
groups and interacting groups have indicated. Individual and group task perform­
ances have often been tested by problems with known answers. A typical ex­
periment was made by Jenness (1932, ref. Metcalfe 1995, 67-68). He asked sub­
jects to estimate the number of beans in a jar. Participation led to consensus but 
did not improve accuracy. Dalkey (1967) found that individuals outperformed 
groups on almanac questions with known answers like "what was the true value 
of the Finnish mark against the US. dollar in J anuary 1990" . 
The results of many studies contradict the "MacGrecor effect". For example 
Kaplan et al. ( 1950, ref. Metcalfe 1995, 68) asked 26 subjects to make over 3000 
separate forecasts based on 16 events in the social and natural sciences. · They 
found that participation in a group of four followed by individual forecasts re­
sulted in 62% correct forecasts. Individuals working alon� were correct in 63% of 
the cases. 
What kind of evidence has been presented conceming the second hypothesis? A 
comparison study of traditionai Delphi and an unstructured, direct interaction 
process was made by Klaus Brockhoff et al. (Brockhoff 1975, 291-321 ). The 
study tried to test directly a group of hypotheses thought to be crucial to the va-
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lidity of the DeIphi method. Their starting point was the traditionaI DeIphi 
method with some exemptions mentioned in the parentheses. 
The participants in the group were not supposed to establish immediate contact 
with each other. They responded to all questions in writing. The responses were 
divided into three c1asses: ( 1 )  responses that were known only to the experiment­
ers ; (2) responses which, after the responses of all participants had been received 
by the experimenter, became objects of computing procedures, the resuIts of 
which were made known to all participants; (3) responses which were recorded 
and made known to all participants without any changes. 
Concerning the DeIphi groups, the first c1ass inc1uded the name of the participant 
and the degree of expertise that he expressed with regard to each question. The 
questions concerned banking and both the DeIphi panellists and the members of 
"normal" control groups beIong to the permanent staffs of the 10caI banks. To the 
second category beIonged the quartile and median values of individual responses 
to forecasting questions. The third category inc1uded all arguments for divergent 
opinions of those whose responses lay outside of the Iower (0.25) or upper quar­
tiles (0.75). The rounds of the DeIphi study meant that DeIphi panellists were 
able to change their minds based on the information (medians, quartiles and ar­
guments of divergent experts) obtained from the previous rounds. 
Beside Delphi groups Brockhoff et al. had face-to-face or normal groups of 4- 10  
persons.  In these groups, the group members were asked to introduce themselves 
to each other by name, field of employment, official position and number of 
years spent in banking. The idea was, as is normal in working groups, to provide 
each participant with a basis for judging the experience of the discussion partners 
in the subsequent discussions. Furthermore, the participants were asked to spec­
ify their degree of expertise for each question on a record. They noted their per­
sonal estimates for each question before any discussion took place. A discussion 
of the problem was expected to follow and unanimous group estimate was re­
quired (Brockhoff 1975, 305). 
Two types of questions were asked: fact finding questions and forecasting ques­
tions. Both questions referred to finance and banking items which were reported 
for example in the monthly statistics of the German Federal Bank. In all cases, 
the correct responses could be verified objectively at the time of the experiments 
or of a later date. 
In these conditions, Brockhoff et al. tested the following hypotheses: 
1) With increasing group size, the group performance increases ceteris paribus.  
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2) With increasing self-evaluated expertise, group performance increases ceteris 
paribus. 
3) The performance of Delphi groups is ceteris paribus higher than the perform­
ance of natural groups. 
4) The performance of the Delphi groups increases ceteris paribus with increas­
ing number of rounds at least at first. 
5) The variance of answers around the median decreases ceteris paribus with in­
creasing number of rounds. 
6) The performance of a group in answering fact-finding questions is ceteris pari­
bus equal to that in forecasting. 
A c1early statistically confirmatory result was obtained only for the fifth hypothe­
sis, as in most similar laboratory studies, though a reduction of the variance of 
responses also happened in normal groups: the Delphi process evidently pro­
duced consensus, but not better performance compared with the normal group. 
Brockhoff et al. (1975, 320) made the following generally interesting final con­
c1usions: 
1) It cannot be discemed that fact-finding questions are a suitable test material for 
recognizing expertise or appropriate organizational structures for forecasting 
groups (different panellists were good in fact finding and forecasting) 
2) A general positive relationship between group size and group performance 
cannot be recognized. 
3) In face-to-face discussion groups, the measure of the group size must be de­
termined by the number of active participants. 
4) Variance reduction almost always occurs in Delphi groups between the first 
and fifth rounds, but the best results are as a rule already known in the third 
round. Further rounds may impair results. 
5) Self-ratings of expertise show a positive relationship to the performance of the 
persons questioned in only two of the four Delphi groups. They tend to be lower 
in face-to-face discussion groups than in Delphi groups, and are determined sub­
stantially by the extent of professional experience rather than being set with re­
gard to the questions in case. It is important to employ and develop better meth­
ods for the determination of expertise. 
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6) Only in the Delphi group with the greatest exchange of inforrnation did re­
searchers observe a positive relationship to group perforrnance. The results indi­
cate that in small Delphi groups more opportunities for information exchange 
should be given. 
Woudenberg ( 199 1)  has made a summary of the studies - including the study of 
Brockhoff discussed above - relevant for the first and the second hypotheses. In 
these studies the accuracy of the Delphi was compared with a staticized group; 
unstructured, direct interaction; and structured direct interaction. The summary is 
presented in table 4. 1 .  In most studies no statistical comparison between methods 
was made. According to Woudenberg, a slight - but not unequivocal - indication 
for Delphi's expected higher accuracy as compared with unstructured, direct in­
teraction can be observed. A similarly unequivocal suggestion can be made in 
Delphi's lower accuracy as compared with the staticized group. The comparison 
between Delphi and structured, direct interaction suggests that there is no differ­
ence in accuracy. The conclusion made by Woudenberg ( 199 1)  was that the 
comparisons between Delphi and all other methods show no difference. 
Table 4. 1 Pairwise Comparisons ofthe Accuracy of Judgment Methods 
Delphi 
More Equally Less 
accurate accurate accurate 
Staticized group vs Delphi 2 1 5 
Unstructured, direct interaction vs Delphi 5 3 2 
Structured, direct interaction vs Delphi 2 4 2 
AlI methods vs Delphi 9 8 9 
The summary of W oudenberg is as questionable as the summary of Amstrong 
( 1985) discussed in the paragraph 4. 1 .  The comparison of studies does not prod­
uct very inforrnative results without taking into account the differences of situa­
tions in the studies. 
Zajonc ( 1965, ref. Hewstone et al. 1995) has presented perhaps the most impor­
tant situational factor relevant for the accuracy of judgments of statizised groups 
and of groups with social interaction. The basic suggestion of Zajonc was that the 
presence of others led to improved perforrnance (social facilitation) if subjects 
worked on easy, well-learned tasks. However, the presence of others led to im­
paired performance (social inhibition) if subjects were engaged in difficult tasks 
which were not (yet) well learned. 
Zajonc's theoretical explanation was that audiences enhance the elUlSSlon of 
dominant responses. A dominant response is described as the response which 
1 7 1  
prevaiIs, that i s  which takes precedence in a subject's response repertoire in a 
given stimulus situation. In easy tasks, Zajonc argues, that the correct responses 
are dominant and therefore audiences facilitate performance of easy tasks, e.g. 
pedalling a bicycle. However, in complex tasks the wrong answers tend to be 
dominant, and therefore audienees give rise to performanee deterioration on sueh 
difficult tasks. 
The results of a Delphi study by Dalkey ( 1 969, Woudenberg 1 99 1 ,  1 36 ) ean be 
explained by the argument of Zajone. Dalkey asked students to answer simple 
almanac-type questions such as "In what year was nylon invented" .  In this study, 
the answers mostly improved as a result of Delphi process. On the other hand, the 
questions in the study of Brockhoff et al. ( 1975) were rather difficult. The domi­
nant responses were probably not better than the answers of single panellists. 
One of the Brockhoffs conclusions concerned the third hypothesis. The hypothe­
sis obtained only weak or no support from the study. It seems that second best 
experts are often better evaluators than the first best experts beeause the first best 
experts are often inc1ined to make response errors, as will be diseussed more 
c10sely in Chapter 5 .  
The perceived expertise and the social proofs are c10sely related. Henehy and 
Glass ( 1 968, ref. Hewstone et al. 1995) made an experiment which direetly illus­
trates the role of perceived expertise in group decision making. They assigned 
subjects to one of four conditions: "alone", "expert together" (Le. task perform­
ance in the presenee of the others, explicitly introdueed as experts); "non-expert 
together" (Le. task performance in the presence of two non-experts) and "alone 
reeorded" (in which the subjeet performed the task alone, but was filmed for later 
evaluation of experts) .  In this experiment eonforrnity responses only oecurred in 
the experts-together and alone-recorded eonditions, while task performance in the 
non-expert-together eondition was similar to that in the aio ne eondition. The 
study elearly supports the eonc1usion, that for the validity of the judgement the 
distorted judgement of a pereeived expert is espeeially damaging. In a version of 
the Aseh experiment more eonformity was obtained if the group firstly gave right 
answers (Di Vesta 1959). 
4.5 Evaluation of the EmpiricaI Results from the Point of View of 
Option and Commitment ReasonabiIity 
We have seen in the previous ehapter that the real focus of the reeent national 
technology Delphi studies is more on option reasonability or the eommitment 
reasonability than on prediction reasonability. The studies are not seeking what 
will actually happen but what will reasonably happen from the point of view of a 
single actor or from the point of view of a group of committed actors. Recent 
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foresight studies he lp actors to make choices conceming futures. A common 
feature of the empirical studies discussed above was that future developments or 
other evaluations on which the study subjects had no impact or a minor impact 
were asked. The subjects looked at topics as outsiders. 
In the previous paragraph I evaluated Woudenberg's summarizing study con­
cerning the prediction accuracy of the Delphi method in comparison with other 
methods. Woudenberg's results obtain new interpretations, if we remove the im­
plicit "outsider assumption" of the discussed studies. Woudenberg's result, that 
statizised groups make more accurate judgments than Delphi groups, is reason­
able in short run predictions based on existing plans of actors like the plans con­
cerning the buying of cars. If somebody has a ready pIan to buy a commodity, it 
is reasonable to assume that the information got from hirn or her is more valid, if 
she or he does not take into account the impression which he or she gives to other 
people. If she or he takes into account the impression, he or she is inclined to an­
swer in a way that makes her or hirn to look good. If the asked product is socially 
approved, respondents might overestimate their purchases and vice versa. 
If the social commitment is, however, very dear and publie, a person is not capa­
ble to behave unlike he publidy expresses. Amstrong ( 1985, 83) has cited a sim­
ple study where the correlation between intentions to donate to a church and ac­
tual donations was .92. In this case the church asked members to sign pledges. 
As was discussed in the chapter 3, option reasonability or commitment reason­
ability of an option does not implicate its predictive reasonability . It is also so 
that all prediction reasonable (or rightly predicted) events are not option or com­
mitment reasonable. It is possible that a realized event (or a realized technology 
generalization) is actually reasonable from nobody's point of view. 
I consider that a main function of recent technology foresight studies has been to 
increase the prediction reasonability of commitment reasonable technology gen­
eralizations or at least option reasonable technology generalizations. This aim 
means that relevant actors have not to regret those technology generalizations, 
which will be realized. The discrepancy between the prediction reasonability and 
the optionlcommitment reasonability has many causes. A basic cause for the dis­
crepancy between the prediction reasonability and the option reasonability is that 
actors do not know different options or do not have enough valid information 
concerning impacts, feasibility and relevancy aspects of technology generaliza­
tion alternatives. A special problem related to the discrepancy between the pre­
diction reasonability and the commitment reasonability is that an actor is not able 
or does not like to tell his or her real future pIan. This is connected with the 
problem of tacit or hidden knowledge which I discussed in the previous chapter. 
If experts do not know each others plans, they cannot build a co-ordinated pIan, 
which is more commitment reasonable choice. 
173 
How should the hypotheses discussed in the previous paragraph be fommlated 
from the point of view of the optionlcommitment reasonability? Let us assume 
that an evaluated future event is a possible technology generalization b. The op­
tion reasonability and the commitment reasonability require that for at least one 
actor k the total vaIue of Ib Fb Vb Rbk - Lk is reasonably higher than zero (the 
generalization belongs to the reaI capability limits of k). Based on the definition 
given in the chapter 3, this means that if k does b, she or he will not repent or 
regret it. In practice, it is of coarse beforehand impossible to decide, which op­
tions will not be repented. One can only present arguments related to repentance, 
as one can present arguments conceming true predictions. From the points of 
view of the option reasonability and the commitment reasonability it is possible 
to formulate the three hypotheses in the following way : 
Hypothesis 1 A communicating expert group can make more valid evaluations 
than separately evaluating experts ( "staticized group") conceming an actor (or 
actors) k who can realize b and will not repent the realization, if the actor( s) 
does it . 
Hypothesis 2 The Delphi method or structured indirect interaction produces 
more valid judgements than the unstructured or direct interaction of experts con­
ceming an actor (or actors) k who can realize b and will not repent the realiza­
tion, ifthe actor(s) does it . 
Hypothesis 3 The experts high in self-evaluated or peer-evaluated expertise pro­
duce more valid judgements than experts who have received low evaluations 
conceming an actor (or actors) k who can realize b and will not repent the reali­
zation, ifthe actor(s) does it . 
Even after k has accomplished b it is very difficult to detect, shouId he or she 
reasonably repent. What we are able to know are arguments conceming the com­
ponents of a reasonable choice: arguments conceming impacts, feasibility, valid­
ity and relevancy of b. New relevant arguments might change the mind of an ac­
tor. If we know arguments which the actor does not know, we might reasonabIy 
suppose that the actor might repent the realization of b.  
The results conceming prediction reasonability are not without qualifications use­
ful for a study focused on option reasonability or commitment reasonability They 
bring to the discussion a new aspect which is not very relevant for prediction rea­
sonability. This is the information policy aspect. 
If a group of outsiders predict realization of technology generalization b, they are 
typically ready to give their best information to the other members of the expert 
panel. The situation is altogether different if panellists are involved in the reali­
zation of b. 
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1 give the following definition for "competent experts" conceming a technology 
generalization b :  competent experts of a technology generalization b are informed 
about most factual arguments relevant for the realization of b and have before the 
argumentation process an opinion conceming the realization of b.  This was the 
criterion which was used in the United Kingdom foresight study for dividing 
Delphi panellists in "experts" and other panellists. Literally the criterion was that 
experts were familiar with the topic "knowing most of the arguments advanced 
for and against some of the issues surrounding it, and had read about it, and have 
formed some opinion about it" (Loveridge et al. 1995, 10)4. 
Competent experts are seldom outsiders in the realization of b, though only about 
one tenth of competent experts considered that they are c10sely involved in the 
realization of a topic based on the UK Technology Delphi survey. In that study 
one-tenth of competent experts c1assified themselves "belonging to that commu­
nity of people who currently dedicate themselves to the topic matter" (the level 5 
of expertise, Loveridge et al. 1995, 1 0- 1 1 , 22). 
Information policies of involved experts are often based on a complex interaction 
process or game among different types of experts or stakeholders. A competent 
expert often likes to hide his or her knowledge because anticipated "negative 
commitment effect". Some experts or their organizations might have already 
started the realization of b but do not report it to other panellists if they do not 
want others to commit themselves to the realization. The actor does not like that 
another decision maker (e.g. a competitor) uses his or her knowledge (e.g. with­
out compensation) in the decision making. 
There are special cases in which avoidance of a negative commitment effect is a 
very reasonable choice. Let us suppose that to the expert group belongs an actor 
k, who is a key person in the realization of b. There might be such a technology 
generalization option c that it is not reasonable for k to realize both b and c, e.g. 
based on resource limitations. It is, however, possible that the realization of both 
b and c belong to the real capability limits of k: if k realizes only b or only c, 
4 In the last Japanese study panellists evaluated their expertise with a scale (NISTEP 1 997,6): 
High: Has considerable specialist knowledge about the topic through current research or work related to 
the topic (including research based on literature); 
Medium: Was once engaged in research or -work related to the topic; or has some specialist knowledge 
about the topic in an adjoining field; 
Low: Has read technical books or literature about the topic or has listened to experts connected with the 
topic; and 
None: Has no expertise. 
The scale in the German study (Cuhls et al. 1 998) gross-mittel-gering-fachfremd was similar to Japanese 
study. "Gross" was, however, perhaps closer to the "high involvement" 5. level of the UK study because 
of a remark: "Dies (gleichen Thema, entspechenden Themen, the author's addition) sind Ihre eigenen 
Arbeitsgebiete!". In reality it is very difficult to control io surveys how the respoodents have interpreted 
the scales. In an interview it is easier. 
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she/he will not regret. From the point of view of another competent expert there 
might, however, be a great difference between b and c. In this situation it is rea­
sonable for the competent expert (let say m) not to tell all the relevant arguments, 
which he/she knows, if the new arguments might change the choice of the first 
key person k between b and c. In this case the optimal infonnation policy of the 
competent expert is not to tell his/ her best infonnation. 
On the other hand, experts try also to produce positive commitment effects. If 
experts want others to commit themselves to some activity they are inclined to 
exaggerate its promises. Two empirical studies cited by Amstrong ( 1985, 88) il­
lustrate the point. Ogburn found that students at colleges with losing football 
teams had forecast that their teams would lose by an average of 3 points. The 
actual defeats averaged 1 8  points. Hultgren examined quarterly forecasts of tons 
of freight shipped over railroads from 1 927 to 1952. The forecasts were made by 
experts employed by railroad shippers. Forecast errors ranged from being too low 
by 1 ,7% to being too high by 40,5%. 
1 think that a basic difficulty in national technology foresight studies is to handle 
the different information policies of experts and impacts of these policies on so­
cial psychological processes in groups of experts. 
Let us focus discussion of the above issue on real choices in national technology 
foresight studies. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the studies have in­
c1uded typically "nominal group stages" and "Delphi stages" .  In the UK foresight 
study (Loveridge et al. 1995), there was a nominal group Panel in every sector or 
in every field of expertise. The Austrian study even has a "staticized group" stage 
where 1000 consumers were asked about their attitudes conceming different 
technologies (Delphi Report Austria 1 1998, 27). The typical nominal group 
stage in the national studies has been the production or the selection of topics for 
different fields of expertise. It has happened in groups of typically 10-25 mem­
bers. Finland has even tried to do almost the whole foresight job in these types of 
groups (Tiellä . . .  1997). Most of the recent national studies have, however, c1ear 
Delphi stages. In these stages, rather large groups of experts (typically 100-300 
persons) had anonymously evaluated any single topic. There has typically been 
only a minimal risk that an expert has been identified by some other experts be­
cause even the feedback arguments have been presented in a standard form 
("proxy arguments").  
The option reasonability (and hence the commitment reasonability) of the na­
tional technology foresight studies is based largely on the quality of evaluated 
topics. The choice oftopics is not a "hannless preliminary stage" in a technology 
foresight process. 1 consider that it is  at least in some connections the most im­
portant stage in the whole process. This has been realized especially well in the 
Austrian national Delphi study. Besides the use of the field-specific working 
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groups, a survey of 1000 consumers and another survey of 370 experts were 
made to specify the most interesting fields and topics for the Delphi stages. Un­
like in the Delphi stages of the Austrian process the firm experts did not dominate 
in the surveys (Delphi Report Austria 1998 1 , 46). 
Let us look at a choice process of topics in a working group. Based on the social 
psychological findings discussed in the paragraph 4.3, the choice process might 
have following problems: 
- Because rigid minorities are disliked (Moscovici and Lage 1976), dissidents in 
the working groups might prefer to co-operate with the majority and with high­
status experts. Members of a working group, who do not accept the judgements 
or arguments of the high status experts, might easily give up the argumentation 
concerning topics. 
- Low-status representatives might present arguments supporting the suggestions 
of high-status experts, because they like to be rewarded by the high-status experts 
(Endler 1965, Lamm and Myers 1978). 
- If there are two or more comparatively equally represented points of views (or 
technological paradigms) in a working group, the result might be many "value 
parties" or relatively separate subgroups inside the working group. The result 
might be "group polarization" with more extreme and conflicting opinions be­
tween the subgroups than the original judgements of the experts (Myers 1982). 
We have real problems with the validity and relevancy of the results if the above 
conc1usions are valid concerning the nominal or Delphi groups of experts used in 
the national technology foresight studies and if the high-status (or best) experts 
are inclined to hide or to distort their best information. 
Is it reasonable to suppose that the above social psychological results do not con­
cern the experts of the national technology studies? Can we suppose that the ex­
perts are less sensitive to. the group influences than the students typically used in 
the experiments? Some experiments have shown that social norms are more ef­
fective than personai properties of individuals. Pettigrew (1958, Avermaet 1 995, 
386) found that white South Africans showed very high levels of anti-black 
prejudice, as did respondents from the southern United States.  In terms of per­
sonality type (e.g. in authoritarianism), they were rather similar to the "normal" 
population. Based on these types of results, it is essential to look at the norms of 
the groups or institutes to which the technology experts belong. The role of sodal 
norms was realized e.g. by the Delphi managers of the first German technology 
Delphi (Grupp 1993, 16):  
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Technische und wissenschaftliche Aktivitäten sind eingebettet und in­
teragieren rnit einer komplexen sozialen Strucktur. Die dabei zu tref­
fenden Entscheidungen, etwa tiber die Aufnahme neuer Arbeitsgebi­
ete, sind nur begrenzt rational, weil sie von erheblichen Unsicher­
heiten und Karrieerwartungen abhängen. 
The scientific institutions typically reward those who present new ideas, even if 
the ideas are only partly validated. We rnight suppose that representatives of sci­
entific institutions do not readily accept majority opinions or the opinions of 
high-status experts because they are rewarded on the basis of early innovations 
and criticality. It is reasonable to suppose that they are comparatively immune to 
group influences. Because of the norms of their institutions, they are also more 
inclined to deliver their best information. They rnight, however, be inclined to 
build "value parties" to support their favorite ideas. 
The group influences seem to be a bigger probIem conceming representatives of 
institutes which appreciate co-ordinated action and Ioyalty more than originality. 
Many firms and government agencies have this kind of norms. The representa­
tives of firms used also be most inc1ined to an information policy restricting the 
delivery of the best information. 
Besides the quality of expert arguments, norms have impacts on the motivation of 
experts to participate in foresight exercises and on their eagemess to produce ar­
guments. Ahti Salo ( 1999) has suggested that the need to consider incentives is 
greatest when the exercise lacks strong support by leading authorities and is not 
related to priority setting. 
4.6 How to Improve the Interaction Processes in Technology Delphi 
Studies? 
In this paragraph, 1 will discuss some possibilities to improve the technology 
foresight processes in order to avoid bad resuIts based on information policies of 
experts and on the effects of group dynamics. 
Anonyrnity, large groups of experts and standardized "proxy-arguments" have 
helped to avoid the combined problem of information policies and group dynam­
ics in the Delphi stages of national technology foresight processes. Most of the 
national studies have also taken into account some weaknesses of classical Del­
phi studies realized e.g. by Brockhoff et al. ( 1975). The consensus of experts is 
no Ionger a special target of the studies. Most studies do not punish the dissident 
views with a special requirement for further argumentation. 
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Though c1ear progress has happened, especially in the Delphi stages of the fore­
sight processes, 1 think that there are still many possibilities to improve the valid­
ity and relevancy of the results of the foresight studies.  My basic suggestions are 
as follows :  
- selection of  working groups and Delphi panels that takes into account the in­
formation policies and group influences beside the experts' expertise in relevant 
arguments; 
- reduction of status differences between the experts used; 
- asking for the best unbiased information of experts and the deliberate use of 
protagonists and antagonists; and 
- active roles of Delphi managers and synthesizers. 
4.6.1 Careful selection of experts based on their positions in the devel­
oper community 
The selection of experts for the national technology foresight studies has been 
based on a balance between representatives of three or four basic types of insti­
tutions: science institutions, firms, regulatory institutions and other e.g. consumer 
institutions. In the last two Japanese studies the share of both company employ­
ees and university related panellists have accounted for 38%, public servants for 
15  % and others for 10% (NISTEPI997, 1 1). In the last German study, the target 
was to get one-third of the experts from industry and one-third from universities 
and other research institutes. One-third of experts in any field of expertise was 
planned to be public servants or representatives of associations (Cuhls et al. 
1998, 7). In the Austrian study, the representatives of firms dominated. They ac­
counted for 56%. The representatives of science accounted for 22 % as did public 
servants and representatives of associations (Delphi Report Austria 1, 1998, 72). 
Representatives of firms also dominated the UK panel. If we divide 26% of the 
panellists in the category "main activity not known" into other categories ac­
cording to their sizes, we get the following percentages: experts working in firm­
related activities 65%, academic research 24 % and others 1 1  % (Loveridge et al 
1995, 21) .  
The dominance of firm representatives in many national panels is a problematic 
feature, when we take into account the above considerations concerning the in­
formation policies of panellists and group influences. ln the next chapter, 1 will 
discuss the norms and information policies of representatives of basic institu- . 
tions, which are relevant in most technology foresight studies. 
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The institutions of developer communities of specific generic technologies are 
divided into 
- basic research and education of generic technologies ; 
- generalization organizations based on specific generic technologies; 
- rival generalization organizations based on different generic technologies; 
- application organizations; 
- regulative or financing organizations; and 
- consumer stakeholders (e.g. political parties, consumer organizations, environ-
mental organizations, trade unions). 
The developer community is a community of experts and their institutions in­
volved in the realization of sirnilar technology generalizations. Though the typi­
cal norms and the information policies of basic institutions give a crude general 
picture of the rules of the game of the technology foresight activities of developer 
communities, any developer community has its peculiar features.  These peculiar 
features have to be taken into account in the selection of panellists. It is not rea­
sonable to assume that the structures of relevant developer communities is known 
before the identification of potential panellists and their real institutions. There 
are many information sources for the identification of potential experts as is e.g. 
discussed in the Delphi Report Austria 1 ( 1998, 70-7 1) :  
- Co-nornination analysis, in  which experts in  a field of issues norninate other ex­
perts based on some criteria of expertise. This can happen using questionnaires 
like those of the UK study (Loveridge et al. 1995) or using telephone contacts as 
in the last German study. 
- Catalogues and Internet homepages of relevant institutions (e.g. research insti­
tutions, universities, associations) 
- Lists and Internet home pages of innovative firms 
- Catalogues of exhibitions. An example was Hawaii communication conference 
attendance used in the study discussed by Ono and Wedemayer, ( 1994). 
- Contributors in expert publications 
- Field specific sources e.g. EMAS certified firms, prize winners. 
It is also possible to do the first norninal group stage or the first Delphi stage in a 
way that makes it possible to add new experts based on feedback from panellists. 
This is also possible in a Delphi stage and not only in a norninal group stage if 
interviews are used in the first Delphi stage as in the Argument Delphi. 
Though the study of Brockhoff et al. ( 1975) is clearly too small and too specific 
for general conclusions, it suggests two conclusions which seem to be important 
for the selection process of the experts used: a) the number of experts is not deci­
sive for valid judgements but the rightly perceived expertise of experts is 
(compare Brockhoff's conclusions 1 ,  2 and 5 in the paragraph 4.4.); and b) the 
active communication of arguments is important and not the size of the group ex-
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changing arguments if the average level of expertise is the same in the compared 
expert groups (Brockhoff' s conclusions 3 and 6). 
The last German study has stressed the number of panellists as the source of valid 
judgements. The report of the study states the following (Cuhls et al. 1998, 7): 
"Because nobody can know exactly what will happen in the future, as many peo­
ple as possible should participate. It has been shown that it is possible to avoid 
individual mistakes based on a great number of answers and so to increase the 
probability of 'right predictions' " .  1 do not deny that large panels might have 
positive impacts on the quality of foresight activities. The most important positive 
impact might be that experts (and citizens) obtain an overview conceming future 
prospects of other experts. Beside positive commitment effects somebody might 
e.g. realize that others have not yet understood the importance of an emerging 
opportunity (compare my discussion conceming the PCR in the paragraph 6 .3) .  
The large panel might also have positive impacts on the validity of judgements 
based on changed information policies of experts. The anonymity is more secure 
in a large panel. On the other hand an expert can present false statements with 
less risk. 
In a trivial but empirically important case the quality of expertise and not the 
number of experts is decisive: a panellist or her/ his organization has already re­
alized a technology generalization with good results but the other experts are un­
aware of it. This has happened at least once in a national technology Delphi study 
of Japan. It can also happen in this type of case that the delivery of information 
conceming the innovation does not belong to the optimal information policy of 
the panellist. In one of the author' s technology Delphi studies an expert asked me 
to mark the realization of an innovation to the year 2010 though the innovation 
was nearly ready in the laboratory of the panellist. 
The analysis of a developer community for the selection of the experts has to take 
into account the personai perspective. Linstone et al. describe the role of the per­
sonal perspective as follows (Linstone et al. 198 1 , 296): 
There are clearly many persons who interact, directly or indirectly, 
with a socio-technological system. There are beneficiaries and victims, 
builders and users, regulators and lobbyists. Then there are the 
"hidden movers" .  These are individuals who, from a second or third 
level position, pull the strings that determine, how things progress. 
Attention is usually so keenly focused on the behaviour of the puppets, 
which is overt, that the effect of the puppeteer, who is hidden from 
view, is ignored . . .  Still, the "gatekeeper", the person who controls the 
information flow in an organization, is often difficult to identify. 
In the selection of experts, technical, organizational and personai perspectives 
should be taken into account in a balanced way. An example discussed by Lin-
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stone e t  al. ( 198 1 ,  3 15-3 16) illustrates the point. Guayule i s  a rubber-producing 
plant suitable for growth in semidesert areas such as the South-westem US. It is 
a substitute for naturaI rubber obtained from the hevea tree. A technology as­
sessment project evaluated the future use guayale (let us calI it the technology 
generalization option b) from different perspectives (Foster et al. 1980). 
From techno-economic perspective, Guayule has been tested and found quite 
satisfactory as a replacement for hevea rubber. A world-wide shortfall of natural 
rubber was anticipated by 2000. The experts who know these types of facts can 
produce important information conceming the impacts (1), feasibility (F) and 
relevancy (R) of b. 
From the organizational perspective, there was a network of researchers which 
has been keeping interest in guayule alive for decades. But this was not sufficient 
to get commerciaIization off the ground. A coalition with adequate leverage was 
needed. Since rubber is a strategic materiaI in the event of a nationaI crisis, both 
the Department of Defence and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
could become the core of this coalition. The organizationaI perspective gives in­
formation conceming a coalition of experts for which the realization of b might 
be a commitment-reasonable choice. It is important that these experts are repre­
sented in the foresight activities. 
From the personai perspective, there was a cruciaI difference between those who 
were emotionally tied to guayule and those who must make commercialization 
decisions. The personai perspective gives hints, e.g. conceming the information 
policies of experts. Linstone et al. (1981 ,  306) made an interesting methodologi­
caI remark: interviews play dominant role in taking into account of organizationaI 
and personai perspectives. This was also realized in the applications of the Ar­
gument Delphi. 
4.6.2 Reduction of status differences between participating experts 
Besides the norms of institutions, the perceived status differences between ex­
perts seem to product bad group influences. In order to avoid perceived status dif­
ferences 1 suggest a "plurality policy' , in the appointment and motivation of ex­
perts. The expertise should not be seen as a one-dimensional phenomenon but as 
a multi-dimensional. The "pluraIity policy" implies that every participating expert 
is a "high-status" expert based on hisl her specific type of expertise. 
A panellist can achieve his or her high status as a representative of an important 
stakeholder group of the developer community. Even if a panellist considers that 
shel he is not a reaI expert conceming a technology generalization, shel he is a 
high-status expert because the expert represents the stakeholder group. In order to 
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avoid bad status effeets it is not reasonable to eommunicate the personai qualifi­
eations of the panellists, though the Delphi managers should seleet the most per­
sonally qualified experts to represent the stakeholder groups. 
The epistemie utility model also provides a sound basis for the plurality poliey. 
Different experts are often best experts in the impaets, feasibility and relevaney 
of teehnology generalizations. The best experts differ in arguments eoncerning 
genuine invarianees, transient invarianees, arguments eoneerning reasons for 
relevaney evaluations or arguments eoneerning eapacity limits of relevant aetors. 
Some persons in a developer eommunity know the possible teehniques, some the 
possible markets of the produets and some are gate keepers of relevant monetary 
or other resourees. The reaetions of some stakeholders - who perhaps do not un­
derstand the teehniques diseussed - indicate the reaetions of ordinary people. 
4.6.3 Asking for the best unbiased information of experts and the 
deliberate use of protagonists and antagonists 
1 eonsider that the argumentation in technology foresight studies should be based 
on the following rule: use the best unbiased information available from an expert. 
As we have diseussed above, the delivery of information ean have positive or 
negative eommitment effeets from the point of view of an expert. The positive or 
negative effeets depend on the type of aetors with whom the information is 
shared. Eerola ( 1996) has divided teehnology foresight studies in three basic 
types: 
1) private technology studies serving primarily individual eompanies or organi­
zations, 
2) joint studies or multi-client studies serving wider business communities that 
share some common interests and 
3) publie technology studies intended to serve the entire society or some impor­
tant parts of it. 
Private teehnology studies that are earried out eonfidentially by eompanies' own 
experts and trustees (consultants, researehers, ete.), although external informants 
may still be widely invited to provide the inputs required. Respeetively, joint 
studies mean teehnology studies that are earried out as joint projeets by all those 
organizations sharing the eosts of the proeess and the resulting messages on fu­
ture technologies. Multi-elient studies refer to technology studies that are carried 
out by eonsultants or researeh institutes that, in turn, sell the resulting study re­
ports to those sharing the interest. The initiative for a multiclient study may also 
come from those buying the study. As for private studies, additional informants 
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can be integrated to provide inputs for joint studies and multi-client studies when 
needed. 
Public studies refer to studies by academic research groups or studies initiated by 
govemmental and political organs. Eerola ( 1996) even classifies academic futures 
research and science fiction literature into this category of technology studies. 
The common feature of all these public studies is that the information generated 
is available to a wide audience against a re1ative1y small charge or sometimes 
even free of charge. 
The published national foresight studies belong to public studies, though some of 
them, for example the UK foresight study, have stimulated private and multi­
client studies. It is evident that the information policies of experts differ in pri­
vate, multi-client and public studies. A firm expert might be ready to transfer his 
or her best information in a private study but not often in a public study. Eerola 
( 1996) considers that though the most important results of private technology 
studies are typically internai and confidential information, it may stilI be advan­
tageous for the company to release some of the results for a wider public. The 
release may be reasonable in order to strengthen the company's argumentation 
power when negotiating the financial arrangements, to create a market for new­
technology products, etc. 
Firms might do an interpretation that national foresight studies are like joint 
studies: they can be seen as ways to cut down the costs of foresight because indi­
vidual companies and organizations do not have to pay for the process and its re­
sults. Firms might also try to use the studies seriously for building of coalitions 
for the realization of some options.  The problem is of course that unlike a genu­
ine multi-c1ient study a firm cannot communicate only with its potential partners. 
It cannot exc1ude competitors from the information. On the other hand, a firm can 
find some new possible partners which it has not realized before. It can also start 
after the public study a joint study with promising partners. 
How to optimize the sought information in a public technology foresight study? 
Let us suppose that an expert knows an argument which makes the realization 
process of a technology generalization feasible for many experts. A reasonable 
information policy of the expert is to try to maximize positive commitments and 
to minimize negative commitments of other experts . 
If the expert hopes that all other experts will commit to the realization, he or she 
is ready to transfer the argument as explicitly as possible. Sometimes the argu­
ment, however, is the tacit knowledge of the expert or he or she is otherwise in­
capable to communicate the argument reliably. In an extensive foresight study 
where opportunities to argument are limited, a reasonable information policy of 
the expert might be to distribute the information only in the form of standard 
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proxy arguments. In this special case an index which tells how sure the expert is 
and possibilities to give e.g. Internet sources for further information might be 
useful for further argumentation and contacts. 
If the expert wishes to exc1ude some other actors from the information, vague in­
formation about the innovation might also be a proper policy. If it is possible e.g. 
using Internet to make contact with the interested experts, the expert can choose 
with whom he or she will co-operate. If the expert wishes to exc1ude all or most 
others from the information, he or she might, however, give the information in a 
distorted way. 
I think that the use of the Argument Delphi inc1uding the use of protagonists and 
antagonists is an effective further stage of the national foresight studies.  The Ar­
gument Delphi works properly if positive commitment effects dominate. The 
domination is in practice possible if the study is focused on a few issues and if all 
participants see other participants as potential partners. It is reasonable to see the 
Argument Delphi stages more as multi-client studies than as public studies.  The 
results of this stage should be open to non-participants only if the participants 
agree. 
4.6.4 Active roIes of Delphi managers and synthesizers 
Based on the above discussion, I suggest the following partly overlapping stages 
for national technology foresight processes: 
a) Analysis of developer communities of studied technologies and the selection 
of core experts based on that information. 
b) Use of core experts in the selection of further experts and the definition of is­
sues and topics in nominal groups or using interviews. 
c) The first "neo-c1assical" Delphi stage like e.g. in the last Japanese, German or 
Austrian study (NISTEP 1997, Cuhls et al. 1998, Austrian Delphi Report 1 ,  
1998). The production of proxy-arguments or standard factual arguments and 
hints for further information. 
d) Possibly the second neo-c1assical Delphi stage. 
e) Argument Delphi stage. 
1 call typical two Delphi rounds of existing national technology Delphi studies 
"neo-c1assical" because their main features are similar to those of the c1assical 
Delphi studies in the 1960s. There is, however, one c1ear difference between 
c1assical and neo-c1assical Delphi stages:  consensus is no longer sought. 
The Argument Delphi might replace the second neo-c1assical Delphi stage or 
follow it. It can be based for example on those experts who are eager to find 
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partners for the realization of some specific technology generalizations. The Ar­
gument DeIphi stage might focus more on commitment reasonability than the 
neo-classkal DeIphi stages. The readiness to provide extra information in earlier 
stages of the foresight process is an indicator of the willingness to participate in 
the Argument DeIphi stage. lf simiIar topics or issues are discussed in technology 
foresight studies in different countries, it is reasonable ta make Argument DeIphi 
stages internationally. In chapter 6, 1 will discuss some possible features of this 
type of exercise in more detail. 
1 suggest that DeIphi managers should have an active roIe in every stage of the 
process. 1 aIready mentioned that a key task in technology forecast studies is to 
uncover the structures of deveIoper communities. An active role of Delphi man­
agers in a neo-c1assical DeIphi stage is to ask for hints af further information 
concerning some issue(s), for exampIe the Internet addresses or articles of the 
panellists. 
Because there are few deveIoper communities without controversies or "value 
parties",  relatively neutral and independent DeIphi managers are needed for 
proper anaIysis and selection of the experts used. It seems to be an advantage if 
the main DeIphi manager is not closely integrated with the developer community 
of the field studied. 
On the other hand, it is highIy important that in all phases of the process Delphi 
managers obtain relevant information from experts. Experts are often not ready to 
argue seriously with persons whom they do not consider experts. Many consider 
that active participation in a developer community is a necessary condition for 
the needed expertise. A feasible solution is to establish a group of DeIphi manag­
ers which consist of one or more independent researchers and some qualified ex­
perts af the developer community studied. At Ieast an advisory board of respected 
experts is needed. 
Beside independent Delphi managers, the role of experts in many topic areas or 
synthesizers (compare the Chapter 1 )  is important in the avoidance of the bad ef­
fects of information policies. Cuhls and Kuwahara ( 1994, 2) made this point in 
the comparative study of German and Japanese technology DeIphi studies as 
follows: 
The success of the method depends heavily on the seIection of the 
speciaIists to be questioned. It must be borne in mind that specialists 
who are involved in a particular deveIopment often tend to rather op­
timistic estimates. An important rule resuIts from this for such sur­
veys: well-informed specialists who are not activeIy involved in a par­
ticular area should be encouraged to express an opinion about that 
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area . . .  (p.7) Participants who want to shift the group's opinion will as­
sume extreme positions . . .  
It i s  reasonable that for example in  the working groups which make the final se­
lection of the experts used, inc1ude generalists or synthesizers as in the latest 
German national study. 
The active role of Delphi managers and synthesizers might prevent biases of the 
information policies of experts and bad group influences. 1 consider that Delphi 
managers should not only be technical collectors and transmitters of the opinions 
of panellists, but also active synthesizers or even provocateurs in the stage, where 
issues and topics are formulated in working groups. Delphi managers should sup­
port those minority panellists who have presented arguments which other experts 
cannot nullify. Support for minorities is reasonable because of the typical lag in 
the publie approval of the ideas of minorities. Minorities can at first expect only 
private change of minds and only later publie change of opinions (Moscovici and 
Personnaz 1980, Avermaet 1995, 365-366). If a minority is not supported, it eas­
ily yields or begins to behave in a rigid or dogmatic manner, which makes it less 
influential (Mugny, 1982). 
Delphi managers might try to direct discussion after the first neo-c1assical stage 
so that both minority and majority judgements are more c10sely inspected. Topics 
with a great dispersion of opinions are especially suitable for further inspection. 
Based on open-minded but "second best" experts, more relevant information can 
be sought from the best experts. 
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5. ROLES OF DIFFERENT EXPERT GROUPS IN 
TECHNOLOGY FORESIGHT STUDIES 
5.1 Basic Institutions Relevant for Technology Foresight Studies 
In this chapter 1 will examine the competencies and information policies of ex­
perts in technology foresight studies, based on an analysis of the ruIes of the be­
havior in some basic institutions. 1 suppose that the information policies of ex­
perts depend on three kinds of interacting factors: the personai competencies of 
expert, the norms of their institutions and the organizers of foresight studies.  In 
this paragraph, 1 will look at institutions of experts and organizing bodies. 
1 will Iook more c10sely at experts in six types of institutions:  
- experts in basic research or in basic education, who represent a developer 
community or a technological paradigm 
- experts in technology generalization organizations of a developer community 
(for example 'technology push' firms) 
- generalization experts in rivaling developer communities 
- experts in application organizations of technology generalizations (for example 
'demand pull' firms) 
- experts in regulative or financing organizations 
- consumer stakeholders (e.g. political parties, conslimer organizations, environ­
mentaI organizations, trade unions) 
1 will divide organizations - typically firms - which use technology generaliza­
tions in their products into two basic types: technology generalization organiza­
tions and technology application organizations. Both types of firms do business 
with products based on technoIogy generalizations specific to a developer com­
munity or technoIogical paradigm. 
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Instead of techn010gy generalization finns Daussage et al. ( 1992) speak about 
firms with technology cluster strategies. Finns with a technology cluster strategy 
(or technology generalization finns) interpret technological potential to be analo­
gous to the business. Businesses are viewed as contingent applications of tech­
nological potentials (Daussage et al. 1992, 1 1 1). The technology-cluster strategy 
implies shifting from a financial (allocating resources to businesses) and market­
ing (concentrating on market share, industry attractiveness, etc.) logic, to a logic 
based on research and development competencies) (Daussage et al. 1992, 1 14). 
According to Daussage et al. ( 1992, 108- 109), finns with a technology cluster 
strategy must systematically look for areas of application where, through their 
technology, they are likely to offer better perfonnance, value, or quality than the 
existing products on the market. The finn must be able to assess the competitive 
advantage its technology could create, and whether this advantage offsets its lack 
of familiarity with a particular market. The success of a technology-cluster strat­
egy hinges on a firm's selective capacity. This capacity includes both choosing 
appropriate products and markets, in which to exploit its technological potential, 
as well as selecting "exploitable" generic technologies which are likely to en­
hance its technological potential. A competitor who is faster to master and apply 
new generic technologies thus represents a serious threat, entry into a given in­
dustry being a possible consequence of such advantages (Daussage et al. 1992, 
1 1 1 ) 
Often generalization organizations or organizations applying the technology 
cluster strategy are multinational corporations (MNCs) or their new ventures. 
Even without direct links with MNCs the experts of generalization organizations 
often see the networks of MNCs as their relevant platfonns: the networks of sub­
contractors, research and education institutes, customers, financiers or public 
regulators co-operating with MNCs. If an independent research organization 
works together with a generalization finn for some product based on a techno­
logical paradigm, it is also a generalization organization. 
While technology generalization firms combine generic technologies for some 
impacts, application firms have other key competencies. Daussage et al. ( 1 992, 
I I?) mentions distribution competencies, production competencies and "brand 
image" competencies based on well-known and appreciated products in the mar­
ket. Technology application finns do not typically develop new technical solu­
tions but try to find most suitable technologies for their special needs from the 
market. They often use the services of technology generalization finns for that 
purpose. 
I 1 use the concept "competence" instead of the concept "capabiJity" used by Daussage et al. in order to 
avoid the misunderstandings resulting from the concept "capability limits" in the general theory of con­
sistence. 
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Technology generalization firms and technology application firms start the inno­
vation processes typically from "different ends" of the process. Application firms 
start with the definition of potential products or businesses and, a posteriori, 
identify technology base as a faetor for success ("market puH"). A technology 
generalization firm starts from its technological paradigm (fltechnology push"). 
The competencies and information policies of the technology generalization and 
application organizations are related in the skiHs and commitments concerning 
"paradigmatic languages" .  Beside experts in basic research and education insti­
tutions, technology generalization organizations are key developers of any special 
technological future oriented language discussed in the chapter 2. Any language 
is shared by experts of a technological paradigm and its developer community. 
Generalization experts in rivaling developer communities do at least partly un­
derstand the language of their rivals but they prefer the language of their own 
developer communities. Also, experts in application organizations have some 
competence in technological languages on which their applications are based. 
Because they do not develop new generalizations but only use2 them, it is enough 
that they can use them more or less as "black boxes" .  They are not committed to 
any specific technological language. Experts of regulatory or financing organi­
zations and consumer stakeholders can also take many aspects of technology 
generalizations as black boxes. 
Based on the research foresight activities in the1980s, Irvine and Martin ( 1989, 
27) distinguished seven organizers of research foresight studies: 
1. Government advisory boards or central agencies involved in the co-ordination 
and planning of national science and technology policy. 
2. Independent public-sector advisory councils with a broad remit to identify fu­
ture needs and opportunities for research, as well as potential problems associ­
ated with existing policies. 
3. Academic funding bodies such as research councils, whose primary task is to 
support basic science in higher educational institutions. 
4. National academies of science and other professional organizations of the re­
search community. 
5. Government departments and mission-oriented agencies financing and/or exe­
cuting work in strategic research and basic technology. 
2 Any application process is a kind of innovation or technology generalization process, This process is, 
however, not necessarily based on the paradigmatic language of the developer community, If e,g, a t1rm 
uses mobile phones in its activities, it does not need to understand the digital technology used, 
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6. Industrial associations bringing together groups of companies (often from the 
same technology sector) to discuss matters of common interest or to collaborate 
in longer-term generic research. 
7. Science-based firms in high-technology fields, many of which have been in­
creasing their investment in strategic research. 
We might compare the above mentioned institutions, which had organized tech­
nology foresight studies in the eighties, with the institutions discussed in this 
paragraph. The organizers in group 7 are c1early technology generalization firms 
making typically private or multic1ient studies using the c1assification of Eerola 
( 1996). In foresight studies organized by industrial associations, technology gen­
eralization firms and technology application firms co-operate typically making 
multiclient studies. The regulation seems to be the typical starting point of the 
multic1ient or publie studies organized by govemment departments. 
Academic funding bodies and national academies of science have as the starting 
points of their foresight activities the norms of academic institutions. Because 
universities like to find practical and economically profitable applications for the 
results of their basic research, universities recently co-operate with large technol­
ogy generalization firms. So the foresight activities of universities are often joint 
efforts with firms, which means that academic institutions have to take into ac­
count the norms of firms. The greatest variety of norms is present in the foresight 
activities organized by govemment advisory boards or independent public-sector 
advisory councils. All national technology foresight studies conducted in the 
1990s have been in this category, with the exception of Sweden in the category 
six. My discussion in this study is mostly focused on the se types of publie stud­
ies. 
5.2 Different Types of Experts in Basic Institutions 
In the Chapter 3, I defined six types of factual arguments relevant for technology 
foresight studies: 
1. Option-suggesting arguments 
2. Arguments conceming genuine invariances 
3.  Arguments conceming transient invariances 
4. Arguments conceming reasons for relevancy evaluations 
5 .  Arguments conceming capacity limits of relevant actors 
6. Process arguments. 
In principle, it is possible to divide experts in basic institutions according to their 
expertise in the above arguments. A further aggregation of competencies of ex-
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perts might, however, be reasonable. As  was more closely discussed in  the first 
chapter, we might speak about scientists, decision-makers and synthesizers. Sci­
entists are experts in invariances. It is reasonable to divide them into natural sci­
entists with special competencies in genuine invariances and into behavioural 
scientists with special competencies in transient invariances. 
Decision-makers are experts in the use of resources because they can make deci­
sions conceming the use of resources. Any consumer is an expert conceming the 
use of his or her resources. In organizations, decision-makers are also typically 
experts in the routines of organizations or in process arguments. The routines of 
organizations include also decisions conceming information policy. A "routine" 
is e.g. a decision not to use the information of an expert, if it does not conform to 
one' s own ideas (Innes 1998). The special competence of a synthesizer (or of a 
generalist) is to see "the whole picture" ,  which defines the' reasonability of a 
technology generalization. He or she is especially competent to produce reasons 
for relevancy evaluations3• 
Any expert or organization has a special profile based on the above competen­
cies. An expert might be a decision maker who is a natural scientist but who 
poorly understands the behaviour of customers. He might work in a technology 
generalization organization which is also oriented to natural sciences.  You can 
find single behavioural-sciences-oriented experts in technology generalization 
firms and single technology-push-oriented experts in an application-oriented 
firm. Often these persons are important links between organizations with differ­
ent strategies. Besides these link persons, the managers of organizations or cor­
porations with both technology generalization oriented and technology applica­
tions oriented units are often good synthesizers. 
The scientific expertise of managers is often, however, superficial as was men­
tioned by a scientist interviewed by Burgelman and Sayles ( 1986, 25): 
Sure, there are times when research ideas come down from above. An 
R&D manager may read something in Scientific American, and that 
gets hirn interested in a topic. Of course, by the time it appears there, 
it's already out of vogue in the real scientific world. 
Often you cannot find the best synthesizers in realizing organizations, as Irvine 
and Martin ( 1989, 1 8-19) have remarked. Experts in 'realization organizations 
might be suspicious of radical scientific or technological breakthroughs, espe-
3 We might make a distinction between the special competencies of decision-makers and those of synthe­
sizers using the concepts of the OTe. Decision-makers are special experts in real (or perceived) capacity 
limits and perceived capability limits of relevant actor(s). Synthesizers are comparatively good experts in 
real capability limits. In other words, decision-makers know better, what kinds of decisions will be made 
based on the recent expertise of decision-makers. Synthesizers are better experts in reasonable decisions. 
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cially when they run counter to existing research paradigms and conventional 
wisdom. Parallel problems with this conservatism stern from the difficulties in 
conceiving novel applications for emerging sciences and technologies. For exam­
ple, while the development of the radio was successfully predicted, it was seen as 
a replacement for telegraphy (removing the need for poles and wires) rather than 
as a means of mass communication. This highlights the importance of creative 
and counter intuitive thought. A valuable role in technology foresight can often 
be played by those with broader perspectives such as futurists, journalists and 
science-fiction writers. 
Administrators or marketers might be important initiators of demand-pull-based 
innovation processes. To make the demand-pull approach useful in real technol­
ogy generalization processes, market needs have to be defined in terms that avoid 
both overly broad and overly specific needs. Superficial broad needs (e.g. 
'materials for home building' ) might result in science-push generalization pro­
posals, which do not meet the real market demands. Too specific needs (e.g. 
, cabinet hinge materia!') might restrict science-push generalization processes too 
much (compare Burgelman and Sayles 1 986, 39). Too specific a definition of the 
market demands might hinder new innovations. The success of the Finnish Nokia 
Corporation in late 1 970s in telephone exchange markets is an example where 
immediate market demands misled competitors like LM Eriksson, which put their 
resources in old fashioned analogous exchanges instead of digital ones. 
An important psychological problem in a demand-pull-based innovation process 
is often the lack of a "true believer" because the idea is not the "brainchild" of 
those persons trying to realize it. In contrast, a technical person who becomes a 
"product champion" of a technology push based innovation process has a sense of 
being identified with the process (Burgelman-Sayles 1 986, 42). 
Institutions and positions in institutions have been used to define the types of 
experts in many national technology foresight studies. In the latest Japanese 
study, the main activity of the experts was very much based on their institutions: 
company employee, university related, public servant, other non-company em­
ployee, other ( NISTEPI997, 1 1 ). In the UK technology foresight study the main 
activity of respondents was based on positions in institutions. The main activity 
of experts was divided into the following categories (Loveridge et al. 1995, 21 ) : 
corporate strategy, marketingl business management, production operations, aca­
demic research, industrial R&D, research management, and other. 
In the next sections, 1 will evaluate the expertise and information policies of the 
main expert groups in the basic institutions relevant to technology foresight 
studies. In any section, 1 first discuss the issue and make preliminary conclusions. 
Then 1 will evaluate the preliminary conclusions based on the empirical evidence 
of the author' s studies Kuusi ( 1987, 199 1  and 1 994). 
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5.3. Expertise and Information Policies in Technology Realization 
Institutions 
5.3.1 Discussion and preliminary conclusions 
A key difference between technology generalization firms and technology appli­
cation firms concems the role of generic technologies as assets. It is reasonable to 
suppose that representatives of technology-generalization firms are typically 
more reluctant to give information conceming their technological prospects than 
representatives of technology-application firms. On the other hand, Georghiou 
(1996, 361) has suggested that firms have become increasingly dependent on 
complementary or extemal sources of technology. That is why the formulation of 
strategy, previously an internai activity, must at least in part be carried out in the 
publie arena. By collaborating in their thoughts about the future, organizations 
may be better placed to anticipate the actions of their customers, suppliers and 
others, such as regulators, who are like1y to influence the environment, in which 
they will operate. 
Dependence on extemal sources seems to be reasonable assumption conceming 
technology application firms. They might be rather ready to present even the 
technical details of their forthcoming products, because they wish to find new 
technological solutions for their businesses. But what kind of information policy 
do technology generalization firms have? Even if large corporations need com­
plementary technologies from other firms, they might not be good sources of in­
formation in public technology foresight studies. In the distribution of their best 
expertise they prefer multic1ient studies or the trade of expertise. Based on stud­
ies Kuusi (1991) and Kuusi (1994) a group of "second best" experts, which is 
relatively ready to distribute its best expertise in a publie study, are experts in 
small relatively independent generalization firms selling products not yet ac­
cepted by mainstream corporations. 
Different expert groups in organizations have different interests in sharing infor­
mation. For the choice of panellists in a publie foresight study, an important issue 
concems the relationship between organizational information policies and the 
information policies of single experts. 
Burgelman and Sayles (1986, 17) argue that there is an evitable tension between 
the need of the organization for tangible, commercially profitable results and the 
need of science to make advances in knowledge. Scientists in industry have an 
interest in making intellectual breakthroughs (which will lead to publishable re­
sUlts) and administrators especially in generalization organizations have often 
good reasons to be suspicious about the commercial potential of interesting sci­
entific discoveries made by their scientists. Another problem is that the scientist's 
norms direct work toward projects involving highly specific experiments. On the 
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other hand, if these experiments are successful, they might have very broad im­
plications (Burgelman and Sayles 1986, 26). 
To secure the continuation of his/her technology generalization activity, the sci­
entist is inclined to stress the future prospects of his activity. He/she has a ten­
dency to stress market applications which are straightforward results of research 
work going on in laboratories. The scientist is inclined to address the needs of 
atypical users and to invoke their acceptance of the new product, process, or 
system as evidence for the existence of a new business opportunity (Burgelman 
and Sayles 1986, 38). 
Scientists in industry are not, however, ready to share their visions with anybody. 
They are enthusiastically shared with other decision-makers in his or her organi­
zation because the scientists recognize that the continued funding for their more 
basic research is dependent upon the enthusiasm of senior management 
(Burgelman-Sayles 1986, 19). But how to inform members of the technology de­
veloper community, which do not belong to the organization? 
The scientist usually realizes that sharing information about realized and poten­
tial applications of a generic technology has both negative and positive value for 
their firm and for their future work. A negative value is that present or potential 
competitors get information about techDical achievements or production ideas. 
On the other hand, the share of information also has positive economic value. 
Those who get information may be potential customers or partners or their reac­
tions may anticipate how a technology generalization idea will be approved by 
other experts, or how the potential product will be accepted in market. A gener­
ally accepted norm in knowledge barter is that you have to give some information 
as compensation for the information you need. 
The weights of positive and negative values in information sharing differ when 
a) the shared information concerns technical solutions under development and the 
solutions have not been protected by patents or by other procedures, 
b) the shared information concerns the company's products which are just coming 
on the market or which are already on the market or 
c) the shared information concerns distant applications of a generic technology. 
In the first case, a business scientist does not usually openly distribute the infor­
mation. In the second case, a possible solution is to deliver information openly 
but only as much as is needed to convince the customers. If, for example, the 
quality of a product can be clearly stated without hints to the manufacturing 
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process, an attempt may be made to retain the manufacturing process as a busi­
ness secret. 
In the third case, at least scientists in enterprises are often ready to behave like 
scientists in basic research. Some experts, however, consider that a contemplation 
of distant uses of a generic technology is useless and has only a tiny economic 
value. Some others think that the free exchange of information is a useful way to 
find new solutions. They may also think that it is an intellectually exciting enter­
prise. 
Scientific experts in developing tasks in companies sometimes experience diffi­
cult role conflicts. In their role as scientists, they have an interest in spreading 
information about their findings and their favorite theories. In interview situa­
tions, the role conflict is expressed by a statement like "1 am talking now about 
confidential matters, do not mention this in your report". A similar type of prob­
lem is experienced by business experts whose ethical convictions forbid lying. 
It is often difficult to evaluate which level in the organization has the most rele­
vant information about real technical possibilities of technology generalization. 
Often, the R&D director of a corporation is no long a real expert in technical 
matters. The R&D manager of the corporation studied by Burgelman and Sayles 
( 1986, 22) explained this as follows: 
Y ou cannot write plans without the experts - and I am no longer an 
expert. The only thing I can do is to make a resource commitment and 
describe the scope within which we can then flesh out a program. So 
what I do is generate and set limits to research "envelopes" , but I do 
not define specifically what goes into them. I can put limits on it, as­
sign priorities, ask questions, go through project reviews, and give 
policy directions. Remember I have about 50 projects to oversee! 
Though lower level R&D persons in large corporations are not necessarily good 
generalists, they might often be better ("second best") choices for public infor­
mants both because of their expertise and their information poliey, especiaIIy if 
the anonymity of their answers is secured. 
Though administrators and marketers in realization organizations may also have 
scientific interests, their main concern is to seek commercial applications to in­
ventions. It is reasonable to suppose, that they see more clearly their expertise as 
a merchandise than company scientists. If expertise has an economic value, they 
are ready to deliver it only in barter (information in exchange for other informa­
tion) or against another type of compensation. If this type of expert does not get 
an adequate compensation, he or she is inclined to deliver information in a very 
general form or even in a biased form, as happened in a study of the author. 
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The assessment of "adequate compensation" is in no way simple. In publie stud­
ies, the use of adequate economic compensations is usually impossible. Often an 
adequate compensation is publicity for new products of the corporation. Some­
times adequate compensation might improve image. For example, positive envi­
ronmental impacts of the new production processes may improve the company's 
image and its market position. 
It is often impossible to get unbiased information from these experts about inno­
vation processes concerning technical solutions under development, if the solu­
tions have not been protected by patents or by other procedures. The possibilities 
to get unbiased information are radically better if the shared information concerns 
the company's products which are just coming on the market or which are already 
on the market or if it concerns distant applications of a generic technology. 
Because it is often difficult to get from administrators or marketers relevant in­
formation concerning decision-making or potential demand for products, it is rea­
sonable to use "second best" experts such as independent social or consumer sci­
entists. The good expertise of managers can sometimes be used in a way which 
takes into account the biases in their information sharing. In an expert panel of a 
future generic technology, a manager of a realizing corporation is often a good 
evaluator of the economic realism of other panellists. He is especially good in 
pointing out the weak points in the arguments of competitors of his or her firm. 
5.3.2 Empirical evidence 
My three technology foresight Delphi studies (Kuusi 1987, 1991 ,  1994) give 
some hints at the biases in information sharing concerning technical solutions 
which have not been protected by patents. Because the answers of experts on the 
Delphi panels were confidential, the empirical evidence does not reveal the iden­
tity of the respondents. 
When experts were not ready to give their best information, they used four types 
of answering strategies: 
1 .  Focusing on other topics 
2. Open "no comment" answers 
3. Commenting on general level 
4. The displacement answer. 
If the main objective of a technology foresight study is to produce future options 
for a generic technology, the first answering strategy produces the most biased 
answers. This type of bias was met when an administrative research manager of a 
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large technology corporation used much time in an interview to talk about mar­
ginal applications and not about those applications which were intensively stud­
ied in his corporation. If an expert uses this strategy he or she can even assert that 
the topic intensively studied by his organization is irrelevant. 
Some firms have given confidential rules to their experts to give "no comment" 
answers to questions concerning details of their delicate technology generaliza­
tion processes. If the "no comment" area covers the general ideas behind the 
planned application, it is a difficult but not as disastrous source of biases as the 
focusing on other topics strategy. If one is looking at applications which will be 
realized in 5-20 years, the general idea of an innovation is often a sufficient basis 
for reasonable discussion about future applications. Moreover a elear "no com­
ment" answer gives a hint to make questions to other experts. 
Clearly, the most commonly used strategy of experts in technology realization 
organizations in the studies of Kuusi ( 1987, 199 1 ,  1994) was commenting on 
general level. No expert in the studies ever gave a "no comment" answer con­
cerning some specific innovation, and then refused to discuss the topic on a more 
general level. An explanation seems to be that firms or their competitors normally 
had nearby "first generation" products which were just coming on the market or 
which were already there. 
A typical example of the answers on the general level concerned rapid diagnoses 
based on monoelonal antibodies. The panellists in the study of Kuusi ( 199 1 )  an­
ticipated that their use will be important in future diagnostics. No specific exam­
ples of future applications were, however, given besides the pregnancy tests al­
ready on the market at the time of the study. In 1997, the Finnish firm Medix 
Biochemica received the national export reward based on their 80 rapid diagnosis 
products. Beside different types of pregnancy tests their products ineluded tests 
used to diagnose the health of new-born babies. This firm was active in this area 
already by the time of the interviews (in 1989), but Delphi experts did not men­
tion their activity. An explanation was the "low profile" information strategy of 
the firm. The managing director of the company explained this strategy in a 
newspaper interview as follows: 
"Our customers are in any case abroad, and so we have kept a rather 
low profile." 
A long time horizon in public technology foresight study is desirable. An impor­
tant reason is the possibility to use the "displacement effect" in opening future 
options. By "displacement effect" 1 refer to a special kind of answering strategy 
for experts. Its most explicit form was exemplified by a firm-scientist panellist 
who in an interview openly tried to solve the dilemma of business secrets and 
option production for the study. The dilemma was that an application of a generic 
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technology was nearly ready in the expert's finn, but it was not protected by pat­
ents or by other procedures. The result of the discussion was that this technology 
generalization was positioned in year the 201 0. This date was more than ten years 
later than the true anticipated realization time. 
5.4 Expertise and Information Polides of Basic Researchers and 
Educators 
5.4.1 Discussion and preliminary conclusions 
Unlike in firms, the nonns of universities are typically accepted by basic re­
searchers. A recent problem is, however, that some universities might have more 
uncIear norms than earlier because of increased business activities of universities . 
Based on their norms, university researchers typically see the transfer of their 
knowledge as a kind of mission. Many of them adopt an attitude to knowledge as 
an articIe for barter (information in exchange for other information) only for 
unique knowledge (compare Zucker et al., 1 995). A genuine basic scientist sel­
dom interprets his knowledge as merchandise. 
The best expertise of scientists in basic research concerns general technical pos­
sibilities or laws recently found or invariances of nature. The invariances, which 
a scientist in basic research presents, are usually quite well supported. A scientist 
also usually presents the reservations which are related to his or her knowledge 
without a special request. 
A scientist in basic research is a good critical evaluator of the scientific informa­
tion presented by other experts. He or she is often an excellent person to uncover 
another expert's purposeful hiding or misrepresentation. On the other hand, he or 
she is typically short of expertise in production costs or the potential market de­
mands for potential new products based on new inventions.  Irvine and Martin 
( 1989, 1 9) considered that academics are especially over-optimistic concerning 
the prospects for the exploitation of their results, in particular the time horizon 
for commercialization. Irvine and Martin considered that academics fai! to antici­
pate institutional constraints (such as resistance to investing in specialized 
equipment or infrastructure) or they misjudge the social response to technological 
developments (for example ethical problems or consumer resistance). 
Scientists in basic research can be divided into two types. The first type is careful 
to present only an invariance which has been successfully established. The in­
formation transmitted by this type of scientist is trustworthy but its scope is typi­
cally narrow. The second type is directed to syntheses and theoretical generaliza­
tions. This kind of scientist willingly emphasizes the development which is con-
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nected with his favorite theory, but may ignore the possibility of another kind of 
technical development. He or she does not often present invalid factual argu­
ments. 
Scientists in basic research sometimes have conflicting roles when they are en­
gaged not only in scientific work but also in businesses recently often organized 
by universities. He/she can also function as a representative of a civic organiza­
tion. Even a "pure" scientist may experience a role conflict because basic re­
search and commercial applications are nowadays often c10sely interconnected. 
As Nelson ( 1993) has noted, the c1aim that new commercial technologies have 
given rise to new sciences is at least as true as the other way around. 
5.4.2 Empirical evidence 
What kind of evidence was found in the studies of Kuusi ( 1987, 1 99 1  and 1 994) 
conceming the behaviour of scientists as members of Delphi panels in publie 
technology foresight studies? The Delphi panels were selected by a co­
nomination process started from experts working for applied research especially 
in VTT (the Technical Research Centre of Finland); in a financing or co­
ordination organization for applied research especially in TEKES ( Technology 
Development Centre of Finland); or in firms. The result was that only a few pan­
ellists were real "pure" scientists and even they used to have some experience in 
technology generalization activities. 
The studies provide no c1ear example of an unrealistic scientist conceming pro­
duction costs or potential market demands. Actually, if the answers of the bio­
technology study given in 1989 are compared with the real situation in 1999, it 
seems that experts from universities and publie health research institutes made 
better evaluations e.g. conceming the tumover of diagnostics business (typically 
100-300 MFmk) than the representatives of firms (typically 300-500 MFmk). 
As was discussed in the chapter 3, the prediction reasonability of evaluations is 
not necessarily compatible with the true epistemic utility of choices (or other 
types of reasonability). Unlike the study conceming new materials (Kuusi 1 994), 
the biotechnology study (Kuusi 1 991)  did not make an attempt to evaluate the 
type of reasonability of evaluations. The above result at least shows, that basic 
researchers were not overoptimistic in comparison with firm experts, as was sug­
gested by Irvine and Martin ( 1989). If we could use the prediction reasonability 
as the proxy indicator of the general reasonability, at least in this case the criti­
cality of scientists without c10se connections to business, was more relevant for 
realistic evaluations than the practical expertise of business experts possibly bi­
ased by business related information policies of technology generalizing firms. 
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Clear examples of the above mentioned two types of university scientists were 
found. The "narrow mind" type of university scientists made focused comments 
in the studies Kuusi ( 199 1 )  and Kuusi ( 1994). Some scientists working in the ar­
eas of animal biotechnology, plant biotechnology and ceramic materials gave 
detailed and informative comments concerning their special ties but were not ea­
ger to comment on other areas. On the other hand, there were enthusiasts of new 
biotechnology and of new tailor-made materials who were ready to comment on 
nearly all types of applications of generic technologies discussed. Many of the 
best synthesizers were found in the national research institute VTT, which is 
"between" basic research and firms. 
The critical role of a scientist was best exemplified by a company scientist spe­
cialized in conventional plant breeding activities instead of the use of new gene 
technology. He transmitted much material to the Delphi managers concerning the 
possible dangers of the use of gene technology in the breeding of plants and also 
in other application areas. 
The conflicting roles of scientists did not result in very difficult problems in the 
studies because the topics were discussed on a rather general le veI. The scientists 
of public research institutes or universities function as good control persons for 
the scientific realism of promising application areas proposed by other experts. 
5.5 Expertise and Information Policies in Institutions of Rival 
Technologies 
5.5.1 Discussion and preliminary conclusions 
Like the experts of the generic technology discussed the experts of rival techno­
logical paradigms can be divided into basic researchers, educators, experts in 
technology generalization or application firms, experts in regulative organizations 
and representatives of consumers. Experts in the application firms of the dis­
cussed technology and experts in the application firms of rival or complementary 
technologies do not differ considerably because of common application areas. 
The same also concerns experts in regulative organizations and representatives of 
consumers. On the other hand, the expertise and interests of basic researchers, 
educators and experts in technology-generalization firms differ considerably. 
If an expert of a rivai technology is also an expert in the discussed technology he 
or she is a potential excellent critic. His or her critic may, however, be biased. 
Like an expert of a generalization firm of the discussed technological paradigm, 
he or she realizes that information sharing has both negative and positive com­
mitment effects. The negative commitment effect is that competitors get informa­
tion for the further development of their rival products. On the other hand, the 
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sharing of information might also have positive commitment effects. Those who 
get information might be potential customers or partners or their reactions may 
anticipate how a technology generalization idea is approved by other experts or 
how the potential product will be accepted by the market. 
The sharing of critical information with application firms is reasonable if the 
technological paradigms can substitute or complement each other in the products 
of application firms. If the technological paradigms might complement each other 
like metal materials and polymer materials in composite materials, the exchange 
of information between firms with different technological paradigms might be 
very reasonable. It is even possib1e that the paradigms will be merged. 
Scientists in the basic research of the rival technology have different information 
policies than company scientists. An expert in basic research directed at the syn­
theses or theoretical generalizations might be more interested in communication 
than narrow-minded specialists. In the case of complementary technologies, the 
biases resulting from the information policies might be less urgent. 
5.5.2 Empirical evidence 
In the studies of Kuusi ( 1987, 1991 ,  1994), the role of rival experts was impor­
tant especially in the study, which was focused on future polymer materials 
(Kuusi 1994). Rival experts were experts in metals and in ceramic materials. A 
problem was evident already in the beginning of the study: the scientific develop­
ers of polymer or plastic materials and the scientific developers of metal materi­
als were not familiar with recent developments in rival materials. The attitude of 
some scientific developers of metals was defensive concerning the future possi­
bilities of advanced polymer or polymer composite materials. 
5.6 Expertise and Information Policies in Regulative or Financing 
Institutions 
5.6.1 Discussion and preliminary conclusions 
Experts in public regulative or financing organizations can in many ways con­
tribute to the diffusion of a generic technology. They transmit information and 
ideas to political decision-makers . Regulative or financing organizations often 
have direct influence on infrastructure decisions. Most of them decide on loans 
and on support for generalizations and applications of technologies. 
Norms of regulative institutions are in a favour of the provision of open informa­
tion concerning existing regulations and the reasons for regulations. Experts of 
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these institutions are usually ready to tell about regulation or technology infra­
structure altematives extensively even at the early preparation phase because they 
like to be aware of possible effects and reactions on different choices. 
Civil servants are often good arbitrators of interests because they often have ex­
tensive contact networks in a developer community and because they are often 
considered to be more neutral than other expert groups. Sometimes, the experts in 
the banking sector have play a similar role as an arbitrator. 
5.6.2 EmpiricaI evidence 
In the studies of Kuusi ( 1987, 1991 ,  1994), experts in public regulative or fi­
nancing organizations had an important synthesizing role. The organization be­
hind the first study (Kuusi 1987) was the Finnish Govemment Consultative 
Committee of Information Technology. The General Secretary of the consultative 
committee was an expert who knew the experts working in the field in Finland. 
He was also capable of making many useful synthesizing comments. The similar 
role in the New Biotechnology study (Kuusi 1991)  was played by both experts at 
VTT and by an expert who was responsible for the area of genetic engineering in 
Technology Development Centre of Finland (TEKES), responsible for the public 
funding of technology in Finland. In study Kuusi ( 1994), the role of experts in 
waste management working in the Ministry of Environment was more specific. 
They gave useful comments conceming the forthcoming national and EU regula­
tion of waste management. 
5.7 Expertise and Information Policies or Consumer Stakeholders 
5.7.1 Discussion and preIiminary conclusions 
The Austrian foresight report remarks that "the most foreign studies have focused 
on the supply side of the technology" (Delphi Report Austria 1 ,  50). For exam­
ple, it often happens that developers of a new technology are men, though the 
majority of the planned future "consumers" of the technology are women. The 
lack of consumer stakeholders in expert panels explains at least partly the fact 
that he share of women has been very low in national technology foresight stud­
ies. In joint German-Japanese Delphi study, female participants in the Japanese 
study accounted only 1-2 percent and in the German study four percent ( Cuhls 
and Kuwahara 1994, 19). Beside the genre-distributions, the age distributions of 
participants used also to be rather biased. In the UK study, panellists younger 
than 30 years accounted 1 % (Loveridge et al. 1995, 21) .  The highest share of 
women was achieved in the Austrian study, where it was 12,5%. The share of 
panellists younger than 30 years was also in comparison with other studies high: 
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3,9% (Delphi Report Austria 1 ,  74). This indicates that the Austrian study was 
taken more seriously than other studies the task of selecting experts who can 
evaluate the "consumption" of technologies from the point of view of earlier ne­
glected groups of people. The shares of women and young people were, however, 
still low even in the Austrian study. 
The large share of men and middle aged or older panellists might be a reasonable 
choice based on expertise on arguments conceming technical feasibility or main 
impacts of technology generalizations. Before there are first realized applications 
of a technology, even the anticipation of negative side effects or side impacts re­
quires the technical competence. Men at least in middle ages might be best in this 
competence, but established experts are often in lack of critical mind of their 
younger or women coIleagues. 
In any case, the evaluation of the relevance of impacts needs, however, feedback 
from consumers or from "ordinary citizens" .  Often consumers are suspicious 
about the suggested impacts of products. Instead of irrational conservatism, this 
skepticism is sometimes proved to be a very reasonable attitude. Consumers 
know old products and they have often seen that new products do not meet their 
suggested promises or produce unanticipated side effects like the nuc1ear energy. 
Often consumers want to continue their old habits with new products. This is 
relevant especiaIly for food, as e.g. Pantzar ( 1992) has shown in the competition 
between butter and margarine in Finland. 
How can experts for the evaluation of the "consumption" of technologies be 
found? A solution is a survey like that of the Austrian foresight study (Delphi 
Report Austria 1 ,  1998), where average consumers evaluate possible trends in 
technological development. The problem is, that it is very difficult to present 
potential technology generalizations in a way, which help average consumers to 
make well-informed choices. 1 think that a better solution wQuld be to use better 
informed consumer stakeholders. 
It is, however, not easy to select proper consumer stakeholders. Workers of con­
sumer organizations or environmental organizations might be good experts re­
garding potential consumer or media reactions to new products and regarding 
their effects on health or environment. Sometimes these organizations have even 
succeeded in obtaining a ban products which public authorities have already ac­
cepted. Another choice is to use representatives of political parties. Beside ex­
pertise in the relevancy evaluations of ordinary people, they have decision­
making expertise based on their connections with political decision makers. 
A recent Delphi study which has taken the consumer point of view into account, 
is the intemational Delphi Agro-Food made in Germany, Netherlands, Italy, 
Spain and Greece (Menrad et al. 1 998). The study anticipates the future use of 
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new biotechnology in agriculture and in food industry. The national panels of the 
study inc1uded six expert groups: industry; research institutes ;  farrners; consum­
ers or users; critics of biotechnology and experts in social impacts of biotechnol­
ogy; and other experts (e.g. politicians, regulators, educators, joumalists, patent­
ing experts). (Menrad et al. 1998, 8). 
Evaluations of experts from industry or research institutes differed considerably 
from evaluations of consumer stakeholders and critics of biotechnology in the 
German study. For example the differences of evaluations were considerable 
conceming the following topic: "Proteins, which are optimized using protein en­
gineering, will be used in different sectors of food industry". About 70% of ex­
perts from industry or research institutes and only about 30% of experts repre­
senting consumers or critics have a positive opinion conceming this developmenr' 
(Menrad et al. 1 998, 19 and 89) . 
5.7.2 Empirical results 
In the study of Kuusi ( 1987) conceming future Intemet-like information services 
representatives of labour unions were used as consumer stakeholders. They 
seemed to be the reasonable choice, because they actively participated in the 
preparation of the "Finnish information society program" of the Finnish Govem­
ment Consultative Committee of Information Technology and were important for 
the core customers of the study. No special consumer stakeholders participated in 
the new biotechnology study (Kuusi 1 99 1) .  The reason was that basic expertise 
in methods of genetic engineering was needed. It was assumed that experts e.g. in 
public health organizations, could represent the interests of consumers. Based on 
aggressive discussions in 1 990s in media and in the political arena, the lack of 
special consumer stakeholders was an evident weakness of the study. The mis­
take was partly corrected by the information obtained from some panellists con­
ceming movements against genetic engineering. 
The mistake of the study of Kuusi (199 1 )  was corrected in the study of Kuusi 
( 1994). From the beginning of the research process, the participation of consumer 
stakeholders was noted. . The consumer stakeholders in this study conceming fu­
ture polymer materials were persons who had actively developed the environ­
mental policy of the Finnish Nature Conservation Association. 
The consumer stakeholders, who participated in the study Kuusi ( 1994), typically 
argued that they had a scientist-like open attitude to distribution of information. 
They seemed, however, to have a subconscious or sometimes conscious aim to 
4 About 200 experts belonging to the first class and about 100 experts belonging to the second class 
commented the topic. 
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transmit mainly the information supporting the aims and ideas of their organiza­
tion. In the beginning of the research process their expertise in new technical de­
velopments relevant for the future of polymer materials was usually rather lim­
ited, but they were eager to take into account the comments from other experts. 
At the end of the process some of them were excellent synthesizers and useful for 
the final report of the study. 
The consumer stakeholders in the study of Kuusi ( 1994) were active ethical 
evaluators of alternative futures; they were eager to assess the ethical validity of 
the arguments of representatives of other groups. They reacted intensive1y against 
the breakers of genera11y approved norms against dishonesty or the narrow pur­
suit of self-interest. 
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6. HOW TO USE THE ARGUMENT DELPHI? 
At the end of the Chapter 4, 1 suggested that an Argument Delphi stage might follow 
the neo-c1assical Delphi stages in national technology foresight studies. 1 suggested 
that the Argument Delphi stage should be based on those experts who are eager to 
find partners for the realization of some specific technology generalizations. When 
the focus in the earlier stages of the foresight process has been largely on option rea­
sonability, the Argument Delphi stage might concem more the commitment reason­
ability besides identifying more specific options. Because similar topics or issues are 
discussed in technology foresight studies in different countries, 1 suggested that it 
might be reasonable to make Argument Delphi stages using intemational panels. 
In this chapter, 1 will elaborate the idea further based on experience from the studies 
of Kuusi ( 1987, 1991 and 1994). The experience from these studies might be useful 
if the Argument Delphi stages are made using small intemational panels of 30-50 
persons.  In the Argument Delphi studies, the focus should be very specific: an issue 
area or a single issue. 
1 will discuss three hypothetical Argument Delphi studies. The idea is to connect 
some issues of my studies with similar topics of the national studies, and to focus the 
discussion on some questions relevant for any Argument Delphi exercise. 
6.1 Core Customers in the Study of Households Computer-Based 
Information Services 
6.1.1 Techniques, impacts and developer community related to a topic 
The fourth Japanese foresight study inc1uded the following topic (IFrECH 1988, 
52): 
Widespread use of home computer systems useable as information system 
terminals as well (for control of home equipment, management of house­
hold finances and family health, and use as dialogue-type study aids). 
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A reasonable conclusion is, that this topic is already realized based on the use of 
Internet. In the present situation we can evaluate the results of Kuusi ( 1987) and the 
imaginary Argument Delphi stage of IFfECH 1988 also from the perspective of re­
alized developments. Let us suppose that the Japanese study would have had an Ar­
gument Delphi stage and experts would have been eager to organize an Argument 
Delphi exercise around the topic. In the present situation, the use of Internet and e­
mail is a reasonable way to accomplish the exercise, for example using the Profes­
sional Delphi Scan software (http://delfoLofw.fi). Let us suppose that the organizers 
of the fourth national study would have selected a Delphi manager or managers to 
organize the Argument Delphi process. 
The topic is a technology generalization proposal based on the rather broad concept 
(or paradigm) of information technology. A first job of the manager is to clarify it 
and to relate it to the other topics of the study or to the issues of other foresight 
studies. The definition of technology generalization arouses two questions: 
- What are the specific techniques (motivated by technological paradigms), which 
are 
related to the topic? 
- What kinds of relevant impacts (motivated by technological paradigms) can be 
produced? 
The se1ection of the relevant topics based on the above questions might be based on 
a special working group or on a voting process of interested panellists of the earlier 
stages of foresight studies. The Japanese study inc1udes at least five related topics 
including ideas about possible techniques (IFfECH 1988, techniques italicized by 
me): 
1 .  Widespread use of same cards with imbedded microprocessors and memories 
(CPU cards) for access control, purchasing, banking and telephone fee payment etc. 
(p.42) 
2. Completion of international integrated services digital networks (ISDN) covering 
virtually all countries, with automatic access from domestic ISDN. (p.2 14) 
3 .  Practical use of electronic mail communications systems offering reinforced con­
fidentiality through use of identity verification technology based on fingerprints, 
signatures, or voiceprints. (p.214) 
4. Widespread use of electronic newspapers transmitted by satellite or ground 
broadcasting (scrambled in form only subscribers can descramble). (p.216) 
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5. Widespread use of remote medical care systems applying computer tomography, 
ultrasonic waves, infrared image transmission equipment, high-resolution monitor 
systems, and biosensors. (p.218) 
The topic discussed mentions some possible applications resulting from the generali­
zation or application of information technology for household information services.  
Further possible applications related to impacts of the techniques are mentioned in 
other topics (applications italicized by the author): 
1 .  Widespread use of same cards with imbedded microprocessors and memories 
(CPU cards) for access control, purchasing, banking and telephone fee payment etc. 
(p.42) 
2. Development of multimedia data base systems capable of storage and retrieval of 
text, drawings, images, and voice data in an organic interrelationship. (p.58) 
3. Widespread use of highly reliable security systems to eliminate leakage of infor­
mation or invasion ofprivacy for individuals or groups. (p.60) 
4. Practical use of local area networks with speeds exceeding 10 Gbps. (p.21 1 )  
5.  Practical use of electronic mail communications systems offering reinforced con­
fidentiality through use of identity verification technology based on fingerprints, sig­
natures, or voiceprints. (p.214) 
6. Widespread use of electronic newspapers transmitted by satellite or ground 
broadcasting (scrambled in form only subscribers can descramble). (p.216) 
7. Realization of production-order-delivery systems enabling customers to order 
merchandise designed to their preferences and have it delivered on a short time ba­
sis, all while remaining at home, based on integration of small-lot, high-diversity 
production facilities, sophisticated conveyance systems, and high resolution termi­
nals. (p.21 8) 
8. Development of anti-hacker devices capable of detecting abnormal access or sig­
naling/receiving based on knowledge acquired (i.e. leaming) about past unauthor­
ized access. (p.220) 
After a preliminary collection of the related techniques and impacts relevant for the 
topic, the next phase is to look after the panellists of the Argument Delphi. Though 
the interested experts of the topic and the above related topics provide a good start­
ing point for the Argument Delphi, the Delphi managers should analyse the devel­
oper community of the topic more c1osely. Especially the identification of core cus­
tomers of the study is a crucial task. 
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The analysis of the developer community can be based on the identification of the 
basic institutions and special types of expertise related to the topic or to related is­
sues. It is possible to use c1assifications of institutions and special types of expertise 
given in Chapter 5 
The classification based on institutions: 
- experts in basic research or education 
- experts in technology generalization organizations (e.g. 'technology push' oriented 
firms) 
- experts in rival developer communities 
- experts in application organizations of made technology generalizations (e.g. 'de-
mand puH' oriented firms) 
- experts in regulative or financing organizations 
- consumer stakeholders (e.g. political parties, consumer organizations, environ-
mental organizations, trade unions). 
The classification based on the special type 01 expertise: 
- natural scientists 
- behavioural scientists 
- decision makers 
- synthesizers. 
1 think that it is useful to make a rather detailed analysis of participants and their 
expertise for an Argument Delphi process; otherwise the peculiarities of the devel­
oper community focused on will not be noticed and taken into account in the argu­
mentation process. As an example, 1 will analyse in Appendix 2 the panellists of the 
study Kuusi ( 1994). 
6.1.2 Core customers and the selection of expert panel in the study con­
cerning computer based information services for Finnish house­
holds 
The study of Kuusi (1987) focused on future computer-based information services 
for Finnish households. It was a Delphi study with two rounds having some features 
of the Argument Delphi e.g. personai interviews in the first round. Though this study 
was not a real Argument Delphi exercise because of the lack of a real factual argu­
mentation stage, it gives a practical illustration of how selection of the panellists can 
be based on the identification of core customers. 
The members of the panel were selected by a working group of experts, which be­
longed to the Consultative Committee of Information Technology. This committee 
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was also the organizer of the study. The selection of the 26 panellists was not based 
on any explicit method or standards devised in advance. The structure of the devel­
oper comrnunity was not explicitly discussed though the representation of the differ­
ent stakeholders of the developer comrnunity was an implicit starting point. The next 
argument illustrates, however, a stage, which seems to be reasonable in any Argu­
ment Delphi process before the selection of the panelists: the evaluation of the rele­
vancy of different stakeholder groups for the study (Kuusi, 1987, 44): 
The banking sector was well represented in the Delphi panel. This choice 
is motivated by the fact that this sector is presently by far the most im­
portant sector of computer-based information services used by households 
[in Finland] . A structural change is going on in this sector, which might 
have a substantial impact on employment. The banking sector is seeking 
new functions. At least in principle, many of the computer-based infor­
mation services discussed in this report can provide that type of new 
functions. 
1 think the Argument Delphi process is more useful if there are core customers in the 
argumentation process. In the Finnish study, the core customer was c1early the 
banking sector. A core customer represents in a way the "main bottleneck" in the 
innovation process of the topic discussed. In this case, the main bottleneck seemed 
to be more applications, not so much techniques. Core customers are also key ex­
perts in commitment processes. In practice, rival experts can be defined based on 
their relation to core customers (and their technological paradigm). 
If we evaluate the choice from the perspective of the development realized, the 
choice of the core customers was very reasonable. The new comrnunication technol� 
ogy has had dramatic impacts on the Finnish banking sector. Besides the economic 
crisis of the Finnish banking sector in 1990s, the new comrnunication technology 
provides the main explanation for the following dramatic changes. The number of 
bank employees was reduced from 54 000 in 1989 to 29 000 in 1997. The number of 
bank offices was reduced from 3500 to 1600 in 1998 (Aro 1998). 
The panel can be described to be based largely on the relation of the panellists with 
the core customers 
Core customers: 
- 7 decision-makers in application organizations (developer managers of computer­
based information services in banking or in insurance). 
Other experts: 
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- 3 experts in technology generalization organizations, more synthesizers or decision 
-makers than scientists (persons working in firms or institutions producing or selling 
computer-based information service equipment typically used by banks or by their 
competitors in information services) 
- 4 behavioural science oriented experts in rival or complementary application or­
ganizations (consultants in information services) 
- 2 natural scientists in basic research or education (professors in information tech­
nology) 
- 4 decision maker-stakeholders of users of the technology (information technology 
experts in trade unions representing bank c1erks and other employees, which provide 
information services) 
- 1 regulating expert (an inspector of the telecommunication area working in a min­
istry) 
- 5 synthesizers or consumer stakeholders (the general secretary of the Finnish Gov­
ernment Consultative Committee of Information Technology, a member of the Fin­
nish Parliament specializing in media issues, three behavioural-science-oriented me­
dia experts, one of them a joumalist) 
The topics of the Finnish study are presented in table 6. 1 .  The panellists were asked 
to evaluate which five topics will be most important in 1996 and in 2010. The serv­
ices are presented in order of importance, based on the share of panellists, which 
inc1uded the service among the five most important services in 1996. It is important 
to note that the evaluation is based on the use of services both in homes and also in 
self-service at public places (for example the use of cash dispensers) and service (for 
example the use of bank c1erks).  
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Table 6.1. The most important household computer based infonnation services 
1 .  Withdrawal of cash inc1uding the use 
of intelligent bankcard, does not inc1ude 
Share of panellists inc1uding 
the topic among the five most 
important in 1996 % 
the use of on-line cash card. 100 
2. Paying of bills. The person accepts the 
bill with a signature or number code. 
Does not inc1ude the use of on-line cash card. 100 
3. Selling or reservation oftickets for trips 
or for other purposes (e.g. theaters) 58 
4. Search for job options 50 
5. Searchfor literature 46 
6. Electronic mail used for hobbies of 
households or for interaction between households 46 
7. Searchfor investment options (e.g. subscribing 
of shares ) 35 
8. Search for durable goods (e.g. cars and machines) 27 
9. Searchfor dwelling options 16  
10 .  Diagnoses of diseases 8 
1 1 .  Search for detailed infonnation on different 
types of practical jobs (e.g. home repairs) 4 
1 2. "Personal" newspapers collected from 
different sources 4 
1 3 .  Households ' communication abroad 
using computer networks 4 
14. Leaving informationfor taxation 4 
15 .  Search and selling ofparts for e.g. cars and 
household appIiances 0 
As option-suggesting arguments, the topics discussed in the Finnish study described 
the final impacts of technology generalizations. They were, however, poorly formu­
lated from the point of view of promising techniques for technology generalizations. 
With only a few exemptions, a general assumption was made that in 1996 there will 
already be a general network of computers inc1uding household computers which 
will provide the services requested. 
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6.1.3 Some remarks concerning the predictive reasonability of the study 
In chapter 3, I gave two necessary conditions for the prediction reasonable generali­
zation b: 
( 1 )  IbFb VbRbA is over LA ' where A is the group of actors whose ac­
tions are decisive for the realization of b 
(2) b is reasonably relevant for the group of customers of a prediction 
study. 
The identification of core customers gives a practical interpretation of the second 
condition. We might consider that the main group of customers of the study was the 
Finnish banking sector. 
Related to the first condition, the study provides examples conceming the connec­
tion between powerful actors and the realized future. 
A special focus of the study was the use of service or self-service in future, which 
was a highly important question for the core customers of the study. Conceming 
every topic three possibilities to use the service were given: 
- service 
- self-service at a public place and 
- self-service at home. 
In the case of cash withdrawal, the possibilities meant the use of a bank clerk, the 
use of a cash dispenser or the use of a home computer. Conceming the first condi­
tion of the prediction reasonability, predictions of different stakeholders conceming 
the cash withdrawal are interesting. The proportion of service and self-service in this 
topic is mainly a result of the interaction process of three kinds of stakeholders : de­
cision-makers in banks, bank c1erks and bank customers. These stakeholders were 
well represented in the expert panel. 
A working technique for self-service in cash withdrawal at a public places was al­
ready in use in Finland in 1 986. In that year, cash dispensers accounted for 6% of 
transactions. The basic technology of cash dispensers in 1986 did not change very 
much in 1986- 1996. The intelligent cash cards, which function as cash, were intro­
duced extensively in the beginning of 1998 in Finland. 
Conceming the cash withdrawal decision-makers in banks made better predictions 
than stakeholders of bank c1erks or bank customers . The distribution of the responses 
of bank experts conceming the use of cash dispensers in 1 996 was very small, the 
distribution range was 50-70 % and the median 60%, which seems to be rather near 
the right number. 
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The range of  the answers of  other experts was 10-80% and the median 40%. The 
representative of the labour union of bank: executives and their umbrella organization 
shared the vision of decision-makers, although other workforce stakeholders (for 
example representatives of public telecommunication administration and other la­
bour unions) estimated the proportion of bank: dispensers to be less than thirty per­
cent in 1996. Other experts generally consider that negative employment effects 
concerning bank executives would hinder the increase of the share. 
In reality, the depression of the Finnish banking sector in 1990s resulted just in the 
dismissal of bank executives for economic reasons. We might conc1ude that deci­
sion-makers in banks were able to make their mind also concerning the use self­
service. They were more or less the "group A" in the first condition of the prediction 
reasonability. 
The decision-makers succeeded relatively well in predicting cash withdrawal based 
on established techniques but not in the anticipation of a new technology. The im­
pacts of the World Wide Web were not anticipated by the panellists. Only one pan­
ellist, a university professor in information technology, estimated that the house­
holds' communication abroad using computer networks will be one of the five most 
important computer-based household services. Finnish households were, however, 
world' s top users of the Internet in 1996. 
6.2 How to Describe a Technological Paradigm for Argument Delphi: the 
Case of New Biotechnology 
The Argument Delphi is essentially based on the systematic production of factual 
arguments based on rival technological paradigms. In this section I will try to give 
some preliminary suggestions concerning a difficult question. How should the basic 
features of some technological paradigm be described to help the argumentation 
process concerning rival or complementary technology generalization proposals 
based on different technological paradigms? 
This discussion is focused on the paradigm of the genetic engineering or the new 
biotechnology discussed in the study Kuusi ( 1991) .  A practical future application 
area, which might benefit from my discussion is the development of solar energy. 
Kerstin Cuhls ( 1998, 207) has presented a kind of relevance tree concerning targets 
or impacts related to solar energy. To really understand - not only to believe based 
on the "proxy arguments" or tacit knowledge of experts - in an Argument Delphi 
process, what impacts are possible, we need to understand the basic features of tech­
nological paradigms that might produce the impacts. For example, if we like to un­
derstand the technological paradigm of the production of solar energy based on bac­
terial rhodophsin, we have to understand the basic paradigmatic features of the new 
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biotechnology. This paradigm differs considerably from the paradigm used in the 
development of silicon cells. 
1 proposed in Chapter 2 that the Bonsai tree is a good way to describe a technologi­
cal paradigm. A technological paradigm changes continuously as the result of learn­
ing processes. An important result of an option-seeking technology Delphi process 
can be the "enrichment" of the technological paradigm or its Bonsai tree. The find­
ing of relevant new branches (promising new product areas), blades (promising new 
products) or new roots (promising new technologies) can be seen as an important 
contribution of a technology foresight study. 
A technological paradigm is a social construction of many actors. At some point of 
time, the actors have different mental pictures of its key features. It is, however, af­
terwards possible to see better what the key features of the paradigm in the past 
"ideally" were. That type of evaluation can be based on the features of the paradigm, 
which have later resulted in the most important applications or technology generali­
zations.  
The following description of the world-wide "ideal" technological paradigm of the 
new biotechnology in 1 989- 1990 is based on successful generic technologies and 
important product areas. The description is on a rather general level. The focus is in 
successful generic technological ideas and product branches. The successfulness is 
based on evaluations made about five years after the Delphi study. All discussed 
generic technological ideas and product branches were already known by the key 
actors of the new biotechnology developer community in 1989-1990. 
As "measures" of successful generic technological ideas and product branches, 1 
have used three survey books of new biotechnology published in 1994-1996 (Wilson 
and Walker 1994, Moses and Moses 1995, Watson et al. 1996). Actually, nearly all 
the generic technological ideas and promising product branches discussed in these 
survey books were already known in 1989-1990, when the interviews of the study 
Kuusi ( 1991 )  were made. 
1 start the analysis of the "ideal" paradigm of new biotechnology from the technol­
ogy-push side or from the "roots" of the bonsai tree. In specifying key generic tech­
nologies of the new biotechnology in 1989-1990, it is important to realize at least on 
the general level all the basic technologies in use at that time in biotechnology. This 
type of "checking list" can be made by looking at the book "Principles and tech­
niques of practical biochemistry" (Wilson and Walker 1994). In its 586 pages also 
the basic methods of genetics and microbiology are described in addition to bio­
chemistry. A simple way to proceed in the description of the technological paradigm 
is to look at the headlines of the book. The book is divided into eleven chapters and 
these chapters are divided in 123 subchapters and these further in 307 subsubchap­
ters. Excluding the first chapter ("General principles of biochemical investigations") 
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the other ten chapters can be interpreted to suggest generic technologies or their 
c1usters. 
1 started the search process at the roots of an "ideal" Bonsai tree by making a 
"checking list" of headlines of chapters and subchapters of Wilson and Walker 
(1 994). This list was evaluated by the professional biochemist who was the key per­
son in the formulation of product branches used in the Finnish biotechnology Delphi 
study. She evaluated the present importance of different generic technologies. Based 
on her evaluation, the most promising biotechnology generic ideas proposed by 
Moses and Moses ( 1995, 272-273) and the other above mentioned sources, 1 have 
divided the "roots" of the "ideal" Bonsai tree of new biotechnology of 1 989-1 990 
into key technological generic ideas, base generic ideas, pacing generic ideas and 
emerging ideas using the c1assification of Arthur D. Little (Irvine and Martin 1989, 
94-95), which was discussed at the end of the paragraph 3.8.  
The c1assification of generic ideas is of course only for illustration. In practical Ar­
gument Delphi processes, both the formulation of generic ideas and their c1assifica­
tion into the categories can be made with experts. They might comment on sugges­
tions made by Delphi managers based on interviews with experts. 
Short motivations for the paradigmatic ideas are presented in Appendix 3. Ideas are 
marked for further discussion. 1 use in the appendix italics with the code numbers 
(B 1 ,  B2, . . .  , K1,  K2, . . .  , PI ,  P2, . . .  El,  E2, . . .  ) to mark important generic ideas, which 
are summarized below. The letter B refers to a base generic technological idea, K to 
a key generic idea, P to a pacing generic idea and E to an emerging idea. 1 use the 
same code number to c10sely related generic ideas. Important generic subideas are 
marked by a,b, . . .  (e.g. B 1 a, B 1b, . . .  ). 
The summary 01 the generic ideas 01 the "ideal" paradigm 01 the new biotechnol­
ogy. 
Key generic ideas of the new biotechnology in 1989-1990 
Techniques to allow the transfer of genetic information from one species to another 
to another species or methods that make possible for a cell to accept a strange string 
of DNA, which codifies the production of a protein (KJ) 
In certain chemical environments, animal cells will take up DNA from the 
environment, just as bacteria do. The process can be helped by applying 
an electric current (KJa) 
Microinjection (KJ b) to inject a DNA-solution directly into animal cells 
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To ineorporate the DNA into eertain viruses which are allowed to infect 
the animal cells (KJc). 
It is sometimes possible to persuade eells from different animals to fuse 
together, resulting in cell hybrids containing the string of DNA codifying 
the sought protein(KJd). 
In the teehnique of partic1e aeeeleration, the DNA to be transferred is 
coated onto minute gold particles which are fired at target cells (KJ e). 
Cellfusion (K2). Fused eells eontain the nuc1ei - and henee the genetic information -
of both fused eells. 
Cloning teehnology was made by fusing antibody producing eells with eaneerous 
lymphoeytes (myeloma eells). The produets are ealled "monoclonal antibodies " 
(K2a) beeause it is produeed as a single, pure substanee from a single c10ne of eells. 
Routines to sequence any newly isolated DNA fragment of interest (K3) 
Automated sequencing techniques (K4) 
Gene libraries (K5) are eonstrueted by isolating the eomplete genomie DNA from a 
eell, and eutting it almost randomly into fragments of the desired average length. 
Protein and enzyme techniques (K6) to uneover 
primary structures (K6a) (sequenees of the amino acid residues), 
secondary structures (K6b) (loealized folding of polypeptide ehain due to 
hydrogen bonding), 
tertiary structures (K6c) (the overall folding of a polypeptide ehain, 
which is stabilized by eleetrostatie attraetions and by weak van der Waals' 
forees) and 
quaternary structures (K6d) (associations of two or more polypeptide 
ehains). 
Base generalization ideas of the new bioteehnology in 1989-1990 
Fermentation and cell and tissue techniques (BJ) 
Light and electron microscopic (B2) examination of tissue, eell or organelle prepa­
rations to evaluate the integrity of samples and to eorrelate strueture with funetion. 
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Radioisotopes (B3) have been very widely used in the study of the mechanisms and 
rates of absorption, accumulation and translocation of inorganic and organic com­
pounds by both plants and animals. 
Centrifugation separation techniques (B4) are based upon the behaviour of particles 
in an applied centrifugal field. 
The recognition of the variety of types of spectrum (B5). 
Components will have been separated according to their electrophoretic mobility 
(B6). 
The choice of stationary and mobile phases is made so that the compounds to be 
separated have different partitions (B7) 
Pacing generalization ideas of the new biotechnology in 1989- 1990 
Polymerase chain reaction technique (PCR)(Pl) 
New very effective microscopes Scanning Tunneling Microscope (STM) and Atomic 
Force Microscope (P2) can discern even single atoms. 
Performing the kind of experiment that causes the molecular entity to disintegrate 
and produce fragment ions each of which is represented by a peak in the result 
spectrum (P3). 
A biosensor (P4) is an analytical device consisting of a biocatalyst (enzyme, cell or 
tissue) and a transducer, which can convert a biochemical signal into a quantifiable 
electrical signal. 
An emerging generalization idea in 1 989-1990 
Any double-stranded polymer with completing strands is a potential target for mul­
tiplication (El). 
How can the above generic ideas be used in the Argument Delphi process? My idea 
is that if we have these types of descriptions of technological paradigms we might 
argue about topics in a more coherent way. The argumentation can be based on 
coded basic arguments instead of written arguments. Ii the Internet is used, any code 
might have a hyper-text link to a file where the basic argument is more cIosely 
e1aborated. 
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1 ean illustrate my idea with generalization proposals presented by Moses and Moses 
( 1995). The final ehapter of Moses and Moses (1995) was entitled ''The future: bio­
teehnologieal bonanzas?" In that ehapter, the authors present a summary of future 
promising teehnological generalizations (Moses and Moses 1995, 272-273). It is 
possible to motivate these options with the key generie ideas of the "ideal" paradigm. 
Teehnology generalization proposals and their motivation: 
A. The Human Genome Projeet will undoubtedly make available enormous amounts 
of information of profound significanee for understanding the human eondition and 
some its defeets. (K3,K4,K5) 
B. With this and other new knowledge, progress in the teehniques of genetic ma­
nipulation will permit new forms of therapeutic treatment. (K1 ,K3 , K4,KS) 
C. Greater insight into moleeular biology and developmental genetics will greatly 
add to an understanding of degenerative and neoplastie diseases, hopefully leading 
to more effeetive therapies. (K1 ,K2, K3,K4,KS, K6) 
D. Parallel progress in plant genetics and the manipulation of plant material will en­
able new forms of erop plants to be developed, perhaps allowing field erops to be 
used as more eonvenient and lower eost faetories for animal proteins than mierobial 
systems in fermenters. (K1, K3,K4,KS, K6) 
E. Advanees in the bioehemistry and genetics of nitrogen fixation should reduee the 
demand for nitrogen fertilizer while biological pest eontrol might in time offer a va­
riety of effeetive and environmentally aeeeptable means of sueh eontrol. Together 
they will improve the efficieney of agrieultural produetion. (Kl ,  K3,K4,K5, K6) 
F. Developments in protein engineering are likely to offer not only better but also 
new enzyme eatalysts: "better" in the sense that they are more robust, survive higher 
temperatures and harsher eonditions, and last longer in service; "new" by being able 
to eatalyse reaetions unknown in bioehemistry and hitherto inaeeessible to biological 
eatalysis. (K6) 
G. The reeent discovery of extremely thermotolerant and other previously unknown 
bacteria offers the prospect of using microbiological procedures in environments too 
hot, to acid or too salty for the more familiar speeies. (K l )  
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6.3 The Problem of Pacing or Emerging Generic Ideas in the Argument 
Delphi Processes 
If we compare the previous analysis of the "ideal" paradigm of the new biotechnol­
ogy 1989-1 990 with the actual suggestions made by Finnish experts in the study 
Kuusi (199 1), there is an interesting difference. Watson et al. (1996) considered that 
the polymerase chain reaction technique (peR) devised by Gary Mullis in the mid 
1 980s has revolutionized molecular geneties by making possible a whole new ap­
proach to the study and analysis of genes. This pacing generic idea of the "ideal" 
paradigm of 1 989-1990 is now c1early a key generic idea of genetie engineering. It 
was not, however, mentioned in the first round interviews or in the seeond round 
arguments of the biotechnology Argument Delphi. The generie idea with its exten­
sive implications was noticed not until the third commenting stage of the study. 
It is illustrative for further Argument Delphi exercises to analyse more c10sely why 
this pacing technology was not mentioned. For that purpose, the author arranged a 
survey. The panellists of the biotechnology Argument Delphi were asked to partici­
pate in it. The aims of the peR survey made in summer 1997 were to obtain infor­
mation concerning: 
a) how important the method is now to the panellists; 
b) when the panellists firstly heard about the method and when they learned its basic 
technical features; 
e) from whom they heard or from which souree they learned the basic features of the 
method; 
d) whieh types of diffieulties panellists have had in using the method; and 
e) from whom they received help in the difficulties. 
The basic idea of the survey was to explain how the Finnish developer eommunity 
learned about the peR and how much tacit or hidden knowledge about peR the 
panellists had in 1989-1990. 
From the twenty panellists who answered the question eoncerning their use of the 
method, six persons stated that they now use it often and two panellists said that 
they use sometimes. Twelve had never used it. 
Taking into aceount that nobody mentioned the method during the Delphi inter­
views, it was interesting that five of the six panellists who now use the method ex­
tensively had already heard about it in 1989. Three of the six had even read a techni­
eal description of the method which was as extensive as the deseriptions in the re­
eent advaneed basic books on bioehemistry (2-3 pages). The other three of the six 
had read such a deseription in 1990-1991 .  
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A panellist had heard about the method already before its publication in a lecture by 
Gary Mullis who has received the Nobel Prize based on the invention of PCR. 
Sources of the information were intemational congresses; one congress was Biotech 
1986 in San Fransisco (or Biotech 1985 in Washington DC) where Gary Mullis told 
about PCR. Two panellists mentioned lectures by Finnish experts from the Techni­
cal University of Helsinki and the University of Helsinki. 
Besides the panellists who now extensively use the PCR, two other panellists knew 
the method in 1989 as extensive as the descriptions in the recent advanced basic 
books of the biochemistry. A now retired panellist heard about the method in a dis­
cussion of researchers in Califomia. 
Why was the PCR not mentioned in interviews, though many panellists knew it and 
some had even used it intensively? One explanation is that the interviews did not 
stress the techniques used. They were more focused on promising products. Another 
explanation is that the panellists did not see the importance of the method in 1989. 
Three panellists had heard about the method already before the interviews but had 
read the technical description of the method (2-3 pages) three to five years later. 
The third and perhaps the most plausible explanation is that the information con­
ceming PCR was so "hot" in 1989 that firms using it were not eager to tell about 
their present or planned applications of PCR. The firm of a panellist started devel­
opment of new medicines based on peR just after the panellist had heard about peR 
in the lecture by Mullis, before the publication of peR. A firm, the managing direc­
tor of which was a panellist, is now a global marketer of the polymerase enzymes 
used in peR. 
A result of the survey which seems to support the third explanation was that few 
researchers have used other institutes as helpers in the technical problems of peR. 
Most panellists who had used PCR answered "self-help" to' the question conceming 
technical helpers. One mentioned TEKES and Sitra, one the University of Helsinki 
and a late beginner the University of Turku. It seems that there has been very little 
interaction between Finnish users of peR at that time. 
What kinds of general conclusions can we make based on the above study? The in­
formation policies of the "first best" experts seem really to matter conceming pacing 
technologies. Even if some "second best" experts have heard about important new 
generic ideas, they might be incapable of seeing their future importance. There are, 
however, often (typically?) some "champions" of the ideas e.g. in universities, who 
are capable and ready to communicate the technical points of the idea and its prom­
ises. In the biotechnology Argument Delphi, the champion was university professor 
who also worked in a new venture firm that actively used the peR. It is essential that 
Delphi managers of the Argument Delphi inc1ude champions of this type on the 
panel. 
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6.4 Scenarios in the Argument Delphi Process: the Case of Environmen­
tally Sound Materials 
The fifth Japanese study and the first German study, which were accomplished at the 
same time as the study Kuusi (1994), inc1uded the following topic (Cuhls and Ku­
wahara 1 994, 157): 
Development of waste recyc1ing technology, enabling the amount of city 
waste (i.e. that must be disposed of) to be reduced to half its current level. 
The German panellists evaluated, that the topic was the second highest in impor­
tance among all 1 146 topics evaluated (the index value 98). AIso Japanese experts 
judged that the topic is very important (the index value 91). The degree of impor­
tance was evaluated with an index having the maximum value 100 and the minimum 
value 0, where the responses "high", "medium", "low" and "unnecessary" got re­
spective1y weights "4", "2", " 1 " , and "0". The index value 98 means that nearly all 
experts considered that the topic is highly important. 
If the common Japanese and German study would have had the Argument Delphi 
stage after the neo-c1assical Delphi stages, the topic would have been one very rea­
sonable choice. The topic was actually a main focus of the author' s Argument Del­
phi study concerning new materials (Kuusi 1994). Though it was not the only focus 
of the study, the whole study in a way provides a general framework for the discus­
sion concerning the topic. This topic seems to be especially suitable for a discussion 
based on general scenarios. I will firstly present how the whole study process in 
Kuusi ( 1994) was accomplished. Then I will discuss how the specific topic was in­
tegrated with the discussion. Besides the demonstration of the proceeding from a 
"whole" picture to a particular issue, the description of the Argument Delphi process 
realized illustrates the general discussion of the Argument Delphi in Chapter 3.  
6.4.1 Basic process features of the study 
Among the three studies of Kuusi ( 1987, 199 1 ,  1994) the study of 1994 was most 
c1early an Argument Delphi. The basic phases of the study were accomplished in 
1991-1993. Delphi interviews were made in autumn 1991 and in spring 1992. The 
report of the first phase was mailed to the panellists in July 1992 and Delphi manag­
ers received the answers from all panellists before October 1992. The final Finnish 
report "Challenges of the New Materials" (in Finnish Materiaalit murroksessa) was 
published in Spring 1994 (Kuusi 1994). 
The Delphi managers, the research board and the panellists of the study are pre­
sented in appendix 2. In the first round of the study, every panellist was interviewed 
by the Delphi managers personally or in groups of 2-3 persons. Most of the inter-
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views were conducted by the author together with 1-3 other Delphi managers. Only 
a couple of interviews were made by the author alone. The idea was that the exper­
tise of the other Delphi manager(s) was (were) as close as possible to the expertise 
of the interviewed panellist(s). The interviews lasted 3-5 hours. 
The interviews focused on specific issue areas. Twelve basic issue areas of the new 
material technology and especially of polymer/composite technologies were defined 
before the interviews. The panellists commented first on those issues on which they 
were experts, based on the evaluation of the Delphi managers. After that they were 
asked to comment on other issues. 
The experts were first asked to present prornising Finnish products in the branches 
or application areas of carbon polymers or their composites. The application areas 
were the eight issue areas below: 
1 .  Packages and films used in food production and delivery or in agriculture 
2. Other paper and paper composite products 
3.  Other bulk material packages and bulk material products in construction (e.g. in­
sulating materials for walls) 
4. Other products in construction (e.g. building elements, tubes, tools) 
5. Machines and vehicles 
6. Electric devices 
7. Textile, leather and fumishings products 
8 .  Other uses of plastic or plastic composite products. 
Beside considerations based on prornising generic technologies, the list of applica­
tion areas was motivated by the consumption of plastic products. In tons, packages 
were the most important use of plastic resins in Europe. In 1990, the share was 38%. 
The use in construction accounted for 20%. Vehic1es, other traffic applications and 
different types of instruments and machines accounted for some 10%. The use in 
electric equipment was 6% and textile products, carpets, mats and fumishing prod­
ucts accounted for 7%. Other uses - household appliances, sport, health and hygiene 
and agriculture - accounted for 19% (Komppa et al. 1 992). 
The options and arguments discussed in the issue areas concemed situations in 2000 
and 2010 with a few exceptions. The Delphi managers presented anonymous argu­
ments of the other panellists already in the interview phase to interviewed panellists. 
A study phase which linked it c10sely to the topic mentioned in the beginning of this 
section were two scenarios presented to the panellists. Each panellist was asked to 
evaluate their suggestions supposing that two scenarios had been realized. The dis­
cussion based on the scenarios was an important part in some interviews and some­
times even the dorninating part. The scenarios concemed the recyc1ing of materials 
and the use of energy: 
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The recyc1ing scenario 
Society has a special interest in the recycling of materials in the following ways: 
- Rates or taxes for waste management will be much higher than at present and the 
tariffs will be scaled according to the difficulty of processing the different types of 
waste. 
- Distributors or producers are obliged to take back the packages or products at the 
end of their life cyc1e. 
- Households are ready to sort their waste to different material groups. 
The energy use scenario 
Society has a special interest in the use of energy in the following ways: 
- Energy is sayed and especially the use of fossil fuels producing greenhouse gases is 
reduced. 
- The average real price of energy will double before 2000 and treble before 2010 
based on taxes scaled according to the damage (e.g. carbon oxide, sulfur or nitrogen 
emission). 
- The use of direct solar energy will obtain extensive development support as will 
the producers which considerably reduce their earlier use of energy. 
Using the above scenarios as starting points the following issues were discussed in 
the first interview round of the study: 
9. Production and use of energy 
10.  Pollution and waste management. 
A part in the first round interviews concemed "the roots" of the discussed 
"technological bonsai tree". The experts were asked to evaluate how the qualities of 
the present plastics and their composites could be improved and how consumption of 
different plastics would develop. The experts were also asked if there are some re­
cently found important polymers or polymer composites. The starting point of the 
discussion was a Hst of present properties and the realized consumption of different 
plastic resins and their composites. The idea was that promising generic technolo­
gies could be identified by asking the experts to argue for their evaluations. Based 
on market pull and technology push, the summary issues conceming the future role 
of carbon polymers, composites and other materials were discussed: 
1 1 .  Production of plastics, other carbon polymers and their composites 
1 2. Production of metal or ceramic products rival with carbon polymers. 
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A rather extensive report concerning the first stage was mailed to the panellists in 
the second round. The report inc1uded specified suggestions concerning 59 future 
relevant issues. The suggestions were mostly based on the presented arguments in 
the first round. The suggestions had five basic elements : 
- a general description of the issue; 
- a suggested point of view of the evaluation using a letter A, B, C or D, where (A) 
was the onlooker's or outsider's point of view; (B) was the future maker's point of 
view; (C) was failure minimization (maxmin) point of view; and (D) was the catch­
ing-hold-of-opportunities (maxmax) point of view; 
- propositions or topics suggesting that something will be true of some future time 
(typically 2000 or 2010);  
- simple yes/ no - type answers to the propositions or topics representing opinions of 
a median expert panellist (evaluations made by Delphi managers based on inter­
views) 
- anonymous factual arguments relevant to the issue. 
The number of propositions or topics connected with an issue varied greatly: be­
tween one and fifty. Most of the issues explicitly or implicitly concerned new op­
tions based on the generalizations of polymerl composite technologies and they took 
into account the environmental challenges described in the two scenarios. 
The suggestions were divided into ten issue areas. The first three areas and the last 
area were general. The numbers refer to the order numbers of areas in the second 
round report: 
1 .  Position of plastics among future materials 
2. Suggestions concerning developer communities of materials 
3 .  Waste management and the recyc1ing of materials 
10. Future options and dangers 
Every panellist was asked to react at 1east to some of the suggestions made in these 
issue areas. Six areas were specific application areas of polymers/composites. The 
ar�as were: 
4. Plastics which decompose in the environment 
5. Future cellulose based materials 
6. Textiles 
7. Packages 
8 . Construction 
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9. Machines, vehicles and equipment. 
One or two issue areas or branches were chosen as areas of special expertise for 
each panellist. Hence, the panellists were asked especially to comment on the sug­
gestions conceming about 15 general issues or issues in the issue areas on average. 
This meant that they were asked to comment on average on about one fourth of the 
issues. Also, the other suggestions were mailed to them and they were asked to 
comment on them if they had time and relevant comments. The simplest comments 
were changes in yes/no answer proposals. Delphi managers asked, however, each 
panellist to give factual reasons for their evaluations even if they did not change a 
given evaluation. Panellists were also asked to comment on anonymous factual ar­
guments connected with issues. 
Besides the nominated special experts, typically 2-3 other experts made judgements 
and comments on the issues. Thus on average about 30 experts or two thirds of the 
panel commented on a general issue. Issues in the application areas were commented 
by on average of 15 experts. The distribution in the numbers of responses in differ­
ent issue areas was, however, considerable. 
In the third round, key panellists were asked to comment on specified parts of the 
preliminary versions of the final report. 
The final report was based on discussions conceming interconnected issues typically 
commented by same panellists. There were five comparatively separate discussions 
in the final report: 
- Key generic polymer technologies and general advantages and weaknesses of 
polymer materials and other materials in future 
- Future of packages and films 
- Future of materials in construction 
- Future of materials in machines, vehicles and in electric devices 
- Future of materials for use in solar energy. 
General scenarios as sources of option reasonability 
Option reasonability was clearly the main focus of the study Kuusi ( 1994). In 
Chapter 3 ,  1 gave a necessary condition for the epistemic value of arguments con­
ceming a generalization b if option reasonability is the main focus of a technology 
foresight study: 
Ib x Fb x Vb x Rbk is reasonably over Lk , where k is any actor who is 
reasonably relevant for the realization of b from the point of view of the 
group of customers of the options-seeking study. 
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where Ib are the impaets of the teehnology generalization proposal, Fb its feasibility, 
Vb the validity of the generalization proposal, Rbk relevaney of the proposal to k. 
Lk is the minimum level of epistemie utility for a generalization proposal whieh k is 
ready to realize. Shortly: a teehnology generalization is option reasonable, if it rea­
sonable from the point of view of any relevant stakeholder. 
A diseussion based on general seenarios like the reeyc1ing seenario above is espe­
ciaIly suitable for an option-reasonability foeused Argument Delphi study. When the 
experts made suggestions based on the scenario, they actually produced options and 
arguments for a stakeholder who is especially interested in the realization of the 
topic mentioned in the beginning of this paragraph. 
The general diseussion eoneerning future generalizations based on polymer teeh­
nologies and their rivals and the more specific diseussion based on two seenarios 
resulted in three future "teehnology generalization strategies", whieh are highly rele­
vant for realization of the topic diseussed. The final report of the study (Kuusi 1994) 
was largely based on diseussion of these basie strategies of sustainable material pol­
iey in the future: dematerialization, durability and reeyeling strategies. 
The strategies are based on a "teehnological program" or using a German word on a 
"Leitbild" ,  whieh would probably not have been found if only experts of reeyeling 
teehnology would have made arguments about the issue: tailoring or eustomization 
af materials. 
Customization means many different things in eeonomie and scientific literature. 
What they aIl have in eommon is that a produet is eustomized or tailor-made for a 
specifie purpose mueh in the same way a tailor makes a garment fit a eustomer. The 
opposite of eustomization is mass produetion though an eeonomie way of eustomi­
zation is mass eustomization. In mass eustornization great volumes of tailor-made 
praduets or varieties of a produet are made e.g. using flexible �anufaeturing systems 
(Pine II, 1993). In addition to an exaet fit there are other features eharaeteristic of 
eustornization: high quality produets, eareful and detailed planning or design and 
features varying aeeording to the user's needs. 
There are two levels of tailoring of material produets: eustornizing material and 
eustornizing of produet made of that material. Custornization of a traditional erafts­
man was foeused on the last type of eustornization. As far .as material is eonsidered a 
tailor-made suit or a table made by a earpenter were in 1930's not very different than 
the mass produets. Customizing material is still now rather irrelevant, when we think 
about metals used in a normal way. The strength of metallie objeet is proportional to 
the eharaeteristie strength of the metal in question and the thickness of the objeet. 
New teehnological advanees in treating materials and especiaIly new polymer and 
eomposite materials have made eustornization of material a foeal problem. Many 
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have tried with disappointing results to replaee a metallie part with a reinforced 
plastics part having a similar form. The strength of reinforeed plastics - unlike that of 
metal - depends mainly on the direetion of the stress. Resistance to strain is manifold 
on the direction of polymer ehains or reinforcing fibers. Beside the strength it is also 
possible to tailor other qualities of polymer materials. The five-Iayered plastics used 
for vaeuum-paeked eold euts is perfeet for this particular purpose but would be to­
tally unsuitable for packing bread. 
The more detailed the eustomization, the harder it is to recyc1e the material using it 
in purposes differing from the original use. Por example, if somebody melts multi­
layered plastics its specific structure is damaged. Leather is an example of nature's 
detailed eustomization. As it overheats it loses its wonderful elasticity. 
Based on the crucial role of tailoring, we ean define three altemative strategies for a 
sustainable material poliey. These strategies were diseussed extensively in the study 
(Kuusi 1994, 84- 166). 
Dematerialization strategy 
The strategy is based on tailor-made light and eheap materials, whieh are not, how­
ever, durable. Some experts eonsidered that it is possible to produee films that meet 
the same basic funetions as existing films, but with a thiekness of one pereent of that 
of present films by using many layers of different materials. Aeeording to the strat­
egy, however, the reeyc1ing of the material and dematerialization will become in­
ereasingly eontradictory. It is not usually eeonomieally feasible to repair goods made 
on the basis of dematerialization strategy. The most reasonable, sustainable way to 
handle eomposite polymer materials after use is eombustion or eomposting. Metals 
in the composite materials ean be reeyc1ed. 
Durability strategy 
The strategy is also based on tailor-made durable materials. They are typically 
heavier than the materials of the dematerialization strategy or if they are light -
whieh is more and more possible based on polymer composite materials designed in 
details - they are expensive. That is why it is reasonable to repair produets made of 
these materials or use old mödules of these materials in new produets. As in the de­
materialization strategy, tailoring hinders reeyc1ing. The most reasonable sustainable 
way to handle the eomposite polymer materials, after a long use possibly in many 
different produets, is eombustion or use as filling material. Metals in the eomposite 
materials ean be reeyc1ed. 
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Recycling strategy 
The potential for recycling is the starting point in the design of materials. This 
means that the potential for tailor-made designs is much more limited than in the 
dematerialization or durability strategies. The materials are heavier, not so durable 
or more expensive than in other strategies. On the other hand, simple materials can 
facilitate repair. In this strategy, there is little need for burning polymer materials, 
though recycling of polymer materials typically makes them weaker and a final 
burning or cracking is eventually needed. 
Three strategies were discussed concerning packages of futures; future construction; 
materials in future vehicles, machines and electric equipment; and applications of 
biomaterials (for example paper). 
Most experts in generalization or application organizations preferred the demateri­
alization strategy in all fields, though they were also ready to accept the recycling 
strategy in construction and in the recycling of paper. Most natural scientists also 
preferred the dematerialization strategy, but also accepted the recycling strategy in 
construction and in the recycling of paper. Especially in the field of packages, they 
potential for a durability strategy. Some experts of polymer composites also saw 
challenging opportunities for this strategy concerning vehicles, machines and electric 
equipment. 
There was an expert representing the Finnish National Association for Nature Pro­
tection who heavily stressed the durability strategy. Other consumer stakeholders 
preferred the recycling strategy, which was also the preferred strategy of rivals rep­
resenting mainly expertise in metals. The regulating experts of waste management 
preferred the recycling strategy thought they saw potential for the durability strategy 
in the fields of packages and construction. 
There was, however, no systematic discussion during the study concerning the 
strategies. The above conclusions are based on the arguments given by the experts 
concerning different issues. It seems that this type of discussion would have been 
essential if the main focus of the Argument Delphi concerning the topic mentioned 
in the beginning of the paragraph would have been commitment reasonability. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has its "practical side" and its "theoretical side". 1 think that in the long 
run it is impossible to develop the practical side without good background theories. 
If we do not have good theories, we will confront the problem of the "Ptolemaic 
communication theory" discussed in Chapter 4. On the other hand, based on my 
rather extensive practical experience in the use of the Delphi method, 1 would like to 
warn newcomers to trust on nice theories too much. The learning processes of hu­
man beings and organizations are so complicated that it is very difficult to find any 
model or theory conceming their future-oriented activities that would work well in 
all connections. 
1 am, however, based on my analysis, ready to present some practical conclusions 
conceming development of the processes of national technology foresight studies in 
order to avoid bad results based on the information policies of experts and on the 
effects of group dynamics. 
The anonyrnity, large groups of experts and standardized "proxy-arguments" have to 
some extent helped to avoid the combined problem of information policies and of 
the group dynarnics in Delphi stages of national technology foresight processes. The 
studies have also taken into account some weaknesses of the classical Delphi studies 
realized e.g. by Brockhoff et al. (1975). The consensus of experts is no longer a spe­
cial target of the studies. Most studies do not punish dissident views with a special 
requirement for further argumentation. 
Though clear progress has happened especially in the Delphi stages of the foresight 
processes, 1 think that there are still possibilities to improve the validity and rele­
vancy of the results of the foresight studies. The price of the focus on the use of 
"proxy arguments" has been considerable. My basic suggestions presented and dis­
cussed at the end of Chapter 4 were as follows:  
- selection of working groups and Delphi panels taking into account the information 
policies and group influences in addition to the experts' expertise in relevant argu­
ments; 
- reduction of status differences between panellists; 
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- special Argument Delphi stage after "neo-classical" Delphi stages; 
- asking for the best unbiased information of experts and the deliberate use of pro­
tagonists and antagonists especially in the Argument Delphi stage but also in other 
stages; and 
- active roles for Delphi managers and synthesizers. 
1 also consider that my epistemic utility model, basic types of factual arguments and 
three types of reasonability might provide practical devices for analysing future ori­
ented innovation processes both in foresight studies and in other connections. 
What are theoretical, "long-term contributions" of the study? The basic theoretical 
starting point of this study is that the future-oriented behaviour of developers of 
technologies can be explained by their specific "languages" .  The general theory of 
consistency - which is the background of my discussion - makes a distinction be­
tween behavioural languages and other languages. There is a special (and often very 
unclear) relationship between behavioural languages and the languages which 
learning beings (e.g. single experts, firms or other organizations) use to understand 
or manipulate behaviour. We might also speak about unconscious behavioural lan­
guages related to "tacit knowledge" of experts and other more conscious languages. 
The basic assumption of the general theory of consistency seems to be simple, but it 
still has wide implications concerning futures studies: it is possible to change be­
havioural languages of learning beings, but not the behavioural languages of not­
learning beings. "The laws of nature" or invariances found by natural sciences are ' 
expressions of conscious languages - often written in the language of mathematics -
which seem to dominate the behavioural languages of not-Iearning beings. The 
domination means that a natural scientist can anticipate how a not-Iearning being 
will behave or use its behavioural language. However, the natural scientist can never 
be sure that the languages really are in concordance. It is also possible to dominate 
learning beings if one finds transient invariances in their behaviour. Because of 
learning, the domination is, however, transient. 
Innovations and technological development are based on generalizations of techno­
logical paradigms. A technological paradigm can be seen partly as a conscious lan­
guage and partly as an unconscious behavioural language (tacit knowledge) of mem­
bers of its developer community . Communication between members of a developer 
community and between different developer communities is based both on explicit 
and on tacit knowledge and also on information policies of experts and on influences 
of group dynamies. 1 think, that a great challenge of future studies concerning tech­
nology foresight is to understand more about technological paradigms and their in­
teraction. 
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Appendix 1 
Basic Concepts and Postulates of the General Theory of Consistency (GTC) 
Postulate 1 .  Learning and not-Iearning beings 
a) It is possible to make true predictions based on two types of beings: learning beings 
and not-learning beingi. True predictions are not possible based only on not-learning 
b ·  2 emgs . 
b) Both learning beings and not-learning beings have behavioural languagei. Learn­
ing beings can also have other types 011anguages4• 
I Like Eino Kaila ( 1940), 1 suggest that it is possible to constitute the universe into entities which behave in­
variantly or using the concepts of GTC: there are not-learning beings which do not change their criteria of 
sameness. Kaila suggested a research program based on his principle of invariance. From the point of view of 
the general theory of consistency, Kaila's program is a translation program: how to translate the criteria of 
sameness of not-learning beings into the languages of human learning beings? Invariant behaviour is the solid 
basis of predictions. If a learning being can realize which situations are similar from the point of view of a not­
learning being, she can predict how the not-learning being will behave in those situations. 
2 Though it is possible to divide the universe into the not-learning parts like atoms, a dual description based on 
learning beings is needed. There is at least one being which necessarily needs a dual description as a learning 
being: the "Cartesian Ego": "1 exist because 1 think" or "1 exist because 1 learn and 1 am able to change my 
behaviour" . 
3 The concept of behavioural language was not used in the tirst version of the theory. Infonnation theory, 
semiotics and the general linguistics have used language based explanations of behavior. They were obvious 
starting points of the original GTC as the following citation shows (Kuusi 1974, 19-20) : "The information 
theory is concentrated on the development of the best codes in a situation in which a sender of a message and 
a receiver of a message can make an agreement concerning the common code and the channel is known. A 
generalizing step which makes the situation more complicated, but which is a very commonly discussed 
situation in semiotics, is a situation in which the codes of the sender and the receiver differ. A situation 
which is especially complicated but important is a situation in which the sender and the receiver think that 
they have a common code, but actually their codes differ. This is not an exceptional situation: according to 
the general theory of consistency every sitootion where it happens learning belongs to this type" .  If i n  the 
above citation we use "language" in place of the code, the citation motivates the postulate lb .  
4 Based on brain lesions, brain researchers have realised the existence of two basic types of memories: a mem­
ory for doing and a memory for nominating (Rose 1994, 1 36-1 38). In my conceptual framework they are based 
on a behavioral language and on another type of language. An example from Rose is riding a bicycle. You can 
learn to bicycle in your behavioral language. You might also learn the name "bicycle" in a language, that is 
only indirectly related to behavioral language. As a result of a brain lesion, a person may forget that the object 
with two wheels that she is capable of riding is a "bicycle". 
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c) The elementary elements of the languages are the criteria of sameness (semsl The 
criteria of sameness of a being's behavioural language define its behaviour6• 
d) A learning being can change its criteria of sameness based on its learning capaci­
ties7• A not-learning being cannot change its criteria of sameness. A not-learning being 
always behaves consistently according to its invariant criteria of sameness. A learning 
being is able to behave inconsistently based on its changed behavioural language8. 
5 An important background for my conception of language and the criteria of sameness in particular is the 
structural semantics of A.J.Greimas. In his book Semantique structurale (Greimas 1966, in Finnish translalion 
1980, 28) Greimas started the analysis of the structure of a language by asking what does the expression "to 
perceive differenees" exaetIy mean. His answer was: 
a) To perceive differences means: to perceive at least two similar objeet terrns 
b) To perceive differenees means: to realize the relationship between terrns and connect them in a way. 
Hence from a) and b): 
e) In order that two object terms can be coneeived as a totality, they has to have something in common (the 
problem of similarity). 
d) In order to make a distinetion between two objeet terrns they have to be not-similar in some sense. 
Greimas called the totality of two object terms A and B a semantie dimension. Greimas eonsidered that A and 
B belong to an objeet language and they are achieved trough an act of perception. The perceived differenees as 
such are not, however, the distinctions which languages use. II is possible to articulate the perceived differ­
ences based on their properties or semie dimensions. Roman Jacobson remarked that the phonologic descrip­
tion of the c1assic Arab language requires 26 phonemes. This produees a program of 325 oppositions. It is, 
however, possible to describe the 31 phonemes of a North-Palestinian Arab dialeet using only nine sems. 
Despite the presenee of a semic dimension (s contra not-s), the semic dimension is not present in some eon­
nections (using my terms: it is not relevant in some eonnections). Greimas uses a notation - s. There are four 
semic possibilities in a connection 
(the presence of s) 
not-s (the presence of not-s) 
- s (the lack of s and not-s) 
s + not -s ( the presence of s or not s) 
In the last ease, the presence of the semic dimension is realized, but we do not know whether s or not-s is pres­
ent ( a eomplex sem eompare knowledge interest below). The coneept of the semie dimension is the key con­
cept of Greimas' structural semantics, on which for example his famous semiotic square is based. In a lan­
guage a semic dimension is the level on which basic distinctions are made coneerning the similarity of objects. 
Based on that faet, let us eall the above four basic semic possibilities basie criteria of sameness in a language. 
This Greimasian idea has been an important starting point for my general theory of consisteney. I have ex­
tended the Greimasian concepts to deal with the problems of learning and prediction. You ean find Greimasian 
counterparts of my eoncepts in parentheses and in black letters. 
6 If a being has not ehanged its relevant eriteria of sameness, that being behaves in similar ways in similar 
situations based on its own eriteria of sameness. From the perspective of the eriteria of sameness of another 
being, it may behave in different ways in similar situations. 
7 According to Rose ( 1994, 155): "The learning is a reaetion of an animal to a new situation. The reaction 
changes its behaviour reliably so that the animal behaves more properly than before, if it meets the situation 
again." A possible interpretation of the learning coneept of the GTC is that it tries to generalize this idea of 
learning to eoneern beside animals all learning beings. 
8 The inconsistency is based on one's own criteria of the sameness of a being. From the perspective of another 
being, it may behave consistently. 
249 
Corollary 1 The weak principle of invariance 
It is possible to find practically certified not-learning beings.9 A being is a certified 
not-Iearning being if it is possible to translate its criteria of sameness (sems) into the 
language of a second being so that the second being can predict the future behaviour 
of the first being without further information conceming criteria of sameness of the 
f· b ' 10 lfSt emg . 
Assumption 1 Private language assumption 
The criteria of sameness of a being are based on basic differences (distinctive jea­
tures) which the being can take into accountl J  . 
9 The corolIary folIows directly from the postulate 1 a. The corollary does not require that an actor can predict 
aJI future behavior of a certified not-learning. The point is that something is considered to remain constant or 
invariant in predictions e.g. in physics. As Kaila has remarked this principle of invariance is necessary for 
measurements. Kaila considered that he was able to show that (Kaila 1979, 1 59) "the theory of temperature 
was in fact based on the presupposition preceding alI measurements that a certain thermal quantity is constant, 
and . . .  the development of the concepts of thermometric measures becomes intelligible only in view of this 
principle of invariance". Kaila's point is that it is of course in principle possible to give up the presupposition, 
but not in practice. What we know, however, is only the predictive dominance of our language concerning the 
language of the measured not-learning being. 
10 The theoretical problem of whether there is a universal language in which all beings can be described as 
certified not-Iearning beings has not been solved. We might caJI the search for such a language the strong 
principle of invariance. The principle of invariance discussed by Kaila ( 1940) seems to be this strong princi­
ple. 1n the first version of the GTC, 1 discussed this topic (Kuusi 1974, 102): "It is somewhat interesting to 
suppose a being which has extremely wide capacity limits to take the criteria of sameness of all beings simul­
taneously into account ( compare the postulate 2 below). This being could predict exactly - supposing that 
learning beings have in principle a dual description as not-learning beings - how the beings behave in differ­
ent situations. It is possible to cal! two situations objectively similar if this type of being does not perceive a 
distinction between them". 
I I  1t seems that people and probably many other species have a capacity to perceive distinctions and remember 
them. This is an evident feature of the eidetic memory of children and some adults. An eidetic memory is, 
however, not very functional in comparison with a common language of many learning beings (compare Rose 
1994, 1 1 7-122). Assumption 1 is very simplifying because the learning beings usuaJIy (and people practically 
always) are born in communities with well-developed languages. A new speaker of a natural language has 
mainly to accept the concepts of the language as given. A capacity of a natural language to discern differences 
between relevant entities is a cultural capacity. A single speaker uses this capacity for the development and 
communication of his or her criteria of sameness. The speaker may take into account the cultural distinctions 
made in the language without any direct experience concerning them. A problem is, however, that the speakers 
do not use the concepts in similar ways: though they use common concepts they often communicate different 
criteria of sameness. 1n behavioural languages customs and routines have roles similar to concepts in natural 
languages. Though the assumption made is not very useful for the description of how people learn existing 
languag�s, i.t is very useful in analysis of the changes in languages e.g. based on perceived inconsistencies or 
contradictions (see postulate 3d). Unlearning is based on perceived differences and inconsistencies. When a 
person develops his or her behavioural language, the unlearning of earlier concepts and routines is a key ele­
ment in the learning process. 
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Postulate 2 A description of the criteria of sameness based on the private lan­
guage assumption 
The criteria of sameness can be stated as follows: 
a) A basic difference which a being can take into account defines a basic dimension 
(semantie dimension) describing a difference between two basic entities (objeet 
terms). 
b) The criteria of sameness of a being give meanings to basic dimensions. The mean­
ings are based on the interests of the being. The criteria of sameness (sems) translate 
basic dimensions (semantic dimensions) into binary (semic dimensions) or joint di­
mensions. Different meanings of entities of a dimension are the different values (semic 
possibilities) of the dimension. A binary dimension inc1udes a "contradiction" between 
two different values12• A joint dimension inc1udes at least three different values and it 
is based on combined binary dimensions. A joined dimension is based on a transitive 
relation between three or more values. It is a preJerence relation or a probability re­
lation. 1 3  
Postulate 3 Capacity Iimits or capacities of a being 
The capacity limits or capacities inc1ude two types of elements: the capacity limits oJ 
taking into account and the capacity limits Jor making true (or realize). Within the 
capacity limits of the first type are all the basic differences (semantic dimensions )or 
perce�tible criteria of sameness of other beings which a being is able to take into ac­
count 4. Within the capacity limits of the second type are capacities for realizing val­
ues in different dimensions (and so for hindering the realization of values which are in 
contradiction with them)lS. 
12 In the first version of the theory, a clear distinction between basic dimension and binary dimension was not 
made. The definition of the binary dimension was dynamic: " A binary dimension (A,B) includes two contra­
dictory criteria of sameness. The dimension will exist as long as a contradiction between A and B remains" 
(Kuusi 1974, 79). Compare a problem solving situation in which a person tries to realize A instead of B. 1 will 
discuss the interpretation more closely in connection with interests. 
13 For example in a joined dimension (A,B,C) A is more probable than B which is more probable than C which 
implies that A is more probable than C, compare Kuusi (1974), 101 
14 Besides the capacities of a being to perceive differences, its capacities to take into account depend on its 
languages, which take into account distinctions that the being cannot (at least directly) perceive. Important 
features of the capacity for taking into account (and the capacity of a language) are the capacities to remember 
and synthesize the distinctions made. They are basic elements of learning based on interests. A learning being 
might have the wrong expectations concerning its capacity Iimits (compare postulate 4d). 
IS In the first version, 1 gave an overly narrow definition of the capacity Iimits. 1 defined them as those changes 
which a being can realize in the instrumental dimensions in a situation (Kuusi 1974,76). 1 think that it is also 
reasonable to include the information processing capacities within the capacity Iimits. 
Postulate 4 Interests of a being 
25 1 
a) An interest is a totality of relevant dimensions. 16 
b) An interest has a target dimension17 and relevant instrumental dimensions reIated to 
the target in a situation defined by reIevant situation dimensionsl8• A being tries to 
achieve a proper vaIue in the target dimension. The proper vaIue is based on proper 
vaIues in instrumentai and situation dimensionsl9• It is possible to divide a process of 
an achievement of a proper vaIue in the target dimension in different sub-tasks or sub­
interestio. It is possible to deIegate sub-interests to other beings. 
16 . . .  "in the framework of the general theory of consistency, it is not possible to anaJyse targets, means and 
actions separate1y. In this sense, the concept of interest in the GTC has common features with the practical 
syllogism discussed extensively in the philosophical literature " (Kuusi 1 974, 72). An important idea in the 
first version of the theory was that interests and especially the most urgent interest (the antagonistic interest) 
determine relevant dimensions in a situation. 'Telling the whole truth' in a situation depends on relevant di­
mensions. Kuusi ( 1 974,65) iIIustrated this 'total truth' problem with the following example. Let us suppose 
that a country A is at war with another country. Let us suppose that a newspaper in A make5 war reports. Let 
us suppose that the target dimension of an (antagonistic) interest of all citizens in A is to defeat the enemy 
without mercy. A relevant dimension from the point of view of this interest is the number of destroyed ene­
mies. "The sufferings of enemies" is not a relevant dimension. "The whole truth" does not require reports on it. 
If the interest of most citizens is, apart from victory, to minimize the sufferings of enemies, the whole truth 
requires the reporting of the sufferings of enemies. 
17 In the first version, the target dimension was defined as a unity of contradictory elements or as a dimension 
which articulates an interest defining contradiction (Kuusi 1974, 68) The idea was that an interest- related 
problem is not solved and a contradiction prevails before only one value obtains the probability 1 and others 0 
in a case of a knowledge interest (compare e.g. Kuusi 1 974,8 1 )  or the preferred value in the dimension is 
achieved in a case of a welfare interest. 
18 One way to define the difference between learning and not-Iearning beings is to assume that the "interests" of 
not-Iearning beings are based only on situation dimensions. A not-Iearning cannot change its behaviour (or 
behavioural language) because it has no instruments (including "knowledge instruments" based on memories) 
to change its behaviour. The changes in its behaviour are determined reactions to changes in the situation. 
19 In an action theory of learning beings based on the idea of interest, Kuusi and Keloharju ( 1984) pointed to 
four basic "strategies" for the changes sought in a target dimension. They connected instrumentaI dimensions 
directly to the capacities of actors (to their resources). The connection between resources and situation dimen­
sions w�s indirect. A first strategy is to accept the situation dimensions or "barriers" as they are and overcome 
the barriers using the resources ("direct action module"). A second strategy is "wait and see" if the situation 
will become better 50 that the target is possible to achieve with (less) resources ("a passive change of a condi­
tion module"). A third basic strategy is to use resources for the elimination of barriers ("an active changing 01' a 
condition module"). A fourth basic strategy is to use resources to produce more resources ("the widening of 
capacity Iimits module"). 
2°Kuusi and Ke10harju ( 1 984) described the active changing of a condition module and the widening of capac­
ity limits module as subinterests. 
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c) A being has a leveI of achievement conceming any interest. There are two basic 
types of interests. In the case of a knowledge interest (complex sem) the level of 
achievement is defined by the probability values21 in the target dimension. In the case 
of a welfare interest the level of achievement is defined by the preference values in the 
target dimension. 
d) The interest related actions are based on basic expectations:22 if and only if a being 
behaves in similar ways (according to values in relevant instrumentai dimensions) in 
similar situations (according to values in relevant situation dimensions) are the results 
similar (according to values in the target dimensions of its interests).23 If a being has a 
proper memory, it can change its behaviour based on its perceived contradictions con­
cerning the realization of basic expectations24. 
21 The problem of a knowledge interest is to decide between different values in the target dimension. Ideally in 
any situation only one value can prevail in the target dimension if the knowledge interest tries to decide the 
criterion of sameness of a not-Iearning being in that dimension. Hintikka (e.g. 1973, 224-225) defined the 
suifaee infonnation for all the sentences of some given applied first order language. He used as measures of 
information probability-like weights that are assigned to the sentences. A probability measure of a sentence F 
p(F} was thought to be a degree of belief (of some sort) that one can rationally assign (a priori) to any sentence 
of a language. Like Hintikka we may consider different values in the target dimension Vi of a knowledge inter­
est as "inconsumerable sentences" (criteria of sameness) with different degrees of belief P(Vi}' A knowledge 
interest tries to specify situation conditions (compare eonstituents in the framework of Hintikka) minimizing 
the insecurity concerning which value Vi prevails. Ideally the probability of one value Vi is 1 and others O. 
Beside the invariant criteria of sameness of not-Iearning beings, the successes in knowledge interests depend 
on the welfare interests of learning beings (compare Kuusi 1974, 87-94). 
22 The concept "basic expectation" was not used in the first version of the general theory of consistency. Its 
content is, however, essentially the same as "the basic idea of the theory" (Kuusi 1974, 4): If the same opera­
tion made to the same objeet produees difjerent results some being has to ehange its eriteria of sameness. 
23 Let us suppose that (behavioural pattern 1 ,  situation 1 ,  result 1) and (pattern 2, situation 2, result 2) refer to 
same basic expectation. We may assume that based on its criteria of sameness, the being has a group A of 
similar behavioural patterns (similar values in re1evant instrumental dimensions) and a group B of similar 
situations and a group e of similar results. From the perspective of produced result 1 and 2 belonging to the 
similarity group e, the being expects no difference between the behavioural patterns 1 and 2 belonging to A if 
situations 1 and 2, where the behavioural patterns are used, belong to B. The similarity supposed between pat­
terns 1 and 2; situations 1 and 2 or results 1 and 2 does not require that the being could not discern the differ­
ence between 1 and 2. The similarity or the sameness of 1 and 2 is the basic expectation specific. 
24 A necessary condition for a learning being is that it has a memory. 
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e) A change in the criteria of sameness (or learning ) may also be based on the reach­
ing or not-reaching of the achievement level resulting in a higher or a lower achieve­
ment level. If a being has permanently achieved the highest achievement level in an 
interest the interest is permanently realized and the learning based on the interest 
stopS.25 
Postulate 5 The genuine learning being or the actor 
Let us assume that a first being had in the past predicted rightly the behaviour of a 
second being in a situation. The second being is the genuine learning being or actor 
lrom the point 01 view 0/ the first being if the second being has capacities and if it is 
ready to change its criterion of sameness so that the first being is, after the change, not 
able to predict its behaviour in the situation without further information conceming its 
criteria of sameness.26 
25 In the first version, 1 calI these changes different types of negations. The reachin'g of the achievement level of 
an interest means that a basic expectation is realized. Only some changes in the instrumentai dimensions be­
long to the capacity limits of a being. As in the realization of a pian the (learning) being may await the proper 
situation for the realization of the interest. It can also try to delegate sub-plans or sub-interests to other beings. 
26 Alan Turing presented "Turing's test" in 1 950s: Let us suppose that you use a telex to communicate with 
another telex in another room. If you cannot discern if you are communicating with another person or with a 
machine the machine has some artificial intelligence (compare Rose 1994, 97). An interpretation of the Turing 
test is that the intelligent machine can use your language intelligently enough. 1 consider that a stronger suffi­
cient condition is needed for a genuine learning being. Let us suppose that in the Turing test you have a paper 
before you. If you cannot manipulate the machine to answer your message as is written on your paper, the 
machine could be a genuine learning being. II is, however, only a candidate: the unpredictability may be based 
on its poorly known past invariant criteria of sameness. In more general terms: a practical definition of a 
genuine learning being is its ability based on its learning to nullify in an unpredictable way a prediction with a 
change in its behaviour. People and perhaps some intelligent animals are examples of this type of genuine 
learning beings as are their organizations. In the future, an important group of learning beings ate probably 
neural computers, the behaviour of which is ruled by prograrnmed interests and which can make action deci­
sions independently. Even now, it may be plausible to interpret the computers and even written documents to 
be organic parts of learning organizations. 
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Corollary 2 Necessary conditions for an actor 
Let us suppose that a first being had in the past correctly predicted the behaviour of a 
second being in a situation. There are three necessary conditions for the second being 
to be a genuine learning being or an actor from the point of view of the first being 
a) The second being has not-realized interests,z7 
b) The second being has an active memory as a store of its learning experiences.28 
c) The second being has capacities to change its behaviour as the result of its learn­
ing.29 
Postulate 6 The essence or genuine interests of an actor 
a) The essence of a genuine learning being or an actor is defined by target dimensions 
of its genuine interests.30 No experience can change the (real or true) preference order 
in the target dimension of a genuine interest. In other words, the order of values in the 
target dimension of an actor's genuine interest is invariane1 • If the order changes the 
actor is not the same actor as before (for example an organism dies ) .  
b) A learning being does not typically know her genuine interests, but she learns to 
know them through her experiences of repentance if she has a feasible and active 
memory.32 
27 A robot, which is programmed to do certain determined tasks, is a being, that cannot change its criteria of 
sameness. It is an example of a not genuine learning being, that has a memory and action capacities but does 
not have interests. A robot can change its criteria of sameness only if somebody changes its software to pro­
mote her interests. 
28 A simple thermostat is a being, with such a simple memory that you can easily predict its behaviour. This is 
the reason to c1assify it as a not-learning being, though it has an "interest" to keep the temperature within cer­
tain Iimits and it has a capacity to start an action, that contributes to the fulfilment of the target. 
29 According to de Jouvenel, for a given person the future is divided into dominating and masterable parts (de 
Jouvenel 1967,52). A disabled person cannot save himself from a fire, because this is not within his capacity 
Iimits. In this "dominating future" the disabled behaves Iike a not-Iearning being. The masterable future is 
what a person can change according to his or her interests. De Jouvenel stressed an important point: olin human 
affairs the future is often dominating as far as I am concerned, but is masterable by a more powerful agent, an 
agent from a different level" (for example a state, the author's addition) 
30 There are two possible metaphysical explanations for the invariance of the criteria of sameness of a not­
learning being. The first explanation is that the not-Iearning being is indifferent to the results of its action (it 
has no genuine targets). The other metaphysical explanation is that even in the case in which the expectations 
of the not-Iearning being are not met (it has genuine targets and it can compare its expectations with the re­
sults of its behaviour), it cannot change its behavioural language. 
31 The genuine interests of a learning being in a way resemble the permanently invariant criteria of sameness of 
not-Iearning beings. 
32 If many actors, for example human beings, have the same or similar interests, it is possible that an expert, 
for example a physician, knows some genuine interests of a person better than that person himself, though only 
that person (or some other learning being) has a direct access to his experiences of repentance or frustration. 
The physician can take into account the experiences of similar actors. 
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Postulate 7 Capability Iimits of an actor 
The actions which do not produce experiences of repentance belong to the capability 
limits of a being.33 The learning and behaving of an actor is undetermined or path­
dependent because there may be many different actions in a situation which belong to 
the capability limits of the actor and the capability limits change according to specific 
learning experiences resulting from selected actions. 
A summary conclusion 
The general theory of consistency gives a metaphysical justification for different sce­
narios of the future. In summary, futures research based on this paradigm is research 
on the capacity limits, capability limits and interests 01 actors and the study 01 possi­
ble and desired futures based on this type 01 knowledge. In the case 01 a not-learning 
being, the activity recommended by the paradigm is seeking invariant criteria 01 
sameness. 
33 Beside the perceiving of genuine interests the capability Iimits depend on true basic expectations inc1uding 
true basie expectations concerning capacity Iimits. A being can have false basic expectations concerning its 
capability limits. 
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Appendix 2 
Finnish Material Communities and the Experts in the Study concerning the Fu­
ture Use of Polymer Materials 
1.Finnish material communities 
In the study of Kuusi ( 1994), a material community was defined to be a network of 
persons, firms, research institutes and other institutes. Its actions and decisions were 
defined to be decisive for the development of some materials and for the selection of 
those materials in different applications. At present, one can hardly identify one na­
tional or intemational developer community of material technology. It is at present 
reasonable to speak rather separate developer communities (and technological para­
digms) conceming metallic materials, ceramic materials, wood & paper materials and 
plastic materials, though composites combining alI materials have continuously be­
come more important. 
The separateness hypothesis was tested in the second round of the Delphi study Kuusi 
( 1994). AlI panellists accepted the folIowing suggestion conceming Finnish material 
communities: 
At present the developers and producers of plastic products are separated 
from developers and producers of metallic materials, ceramic materials and 
wood & paper materials. 
Though the panellists' evaluations were based on a comparison with Finland and other 
OECD countries, it is reasonable to assume, that separateness is not only a Finnish 
problem. With one exception the panellists rejected even the folIowing suggestion: 
At present, the developers and producers of plastics products have c10se 
connections with the producers of paper and board . 
The deviant panellist was a special expert on packages. The relative separateness of 
material communities will probably continue in the near future, but in the long run the 
developer communities may integrate as was also anticipated by the panellists. In the 
present situation it is reasonable to calI developers of different materials as rival ex­
perts. 
An important feature of the plastic developer community in Finland (and world-wide) 
is its newness in comparison with long traditions of metallic, ceramic or paper mate­
rials. The production of plastics products started in Finland in 1921 with a company 
(Servis Co) producing buttons and buckles from milk casein. It took over ten years 
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before a next Finnish user of plastics started. Just before W orld War II there were 
about ten finns in Finland making plastic products. 
After the war, the Finnish plastics industry grew rapidly. The number of firms pro­
ducing plastics products was estimated to be 760 at the end of 1990 (Neste . . .  1992). At 
the time of two first Delphi rounds of the study one multinational plastics producing 
company (Neste Co.) had a key position in the Finnish plastics community. It was the 
only finn in Finland producing plastic resins. 
2. Experts and their types 0/ expertise 
The study had six Delphi managers: Osmo Kuusi (VATT, the Govemment Institute 
for Economic Research); Petteri Sivula (VATT); Veikko Komppa (VTT -Technical 
Research Centre of Finland - Chemistry); Arto Mölsä (VTT Chemistry); Irina Aho­
Mantila (VTT Metal); Heikki Kukko (VTT Construction). Komppa, who was also a 
panellist, was the professor and the director of the VTT Chemistry research labora­
tory, Aho-Mantila and Kukko were senior researchers and doctors, Sivula and Mölsä 
were junior researchers. 
The study also had an advisor group which together with the Delphi managers played 
a key role in the selection of panellists. It included leading experts of material tech­
nology at VTT: Prof. Tor-Magnus Enari (VTT Biotechnology), Prof. Simo-Pekka 
Hannula (VTT Metal), Prof. Heikki Kleemola (VTT Metal), Prof. Veikko Komppa 
(VTT Chemistry), Liisa Rautiainen (VTT Construction) and research manager Antti 
Romppanen (VATT). Hannula, Kleemola, Komppa and Rautiainen were also panel­
lists. 
The 45 Delphi panellists are below classified into the basic stakeholder groups dis­
cussed in Chapter 5. 1 call rivals all researchers or realizing experts specializing in 
materials other than plastics, their composites or wood & paper. Also, those members 
of the wood & paper community who did not used plastics composites were classified 
as rivals. An important new category in the list comprises experts in institutions that 
link university research and realizing firms. There are only 40 items in the list of pan­
ellists because 5 panellists gave answers together with some other panellists. The pan­
ellists are presented in the order of interviews. 1 will later use the rank order numbers 
for the identification af panellists. 
1 .  Natural scientist, synthesizer, Iink institution (professor VIT -Technical Research Centre of Finland - Con­
struction) 
2. Natural scientist, Iink institution (professor, VIT Chemistry, specializing in plastics) 
3. Natural scientist, rival (professor, VIT Metal) 
4. Natural scientist, rival (professor, VIT Metal) 
5. Administrator, application organization (product manager in a firm using plastic composites) 
6. Natural scientist, basic research (associate professor at TKK -Technical University of Helsinki - specializing 
in advanced polymer composites) 
7. Natural scientist, Iink institution (professor in KCL - Central Laboratories of Finnish Forest Industry - spe­
cialized in polymers of wood and textiles) 
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8. Administrator, synthesizer, application & generalization organization (managing director and a researcher 
at the Finnish Plastics Association) 
9. Adrninistrator, application organization (project manager in a firm making polymer furniture and wans) 
10. Natural scientist, generalization organization (managing director of a sman firm specializing in advanced 
polymer composites) 
1 1 . Administrator, generalization organization (research director of a large firm which makes plastics) 
1 2. Natural scientist, generalization organization (director of a firm specialized in the use of advanced plastic 
composites) 
13 .  Natural scientist, generalization organization (research director in a firm using sman plastic components, 
e.g. in electric equipment) 
14. Natural scientist, regulator (senior researcher of TEKES, Technical Development Centre of Finland, spe­
cializing in the funding of applications in material technology) 
15 .  Natural scientist, generalization organization (development manager in a firm making products based on 
plastic composites) 
1 6. Adrninistrator, application organization (research director in a firm making mostly cerarnic products for 
construction, but also applications based on polymers) 
17 .  Natural scientist, link institution (senior researcher, VTT Pyrotechnology) 
18. Natural scientist, basic research, generalizing organization (professor of TTKK - Tampere University of 
Technology - specialized in biodegradiable polymers) 
1 9. Natural scientist, rival (associate professor of TTKK specializing in advanced cerarnics) 
20. Natural scientist, generalization organization (research director in a firm specialized in advanced poly­
mers) 
2 1 .  Natural scientist, basic research (professor in polymer technology of TKK) 
22. Consumer stakeholder (a women, who has written a critical book about plastics for the Finnish Nature 
Protection Association) 
23. Natural scientist, regulator (senior researcher specializing in the financing of construction in TEKES) 
24. Natural scientist, generalization organization (managing director of a firm making applications based on 
advanced polymer composites for aircraft) 
25. Natural scientist, link institution (researcher at KCL specialized in the recycling of paper) 
26. Adrninistrator, rival (managing director of a firm specializing in recycled paper as an insulating material 
in construction, very critical concerning the use of plastics ) 
27. Synthesizer, consumer stakeholder (eco-consult used by the Finnish Nature Protection Association) 
28. Synthesizer, consumer stakeholder (eco-consult used by the Finnish Nature Protection Association) 
29. Adrninistrator, regulator (civil servant at the Ministry of Environment specialized in waste management ) 
30. Natural scientists, link institution (researchers at KCL, specializing in the package technology) 
3 1 .  Natural scientist, application organization (research manager in a firm specialized in the production of 
waterproof packages) 
32. Natural scientist, generalization organization (research director and researcher in a large firm specializing 
in plastics pipes) 
33. Adrninistrator, regulator (civil servant in the Ministry of Environment specialized in waste management ) 
34. Adrninistrator, regulator (civil servant in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs specialist in waste management ) 
35. Natural scientists, application organization (research director and researchers in a sman firm specializing 
in the recycling of cars) 
36. Natural scientist, application organization (research director in a firm making mostly ceramic products for 
construction, but also applications based on polymers) . 
37. Natural scientist, basic research (docent at the University of Helsinki, speciaIized in the basic physics of 
materials) 
38. Natural scientist, generaIization organization (research director of a large paper producing firm) 
39. Behavioural scientist, consumer stakeholder (researcher in the Consumer Research Institute making study 
concerning the consumption of plastics) 
40. Behavioural scientist, rival (researcher in V A TT - the Government Institute for Economic Research - spe­
ciaIizing in the worId markets of metals) 
The ten polymer scientist panellists (or small groups of panellists) had various special 
types of expertise. Researchers 2, 6, 18, 21 were technical specialists in the use of 
plastics ,ar plastic composites. Panellist 1 was a specialist in materials in construction, 
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7 was a scientific expert especially in cellulose fibers, 17  in pyrotechnology, 25 in 
recyc1ing of paper, 30 in packaging technology and 37 in basic physics of materials. 
Sixteen panellists (or small groups of panellists) are c1assified as realizing experts. It is 
possible to divide this group in three subgroups. The reaIizing experts 8, 1 1  and 32 
were "plastic generalists" .  They, or at least their institutes or firms were prominent 
decision makers in the Finnish material community being mass producers or users of 
plastic resins or general promoters of the use of plastic resin materials. The realizing 
panellists 10, 1 2, 1 5, 20 and 24, were technical specialists in the use of plastics or 
plastics composites. The third subgroup of the realizing experts was rather heteroge­
neous. They - 5, 9, 13,  1 6, 3 1 ,  35, 36 and 38 - represented different types of applica­
tion firms using plastics and also other materials. 
Five panellists were c1assified as rivals. Except for 26, all were experts specialized in 
metals or in ceramic materials. The c1ass of regulating experts inc1uded two represen­
tatives of funding (TEKES) and three civil servants specializing in waste management. 
Four panellists were c1assified as "consumer specialists" .  Except for 30 they have 
close links with the Finnish Association for Nature Protection. 
Another way to look at the roles of panellists is to look at their organizations. Four 
panellists were university researchers. Eight panellists worked in public research or 
development institutes (TEKES, VTT, Govemment Institute for Economic Research). 
Nine panellists worked in the multi-client research institutes of industry, in an asso­
ciation of industrial firms or in a multi-c1ient consulting firm (KCL, Package Research 
Group of Finnish Industry, Finnish Plastics Industry Association, Advanced Environ­
ment Management - the consulting firm). Fifteen panellists were research managers or 
researchers of firms. Three panellist were experts in the public regulation of waste 
management. Five panellists were selected to the panel as representatives of environ­
mental organizations though two of the them were also managing directors of small 
"altemative firms" and three were researchers focused on consumer and environmental 
issues. 
A way to c1assify the experts is to try to formulate indicators of their expertise based 
on the comments produced and on the background of experts. 1 present this c1assifica­
tion as an illustration of a way which can be used to operationalise the basic c1assifi­
cation into scientists, decision makers and synthesizers. 
Synthetic expertise. Synthesizers are experts with expertise or well argued opinions on 
many different uses of polymers. The synthetic expertise can be evaluated by a simple 
indicator. This crude and not very valid indicator is the average number of issues 
commented by the experts in the first round of the study. Because the comments were 
the result of a rather unstructured interaction process between the Delphi managers 
and the interviewee, the expectations of the Delphi managers conceming the 
"synthetic abilities" of the interviewee had an impact on the number of discussed ar­
eas. The experts made, however, final decisions to comment or not to comment on an 
issue. 
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Mass producers or users of plastics or general prornoters of the use of plastic resin 
materials obtained the highest average score, 7,0. In the group of scientists researching 
carbon polymers or their composites, the average score was 6,3 .  The average score of 
public administrators of recycling of materials was also 6,3 and consumer or environ­
mental organization experts in future demands for carbon polymers or their compos­
ites obtained the next highest score, 6,0. In the group of general experts in material 
sciences the average number of discussed areas was 5,3.  Other groups obtained the 
following average scores: specialists in qualities of rival materials of carbon polymers 
5,2; experts in recycling technology 4,5 and finally specialists in applications of ad­
vanced carbon polymers and their comppsites 3,0 . 
Core ( "paradigmatic") scientific expertise. The evaluation of the core scientific ex­
pertise in polymers (and espe9ially plastics) and in their composites is based on the 
positions of experts in the developer community. Experts re,sea,rching, pJ;QQ.llcing or 
applying new plastics resins or carbon composites received a score A. Other experts 
who had studied or used plastics or their composites received a s,core B.  Others re­
ceived a score C. 
Rival scientific expertise. The evaluation of the rival scientific expertise in other mate­
rials is also based on the positions of experts in the developer community. Experts 
researching, producing or applying other materials received a score A.. Others re­
ceived a score C. 
Core decision making expertise. The evaluation of the core decision making expertise 
in polymers (and especially plastics) and in their composites is based on the capacities 
of experts to make production decisions or to regulate production directly by for ex­
ample standards or indirectly by consumption decisions. All representatives of reali­
zation organizations, which were managing directors or planl1ing directors of firms 
received a score A. Experts representing public regulating organizations or consumer 
viewpoint received a score B.  Others received a score C. 
Critical decision making expertise. The' evaluation of the critical decision making ex­
pertise is based on the capacities of experts to make production decisions which can be 
based either on carbon polymers (+ their composites) or on other rival materials. The 
representatives of application organizations, which have to compare different materials, 
received a score A. Experts representing public regulating organizations or consumer 
viewpoint received a score B.  Others received a score C. 
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Appendix 3 
The Motivation of the "Ideal" Technological Paradigm of New BioteChnology in 
1989·1990 
The concepts of the paradigm of the new biotechnology are mostly developed based 
on invariances found in three interconnected sciences (Moses and Moses 1995): 
- Biochemistry, which addresses the chemical structure and behaviour of all types of 
living beings 
- Genetics, the study of inheritance and the relationships between iIldividuals and 
populations; 
- Microbiology, a field c10sely integrated with both biochem,istry and genetics, which 
explores and manipulates microbes of all sorts 
The basic scientific concepts of these sciences are given in many introductory books 
on these sciences. A short introduction of concepts of these sciences were also given 
(in Finnish) in Kuusi ( 1991 ). 
1 .  Recombinant DNA technology 
The evident key generic technology of the past few decades of biotechnology has been 
the development of techniques to allow the transfer of genetic informatipn from one 
specie to another specie (KJ). In successful applications this is done in such a way 
that the protein(s) specified by the transferred gene(s) can be made (expressed) in the 
new host. 
Recombinant DNA technology is part of molecular biology, a name oftep. �'sed for the 
interface between biochemistry and genetics .  The basic techniques of this t�chnology 
are methods that make possible to get a cell to accept a strange string of DNA, which 
codifies the production of a protein (KJ) . The "acceptation" means, that the cell be­
gins to produce the protein (c1osely e.g. Moses and Moses 1995, 32-37). 
The first techniques concemed the transfer of a string of DNA to bacteria, which 
rather easily accept DNA material. Manipulating the genes of plants and anilIl�ls pres­
ents more technical problems than those in bacteria. Not only is their genetie otgani­
zation very much more complex, but the cells are part of a large structure, tlle Qody of 
the animal or plant. 
Basic techniques provide several ways of inserting foreign DNA into isolated cells of 
animals or plants (Moses and Moses 1995, 38): 
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The first realized target concemed bacteria. A prerequisite of effective genetic mate­
rial is the replication of transferred genetic material as the cell grows and divides. The 
replication will occur only if the DNA contains a sequence that is recognized by the 
cell as an origin of replication (Wilson and Walker 1996 p . 133).  Most DNA samples 
do not contain such sequences and therefore the transferred DNA has to be attached to 
a carrier or vector DNA that contains an origin of replication. The first carrier tech­
nique involved the use of plasmids of bacteria. A plasmid is a relatively small, circular 
extrachromosomal molecule, which contain an origin of the replication. 
Now many techniques are also available to accomplish the transfer to isolated cells of 
animals and plants (Moses and Moses 1 995, 38): 
1 )  In certain chemical environments, animal eelis will take up DNAfrom 
environment, just as bacteria will. The process can be helped by applying an electric 
current (KJa) which he1ps to enlarge the natural pores in the membrane surrounding 
the cells, a method called electroporation. 
2) Because of their large size, it is possible by microinjection to inject a DNA-solution 
directly into animal eelis (KJ b). 
3) It is possible to incorporate the DNA into certain viruses which are then allowed to 
infect the animal eelis (KJc). 
4) Using some viruses, it is sometimes possible to persuade eelis from different ani­
mals to fuse together, resulting in cell hybrids containing the DNAfrom both (KJd). 
5) In the technique of particle acceleration, the DNA to be transferred is coated onto 
minute gold particles which are fired at target eelis (KJ e) in an electric discharge ap­
paratus. 
The potential generalizations of recombinant DNA technology concem the techniques 
of the effective transfer of DNA to different types of cells applying an electric current 
which helps to enlarge the natural pores in the membrane surrounding the cells, a 
method called electroporation. 
2. Cloning technology 
Cloning techniques inelude different ways of producing and multiplying cells or whole 
organisms, e.g. plants or animals. The technology can be seen as a sophisticated ver­
sion of the traditionai cultivation technology for animal and plant cells. A basic tech­
nique of the technology is cell fusion. The fused eelis contain the nuclei - and hence 
the genetic information - ofbothfused eelis (K2). 
An important application of cell fusion technique known in 1989 was the production 
of monoelonal antibodies. So called monoelonal antibodies will probably be important 
both in therapy of infection diseases and in their diagnostics. Antibodies are key ele-
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ments of animal immune systems. They are a defense mechanism which has evolved 
primarily, it seems, to protect the animaIs from the ravages of infeetion by foreign or­
ganisms (Moses and Moses 1995, 104). The immune system is based on the existenee 
of large numbers of eelIs ealIed T- or B-Iymphocytes and monocytes. There may be 
trillions of them in every human being. These eells respond to the presenee of anti­
gens, eomprising mostly proteins not found within the body of that individual. 
The response is based on special proteins calIed antibodies. The two interacting pro­
teins (the antigen and its antibody) possess eomplementary structures whieh alIow a 
precise fit and hence eonfer specifieity. 
Antibodies are produced by B-Iymphocytes: eaeh B-cell has no more than one type of 
antigen-reeeptor protein but every animal and every human being possesses enormous 
numbers of different types of B-eelI, eaeh with its own specific reeeptor/antibody. 
Suppose an infection oeeurs for the first time in an individual's life. They activate the 
appropriate B-eelIs to produce by dividing large numbers of so called plasma celIs, 
eaeh one of which aetively seeretes that same antibody. This happens in the course of 
few days (the primary immune response). After the attaek of antigens, special celIs 
calIed memory eells remain in tissues : they "remember" the earlier contaets with that 
antigen and respond with the production of the required antibody mueh more rapidly 
and in much larger amounts than was case on the first contact (seeondary immune re­
sponse). 
The idea of traditionai vaccines has been to evoke primary immune response with 
weakened infectious organisms. Alternatively, antibodies (antitoxins) might be pre­
pared in advance and stored. In this endeavour, new c10ning technology has proved to 
be very useful. With traditionai methods it is possible to isolate and cultivate correct 
B-cells. The problem is that b-celIs can undergo only a Iimited number of cell divi­
sions before they die. The growth of cells on a scale necessary for generating usable 
amounts of antibody requires them to be effectively immortal. They have to be able to 
go on growing and dividing, and seereting their particular antibody, as long as essen­
tial nutrients are provided for them. 
The scientific breakthrough in the antibody production based on the new cloning teeh­
nology was made by fusing antibody produeing eells with eaneerous lymphoeytes 
(myeloma eells) (K2a). Some of the fused eells were immortal and produeed the anti­
body. It is possible to culture those so ealled hybridomas on a large scale in a manu­
faeturing process for antibody produetion. The produet is ealled "monoclonal anti­
body" beeause it is produeed as a single, pure substanee from a single clone of eells 
(K2a). 
3. Sequencing techniques of nuc1eic acids and gene libraries 
The sequencing technologies are c10sely linked with the recombinant DNA - technol­
ogy. The advent of methods for the sequencing of DNA has radiealIy changed the un-
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derstanding of gene structure. By the beginning of 1990s, it was already routine to 
sequence any newly isolated DNA fragment of interest (K3). Two methods were used: 
the dideoxy or chain termination method of F. Sanger and the chemical cleavage 
method of A Maxam and W. Gilbert (Wilson and Walker 1994, 142). Both methods 
are based on the high resolution electrophoresis of four sets of radioactive oligonu­
cleotides produced from the DNA to be sequenced. The chemical cleavage method is 
now used less frequently. 
For one version of the Sanger method, single stranded DNA is required. This is readily 
obtained by cloning the DNA in bacteriofage M13.  The attraction of M13 was that it 
provides a convenient way to generate large quantities of single stranded DNA, all 
containing a piece of "foreign" DNA to be sequenced. Sanger sequences may also be 
carried out using double-stranded DNA using pUC plasmid. Some deoxyribonucleo­
side triphosphates that must be provided for DNA synthesis are radioactively labeled. 
The development of automated sequencing techniques (K4) has made possible the 
projects like HUGO and GENOME. One automatic method involves the use of dide­
oxyribonucleotides labeled with coloured or fluorescent groups. Mter a standard 
Sanger reaction all four samples are run on the same track of an electrophoresis gel, 
and an optical sensor further down the gel detects the passage of each fragment of 
DNA and identifies whether it has terminated by ddA (adenine), ddC (cytosine), ddG 
(guasine) or ddT (tymine) from its colour or wavelength of fluorescence. The output 
from the sensor can be fed directly into a computer. 
The most difficult part of genetic manipulation is not the cloning of DNA, but the 
isolation of the particular piece of DNA to be cloned (Wilson and Walker 1994, 148). 
If the aim is to clone a gene then it is helpful to have as much information as possible 
about the gene product. U sually this product is a protein and ideally antibodies to the 
protein should be available for detection of the protein. If the amino acid sequence of 
a protein is known, there is no need to prepare a cDNA probe for its gene. 
Frequently an attempt is made to isolate the mRNA transcribed from a desired gene. 
When a fraction containing the desired mRNA has been identified, it is used to direct 
the synthesis of DNA molecules complementary to all of the mRNA in that fraction. 
During maturation of mRNA in eukaryotes, the introns are excised from the molecule, 
leaving only the exons spliced together; it is this spliced molecule that is used to make 
cDNA. Genes also have regions flanking them that are of importance in their expres­
sion and are not transcribed as part of the mRNA. When a complete gene must be 
isolated, cDNA can be used as a probe to search through a gene library for the desired 
gene. 
Gene libraries are constructed by isolating the complete genomic DNA from a cell, 
and cutting it almost randomly into fragments of the desired average length (K5). This 
can be achieved by partial restriction with an enzyme that recognizes tetranucleotide 
sequences. The mixture of fragments is ligated with a vector, and cloned. If enough 
clones are produced there will be a very high chance that any particular gene will be 
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present in at least one of the c1ones. Such colIection of c10nes is known as a gene li­
brary. A cDNA library can be created similarly by c10ning cDNA prepared from the 
total mRNA of a tissue. 
4. Polymerase chain reaction technology and its possible generalizations 
According to Watson et al. ( 1 996), the polymerase chain reaction technique 
(PCR)(PI) devised by Gary Mullis in the mid 1980s has revolutionized molecular ge­
netics by making possible a whole new approach to the study and analysis of genes. 
The use of PCR is c10sely linked with recombinant DNA technology. PCR was devel­
oped as an extension of recombinant DNA technology, and it is e.g. extensively dis­
cussed in major text-book Recombinant DNA (Watson et all 1996). Because the future 
applications of PCR seem to be manifold and may not be restricted in the area of re­
combinant DNA technology or even molecular genetics (general applications in 
nanotechnology in multiplication of polymers), it is reasonable to calI PCR a generic 
technology instead of a technique. 
The first applications of PCR technology have been in molecular geneties. A major 
problem in analysing genes is that they are rare targets in complex genome. Many 
techniques are used to overcome this problem: different techniques of c10ning tech­
nology and recombinant DNA-technology (e.g. methods for detecting specific DNA 
sequences). The polymerase chain reaction has changed alI this by enabling to produce 
enormous numbers of copies of a specified DNA sequence. DNA polymerase uses 
single-stranded DNA as a template for the synthesis of a complementary new strand. 
These single stranded DNA templates can be produced by heating double-stranded 
DNA to temperatures near boiling (Watson et all 1996 p. 80). DNA polymerase also 
requires a smalI section of double-stranded DNA to initiate ("prime") synthesis. The 
primers define the specific DNA-codes of the regions which are multiplied. 
After the synthesis of complementary DNA-strands the reaction mixture is again 
heated to separate the original and newly synthesized strands, which are then available 
for further cyc1es of primer hybridization, DNA synthesis, and ' strand separation. A 
possibility which makes PCR a real generic technology with promising potential ap­
plications outside the area of moleeular genetics is, that in principle the idea of PCR is 
not only usable in the multiplieation of DNA or RNA. Any double-stranded polymer 
with completing strands is a potential target for multiplication( El). 
In the present state of the art, PCR technology ean be used to diagnose alI properties 
which are visible in genetic eode e.g. PCR-products can be sequeneed directly in 
identification of genes; mutations e.g. those producing cancer ean be detected; DNA 
typical to bacterial or viral infeetions ean be detected; PCR amplification is used for 
sex determination of prenatal eelIs; and PCR can be used in evolutionary studies to 
determine the degree of relatedness between species (Watson et al. 1996, 88-95) 
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5. Protein and enzyme techniques 
Twenty amino acids varying in size, shape, charge and chemical reactivity are found 
in proteins and each has at least one codon in the genetic code. Proteins are based on 
chains of amino acids (polypeptide chains). Enzymes are special kinds of proteins 
which function as catalysts. One focus of protein and enzyme techniques (K6) is to 
uncover primary structures (sequences of the amino acid residues) (K6a), secondary 
structures (localized folding of polypeptide chain due to hydrogen bonding) (K6b), 
tertiary structures ( the overall folding of a polypeptide chain, which is stabilized by 
electrostatie attractions and by weak van der Waals ' forces) (K8c) and quaternary 
structures (associations oftwo or more polypeptide chains) (K6d) (Wilson and Walker 
1992, 1 67- 1 69). Another focus of protein and enzyme technologies is to uncover the 
activity of proteins and enzymes and the impacts of their e.g. catalytic activities. 
6. Fermentation and cell, tissue or organ culture technology 
In vitro techniques, which involve the incubation of biologically derived material in 
artificial physical and chemical environments. The promotion a limited degree of 
growth, differentiation and development in cell, tissue and organ culture of animals 
and plants. According to the evaluation of the interviewed expert, fermentation and 
cell and tissue techniques (BI) are base technologies of the new biotechnology. 
7 .  Microscopy 
Biochemical analysis used to be accompanied by light and electron microscopic ex­
amination of tissue, cell or organelle preparations to evaluate the integrity of samples 
and to correlate structure withfunction (B2). Microscopy has served two independent 
functions of enlargement and improved resolution (the rendering of two separate ob­
jects as separate entities) (Wilson and Walker 1995, 41) .  Light and electron micro­
scopes may work either in a transmission or scanning mode depending on whether the 
light or electron beam passes through the specimen and is diffracted or whether it is 
deflected by the specimen surface. New very effective microscopes Scanning Tunnel­
ing Microscope (STM) and Atomic Force Microscope can discern even single atoms 
(P2). Heinrich Rohrer and Gerd Binnig got the Nobel Prize in 1986 based on the in­
vention of the STM. 
8. Radioisotope techniques 
Auxiliary technology. Radioisotopes have been very widely used in the study of the 
mechanisms and rates of absorption, accumulation and translocation of inorganic and 
organic compounds by both plants and animals (B3). Radioisotopes are frequently 
used for tracing metabolic pathways. This usually involves adding a radioactive sub­
strate (inc1uding e.g. H3, C14, P34, 1123), taking samples of the experimental material 
at various times, extracting and chromatografically, or otherwise, separating the prod­
ucts (Wilson and Walker 1 994, 266). 
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9. Centrifugation techniques 
Auxiliary technology. Centrifugation separation techniques are based upon the be­
haviour of particles in an applied centrifugal field (B4) and assume that the parame­
ters of the molecules under investigation, such as the relative molecular mass, shape 
and density, may be related to the behaviour of those molecules in gravitational field 
(Wilson and Walker 1992, 275). Centrifugation techniques are of two main types. 
Preparative centrifugation techniques are concemed with the actual separation, isola­
tion and purification of, for example, whole cells, subcellular organelles, ribosomes, 
nucleic acids and viruses, for subsequent biochemical investigations. Very large 
amounts of material may be involved when microbial cells are harvested from culture 
media. In contrast, analytical centrifugation techniques are devoted mainly to the study 
of pure, or virtually pure, macromolecules or particles. They require only small 
amounts of material and utilize specially designed rotors and detector systems. 
10. Specroscopic techniques 
Auxiliary technology. An understanding of the properties of electromagnetic radiation 
and its interaction with matter leads to the recognition of the variety of types of spec­
trum (B5), and consequently spectroscopic techniques. Bach region of the electomag­
netic spectrum (gamma, X-rays, ultraviolet, visible, infrared, microwaves and ra­
diowaves) has different types of interactions and needs different types of instrumenta­
tion for applications in biotechnology. 
1 1 .  Mass spectrometric techniques 
In order for the mass spectrometry to identify different chemical structures it is neces­
sary to peiform the kind of experiment that causes the molecular entity to disintegrate 
and produce fragment ions each of which is represented by a peak in the result spec­
trum (P3). The mass spectrum is essentially dependent upon the thermodynamic sta­
bility of the ions produced and collected during a mass spectometric experiment. The 
variety of mass spectra that may be obtained range from a single peak to quite compli­
cated pattems of peaks representing various fragments of the original species. Single 
peak spectra are of particular value in the determination of very accurate molecular 
masses. 
1 2. Blectrophoretic techniques 
The term electrophoresis describes the migration of a charged particle under the influ­
ence of an electric field. Many important biological molecules such as amino acids, 
peptides, proteins, nucleotides and nucleic acids, possess ionisable groups and, there­
fore, at any given pH, exist in solution as electrically charged species. Provided the 
electric field is removed before the molecules in the sample reåch the electrodes, the 
components will have been separated according to their electrophoretic mobility (B6). 
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1 3. Chromatographic techniques 
Auxiliary technology. The basis of alI forms of cromatography is the stabile partition 
of compound between two immiscible phases at a given temperature. AlI cromatogr­
phic systems consist of the stationary phase, which may be a solid, gel, liquid ör a 
solid/liquid mixture that is immobilised and the mobile phase. The choice of stationary 
and mobile phases is made so that the compounds to be separated have different par­
titions(B7) (distribution coefficients Wilson and Walker 1992, 463). For example in 
column chromatography, the stationary phase is packed into a glass or metal column 
and the mobile phase is passed through the column either by gravity feed or by use of 
pumping system or applied gas pressure. 
14. Electrochemical techniques 
Auxiliary technology. At one time the only piece of electrochemical apparatus used 
commonly in biochemistry was the pH electrode (Wilson and Walker 1992, 535). The 
transformation of chemical energy into electrical energy (an vice versa) of living sys­
tems have, however, presently provided interesting techniques e.g. in the measurement 
of the concentrations of biologically important substances. Perhaps the most promising 
applications are biosensors. A biosensor is an analytical device consisting of a bio­
catalyst (enzyme, cell or tissue) and a transducer, which can convert a biochemical 
signal into a quantifiable electrical signal (P4). 
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